The ILO @ 100 by Gironde, Christophe et al.

<UN>









The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/idp
<UN>
Editorial Board
Marc Bacchetta (Counsellor, Economic Research and Statistics Division, wto, Geneva, Switzerland)
Jean-François Bayart (Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development, The Graduate Institute, 
Geneva, Switzerland)
Gilles Carbonnier (Vice-President, International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), Geneva, Switzerland)
Carlos Casas Trogodara (Professor of Economics, Universidad del Pacifico and Director of Center for Studies in 
Mining and Sustainability, Peru)
Monique Chaaya (Professor and Chair, Department of Epidemiology and Population Health, American 
University of Beirut)
Francis Cheneval (Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Zurich, Switzerland)
Suren Erkman (Head, Industrial Ecology Group, Faculty of Geosciences and Environment, University of 
Lausanne, Switzerland)
Till Förster (Professor of Anthropology, Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Basel, Switzerland)
Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva (ceo, Oxfam, Mexico)
Inge Kaul (Adjunct Professor, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany)
Pamela Martin (Professor in Political Science and Geography, Coastal Carolina University, usa)
Katharina Michaelowa (Professor in Political Science, the Institute for Political Science (ipz), University of 
Zurich, and Director of the Center for Comparative and International Studies (cis), Switzerland)
Patrick Osakwe (Head, Trade and Poverty Branch Division for Africa, ldcs and Special Programmes,  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (unctad), Geneva, Switzerland)
Dennis Rodgers (Research Professor, Anthropology and Sociology, The Graduate Institute,  
Geneva, Switzerland)
Jésus Seade (Professor of Economics and Associate Vice-President for Global Affairs, Chinese University of 
Hong Kong-Shenzhen)
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (Chief Executive, South African Institute of Interntional Affairs, South Africa)
Mahaman Tidjani Alou (Doyen de la Faculté des sciences économiques et juridiques, Enseignant chercheur en 
science politique, Université Abdou Moumouni de Niamey, Niger)
Jorge Alberto Restrepo Torres (Associate Professor, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,  
Bogota, Colombia)
Wening Udasmoro (Professor of Gender and Literature, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia)
James Zhan (Director, Division on Investment and Enterprise, unctad, Geneva, Switzerland)
Editor-in-Chief
Ugo Panizza







Jienna Foster, Maren Schulte
Figure layout & copy editing
Dave Brooks, Marie Thorndahl
Cover photo
Simon Bradley, Swissinfo





Africa: 50 Years of Independence, No. 1, Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications,  
2010, issn print 1663-9383 | issn online 1663-9405 | ean 9782940415274.
Energy and Development, No. 2, Basingstoke/Geneva: Palgrave  
Macmillan/Graduate Institute Publications, 2011, ean 9780230282483.
Aid, Emerging Economies and Global Policies, No. 3, Basingstoke/Geneva:  
Palgrave Macmillan/Graduate Institute Publications, 2012, ean 9781137003409.
Religion and Development, No. 4, Basingstoke/Geneva: Palgrave  
Macmillan/Graduate Institute Publications, 2013, ean 9781137329370.
Education, Learning, Training: Critical Issues for Development, No. 5,  
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications, 2014,  
ean 9789004281141.
Large-Scale Land Acquisitions, Focus on South-East Asia, No. 6,  
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications 2015,  
ean 9789004304741.
Combining Economic and Political Development, The Experience of mena, No. 7
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications 2017,  
ean 9789004336452.
Development as a Battlefield, No. 8
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications 2017,  
ean 9789004349520.
Alternative Pathways to Sustainable Development
Lessons from Latin America, No. 9
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications 2017,  
ean 9789004351660.
African Cities and the Development Conundrum, No. 10
Leiden|Boston/Geneva: Brill Nijhoff/Graduate Institute Publications 2017,  
ean 9789004387928.
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE | GENEVA
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies








The ilo @ 100







This is an open access title distributed under the terms of the prevailing cc-by-nc
License at the time of publication, which permits any non-commercial use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Cover illustration: ‘ILO Headquarters under renovation, Geneva’. Credit: Simon Bradley / Swissinfo (2016).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Gironde, Christophe. | Carbonnier, Gilles.
Title: The ILO @ 100 : addressing the past and future of work and social protection / 
   edited by Christophe Gironde, Gilles Carbonnier.
Other titles: International Labour Organization | International Labor 
   Organization at 100
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill/Nijhoff, 2019. | Series: International 
   development policy ; volume 11 | Includes bibliographical references and 
   index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2019011777 (print) | LCCN 2019012031 (ebook) | ISBN 
   9789004399013 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004399006 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: International Labour Organization. | Labor laws and 
   legislation, International.
Classification: LCC K1707 (ebook) | LCC K1707 .I46 2019 (print) | DDC 
   331.88--dc22
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019011777




Copyright 2019 by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi,
Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect the publication against unauthorized use and to
authorize dissemination by means of offprints, legitimate photocopies, microform editions, reprints,
translations, and secondary information sources, such as abstracting and indexing services including
databases. Requests for commercial re-use, use of parts of the publication, and/or translations must
be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV.





List of Figures and Tables  xi
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations  xii
Notes on Contributors  xv
Introduction
1 The ILO @ 100: In Search of Renewed Relevance  3
Gilles Carbonnier and Christophe Gironde
Part 1
The ILO at Work
2 ILO: Social Justice in a Global World? A History in Tension  21
Sandrine Kott
3 Who Decides? Representation and Decision-making at the  
International Labour Organization  40
Marieke Louis
4 The Achievements and Limitations of Statutory and Non-statutory 
Tripartism in South African Mining  59
May Hermanus, Sizwe Phakathi, Nancy Coulson and Paul Stewart
5 The ILO’s Role in Global Governance: Limits and Potential  82
Velibor Jakovleski, Scott Jerbi and Thomas Biersteker
Part 2
Protecting People
6 Health Protection in Ghana and Senegal: What is the ILO’s Role?  111
Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Abena Asomaning Antwi, Elvire Mendo  




7 The ILO’s Shifts in Child Labour Policy: Regulation and 
Abolition  133
Edward van Daalen and Karl Hanson
8 From the Centre to the Margins and Back Again: Women in Agriculture 
at the ILO  152
Christine Verschuur




The Future of Work
10 Digitisation and the Disappearing Job Theory: A Role for the ILO  
in Africa?  203
Stefano Bellucci and Eric E. Otenyo
11 Working Futures: The ILO, Automation and Digital Work in 
India  223
Filipe Calvão and Kaveri Thara
12 Promoting Green Jobs: Decent Work in the Transition to Low-carbon, 
Green Economies  248
Kees van der Ree
13 Redefining Working Conditions in Europe  273




On the occasion of the centenary of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), we are pleased to introduce this 11th special issue of International De-
velopment Policy, which explores the Organization’s capacity for action, its ef-
fectiveness and its ability to adapt and innovate.
The moral idea, ‘If you desire peace, cultivate justice’, which lay at the heart 
of the ILO’s foundation one hundred years ago, remains just as relevant to-
day, in a world undergoing profound economic and technological transforma-
tion and increasing global inequality. How has the ILO adapted to change over 
time? What steps has the Organization taken to protect the most vulnerable? 
How well is it prepared and positioned to confront the new challenges of digi-
tisation, automation and the ‘uberisation’ of work?
This collection of thirteen articles, written by twenty-one authors from 
around the world, attempts to address these questions in three parts. Part 1 
looks at the ILO’s historic context, its functioning and decision-making process 
and the contemporary challenges it faces; Part 2 explores approaches and re-
sults in relation to labour and social protection; and Part 3 considers the chang-
es shaping the future of work. The articles highlight the progress and gaps to 
date, as well as the constraints and circumstances that confront the ILO in its 
efforts to respond to the new dilemmas and challenges of the fourth industrial 
revolution, with regard to labour and social protection.
Articles in this issue were the subject of lively exchanges during and after an 
author’s workshop held in Geneva in September 2017 and we are grateful for 
the substantive comments of the anonymous reviewer and others who com-
mented on earlier drafts. We also thank the Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC) and the État de Genève for their  financial support.
We hope this collection will make a positive contribution to the reflections 
and debates around the hundredth anniversary of the ILO and will resonate 
among our readership of scholars and practitioners, thanks to its timely and 





International Development Policy is a critical source of analysis of development 
policy and international cooperation trends and is aimed at scholars, policy 
makers and development professionals. It offers a diverse range of academic 
views from both industrialised countries and emerging economies.
International Development Policy is edited by the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national and Development Studies, an institution of research and higher edu-
cation dedicated to advancing world affairs. Located in Geneva, at the heart 
of an international centre of multilateral governance, the Graduate Institute 
benefits from a rich legacy linked to the founding of the international system 
and the League of Nations in the 1920s, and the emergence of the developing 
world in the 1960s.
http://devpol.org
http://graduateinstitute.ch/research
We extend our thanks to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
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Chapter �
The ilo @ 100: In Search of Renewed  
Relevance
Gilles Carbonnier and Christophe Gironde
Abstract
As the International Labour Organization (ilo) celebrates its centenary, its founding 
precept remains as relevant as ever: the main breeding grounds for threats to peace are 
the injustices and unequal opportunities that result from ongoing economic transfor-
mation. The moral idea that forged the ilo still lies at the heart of the international 
efforts for peace and development driving the Agenda for Humanity, the Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and the consensus on the need for inclusive growth that will 
‘leave no one behind’.
This introductory chapter explains the rationale behind the 11th special issue of 
International Development Policy, which addresses questions around the ilo’s capacity 
for action and its effectiveness, the relevance of its programmes and ability to adapt to 
a world of work undergoing profound change. The volume of thirteen chapters high-
lights the tensions that constitute the ilo and its action, the changing and different 
environments in which the Organization operates, and the initiatives taken by the ilo 
to respond to these challenges. The need for adaptation is especially pronounced today 
in view of the acceleration of technological developments and radical changes in the 
organisation of employment and work, and the consequent impact on social protec-
tion systems.
We shall endeavour to spread the bread thin on the butter to make what work 
there is still to be done to be as widely shared as possible. Three-hour shifts or 
a fifteen-hour week may put off the problem for a great while. For three hours 
a day is quite enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us!




1 The Context of the Centenary
When it turned fifty, the International Labour Organization (ilo) was awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize. At the award ceremony on 10 December 1969, the chair of 
the Nobel Committee justified the decision in these words: ‘There are few orga-
nizations that have succeeded to the extent that the ilo has, in translating into 
action the fundamental moral idea on which it is based’ (Lionaes, 1969). This 
fundamental moral idea can be found in a document that lies beneath the foun-
dation stone of the ilo building in Geneva: ‘If you desire peace, cultivate justice’.
As the Organization celebrates its centenary, this precept remains as rel-
evant as ever: the main breeding grounds for threats to peace are the injustices 
and unequal opportunities that result from ongoing economic transformation. 
The moral idea that forged the ilo still lies at the heart of the international 
efforts for peace and development driving the Agenda for Humanity, the Agen-
da for Sustainable Development and the consensus on the need for inclusive 
growth that will ‘leave no one behind’.
However, the ilo faces severe criticism, first and foremost over whether it 
actually does have the capacity for action that was lauded half a century ago 
by the Nobel Committee. What are the powers of the ilo, which—unlike the 
World Trade Organization—has neither the mechanisms to impose sanctions, 
nor the financial leverage of organisations such as the World Bank, but oper-
ates through persuasion? With a biennial budget of less than usd 800 million, 
the ilo has limited resources to address even the broad structural issues that 
stop states fulfilling commitments under the ilo Core Conventions let alone 
ensure decent employment conditions in new sectors, equal pay for men and 
women and fight against forced and child labour, etc. Do the lack of sanctions 
and financial resources mean that it is powerless or paralysed? To what extent 
can the ilo expect to regulate and significantly affect working conditions and 
social protection at the global level if it lacks strong enforcement mechanisms? 
(see Maupin, 2012).1 The question of the ilo’s capacity for action is indeed in-
separable from that of the capacity and will of states to implement the ilo’s 
instruments, as illustrated by the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (La Hovary, 2009), which aimed to encourage ratifications 
with a follow-up mechanism, a strategy that actually worked when considering 
the number of ratifications (La Hovary, 2009).
The power of the ilo is also being challenged on the ideological front by 
organisations such as the oecd, which contributed to a paradigm shift in social 
protection in the 1970s and 1980s (Leimgruber, 2013). For some analysts, the 
1 This study published by the ilo, is subtitled ‘Is it possible to regulate without enforcing?’.
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ilo also faces challenges from neo-liberal reforms and the growing influence 
of multinational companies in the UN system, for example with the Global 
Compact launched in 1999. If such initiatives reduce the regulatory capacity 
of states, this would undermine one of the ilo’s key tools—the ilo Standards 
(Ahooja-Patel, 2005). From this perspective, the ilo has not been able to avoid 
the increasing commodification of labour, which has become an adjustment 
variable in financial and economic cycles and entails high levels of insecure 
working conditions and low levels of pay for the most vulnerable people.
Has the ilo perhaps lost the battle that aimed to bring Karl Polanyi’s ‘Great 
Transformation’ to an end? A century after its creation, the ilo operates in a 
context where labour laws struggle to keep pace with the increasing complex-
ity of labour markets (Trebilcock, 2004). The need for the ilo to adapt to dif-
ferent historical, geographical and institutional settings is not new (Rodgers et 
al., 2009). Yet, the acceleration of technological change and the integration of 
markets is dramatically reshaping the relationship between labour and capital 
and reinforcing tensions between social justice and worker productivity. The 
automation and ‘uberisation’ of work are profoundly affecting labour relations 
and the social protection systems that are bound to employment. The ilo is 
well aware that it will need to promote innovative policies (ilo, 2018a), many 
of which are at the experimental stage, to avoid decoupling social protection 
and employment. Otherwise, there is the risk that the implementation of con-
tributory social protection models, together with more flexibility in labour 
markets and overall reduction of regulations protecting workers (ilo, 2018a), 
would further increase social inequalities and economic insecurity (Alvaredo 
et al., 2018; ilo, 2018b).
Another criticism of the ilo centres on tripartism. Structurally, tripartism 
has been the subject of tensions between the Organization and member states 
which aim to restrict the freedoms of worker and employer organisations 
(Rodgers et al., 2009), and because of substantive disagreement between em-
ployer and worker groups, for instance on the right to strike (La Hovary, 2015). 
The narrowing representativeness of the ilo constituents due to the changes 
in the world of work and labour markets is another major issue regarding this 
unique feature of the Organization (La Hovary, 2015).
As Guy Standing argues (2008, 355), is the ilo now simply fighting to pre-
serve its relevance? The Organization and the Secretary General himself are 
sparing no effort to disseminate the results of studies and programmes and 
launch slogans and new initiatives. This is certainly a reflection of the present-
day imperative to constantly communicate in order to be significant; it also 
illustrates the battle for ideas and the competition among international organ-
isations, who are all striving to make themselves heard and remain relevant.
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2 The ilo in a Rapidly Changing World of Work
Put together for the centenary of the ilo, this special issue of International 
Development Policy addresses questions around the Organization’s capacity 
for action and its effectiveness, the relevance of its programmes and ability 
to adapt. The volume adopts a diachronic approach, providing a retrospective 
review of the ilo’s contributions, highlighting the progress and shortcomings 
to date, and looking forward at the context and constraints under which the 
ilo and its stakeholders would have to evolve and innovate to meet the new 
challenges of the fourth industrial revolution.
The editors invited authors to address the following questions:
– How and to what extent has the ilo adapted to the changing global eco-
nomic and political context? What were the tensions and balances between 
its mission of social justice and protection, and the growing imperative of 
productivity tied to economic globalisation? What tensions were at play 
between agents of change and supporters of the status quo? How have tri-
partite decision-making mechanisms worked, both at Geneva headquarters 
and in the field? How are global governance and the balance of power be-
tween the ilo and other actors changing, and what initiatives were aimed 
at reforming and maintaining the Organization’s influence?
– How has the ilo evolved in its vision, position and action to protect the 
most vulnerable, in the context of fiscal austerity and a reduction in protec-
tion systems and public expenditures in many countries? What steps has 
the ilo taken to address the needs of the 150 million children under the 
age of 15 who are working; on women in the agricultural sector; on migrant 
workers; and to strengthen social protection in developing countries?
– How can the ilo confront the challenges of digitisation, automation and 
the ‘uberisation’ of work that, coupled with artificial intelligence, may lead 
to a reduction in the number of jobs? How can the organisation put into 
practice its stated ambition to ‘take hold of the fourth industrial revolution’ 
(Le Temps, 2016)? And what measures should accompany ecological transi-
tion and the emergence of the green economy that, according to the ilo 
(ilo, 2018c), could generate 24 million jobs worldwide by 2030 provided 
that good policies are put in place? And what lessons can be drawn from the 
changes happening to working conditions in Europe?
We inevitably had to make certain choices about what to include in the vol-
ume leading to some gaps in terms of themes and geographic coverage. For 
instance, there is no chapter dedicated specifically to the role of worker and 
employer organisations, to gender relations and inequalities between men 
and women, nor the informal sector. These topics are nonetheless addressed 
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in several chapters in this volume, including tripartite relations with regard to 
trade unions (Chapter 4) and women farmers (Chapter 8). In addition, the sec-
ond part of the volume deals extensively with working conditions and initia-
tives and measures implemented on behalf of categories of workers that have 
long remained outside the scope of the ilo.
3 What Lessons Can We Draw from the Past?
The first part of this volume draws heavily on history to analyse the contempo-
rary challenges facing the ilo in fulfilling its mandate and function. These chal-
lenges initially arise internally, which has been the case ever since the creation 
of the ilo, as Sandrine Kott reminds us (Chapter 2). On the one hand, there 
have been changes in the respective influence of the three streams of inspi-
ration of the Organization (social democratic, social Christian and reformist-
liberal) and the movements and organisations that have embodied them and 
supported the work of the ilo.2 On the other hand, the normative approach 
has been questioned by the developmentalist approach of economists who 
came to prominence in the 1930s and made productivity a priority from the 
1950s onwards. From a socio-historical perspective, Marieke Louis (Chapter 3) 
highlights the importance of the ‘long term representation’ of elected mem-
bers of the Governing Body on the dynamics of influence within the Orga-
nization. May Hermanus, Sizwe Phakathi, Nancy Coulson and Paul Stewart 
(Chapter 4) also draw on history in the South African context, recalling the role 
played by the ilo in providing financial and technical assistance at the end of 
the apartheid regime, which the Organization had strongly opposed. Velibor 
Jakovleski, Scott Jerbi and Thomas Biersteker (Chapter 5) also take a historical 
approach in their account of the ilo’s attempts over the last 20 years to reform 
and maintain its influence, notably by promoting non-binding standards and 
relying on a range of incentives to encourage states to adopt these standards.
Tripartism holds a prominent place in critical reflection on the function-
ing and activity of the ilo, and consequently on the future of the Organiza-
tion and of international labour law (La Hovary, 2015). The case of the mining 
sector in post-apartheid South Africa illustrates the challenges of statutory 
tripartism (Chapter 4, this volume). In the context of the withdrawal of eco-
nomic sanctions and the internationalisation of mining companies, the effort 
2 The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (icftu), for example, in the develop-
ment of the new Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Convention 182, 1999), see 
Chapter 7, this volume.
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to institutionalise tripartism has struggled with the strategies of the mining 
companies, which increasingly turned to opportunities abroad. The erosion of 
the capacity of trade unions to represent their workers, due to the promotion 
of union leaders to supervisory and managerial positions, presents another 
challenge. And the multiplicity of unions, reflecting a strong stratification and 
division among mining workers, is a further complicating issue.
An examination of tripartism, however, is not sufficient to understand ‘what 
the ilo does or cannot do’, says Marieke Louis (Chapter 3, this volume). Her 
analysis not only raises the question of the representativeness of the Inter-
national Labour Conference, and the Governing Body in particular, it also 
highlights the presence of actors and powers without ‘constitutional or regula-
tory existence’, best illustrated by the group of Industrialized Market Economy 
Countries (imec).
The analysis of change within the ilo can be linked to changes in inter-
national politics and economic development, showing how the Organization 
has been able to play on the balance of power, as it did with the ‘communist 
threat’ during the Cold War. It also shows how the Organization was subjected 
to competition from other international organisations, such as the health sec-
tion of the League of Nations in the interwar period, and the oecd since the 
1970s. The intrusive representation of non-governmental organisations as well 
as private companies also sheds light on the way the ilo operates. With the 
development of fora and mechanisms of governance outside ilo structures, 
the Organization has had to engage in multi-stakeholder platforms with other 
international organisations as well as in public–private partnerships. This is of-
ten perceived as a constraint or compromise, sometimes even compromising 
the basic principles of the Organization. But it can also present an opportunity 
for more effective action, as in the case of occupational health in the mining 
sector in South Africa, or a way forward, as Sandrine Kott argues, for activists 
involved in the protection of domestic workers.
4 Protecting People
To date, four billion people, 55 per cent of the world’s population, have no so-
cial protection system, and a further 1.2 billion people are only partially and 
inadequately protected, as the ilo states in its World Social Protection Report 
2017–19 (ilo, 2017). This lack of protection, says the Organization, is particu-
larly pronounced for children (1.3 billion of them have no social security) and 
pregnant women. Moreover, only a small percentage of workers have unem-
ployment, accident or sickness protection, while those in the informal sector 
do not benefit from any formal protection system. However, notable progress 
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has been made in some countries in the provision of benefits for children 
and the implementation of universal coverage for health and retirement, 
but the levels of benefit are often insufficient to lift the beneficiaries out of 
poverty.
The commitment of national governments and international organisations 
to making progress on social protection is one of the notable changes present 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) compared to the earlier Millen-
nium Development Goals (mdgs). What actually can be expected from this 
commitment? It can be interpreted optimistically as going beyond the poverty-
reduction programmes, which proved to have no significant effect on the most 
vulnerable people. The sdgs could thus be seen as a return of ‘social develop-
ment’, as promoted in the late 1960s (UN, 1969). Nowadays, the minimal level 
of social protection, for which the ilo advocated as early as 2004 (ilo, 2004), is 
back on the agenda, under a new name: ‘Social protection floors’. Including not 
only a minimum level of income, but also goods and services guaranteeing ac-
cess to essential healthcare, food and education, and basic income security for 
workers and the elderly, social protection floors reflect the idea that social de-
velopment serves economic development. How does this work out in practice? 
The chapters on the ilo’s mandate to ‘protect people’ reveal different changes 
in approaches and positions, and uneven results.
Juliette Alenda-Demoutiez, Abena Asomaning Antwi, Elvire Mendo and 
Zrampieu Sarah Ba (Chapter 6) show that by providing support for community- 
based mutual health organisations in West Africa, the ilo is reinventing itself. 
The Organization is becoming more pragmatic, renouncing the initial vision 
of a protection system managed by state institutions, and relying less on the 
ratification of conventions than on the adoption of ad hoc modalities of sup-
port for health stakeholders. This evolution in the field of health contrasts with 
the change of approach to child labour examined by Edward van Daalen and 
Karl Hanson (Chapter 7). In the early 1990s, the Organization abandoned the 
progressive and pragmatic approach, which had combined the long-term goal 
of abolishing child labour with the transitional goal of protecting and regulat-
ing such labour, and returned to a position where it seeks solely to eradicate all 
forms of child labour.
The attention paid to rural women presents another type of evolution, in 
this case an innovative and progressive vision without further action. Chris-
tine Verschuur (Chapter 8) explains that the ilo, through its Rural Women 
programme, carried out innovative research to promote the visibility of not 
only the paid work but also the unpaid work of women in agriculture. How-
ever, the progress promised by the recognition of women’s contribution to 
both food production and social reproduction did not materialise: research 
and knowledge were not integrated into the different departments of the 
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Organization and the Rural Women programme remained isolated and poorly 
funded, and eventually disappeared.
Finally, analysis by Antonio Donini (Chapter 9) of the migration, recruit-
ment, and working and living conditions of Nepalese migrant workers in Qatar 
highlights the ilo’s lack of resources to put its protection mandate into prac-
tice, even if it were to involve nothing more than legal instruments regulat-
ing the organisation of migration, or tools for monitoring and warning about 
working conditions. After the Governing Body of the ilo decided in 2017 to 
drop its complaint about non-compliance with the Forced Labour Convention 
and the Labour Inspection Convention, it seems the Organization can do no 
more than rely on the Qatari Government’s declarations of intent to cooper-
ate. On September 4th 2018, the Qatari Government adopted new legislation 
that removes the permit system for migrant workers to leave the country and 
change employer; it is certainly a positive sign, on paper, but it would be naive 
to consider it right now as a significant step towards decent working and living 
conditions for migrant workers.
Between pragmatism and dogmatism, openness and withdrawal, how do 
these developments in the ilo’s policies and practices actually work out when 
it comes to protecting the people most in need? In the field of health in West 
Africa, the ilo is broadening the scope of its work beyond the contractual 
forms of wage labour, to workers in the informal economy and casual work. In 
so doing, the Organization may be more in tune with the informal sector where 
interpersonal and kinship social relationships and protection are embedded 
in norms and practices of solidarity and responsibility. With regard to child 
labour, van Daalen and Hanson question the relevance of abandoning the 
progressive approach, which after all was validated by numerous actions and 
‘creative projects’ and which remains relevant, according to the authors, given 
the fact that some 150 million children under the age of 15 are still engaged in 
exploitative or harmful labour today. Regarding the work of women in rural ar-
eas, Verschuur notes that the ilo has opted for programmes that focus mainly 
on female wage earners, a vision that falls short of the increasing burden of 
women’s unpaid ‘reproductive’ work that, paradoxically, the Organization had 
highlighted previously. As for the Nepalese working in Qatar, Donini insists on 
the enormous gap between what can be reasonably expected in terms of ilo 
action and the (in)human condition of these workers. The author notes that 
in addition to the exploitation of the Nepalese emigrant physical labour force, 
‘under-regulation’ and the absence of any social protection have also exposed 
these workers to mental suffering because of living conditions that undermine 
their freedom of movement as well as their sexuality and marriageability.
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5 The Future of Labour and the ilo: Gazing into the Crystal Ball
The divinatory arts are experiencing an extraordinary upsurge in the social sci-
ences and among decision makers who are trying to predict the future of work 
against a backdrop of digital transformation, advances in artificial intelligence 
and labour automation. A simple Internet search on the future of work yields 
more than 3 billion hits in 0.54 seconds…
The ‘techno-optimists’ do not see why history, which has often proved the 
correctness of Schumpeter’s theory of destructive creation, might not repeat 
 itself, with a proliferation of new jobs from the knowledge economy or from 
the green economy. ‘Techno-pessimists’, on the other hand, argue that the ex-
tent and speed of the destruction of jobs made obsolete by new technologies 
and emerging modes of production will lead to unprecedented mass unem-
ployment that will hit regions of the world where the population is growing 
fast particularly hard (Africa, the Indian subcontinent). In its World Develop-
ment Report 2019, the World Bank confirms that labour-intensive industries, 
such as textiles and clothing, which currently employ large swathes of the la-
bour force of industrialising countries, will not be able to fulfil this function 
in the future (World Bank, 2018). Other sectors, such as tourism, information 
technology and health could take over this role but the World Bank notes that 
there is a wide range of estimates for jobs at risk from automation and the im-
pact of technology is far from predictable.
Beyond accounting for job losses and job creation, new technologies and 
new ways of organising labour raise crucial questions, including the type of 
professional skills required, the need for accompanying policies, the (de-)regu-
lation of labour and the protection of workers in new ecosystems, such as la-
bour platforms which are poorly regulated. These issues are addressed in the 
third part of this volume, which examines the ilo’s stated ambition to adapt to 
the forces transforming the world of work (Bughin et al., 2018).
The impact of on-going digitisation in the entertainment, security and li-
brary services sectors on employment in Africa, analysed by Stefano Bellucci 
and Eric Otenyo (Chapter 10), supplies techno-optimists with some prelimi-
nary arguments. In the cases portrayed, the beginning of the process of digiti-
sation has not been accompanied by massive job losses and even seems to be 
creating new jobs in these sectors. The authors suggest a series of interventions 
that the ilo could undertake to support the efforts of African states to foster 
job creation, including support to training institutions that are ‘ill-equipped’ 
with regards to digitisation in the workplace, and a reorganisation of informal 
sectors to enable them to capture global market opportunities.
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Conversely, the combined effect of automated production and digitally-
mediated labour has led to dwindling job opportunities in the manufacturing 
sector and an increase in temporary and disposable freelance work in India’s 
technological sector. Filipe Calvão and Kaveri Thara (Chapter 11) demonstrate 
that, even in the information technology industry, the impact of the on-going 
digital revolution is affecting many jobs in both the formal and informal sec-
tors. As workers in the global South are ever more likely to be affected by the 
automation of labour, the authors ask how the ilo can valorise digital work 
and avoid a situation where ‘humans are seemingly left with being the creative 
complement to AI’ (artificial intelligence).
In the context of automation, digitisation, and the development of artificial 
intelligence, new jobs are requiring not only technological skills, but also so-
cial and emotional skills, the ability to work in multidisciplinary and flexible 
teams, creativity and ‘entrepreneurship’ (Bughin et al., 2018). There is a broad 
consensus that states’ policies (World Bank, 2018), including support to educa-
tion and life-long learning programmes (Bughin et al., 2018) will be needed to 
enable the development of such skills. It is also the case with the ecological 
transition, explains Kees van der Ree (Chapter 12) on the potential of the green 
economy to create a significant number of jobs. Focusing more specifically on 
the interactions between climate change and employment, the author notes 
that although the ilo has gradually adopted and integrated the concept of 
green jobs into its work programmes, states and social partners are reluctant to 
include the transition to low-carbon economies in the ilo’s work programme 
and to provide the Organization with a significant ad hoc budget.
It is also acknowledged that the state is called upon to play a central role 
in supporting job—and labour-related transitions by strengthening the social 
protection system. Calvão and Thara address this issue and suggest the ilo 
develops innovative approaches to ensure adequate protection of the digital 
workforce. At the point where wages have lost their prominence in defining 
conventional working relations, the authors argue for the need to take into 
account working conditions in the digital ecosystem and promote new forms 
of regulation for digitally mediated work. Such regulation could be inspired by 
principles and practices that characterise platform cooperativism or the so-
cial and solidarity economy, while also addressing the problem of technologi-
cal transfers to developing economies. Kees van der Ree also raises the issue 
of distribution and social inclusion with regards to the increasing effects of 
climate change on migration flows both nationally and internationally, with 
major challenges in terms of social inclusion at national, regional and global 
levels.
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In this respect, many experts agree that the relationship between employ-
ers and employees that developed during the twentieth century in the West—
with stable full-time jobs held by unionised employees expected to become 
the norm—has largely had its day. Moreover, full-time contracts of indefinite 
duration exist at best for only a quarter of the global workforce and have not be-
come standard in a majority of developing countries, where informal, insecure 
and part-time work is usual. This raises the question of the future role of trade 
unions and, more fundamentally, of the power relations between stakeholders 
within the ilo tripartite model and beyond. To better understand the impact of 
the on-going transformations, it is interesting to look at the evolution of work-
ing conditions in Europe for relevant lessons for the future of labour relations 
more generally and for the future of the ilo itself. Some trends raise serious con-
cerns for the availability and security of employment and income levels, given 
the flexibilisation of the labour market and ageing populations. While working 
conditions in Europe have sometimes served as a model for the aspirations of 
developing countries, the European Commission is facing significant challeng-
es in terms of generating sustainable jobs and deteriorating working conditions 
that seem prejudicial both for employees and for communities as a whole.
Patricia Vendramin and Agnès Parent-Thirion (Chapter 13) note that the is-
sue of quality of work is making a comeback in debates in Europe, notably 
with the notion of sustainable work, as well as in the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (European Commission, no date), implemented by the European Com-
mission. Based on surveys of working conditions in Europe conducted by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound), the authors draw up an inventory of working conditions and 
suggest that the ilo adopt a forward-looking approach based on the notion 
of sustainable work. Taking an historical and comparative perspective of the 
meaning of work, the authors identify three kinds of expectations in our rela-
tionship with work: it should provide income and security, create social bonds, 
and give people the means to develop and flourish through professional activ-
ity. They note that social recognition, the meaning that work gives to life, and 
the feeling of ‘being useful’ are major and meaningful expectations in an ever 
better-educated population that has benefited from the social security policies 
set up in the twentieth century. The 20 principles of the European Pillar of 
Social Rights emphasise high-quality employment that involves not only social 
dialogue with worker participation, and the promotion of a supportive work 
environment, but also increased attention to the balance between professional 
and private life as well as gender relations in the context of the widespread 
participation of women in the labour market.
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6 Adapting and Opening Up
This volume highlights the tensions that constitute the ilo and its action, the 
changing and different environments in which the Organization operates, and 
the initiatives taken by the ilo to respond to these challenges. The need for 
adaptation nowadays appears particularly pronounced in view of the accelera-
tion of technological developments and radical changes in the organisation 
of employment and work, and the consequent impact on social protection 
systems.
The need for the ilo to adapt also stems from the increased power of new 
actors in the global governance system and the changing balance of power un-
derpinned by interest groups, ideological currents and an institutional frame-
work that are all less favourable to the ilo today than they were at the time of 
its creation, a century ago. This raises the question of whether the Organiza-
tion is providing adequate responses that can rise to the challenge of current 
upheaval. The contributions in this volume outline various ways of question-
ing these adaptations and providing some answers.
The ilo cannot be satisfied with the promulgation of international stan-
dards accompanied by monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at the na-
tional level (Jakovleski et al., this volume). The case of the informal economy 
provides a good illustration of the criticism the Organization has received in 
this regard, in this case the ‘belief that international labour standards do not 
address people in the informal sector, whereas in fact many provisions do’, as 
shown by A. Trebilcock (2004, 587). Yet the author acknowledges that ‘de facto 
or de jure, too many people remain without legal protection and recourse to 
right’ (Trebilcock, 2004, 586). That said, progress has been made, for example 
thanks to Convention 189 on Domestic Workers, adopted in 2011, which rep-
resents an opening towards the particularly vulnerable category of migrant 
women (Kott, this volume). The process that led to the Convention and the 
way in which groups of activists took up the subject and then ratified the Con-
vention in various countries could be a source of inspiration, and could open 
up ways to improve the systems of protection for other particularly vulnerable 
categories of people (Boris and Fish, 2014; quoted in Chapter 2, this  volume). 
These experiences could inspire the Organization with regard to child la-
bour and women working in rural areas. The ilo will also have to innovate 
in emerging economies, where the growing number of workers in so-called 
‘special’ economic zones might well remain deprived of any social protection 
in practice, even if, in law, the ilo Conventions include them. Such zones, 
 characterised by no rights for workers and the repression or lack of trade union 
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 organisations, may expand and become the norm. Finally, in developed coun-
tries, the question arises as to how the ilo will be able to respond to new types 
of ‘deformalised’ labour, provided as a franchise and sold on platforms.
In addition to the question of the types of jobs covered or not covered by the 
ilo and the national organisations of workers and employers, and their rep-
resentativeness, a question that arises for the ilo is the stance of the unions 
with which it operates. In countries like China and Vietnam, these unions 
were not formed at the initiative of workers but were established, and are 
controlled, by the party-state, which relies on them to guarantee investors a 
docile labour force (Chang, 2002). There is also the question of what work-
ers expect of unions, as evidenced by the rise in China of labour movements 
not supervised by unions. What actions and room for manoeuvre can the ilo 
have in such contexts? And in other contexts, what balance of power is ex-
pressed by partnerships such as Better Work in Bangladesh, which proclaims: 
‘workers are seizing on democracy in factories’? (BetterWork, 2016). Have 
these partnerships become a means of, or a condition for, the ilo to remain 
operational? Does the emergence of civil society organisations in the field of 
work create a system of ‘quadripartism’ or ‘tripartism +’ (Chapters 3 and 4)? 
Is this a strategy that will allow the Organization to ‘promote fair globaliza-
tion for the workers’ or should we rather interpret it as a step backward and 
see the ilo as an organisation whose role is largely supporting globalisation 
(Chapter 5)?
Amid the myriad publications produced by international organisations, the 
studies by the ilo have often stood out: denouncing working conditions and 
low wages, calling into question economic policies leading to less equitable 
income distribution, and highlighting the social consequences and risks to se-
curity and peace. The authors who have contributed to this volume call on the 
ilo to draw inspiration not only from the academic community, but also from 
the knowledge produced by the Organization itself, and to take advantage of 
its rich past to adapt in a robust and flexible way to the challenges of a world of 
work undergoing profound change. We hope that this volume will make a posi-
tive contribution to the reflections and debates accompanying the occasion of 
the hundredth anniversary of the ilo.
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This contribution analyses, from a historical perspective, the ways in which the Inter-
national Labour Organization has been able to affirm and fulfil the mission entrusted 
to it in 1919: to represent the worlds of labour and promote social justice in a universal 
way. It shows that, from its inception, the Organization has been locked in a funda-
mental contradiction between the promise of social justice and the decommodifica-
tion of labour that this promise expresses, on the one hand, and the Organization’s role 
as a social agent of economic globalisation, on the other. This tension increased after 
the Second World War, in the context of the Cold War and decolonisation.
1 Introduction
The International Labour Organization (ilo) was founded in 1919, as a corol-
lary of the peace treaties that marked the end of the First World War. Its Con-
stitution forms Part xiii of the Treaty of Versailles. Until 1940, it functioned as 
a sort of technical agency for the League of Nations (Tortora, 1980). But unlike 
the League, it survived World War ii, moving to Montreal in 1941. It was reborn 
in 1944, when the principles presiding over its foundation were reaffirmed in 
the text of the Declaration of Philadelphia in the Appendix to its Constitution. 
In 1946, it officially became a specialised agency of the United Nations (Alcock, 
1971; Ghebali, 1989).
The ilo celebrates its centenary in 2019, which it decided to dedicate to 
the ‘future of labour’ (ilo, 2018a). This decision calls for some remarks. While 
prophesying the ‘end of labour’, the Organization has chosen to reaffirm the 
importance of labour for the world’s future but it has apparently given up 
thinking about its own future. It seems reluctant to re-examine its past and to 




A great deal of historical work has been done on the ilo (Van Daele, 2008) 
and, in the last ten years, this corpus has grown, and opened up new avenues 
for reflection. With the global turn taken by the social sciences, the Organi-
zation has become a popular field for such expanding areas of study as the 
history of human rights, economic development, networks, and social reform; 
this research testifies to the centrality of the Organization and labour-related 
issues when it comes to thinking about the world (Van Daele et al., 2010; Les-
pinet-Moret and Vincent, 2011; Aglan et al., 2011; Kott and Droux, 2013). In ad-
dition, the history of labour, neglected since the 1980s, has recently seen a re-
newed surge of interest. In the 1960s and 1970s, this field of study was mainly 
focused on the history of workers and the affirmation of workers’ culture, giv-
ing rise to studies of the practices and forms of collective expression, carried 
out using a ‘bottom-up’ approach and paying close attention to particular ter-
ritories. As evidenced by debates on the issue of free or coerced labour and 
informality (Brass and Van der Linden, 1997), current research is taking labour 
out of the industrial workshop and looking more clearly at the diversity of its 
forms. Last but not least, historians have opened up their geographic space of 
investigation: labour is now grasped in its global and transnational dimension, 
and the proponents of this approach are showing an increasing interest in 
connections between workers and their circulation. Labour historians use the 
archives and documents produced by the ilo, but they also share the current 
concerns of the Organization when it reaffirms the importance of labour and 
workers in our global economy (Louis, 2011). This perspective lies behind the 
actual creation of the Organization, and behind the measures implemented 
to accomplish its mission and the tensions and limits on its actions (Interna-
tional Labour Office, 1931, 15–16).
This contribution therefore analyses, from a historical perspective, the ways 
in which the International Labour Organization has been able to affirm and 
fulfil the mission entrusted to it in 1919: to represent the worlds of labour and 
to promote social justice in a universal way. To this end, I will first explore the 
genesis and founding texts of the Organization to understand how it conceived 
and organised its mission of social justice (Gerry et al., 2009). Then, start-
ing from the formula with which the Declaration of Philadelphia begins—
‘labour is not a commodity’—I will examine the tensions created within the 
Organization by the contradiction between the social objectives that it is 
supposed to promote and the conditions for their realisation in an open capi-
talist economy. Finally, I will explore the solutions implemented by the ilo 
during its first fifty years of existence to work towards a fair globalisation for 
workers.
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2 Social Justice at the Heart of the ilo’s Mission
The founding principles of the ilo were formulated in 1919 and have remained 
the same. The Constitution of the Organization has barely changed and begins 
with this premise: ‘Universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is 
based upon social justice’, which gives the ilo essentially three filiations. The 
promise of social justice was first and foremost a response to the demands 
of the reformist workers’ movement that came together in the union sacrée 
during the First World War. At the international trade union conference in 
Leeds, Great Britain, in 1916, trade union representatives of the nations that 
were allied against Germany called for the creation of an international labour 
organisation, a kind of world parliament in which the social demands of the la-
bour movement would be discussed and examined (ilc, 1916; Riegelman, 1934; 
Tosstorff, 2005). Social Christianity was another inspiration as well as a cor-
nerstone for the foundation of the ilo. Since the publication of the encyclical 
Rerum novarum in 1891, the social doctrine of the Catholic Church had clearly 
been based on a demand for justice, taken up and amplified by the Catholic 
and Christian workers’ movement (Pasture and Govaert, 1999). But the ilo was 
also the direct heir to liberal social reform, some of whose movements had al-
ready organised themselves within various international associations. The ilo 
inherited the library, staff and part of the social programme of the most highly 
organised of these bodies, the International Association for Labour Legislation, 
based in Basel since 1901 (Kott, 2014; Van Daele, 2005). These networks played a 
vital role in the birth of the International Labour Office (the Secretariat of the 
Organization) and in its survival during the first twenty years of its existence. 
Its first director, French socialist Albert Thomas, was also keen to ensure their 
cooperation by developing and organising their support to the Organization 
(International Labour Office, 1931, 424–468). The proponents of the different 
movements agreed on two points: capitalist industrialisation had generated 
mass poverty that might lead to political and social unrest; and this social ques-
tion could and should be tackled by social reforms within the existing political 
and economic order. In 1919, this reform activity developed along three main 
lines: protection, redistribution and collective bargaining. Nevertheless, areas 
of contention still existed within the movement, especially concerning the role 
that should be attributed to the different stakeholders. Socialists emphasised 
the regulatory role of the state; the Christian movement, joined by the coop-
erative tradition, was more favourable to the development of free associations 
based on the self-help mode; and employers insisted on the importance of free 
enterprises that could generate economic growth to finance social spending.
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The idea of  social justice itself has never been the subject of theoretical de-
bate within the ilo. However, the preamble and general principles of the 1919 
Constitution, and then in the Declaration of Philadelphia that replaced it in 
1944, defined a number of objectives that constitute the foundations of the 
Organization:
Regulation of the hours of work including the establishment of a maxi-
mum working day and week; Regulation of labour supply, prevention of 
unemployment and provision of an adequate living wage; Protection of 
the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employ-
ment; Protection of children, young persons and women; Provision for 
old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed 
in countries other than their own; Recognition of the principle of equal 
remuneration for work of equal value; Recognition of the principle of 
freedom of association; Organization of vocational and technical educa-
tion and other measures.1
The ilo’s normative activities thus originally aimed to achieve these different 
objectives (Bonvin, 1998) in the form of a sort of international labour code, 
inspired by the legislation implemented in the most socially advanced na-
tions. The main task of the Committee on International Labour Legislation, 
meeting in Paris between January and April 1919, was to define the modalities 
for the creation of such a code. The Italian and French representatives pro-
posed that the International Labour Conference—the parliament of the fu-
ture Organization— be able to adopt conventions that would be automatically 
binding on the member states; the British, for their part, favoured an almost 
automatic ratification system. However, under pressure from US negotiators, 
the power of the Organization was reduced to such an extent that it became 
almost entirely dependent on national stakeholders (Shotwell, 1934). Until 
today, the ilo’s recommendations are only indicative and the conventions 
must be ratified by the national parliaments of the member states. In general, 
however, states have no interest in ratifying a convention: not only does rati-
fication involve bringing the country’s legislation into line with ilo rules, it 
also constitutes a heavy commitment subordinated to an annual supervisory 
system, constraints that states have been trying to escape (Maupain, 2010). 
This tension, already present at the time of the adoption of the very first ilo 
 convention—the convention on the eight-hour day—partly explains why the 
1 See the website http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm (ac-
cessed on 17 July 2018).
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ilo’s  normative system has always been developed under strained conditions. 
This first convention was symbolic, since the eight-hour day lay at the heart 
of the demands of the worldwide workers’ movement but it was not ratified 
by any of the major industrial countries despite the efforts of Albert Thomas. 
In reality, the activities of the ilo and the adoption of its conventions have 
always been very dependent on the commitment of governments and the vari-
ous national participants.
Despite these obstacles, the ilo carried out a considerable amount of nor-
mative work during the period between the First and Second World Wars. In 
all, 67 of the 189 conventions in force to date were adopted between 1919 and 
1939, which means that more than a third of the conventions of this century-
old Organization were adopted during its first twenty years of existence (ilo, 
2018b). This normative work, based on a skilful exchange of ideas between ilo 
officials and those of national administrations, enabled the establishment of 
a recognised social expertise and know-how disseminated by ilo officials, of 
whom there were no more than 400 in 1931 (Kott, 2008).
In 1919, the three main social reformist schools of thought agreed on vari-
ous social goals in the specific context of the end of the war but their union 
was also aimed at countering the Bolshevik Revolution and the upsurge of 
European revolutionary movements (Phelan, 1949). The ilo, clearly founded 
as an ‘alternative to violent revolution’ (Shotwell, 1933, 18–25), was in return 
denounced by the communists, who accused it of betraying the fundamental 
interests of the working class under the guise of reforming capitalism. Until 
1934, the Soviet Union refused to join the Organization.
Nevertheless, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ussr) and the revolu-
tion were ‘useful enemies’ that the reformers could use to advance their social 
agenda. On his travels, Albert Thomas tirelessly stressed the importance of 
fighting against poverty in order to prevent revolution. This same argument—
or belief—was used to prompt (or encourage) the funding of the major post-
Second World War development programmes whose instigators, often former 
New Deal officials, joined the UN system through the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (Ekbladh, 2010).
In 1919, the ilo embarked on a mission to convince the workers’ movement 
that reformism was the solution that would ensure the well-being of all. To this 
end, it worked to disseminate information on the reality of the working-class 
situation in the ussr. From the beginning of 1920, at their second meeting, the 
members of the ilo’s Governing Body raised the possibility of conducting an 
inquiry into the situation in Soviet Russia (ilo, 1920), for the stated purpose of 
disarming the upsurge of revolution by putting an end to the ‘illusions’ of the 
workers (abit, 1921). A Russian section was formed and, during the interwar 
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period, the ilo became a kind of intelligence agency with regard to commu-
nism in the ussr. These thoroughly anti-communist activities were reactivat-
ed at the beginning of the Cold War. In the absence of the ussr, the leading 
American union, the American Federation of Labour, used the ilo to cam-
paign against forced labour in the ussr and the countries that would form the 
Eastern Bloc (Kott, 2012). After the ussr re-joined the Organization in 1954,2 
the ilo became a platform for the two blocs to collaborate on the basis of a 
strong common belief in the need for more economic growth and increased 
productivity; this lasted until the crisis of 1977 and subsequent withdrawal of 
the United States from the ilo until 1980.
In addition to the direct struggle against the communist model, the ilo 
relied, from its inception, on its tripartite structure and the principles of 
collective negotiation meant to implement the reformist solutions that the 
Organization advocated. Tripartism is a cornerstone of the Organization and 
its representatives (governments, workers and employers) meet at the Annual 
Labour Conference and, four times a year, under the framework of the Ad-
ministrative Council—or executive body—of the Organization. In the 1990s, 
tripartism even entered the International Labour Office with the creation of 
offices of the Bureau for Workers’ Activities (actrav) and the Bureau for Em-
ployers’ Activities (actemp). Tripartism is consistent with a liberal reformist 
vision that seeks to correct the asymmetric power relations between workers 
and employers intrinsic to the employment contract through the organisation 
of collective bargaining. Tripartism stands in contradiction with the logic of 
state socialism, which does not distinguish between state and economic stake-
holders. On the other side, the tripartite structure and the collective bargain-
ing promoted by the ilo relied on the existence of organised social partners, 
and thus on freedom of association. This freedom of association, stated in the 
preamble to the 1919 Constitution, is therefore essential to the very function-
ing of the ilo. The 1948 Convention on Freedom of Association and Protec-
tion of the Right to Organise is a foundational Fundamental Convention of 
the ilo and, since 1951, its enforcement has been under a specific supervisory 
 committee—the Committee on Freedom of Association. In the liberal social 
logic of the ilo, the presence of a representative union within companies is a 
guarantee of justice. It helps to tilt the balance of power in favour of the work-
ers and ensure that their social situation is not systematically indexed to the 
economic results achieved by the company. With this in mind, the ilo could 
say that ‘labour is not a commodity’.
2 The ussr initially joined the ilo in 1934 and left in 1940.
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3 ‘Labour is not a commodity’
US trade unionists were behind the first reference to the decommodification 
of labour as enshrined in the general principles of the ilo Constitution, ad-
opted in 1919:
But, holding as they do that labour should not be regarded merely as an 
article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles 
for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should 
endeavour to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit.3
The encyclical Rerum Novarum already contained an explicit condemnation of 
labour as a commodity, but the wording chosen by the ilo was inspired by the 
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914—‘That the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce’—which guaranteed, on this basis, the right to 
coalition and strike. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation 
of Labor (afl), regarded this article as the Magna Carta of the workers and 
regretted that the term ‘merely’ had been added in the ilo text. It was again 
under the influence of the United States that the Declaration of Philadelphia, 
added as an annex to the ilo Constitution after the Second World War, con-
firmed and hardened this condemnation of labour as a commodity, stating 
that ‘labour is not a commodity’.
The ilo tackled the issue of labour as a commodity as early as 1920, in the 
context of its normative work on fixing a minimum wage—one of the general 
principles expressed in its Constitution. The government delegate from Para-
guay stated in 1920:
the delegation from Paraguay intends that incorporation of the Ameri-
can principle that human labour shall not be considered as merchandise 
shall include the principle, not only of limiting the working day, but also 
of the minimum wage in the various industries (LN, 1920, 130).
In 1944, the government delegate from Colombia went further by saying: ‘Work 
should not be a commodity. There should be guaranteed living wages’ (ilc, 
1944, 101). This question of the minimum wage defined as a condition and an 
instrument of the decommodification of labour runs through the history of 
the Organization. The first Minimum Wage Fixing Convention was adopted 
3 See Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919, Part xiii, Annex, Section ii, Article 427 on the website 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partxiii.asp (accessed on 17 July 2018).
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in 1928 after extensive research by the International Labour Office and was 
supplemented in 1970 by another convention that encouraged states to estab-
lish a minimum wage system (Reynaud, 2017). In general, the normative activ-
ity of the ilo has always been built on the idea that the conventional system, 
by placing workers under the protection of a political authority, constitutes a 
powerful tool for the decommodification of labour.
In practice, however, the Organization was soon faced with the limitations 
of its call for the the decommodification of labour as referred to in 1944 by the 
Indian workers’ delegate:
The proclamation of this preamble of our Constitution and of Article 41 
that workers are not a commodity is a paper declaration. Workers are a 
commodity in my country. I am afraid they are a commodity in many 
other countries (ilc, 1944, 81).
From the outset, the communists voiced a more fundamental criticism of the 
ilo, stating that it contributed to the perpetuation and even the propagation 
of labour as a commodity by agreeing to improve the capitalist rules of the 
game. This criticism was recently taken up by Guy Standing—an official in the 
ilo from 1975 to 2006—but from another point of view:
Depicted as reducing the commodity character of labour, the conven-
tions actually helped to legitimise and spread ‘fictitious decommodifi-
cation’: they made the activity of labour less like a commodity but fos-
tered national systems in which workers’ entitlements were increasingly 
dependent on the performance of labour and being in stable wage la-
bour. If decommodification is about making people less dependent on 
the  labour market, then making them more dependent on being in wage 
labour for their ‘social rights’ is a strange way of going about it (Standing, 
2008, 355–384).
Guy Standing’s statement must be understood in the light of his commitment 
to universal basic income, which is supposed to guarantee the subsistence of 
individuals regardless of their activity, or even the wages earned for their work. 
For its supporters, universal income is a modern and radical way of moving 
towards the decommodification of work.
However, from 1919 onward, the ilo has taken the opposite path, since its 
target group is composed of industrial wage earners—that is to say, workers 
employed in the ‘labour market’. Although the self-employed have been for-
mally covered by the Declaration of Philadelphia since 1944, workers holding a 
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so-called ‘standard’ job—that is to say, wage-earners with an employment con-
tract and protected by social legislation—still remain the main target group of 
ilo norms.
Many workers are thus excluded from the scope of the Organization; this 
is particularly the case for informal workers who, in India, make up almost 
93 per cent of the labour force. Reproductive work, generally undertaken by 
women, should be added to informal labour. To overcome this difficulty, the 
ilo has largely promoted the development of wage labour and the generalisa-
tion of ‘standard employment’ conditions (meaning under contract). The 1930 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (C 29) is a perfect illustration of this 
orientation; it aimed to transform forced labour into contractual wage work 
framed by the two 1939 agreements on employment contracts and penal sanc-
tions, respectively (C 64 and 65) (Maul, 2012; Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005; Zimmer-
mann, 2010; Daughton, 2013). While the ilo has promoted measures to frame 
and regulate labour as a commodity, the very principles on which it is based 
condemn it to accept its existence.
Under the mandate of David Morse, Director General from 1948 to 1970, the 
terms of the relationship were even reversed in favour of an economist’s vision 
of labour as Morse, who previously worked in the New Deal administration, 
made increased productivity a central goal of organisational policy (Maul, 
2010).
The ilo took an interest in the question of the scientific organisation of 
labour and elaborated a ‘productivity policy’ (Maier, 1977; Maier, 2010) as early 
as in the 1920s. This orientation led, for example, to the creation in Geneva in 
1927 of the International Management Institute, headed by the Briton Lyndall 
Urwick. The Fordist model of welfare capitalism was the main inspiration be-
hind all these productivist measures: by creating wealth, the increase in pro-
ductivity was supposed to increase the purchasing power of the workers. This 
policy, which made social progress dependent on the results of the capitalist 
economy, soon met resistance from some employers, who refused to increase 
wages, as well as from unions, which feared a rise in unemployment (Cayet, 
2010).
Nevertheless, from 1950, productivity became a priority of the Organization. 
In his 1950 report, David Morse asserted that ‘From the world point of view 
the real need in almost every sector is for increased production’ (ilc, 1950, 3). 
According to him, workers relied excessively on redistributive measures to in-
crease their standard of living, whereas they needed to become responsible for 
their well-being by increasing their productivity at work.
Within the ilo, this ideological shift mainly expressed itself in two ways: the 
nature of the conventions evolved and the Organization redoubled its efforts 
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to provide technical assistance. The conventions of the Cold War years were 
primarily intended to protect ‘human rights’ and to ensure fairness (including 
through the Convention on Discrimination) rather than to create the condi-
tions necessary for greater equality. They aimed to ‘empower’ rather than pro-
tect workers (as in the conventions on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining of 1948). Furthermore, the ilo continued to carry out important 
normative work, but activities to encourage economic development took pre-
cedence over other areas as shown by the rising number of economists among 
the staff and the recruitment of many development economists as external 
experts.
As part of this policy in favour of economic development, the ilo set up 
and implemented productivity missions, the first of which was sent to Israel in 
1952, one year before the activities of the European Productivity Agency (epa) 
began—an agency placed under the authority of the European Organization 
for Economic Co-operation as part of the Marshall Plan. The epa was created 
with the aim of increasing productivity in member countries and thus fight-
ing poverty and preventing a revolution from breaking out (Boel, 2003). The 
ilo’s productivity missions were the global component of the epa’s activities 
in Western Europe. After Israel, other missions were sent to India, Egypt, Paki-
stan, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Bolivia, Greece, Hong Kong and Ceylon (abit, 1952–56). 
At the request of many governments, the ilo set up productivity centres in 
which experts provided training (ilo, 1957a, 1957b). These productivity mis-
sions were systematically flanked by a management training programme for 
those in charge of labour organisation (ilo, 1965).
The productivist approach chosen by the ilo clearly established the pri-
macy of the economic sphere over the social, but the Organization simultane-
ously reaffirmed its social goals within this economic framework. David Morse 
reminded the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ecosoc) that 
productivity gains were intended to raise the standard of living of workers and 
to create jobs, that social benefits should flow from the economic results of 
employees, and that any measure to increase productivity should be negotiat-
ed between workers, trade unions and employers (ecosoc, 1953; ilo, 1953). In 
1950, in his speech to the International Labour Conference, he underlined the 
exemplary role played by the Czechoslovak trade unions which were able to 
negotiate the way increase of productivity should be organised with the direc-
tors of the state-owned enterprises, even though these trade unions fell under 
Convention 87 on freedom of association.
Thus the productivist turn of the 1950s stood in conflict with the values on 
which the Organization was based in two ways: it ran against the idea that the 
social sphere had to prevail over the economic, and it questioned the liberal 
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conception of trade unions on which it was grounded. This productivist turn 
admittedly marked an inflection, but it endorsed the ilo’s lasting assumption 
that economic prosperity was the condition of universal social justice.
4 Fair Globalisation
The third clause in the preamble to the ilo Constitution4 justifies the exis-
tence of the Organization with an economic argument:
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of 
labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve 
the conditions in their own countries.
At the time of its creation, the Organization was well placed to fight for social 
justice, but in a context of free trade and global economic competition. The 
idea that employers, forced by stricter national laws to offer better social pro-
tection to their employees, would be disadvantaged on the world market is an 
old belief that is not necessarily based on reliable calculations (International 
Labour Office, 1931, 15). However, like the revolutionary threat, it encouraged 
reforming employers to promote international social protection. The ilo has 
always situated itself in the tradition of the great free-trade reformers of the 
first half of the nineteenth century, such as Robert Owen and Daniel Legrand 
(International Labour Office, 1931, 4–5) and has seen, in the set up of interna-
tional social norms, the very condition of undistorted economic competition. 
In 1944, Karl Polanyi summed up this point of view in the following terms:
The League of Nations itself had been supplemented by the Internation-
al Labour Office partly in order to equalize conditions of competition 
among the nations so that trade might be liberated without danger to 
standards of living (Polanyi, 1944, 27–28).
From its inception, the ilo emerged as a social regulator of economic globali-
sation (Feiertag, 2008) that was at that time limited to the capitalist countries 
of the North Atlantic. Like the League of Nations on which it depended, it 
was initially a European enterprise (Guérin, 1996). At the 1930 International 
4 The ilo Constitution is available on the website http://www.ilo.ch/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (accessed on 4 December 2018).
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Labour Conference, half of the 51 countries gathered were not European; but 
 European states, especially the victors of the First World War, dominated the 
ilo: all the section chiefs were then French or British. In addition, a number 
of US participants played a major role at the time of the creation of the Orga-
nization. This includes members of the social reformist movement embodied 
by the American Association for Labor Legislation (the US branch of the Inter-
national Association for Labour Legislation)—of which President Woodrow 
Wilson was an active member—and Samuel Gompers, President of the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, who chaired the International Labour Commission 
that met in Paris from January to April 1919 and played a significant part in the 
discussions surrounding the birth of the Organization (Moynihan, 1960). In 
addition, the United States joined the ilo in 1934 despite never having been a 
member of the League of Nations.
The norms developed during this period were heavily inspired by the leg-
islation in place in the economically developed world at the time, while colo-
nies were subjected to special exemptions. As a result, the European and Latin 
American peripheries felt marginalised and threatened to create a rival organ-
isation more suited to their needs. Asian countries, for their part, stated that 
their level of development did not allow them to implement a policy designed 
for developed countries. As early as the 1930s, ilo officials became aware of 
the need to ‘help’ economically and socially less developed countries in or-
der to establish social legislation compatible with ilo norms and to offer their 
technical assistance for this purpose, first in the Balkans and subsequently in 
Latin American countries (Stenger, 2016; Kott, 2010). This technical support al-
lowed the Organization to disseminate its model of social insurance by ensur-
ing that the legislation put in place in these countries was compatible with its 
conventions.
During David Morse’s term of office, the number of members of the Organi-
zation grew from 52 to 121 as a consequence of decolonisation (meanwhile the 
number of staff increased fivefold). The question of the universality of norms 
thus came to the fore, and the ilo had to face new difficulties, in particular 
during the debates on the Convention on Social Security from 1950 to 1952. 
Representatives of the less developed countries stated that, given the embry-
onic state of their legislation, it was impossible for them to adopt European 
norms. Convention 102 proposed an à la carte solution allowing the least devel-
oped countries to select the branches of social security they wished to include 
first in their systems. Employers from northern countries were very hostile to 
this solution, which in their view distorted economic competition (Guinand, 
2003).
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On the other hand, the ilo proceeded differently for the territories now 
described as ‘non-metropolitan’: in 1947, it adopted Conventions 83 to 86, 
which extended to the populations concerned the social rights in force in met-
ropolitan areas. In 1950, a committee of experts on the social policies relating 
to the colonies (Committee of Experts on Social Policy in Non-Metropolitan 
Territories) was created to develop a funding strategy for these social policies 
(Cooper, 1996). At the same time, this question was discussed at the third Inter-
African Labour Conference—set up by the colonial administrators—whose 
main conclusions were taken up in 1953 by the ilo Committee. Insofar as it 
seemed certain that metropolitan participants could not invest as much as was 
needed in the colonies, the ilo proposed extending the European model of 
productivity to non-metropolitan territories by bringing African workers into 
the labour market, but also by training managers and workers and by develop-
ing a management culture. Finally, to encourage workers to be more produc-
tive, the Committee recommended the introduction of piecework (ilo, 1953). 
The extension of social policies was therefore, in this case too, closely linked to 
the economic results of the territories.
Similar policies for the countries of the global South were elaborated in the 
field of technical assistance and development, two objectives that became 
central for the ilo from 1949 (Alcock, 1971, 209–251, 338–364) and were imple-
mented under the UN’s Comprehensive Technical Assistance Programme—
launched by Truman (Point iv initiative)—in 1949, and later in the United 
Nations Development Programme from 1965 onwards. Within this UN devel-
opment framework the ilo was primarily responsible for human resources, 
such as management training programmes aimed at increasing labour produc-
tivity. More than 2,000 experts, mostly economists, were recruited from outside 
the Organization and were sent to different countries between 1950 and 1959. 
The Organization also implemented a fellowship programme and then a pro-
gramme of courses for supervisory staff from developing countries in the Turin 
International Training Centre, established in 1965. The common goal of the 
Organization and local political elites was to foster economic development to 
enable the various countries involved in these programmes to find their place 
in global economic competition. Once again, social progress was seen as the 
desirable outcome of increased economic performance, not as a prerequisite.
The ilo was certainly not responsible for this focus on economic develop-
ment as a condition for human development; this approach espoused the logic 
that was then predominant, including in developing countries themselves. 
Similarly, in 1969, the Organization borrowed from India the ‘basic needs’ ap-
proach, which underpinned the World Employment Programme, set up in 
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1969, and was then criticised for its excessive focus on production and con-
sumption at the expense of the human factor. This contradiction between the 
social objectives of the ilo, and in particular its emphasis on decommodifica-
tion of labour and its actions on the ground, had considerable consequences 
and undoubtedly accounted for much of the lack of interest accorded to it by 
developing countries at different times in its history. Thus, in 1995, when the 
ilo wished to negotiate the introduction of a social clause in the founding 
treaty of the World Trade Organization, the representatives of Indian trade 
unions opposed it on the pretext that removing a comparative advantage from 
their country with regard to international competition would throw millions 
of Indian workers out of work (Hensman, 2011).
5 Conclusion
From its inception, the ilo has been gripped by a fundamental tension, on 
the one hand between the promise of social justice and the decommodifica-
tion of labour that this promise embodies, and its role as a social agent of eco-
nomic globalisation on the other. This tension intensified in the years after the 
Second World War, in the context of the Cold War and decolonisation during 
which time the number of member states increased significantly, while the 
problems and the solutions to be implemented became increasingly divergent.
But the tensions that have run through the Organization also reflected the 
diversity of its sources of inspiration. Different movements have coexisted 
within the ilo right from the start: a liberal reformist wing, a social democratic 
tendency and a Christian social component. In addition, since the 1930s, the 
dominant normative approach pursued by jurists was accompanied by a de-
velopmentalist vision defended by an increasing number of economists, with 
the latter eventually coming to rival the former.
Despite their ambiguity and difficulty, the norms remain nevertheless 
important reference points even when they are not ratified. For their part, 
development policies have always subordinated social progress to econom-
ic performance and emphasised the notions of growth, productivity and 
consumption— even those that have been supported by progressive schools of 
thought, such as the World Employment Programme.
Last but not least, the ilo has always worked within a constrained space: 
constrained by national governments, constrained by the diverging interests of 
workers and employers, and constrained by the international system itself, in 
which the place occupied by the Organization has always been contested. Dur-
ing the period between the two world wars, the ilo had great difficulty finding 
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its place in the economic negotiations, conducted under the auspices of the 
League of Nations, and to which ilo officials wished to add a social dimension. 
In addition, the Health Section of the League of Nations competed with cer-
tain sectors of the Organization’s activities, relying on Rockefeller Foundation 
money, which was less accessible to the ilo. In the 1970s, the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (unido) took over a large share of the 
ilo’s development activities in industrialised countries, and the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco) took over a 
number of its training capacities.
Nevertheless, as long as communist regimes existed, the reformist stake-
holders of the ilo mobilised and used the fear that these regimes aroused to 
advance their social agenda. Since the disappearance of this useful enemy, the 
ilo discourse of social regulation and normative practice has become more 
difficult to get across, especially in comparison with the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (oecd) and the World Bank, both of 
which have advocated for liberal deregulation since the 1980’s. Yet in a world 
where multinationals manage to free themselves from all national social legis-
lation and where workers’ mobility is increasing, the international norms pro-
posed by the ilo should be on the agenda more than ever.
In this respect, the last Convention on Domestic Workers (C189, 2011) is both 
an opening and a model. It targets a group largely composed of women and 
migrants, a group doubly marginalised on the national level and much more 
dependent than others on international protection. The way in which groups 
of activists in different countries have seized on this subject, and on the rules 
laid down in the Convention, shows not just the symbolic but also the practi-
cal importance of such regulations and opens up new perspectives (Boris and 
Fish, 2014).
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Chapter 3
Who Decides? Representation and Decision-
making at the International Labour Organization
Marieke Louis
Abstract
The study of international organisations most often consists of an analysis of the imple-
mentation and effectiveness of their policies. This chapter takes a different approach, 
and discusses the processes that prevail within the International Labour Organization 
(ilo), upstream of the programmes it implements; it focuses on the participants who 
decide what the ilo does, what it cannot do and how its mandate is fulfilled. Building 
on the work of Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson (The Anatomy of Influence: Decision 
Making in International Organizations, 1973), the author will attempt to understand 
how this institution has developed its process of representation and decision-making 
since its creation. While the tripartite dynamics of the ilo and the unique role of the 
trade unions and employers active within it are often underlined, it will be seen that 
its decision-making process also responds to other logics underpinned by the political 
and economic balance of power (East/West, North/South, industrialised countries/de-
veloping countries), by organisational dynamics (the relative autonomy and expertise 
of its secretariat and director general) and by external pressures (non-governmental 
organisations). Based on an analysis of representation in the ilo, this chapter reveals 
the complexity of its decision-making process. It shows that this institution does not 
fundamentally upset the traditional balance of power between states, but that its in-
fluence also arises from certain structural arrangements and ways of making represen-
tation work.
1 Introduction
The International Labour Organization (ilo) is first and foremost known 
for the missions entrusted to it: the improvement of working conditions, the 
achievement of social justice and the creation of decent jobs. This mandate is 
set forth in the founding texts of the Organization: Part xiii of the 1919 Treaty 
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of Versailles which became the ilo Constitution,1 the 1944 Declaration of 
Philadelphia,2 the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work,3 the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization4 and the 
2009 Global Jobs Pact.5 Much academic work has studied the ilo by focusing 
on its mandate and the tools and resources it uses to implement it (Alcock, 
1971; Bonvin, 1998; Cayet, 2010; Ghebali, 1989; Haas, 1964; Hughes and Haworth, 
2011; Kott and Droux, 2013; Lespinet-Moret and Viet, 2011; Louis, 2011; Maupain, 
2013; Van Daele et al., 2010). It has at its disposal normative instruments of a 
more or less binding nature: international labour conventions, recommen-
dations, resolutions and declarations. It also deploys practical tools—often 
grouped under the category of ‘technical cooperation’—which consist in the 
provision of funds and the dispatch of ilo experts to the various member 
countries. Among these instruments, which aim to ensure the local applica-
tion of international standards and the dissemination of good practices (Klein 
et al., 2015), the ilo attaches particular importance to the training of members 
of governments, trade unions and employers’ organisations on subjects within 
its competence; most of the time this training is provided by the Turin Interna-
tional Training Centre, established in 1964.
These studies tell us a great deal about what the Organization does and 
how it does it, but they do not necessarily answer another important  question: 
‘Who decides what the ilo does?’ To identify the participants in the decision-
making process, it is necessary to position oneself upstream of the institution’s 
policymaking, whether this concerns standards, cooperation or, increasingly, 
development with a view to achieving the goal of social justice.6 It is also nec-
essary to take another look at two fundamental aspects of the study of inter-
national organisations from a political science perspective, asking how rep-
resentation, on the one hand, and decision-making, on the other, can help us 
better understand power relationships, which are often absent from official 
organisation charts. In political science, representation, decision-making and 
1 See the Constitution on the website http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO: 
62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (accessed on 19 June 2018).
2 See the Declaration on the website http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO: 
62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO (accessed on 19 June 2018).
3 See the Declaration on the website http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed on 19 June 2018).
4 See the Declaration on the website http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--- 
cabinet/documents/genericdocument/wcms_371208.pdf (accessed on 19 June 2018).
5 See the Pact on the website http://www.ilo.org/jobspact/about/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 
on 19 June 2018).
6 See also the chapters in this volume by Sandrine Kott (Chapter 2) and by Patricia Vendramin 
and Agnès Parent-Thirion (Chapter 13).
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power are distinct but often interlinked concepts and processes. In its Webe-
rian sense, power can be defined as the opportunity for a certain person to 
impose his or her will in a social relationship characterised in particular by co-
ercion and domination. We will not tackle the question of power in its entirety 
here, but we will examine one aspect of it: the link between representation and 
decision-making, in the sense that the chances of a person imposing his or her 
will are greater if that person is in a position to make decisions. But the ability 
of a person to influence decisions does not necessarily determine his or her 
ability to enforce them in the field.
In this chapter, we will focus on the evolution of the representation of the 
tripartite members of the ilo (states, trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions), officials of the Organization, and also participants who are a priori 
more external to the ilo—that is to say, non-governmental organisations. 
We argue that being represented in the Organization is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to influence the decisions made and the policies imple-
mented. Influential participants have a number of attributes, including finan-
cial and personal investment, longevity, and adherence to the Organization’s 
tripartism and values. We will set out this argument in a first section devoted to 
the study of the representation of ilo members on the Governing Body—the 
ilo’s restricted executive body, which meets three times a year in Geneva. The 
Governing Body is not the only place of power within the ilo since norms are 
adopted by the International Labour Conference (the annual general assembly 
of ilo members) and since some of its commissions—the Conference Com-
mittee on the Application of Standards for example—play a key role in nor-
mative policies. But it remains the space of representation that is most valued 
and most coveted by Organization members. In the second part, we will show 
that some participants (state and non-state) have had great difficulty in mak-
ing their voices heard, but that they have succeeded, through contestation, in 
reforming the process of representation while remaining on the sidelines.
2 Who Decides in International Organisations?
2.1 States are Central but Not Exclusive Participants in the Process
The most intuitive answer to the question posed in this section is obviously 
the state; states—the creators of these organisations—therefore play a part 
in decisions that depend on their relative power, evaluated according to vari-
ous criteria (military, economic, cultural, social, etc.). Within the ilo, at least 
two bodies must be distinguished: on the one hand, the International Labour 
Conference (ilc), which negotiates and adopts (through substantive work in 
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committees) international labour standards, and on the other hand, the Gov-
erning Body, the restricted executive body of the Organization. It had 24 mem-
bers in 1919 and since 1995 it has had 122 members (56 full members and 66 
deputy members). Among the members of the Governing Body, ten (initially 
eight) are not elected but represented de jure because of their industrial power 
(Louis, 2016a): Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. These states are not permanent mem-
bers in the strict sense of the term, since the classification of states accord-
ing to their industrial power may vary. Nevertheless, this list has only rarely 
changed in the history of the Organization: the last modification dates back to 
1983. Although the majority of the members of the Governing Body are elected 
every three years by the ilc, this election is most often a mere formality. New 
entrants are co-opted upstream by the International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ituc) as regards workers, the International Organization of Employ-
ers (ioe) as regards employers, and finally by the regional groups as regards 
governments.
The role of the Governing Body has been considerably strengthened since 
1919. Although the founding fathers of the ilo had initially assigned to it solely 
the task of drawing up the agenda and the direction of the ilo, its powers in 
fact went far beyond. Over time, the Governing Body has become one of the 
most important, if not the most important, bodies of the ilo. It elects and 
appoints its Director General without any formal need for the agreement of 
the ilc. It also has the power to create commissions of inquiry. In addition, 
whereas the adoption of the budget is, in principle, the responsibility of the 
ILO, the Governing Body prepares it on the basis of the proposals of the Direc-
tor General. After the Second World War, the Governing Body was even given 
the ability to influence its own composition: it has since then had the task of 
determining, in the last resort, the classification of states according to their 
industrial power. In the members’ eyes, the Governing Body is thus the place 
where ‘everything is at stake’.
As mentioned earlier, the list of the most industrialised states occupying 
a de facto permanent seat has remained quite unchanged, despite significant 
developments in recent years with regard to the regular budget of the Organi-
zation, which is subject to a fixed scale, unlike the voluntary contributions of 
members (ilo, 2011, Table 5; ilo, 2017, 65–69). The United States remains the 
largest contributor, with 22 per cent of the regular budget; Japan represents 
only 9.684 per cent (compared with 16.631 per cent in 2010); Germany 6.392 
per cent (compared with 8.581 per cent in 2010); the United Kingdom 4.465 
per cent (compared with 6.645 per cent in 2010); and France 4.861 per cent 
(compared with 6.304 per cent). Italy’s contribution has also fallen slightly 
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(from 5.081 per cent to 3.750 per cent). On the other hand, China has seen the 
amount of its contributions increase considerably, from 2.668 per cent in 2010 
to 7.924 per cent in the last budget plan, as have Brazil (from 1.201 per cent 
in 2010 to 3.825 per cent) and Russia (from 1.201 per cent to 3.089 per cent). 
Only India remains below the 1 per cent threshold. Thus, the largest industrial 
powers are not necessarily the largest contributors, and vice versa; Canada, 
Mexico and Spain have long made higher contributions than Brazil, Russia or 
India (Louis, 2016b, 388). The so-called ordinary ilo budget is financed by the 
fixed contributions of the states (also known as mandatory or statutory con-
tributions) according to a scale common to the agencies of the United Nations 
(UN) system. The amount of these contributions is therefore not specific to 
the ilo and does not necessarily reflect a particular commitment of members 
to the Organization—since it is largely proportional to their gross domestic 
product. But these amounts represent only a part of the ilo’s total resources. 
To have a comprehensive view of each state’s contribution and voluntary com-
mitment, voluntary and extra-budgetary contributions as well as the Organi-
zation’s  Regular Budget Supplementary Account (rbsa) should be taken into 
account. For the 2018–19 period, these two budgets are estimated at usd 450 
and usd 36.4 million, respectively, compared with usd 625.9 million7 for the 
regular budget (ilo, 2017). Under these two types of voluntary contributions, 
the United States, the European Union, Australia, Norway and the Netherlands 
top the list of the thirty largest contributors for the period 2012–15; Brazil and 
Russia rank respectively no higher than 17th and 23rd, while China and India 
are not even included in the rankings.8
These indicators make it possible to draw up an initial inventory of the ma-
terial investment of states within the ilo, but they are insufficient to account 
for the capacity of the former to influence the decisions taken by the Organiza-
tion as a whole.
Other participants influence the decisions taken, in general, by interna-
tional organisations. In the case of the ilo, these participants are evident 
precisely because of the Organization’s tripartite composition. This involves 
the representation of trade unions and employers’ organisations (in  particular 
7 It should be noted that, since 1991, the Director General has also been authorised to receive, 
on behalf of the Organization, donations from public and private organisations (including 
workers’ and employers’ organisations).
8 Multi-bilateral Development Partner and EC Ranking Total Extra-budgetary Development 
Cooperation (xbtc) and rbsa Contributions (2012–15) can be viewed on the website http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---exrel/documents/genericdocument/
wcms_206667.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2018).
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those  affiliated to the ituc and the ioe), which are placed on an almost equal 
footing with states in all the bodies of the ilo, and in particular in the Gov-
erning Body. While tripartism is specific to the ilo in the world of interna-
tional organisations, other institutions involve non-state participants in their 
decision-making—for example, the International Organization for Standard-
ization (Louis and Ruwet, 2017), and at the national level, joint bodies such as 
economic and social councils.
Tripartite participants are recognised as constituent members of the ilo 
and the only ones officially empowered to make decisions. Only they have the 
right to vote, even though a large number of decisions are taken by consensus. 
But other participants can play, in a more informal way, a decisive and even 
decision-making role.
In observing the functioning of international organisations, it is easy to 
highlight the key role of the secretariat (officials and the like, directors gen-
eral and secretaries general). During the interviews conducted as part of this 
research, delegates often referred to the ilo’s more ‘quadripartite’ than tripar-
tite character, with the International Labour Office being designated as the 
fourth key player in the institution. The extensive theoretical literature on the 
‘principal–agent’ relationship (Bauer, 2007; Reinalda and Verbeek, 1998) has 
highlighted the relative independence of the secretariat (the ‘agent’, or the one 
who executes an order) from the states (the ‘principal’, or the one who gives the 
order) in various organisations. The secretariat can influence the development 
and implementation of policies and guide negotiations in their preparatory 
phases. It is recognised by other organisations as the legitimate representa-
tive of the Organization and benefits from its permanent character (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 2004; Strange, 1998). The workings of the ilo confirm the 
conclusions of its work, since the leading role of the International Labour Of-
fice, headed by the Director General of the Organization, is well established. 
For example, between 1919 and 1932, Albert Thomas, then Director of the ilo, 
played a notorious role in empowering the Secretariat in relation to states, but 
also in relation to the League of Nations. More recently, other directors have 
distinguished themselves by their influence, including Juan Somavía and his 
iconic use of the ‘creative leadership’ highlighted by Ernst Haas (Haas, 1964; 
Louis, 2011). Juan Somavía, who was the first Director General from a southern 
country (Chile), led the International Labour Office from 1998 to 2012 and, in 
1999, launched the Decent Work Agenda. This set of reforms was intended to 
mark the repositioning of the ilo on the international scene, to be the stan-
dard bearer of the strategy developed by the Organization to renew itself and 
gain recognition from the outside world after the end of the Cold War (Louis, 
2011; Louis and Maertens, 2014).
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2.2 The Anatomy of Influence
In 1973, Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson edited and published The Anat-
omy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organizations, a landmark 
in the analysis of decision-making in political science and, more specifically, 
in the study of international organisations. Robert W. Cox’s chapter on the 
ilo bears an evocative title: ‘A limited monarchy’. The author describes the 
Organization as a political system ‘in which influence is structured around 
one central figure—the executive head—who though he plays a leading role, 
does so subject to very real constraints’ (Cox, 1973, 102). He dwells at length 
on the transformations that the Organization has experienced since the 1960s 
and extends the analyses published by Harold Jacobson in the 1950s and 1960s 
on the place of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (ussr) within the ilo 
by studying in particular the under-representation of developing countries 
and the Soviet Union. Jacobson had already stated: ‘In formal terms alone, 
membership does not always carry with it full representation in all organs. 
And political influence is rarely directly proportionate to numerical strength’ 
(Jacobson, 1960, 406).
After decolonisation, the number of ilo member states increased consid-
erably, without however leading to a substantial change in the composition 
of the Governing Body and, consequently, decision-making power in the ilo. 
Thus, when the ussr rejoined the ilo in 1954, every effort was made to ensure 
that no Soviet employers’ or workers’ representative was elected to the Govern-
ing Body and to limit the influence of communist countries in commissions. 
Surprising as it may seem to the unfamiliar observer of the ilo, the ussr—
and Russia after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc—has never been able to exert 
an influence comparable to that of other permanent members of the ilo, in-
cluding in non-governmental groups. A similar observation can be made with 
regard to China. While these two countries were permanently represented on 
the Governing Body as major industrial powers, it was not until the end of the 
1990s that a Russian employers’ representative (with the status of deputy mem-
ber) was elected and not until the turn of the new millennium that China had 
a workers’ representative and an employers’ representative (again, these were 
deputy members sitting in the Governing Body). The last elections to the Gov-
erning Body—for the period 2017–20—confirmed how controlled this open-
ness of non-governmental groups actually was: on the employers’ side, the Chi-
nese and Russian representatives remained deputy members; on the workers’ 
side, the Chinese representative was given the status of titular member, but the 
Russian representative remained a deputy member. Unlike regular members 
(also called titular members), deputy members do not have the right to vote. 
While most decisions are taken by consensus, voting is still practised,  especially 
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for important political decisions such as the election of the Director General. 
Although these two states are among the most powerful in the world and are 
permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, their rep-
resentation on the ilo Governing Body remains carefully monitored so as to 
prevent the Organization from deviating from its original mandate. From a 
Coxian perspective, the ilo thus seems to function as a Western monarchy of 
industrialised countries (or more precisely as an oligarchy, insofar as decisions 
are taken by several participants).
Cox’s perspective corroborates the above analyses by noting that the deci-
sions taken in the ilo depend to a large extent on International Labour Office 
officials, whose recruitment is closely monitored by the states: ‘[…] the con-
stituents keep a close eye upon the composition of the staff particularly at the 
upper levels’ (1973, 108).
2.3 The Long-term Nature of Individual Representation
Why pay so much attention to the composition of the ilo Governing Body? 
States, like workers and employers, undeniably wish to be elected to it because 
of the importance of its prerogatives, but above all they want to anchor their 
representation in the long term, and thus be regularly re-elected. This perma-
nence or quasi-permanence of representation constitutes the main guarantee 
of influence within the Organization. The Governing Body is in principle re-
newed every three years, but in fact the elected members retain their seats 
for at least two terms, or many more. States, like employers and workers, have 
every interest in ensuring their long-term representation—in the name of the 
principles of continuity and efficiency of action that justified the creation of 
seats reserved for the largest industrial powers. In addition to being able to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process (not just voting, as discussed above), 
delegates are able to consolidate their influence by accumulating knowledge 
about the Organization and its history, procedures, routines, reports and ex-
pertise. Over time, they can build relationships with civil servants—who have 
truly permanent appointments—and thus gain better access to information 
and an opportunity to distinguish themselves from the more novice members 
in the negotiations of normative instruments within the ilc. At conferences, 
new delegates usually rely on more experienced members—that is to say, usu-
ally Governing Body members who spend several weeks a year in Geneva. As a 
result, some delegates have, as it were, become the ‘living memory’ of the insti-
tution; their experience is considered to be unique, if not irreplaceable, and this 
argues in favour of their retention or re-election in the case of non-permanent 
members. On this point, our study corroborates Robert Cox’s analysis of the 
influence of individuals and personalities on the functioning of the  institution. 
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As regards both large and small states, Cox evokes this organisational elite in 
these terms: ‘a network of personalities who together play the roles of brokers 
and controllers. What is important is the continuity and confidence of their 
mutual relationships’ (Cox, 1973, 127). In addition, it would be appropriate to 
include in this category the politicians and other persons who do not belong to 
the ilo but have a good relationship with its Director  General—a practice that 
once again highlights the importance of the latter’s role.
Under the rationale of continuity, the struggle for representation to be guar-
anteed is particularly intense within the group of workers and the group of 
employers. The members of these groups exercise their responsibilities for 
 particularly long periods: the majority of delegates remain members of the 
Governing Body for two terms, but some retain their positions for ten, twenty 
or even thirty years—the record being held by the Mexican Sanchez Madaria-
ga (1905–99) of the Mexican Confederation of Workers, who served from 1954 
to 1999. Among the delegates, the most influential are the chairpersons and 
group secretaries, who have special links with the ituc, the ioe, but also with 
the Bureau for Workers’ Activities (actrav) and the Bureau for Employers’ 
Activities (actemp), the two International Labour Office services in charge of 
relations with workers’ and employers’ organisations. In fact, some particularly 
loyal former delegates pursue their careers in one of these services as interna-
tional civil servants.
Here again, tripartism can ‘counter’ the classic, realistic reading of power 
relations based on military or economic power. It can happen that nationals of 
middle powers, even of small states, exert a considerable influence within their 
group. For example, Roy Trotman from Barbados served as chair and spokes-
person for the workers’ group from 2002 to 2011; he was thus a regular member 
of the Governing Body during this period.
Workers’ representatives often present Roy Trotman as a model of success, 
as a man who has established himself through his personal qualities, skills and 
charisma. He came from an insular microstate and did not represent any of the 
world’s leading trade union organisations. He and his predecessor, M.T. Wal-
cott, were the sole representatives from Barbados on the Governing Body since 
its accession in 1967. As chairman of the workers’ group (2002–11) Roy Trotman 
thus escaped the basic trends that shape the nature of representation on the 
Governing Body, but only in part, because of his activities in the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (icftu) (he was the first black president 
of the organisation), and later the ituc, and to his being appointed by the 
latter.
On the government side, turnover is more substantial for states and indi-
viduals alike. Many delegates believe that this relative instability is one of the 
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reasons for the lesser influence of the government group in negotiations in 
addition to the regional fragmentation (Louis, 2016b).
3 Representation without Influence? The Margins of the ilo
3.1 State Margins: Non-European Countries, Developing Countries and 
Southern Countries
Since the creation of the ilo in 1919, a number of members have protested 
against what they consider to be a monopolisation of power by some states, 
particularly the victorious powers of the First World War (though from the 
outset, the ilo gave Germany a prominent place that it had never found in 
the League of Nations). These protests, notably from Brazil, Canada, India, 
and South Africa,9 focused on the composition of the Governing Body. Its lim-
ited character and the fact that no representative from a ‘non-European’ (or 
‘extra-European’) state—according to the terminology of the time—was ap-
pointed were seen as evidence of an initial marginalisation of certain mem-
bers of the Organization. As a consequence, the ilo amended its Constitution 
in 1922 so that a minimum number of seats would be granted to non-European 
countries.10
This brief historical review highlights an important element: ilo mem-
bers view their representation as a prerequisite for their involvement in the 
decision-making process, and their demands in this area are consubstan-
tial with the Organization. No one wants to be left out. Many members feel 
that the Governing Body is not representative of the ilc and that the system 
of reserved seats for the major industrial powers is both undemocratic and 
 counterproductive—since the other members think that the norms adopted 
only take into account European issues.
These demands, first expressed by non-European countries, have contin-
ued throughout the twentieth century and up until today. However, they have 
not always been expressed by the same participants, nor in quite the same 
terms, although we can detect elements of regularity. During the interwar pe-
riod, the protesters spoke of the marginalisation of non-European countries. 
During the Cold War, they spoke more about the recently decolonised coun-
tries and, above all, the Eastern Bloc countries, allies of the ussr. Western 
9 We cite only the most recurrent protesters. Many countries have occasionally issued pro-
tests about their lower level of representation.




members made concessions by agreeing to the enlargement of the Governing 
Body and the creation of new statutes (deputy members, substitute members 
and observers). But the various reform commissions that have been held since 
the 1960s have never endorsed the implementation of a proportional system 
of election of members of the Governing Body—a system that not only the 
Communists but other actors such as the Christian trade union workers’ or-
ganisations, a minority in the global trade union movement, have also called 
for (Dupuy, 1987). Developing countries, for their part, felt marginalised twice 
over. Relatively absent from the ilo’s decision-making bodies, they also had to 
accept the fact that the standards and programmes adopted by the ilo some-
times seemed to them unsuited to the problems they faced. As stressed by Cox: 
‘Government representatives from less developed countries often took the 
position that ilo standards were framed in the light of conditions in advanced 
countries and were inappropriate to their own’ (1973, 112).
As for the 1922 amendment, some contestations did succeed. In the late 
1970s, intense negotiations on the criteria for measuring industrial power 
finally led to Brazil’s entry into the club of the ‘permanent’ states represented 
de jure on the Governing Body (Louis, 2016a). Since India and Brazil became 
part of the ilo’s ‘organisational elite’ as major industrial powers, and espe-
cially since the reform of the Governing Body adopted in 1995 (see below) de-
veloping countries can no longer be considered excluded from the Governing 
Body. The marginalisation of African countries, however, is still an issue. The 
African group is indeed one of the only ones to demand, even today, a reform 
of the Governing Body: they favour the abolition of the seats reserved for the 
major industrial powers provided for by the 1986 Amendment or the integra-
tion of African states into this restrictive club. The abolition of the ‘permanent’ 
seats is indeed one of the few components of the 1986 Amendment that has 
not been taken over by the 1995 reform (see below, Table 3.1).
3.2 A New ‘Monarchy’? The Case of the Industrialized Market Economy 
Countries (imec)
Despite these changes in the structure of the Organization and in particular in 
the formal composition of the Governing Body, it cannot be concluded that the 
decision-making process is being made more balanced or even more democrat-
ic. Indeed, while the Governing Body has expanded and been rebalanced on a 
regional basis (Africa, America, Asia and Europe), offering the different mem-
ber states the opportunity to participate more in the decision-making process, 
it remains highly dependent on the material logics set out at the beginning 
of this chapter. In addition, the ‘numerical’ logic (number of seats, number of 
votes) comes up against the fact that, within the ilo as in most international 
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organisations, decisions are more and more frequently taken by consensus 
and that the use of the vote is becoming increasingly rare—the election of the 
 Director General is a notable exception in this regard.
Although it does not have a constitutional or regulatory existence (unlike 
the regional groups), the group of Industrialized Market Economy Countries 
(imec) exercises most of the decision-making power at state level in the ilo. 
This group of about thirty states11 was established on the basis of economic 
11 In 2011, the imec group consisted of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Table 3.�  Comparison of the 1986 and 1995 amendments
1986 Amendment (not in vigour) 1995 Amendment
Enlargement
112 seats (112 voting members)
 – governments: 56 seats
 – workers: 28 seats
 – employers: 28 seats
Enlargement
122 seats (56 voting members)
 –  governments: 56 seats (28 per-
manent members; 28 deputy 
members)
 –  workers: 33 seats (14 permanent 
members; 19 deputy members)
 –  employers: 33 seats (14 permanent 
members; 19 deputy members)





2 remaining so-called rotating seats: 
the first to be alternated between Af-
rica and America, from one mandate 
to the next; the second to be alter-
nated between Asia and Europe from 
one mandate to the next.
Regional distribution of seats
Africa: 13 and a half seatsa
America: 12 and a half seatsa
Asia: 15 seats
Europe: 15 seats





rather than geographical criteria and includes the main contributors to the ilo 
budget. The imec grouping was created in 1978, during the Cold War, with the 
aim of strengthening the links between market-economy countries when the 
United States left the ilo. It is worth noting that this group, with particularly 
strong internal cohesion, is the only one to meet almost every day during the 
ilc, as has been the case since the 1980s. Many positions are taken in its name, 
through a rotating spokesperson who changes according to the year, the con-
ference, and the topics on the agenda. As an example, we can mention its very 
regular and detailed interventions in the framework of the Committee on the 
Application of Standards, one of the key committees of the Conference (ilo, 
2013, 11/40-11/46; ilo, 2014, 13 Part 1/56).
In addition, the imec’s representatives interviewed for the present survey 
expressed a greater attachment to this informal group than to their regional 
group, at least when it comes to representing their interests within the ilo. 
For the UK government representative, the imec is a more important group 
than the Western European region or even the European Union, because of the 
diversity of both the topics covered and the participants it brings together (‘the 
big players’): ‘imec has got a much higher standing. imec is a bigger group, so 
we wouldn’t generally do at all [the same] as Western Europe, it [the imec] 
has a much more important role because of its coverage, and all of the big 
players are in the imec’.12 The Japanese representative also showed a greater 
sense of belonging to the imec, but for different reasons: ‘Japan feels more 
associated with imec than with Asia Pacific, with the aspac countries; Asia 
is a very broad region and there are so many differences in terms of size of the 
countries, size of the economies, so it’s not so easy for all Asian countries to 
agree on a simple statement on single issues’.13
Other delegates, such as those from Australia or New Zealand, have stressed 
the critical importance of the imec, which they describe as the place where, 
more than in regional meetings, key issues relating to the functioning of the 
ilo are discussed. ‘imec is at the forefront of those. We see it as a very im-
portant, sort of intellectual way of generating and pushing ideas’.14 For Cana-
dian government officials, the imec’s dominating role in decision-making, 
Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the UK and the US.
12 Interview with representative from the government of the UK, 4 June 2013, Geneva, Inter-
national Labour Office.
13 Interview with representative from the government of Japan, 29 October 2012, Geneva, 
seat of the permanent mission of Japan.
14 Interview with representative from the government of New Zealand, 5 June 2013, Geneva, 
Palace of Nations.
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 particularly with respect to the International Labour Office, is indisputable: 
‘[…] for Canada our priority has continued to be the imec group, because we’d 
chaired that, and it has given us quite a significant voice in the organisation 
[…]. I think when the imec has something to say, the Office pays attention. 
And I think the workers and the employers too. Generally speaking when the 
imec expresses its views, there is a certain amount of attention paid to that’.15
However, the imec remains an entity specific to the government group. In 
the workers’ and employers’ groups, respectively, there is a desire to ensure 
the representation of organisations from the most industrialised countries, but 
imec-type groupings have not been institutionalised, at least within the ilo.
3.3 Non-governmental Organisations: Towards ‘Tripartism +’?
The ilo is a subject of study that makes it possible to re-examine the prob-
lem of the inclusion of non-state participants in the international scene. Its 
unique tripartite structure has given non-state participants the opportunity 
to benefit from a status almost identical to that of the state participants that 
are members of the Organization. But we may ask whether this new position-
ing has, in general, given non-governmental organisations greater influence 
within the ilo. The answer is no. In fact, the space of non-state representation 
was immediately monopolised by the major international trade union and 
employer confederations. As early as 1919, some organisations—such as the 
 cooperatives—felt unjustly excluded from the tripartite system of represen-
tation and the decisions taken by the ilo on matters concerning them, and 
argued for the expansion of tripartism. In fact, the concept of ‘tripartism +’ 
(Fashoyin, 2005), formulated for the first time during the mandate of Juan 
 Somavía, is only one expression of this desire to see representation extended 
to participants from ‘civil society’ (a rather vague term, to say the least) whose 
scope overlaps that of the ilo. Social partners (workers and employers) have 
generally come together to oppose this enlargement, arguing in particular that 
non-governmental organisations (ngos) are not representative (Thomann, 
2008; Louis, 2016b), and governments have remained divided on the subject, 
with some being very favourable and others completely opposed.
However, civil society organisations have never been purely and simply 
excluded from the ilo. From the inception of the Organization, alternatives 
to the status of delegate were envisaged, so as to allow for participants who 
did not necessarily fall into the three officially represented categories. For 
15 Interview with representative from the government of Canada, 10 June 2013, Geneva, 
 Palace of Nations.
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example, the status of technical adviser allows states, as well as trade unions 
and employer organisations, to include a number of people with specific ex-
pertise in their delegations. In addition, like the United Nations, the ilo after 
the Second World War created an observer status reserved for international 
non-governmental organisations. This gives ngos an observation and consul-
tation role and facilitates their access to ilo documentation and negotiations. 
Observer members are themselves divided into three sub-statuses: general, re-
gional and roster.
The influence of ngos on decisions taken within the ilo must be analysed 
without generalisation. Interviewed ngo members agree that this influence 
varies greatly depending on the organisations themselves, but also on the topic 
on the agenda and the quality of the relationships they have with members, 
who may—or may not—pass their demands on. It seems, for example, that 
ngos had a considerable influence on the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention (Convention 182)16 and, more recently, on the 
Convention on Domestic Workers (Convention 189).17 In interviews, many tri-
partite delegates stressed the importance of ngo awareness-raising work on 
issues that did not necessarily fall within the priority scope of the activities 
of social partners (Louis, 2016b, 271–276). Moreover, in 2011—the year of the 
adoption of Convention 189 on domestic work—a dozen delegations (among 
them delegations from Belgium, Brazil and the United Kingdom) included rep-
resentatives of associations (sometimes trade unions) specialising in domestic 
work issues. However, despite their relative goodwill towards ngos, members 
occasionally called their representatives to order on issues of ‘behaviour’—
especially when they were deemed too noisy, applauding or booing certain 
 amendments—and strictly limited the time they could speak at the opening 
of the work of the Commission (Louis, 2016b, 299–300).
Since its creation, the Secretariat has endeavoured to establish links with 
non-governmental organisations in order to broaden the sphere of influence 
of the Organization. In fact, the ilo considers ngos other than trade unions 
and employers’ bodies as potential allies, as it can benefit from their exper-
tise, their fact-finding activities and their ability to mobilise opinion and raise 
awareness among the public. But since their formal prerogatives are very lim-
ited, the influence of ngos may be considered rather insignificant (Salah-Bey, 
16 See the Convention on the website http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXP
UB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182 (accessed on 19 June 2018).
17 See the Convention on the website http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXP
UB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189 (accessed on 19 June 2018).
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1963, 67). According to Georg Nolte and Sergey Lagodinsky (2004, 339), ‘The 
ilo grants ngos passive participation rights’. These authors may not take suf-
ficient account of the diversity of ngos present at the ilo, but it is true that 
these organisations are sometimes effective lobbyists and sometimes extras, or 
mere spectators of decisions taken by members. As a matter of fact, ngos did 
not radically change the balance of power in the process of negotiating and 
adopting the Convention on Domestic Workers for instance.
The resilience of the tripartite norm in the field of effective decision-making 
is thus a given. To reflect the attitudes of both employer and worker members, 
Georg Nolte and Sergey Lagodinsky (2004, 325) speak of a ‘struggle for posi-
tions’ within the ilo. But this analysis is incomplete. These members, of course, 
occupy an important position within the ilo that they wish to preserve. But 
beyond that, they fear—as do governments, to some extent—that they might 
destabilise the collective bargaining structure as a whole. The relationship be-
tween tripartite constituents and ngos is a recurrent issue, as evidenced by 
the 2002 resolution of the ilc on tripartism and social dialogue, which aims 
precisely at framing relations with civil society (Baccaro and Mele, 2012). Yet 
the debates on the role of ngos also highlight a more fundamental issue: 
the redefinition of both the scope and the purpose of social dialogue today. 
Trade union and employer representatives fear, in particular, that greater inte-
gration of ngos into the ilo structure may lead to the institutionalisation of 
forms of work deemed prejudicial to workers (hence the challenge both they 
and the ilo in general face: the formalisation of the informal). For its part, the 
workers’ group (and, to a lesser extent, the employers’ group) strives to ensure 
that its representativity is not called into question (Louis, 2016b, 194–201).
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored, from a socio-historical perspective, the links 
that unite representation and decision-making power within the ilo. Building 
on the work of Robert Cox, we have shown the sustainable nature of the concen-
tration of decision-making power in certain forums—notably the Governing 
Body—and its monopolisation by certain state and non-state participants. But 
we have also highlighted the ability of the tripartite logic characteristic of the 
ilo to disrupt the traditional balance of power mechanism.
Representation is considered by both professionals and academics to be a 
necessary condition for participation in the decision-making process, but it is 
not sufficient in itself. In particular, it is not a tool for resisting certain forms of 
marginalisation—including the marginalisation of developing countries—in 
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spite of the significant rebalancing that has taken place since the 1980s and 
1990s. Furthermore, we have identified, without exploring them though, other 
ways of exercising influence within the ilo, including expertise and, more 
generally, knowledge. Representation, then, is not the only determinant of de-
cision-making power. To study it, it is essential to analyse the practices of rep-
resentatives, practices that sometimes differ from the formal provisions of the 
official texts. Thus, we have shown that representation is, within an organisa-
tion, a process in motion; it evolves with the mobilisations of the participants, 
whether they express themselves in an openly critical or a more cooperative 
way, by material contributions or, as in the case of ngos, by their capacity to 
demonstrate their added value during negotiations.
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Chapter 4
The Achievements and Limitations of Statutory 
and Non-statutory Tripartism in South African 
Mining
May Hermanus, Sizwe Phakathi, Nancy Coulson and Paul Stewart
Abstract
Unresolved problems in South African mining, particularly on gold mines, are en-
meshed within the system of production through mining methods and labour prac-
tices entrenched by apartheid. This system sets the parameters for, and hence limits 
and constrains, strategies designed to improve occupational health and safety. This 
chapter explores the achievements and limitations of statutory tripartism in mining 
as practiced under the Mine Health and Safety Act (mhsa), in the context of social 
dialogue in the National Economic and Labour Council (nedlac) and other statu-
tory and non-statutory tripartite forums. The term statutory tripartism refers to the 
institutions and forums for social dialogue established in law. Non-statutory tripartism 
refers to ad hoc forums in which stakeholders deliberate on specific issues. Presented 
as a detailed case study in which issues are explored thematically, the chapter ben-
efits from the experience of the lead authors in statutory mine health and safety struc-
tures. The authors reflect on the International Labour Organization’s (ilo) role to date 
and its future role, at a time when prospects for a broad social compact remain out of 
reach. While key discussions often take place outside of formally established tripartite 
structures, the ilo’s vision of authoritative social compacts and its institutional forms 
find expression in many settings. The ilo was important at critical junctures in the 
past and a continued role in championing social protection, inclusion and dialogue 
is foreseen. South Africans themselves must, however, find agreement on how best 
to address systemic issues. The practice of tripartism remains relevant to creating an 
inclusive and more equal society.
1 Introduction
South Africa was a founder member of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ilo). It was forced to withdraw from the Organization in 1964 having 
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fallen foul of the Discrimination Convention of 19581 and rules against forced 
labour, under apartheid. The ilo’s criticism of apartheid is set out in the 1964 
Declaration on Action against Apartheid in South Africa.2 Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s the ilo continued to oppose apartheid, maintaining contact with 
employers representing international companies and mobilising support for 
South African trade unions and liberation movements (Grawitzky, 2013, 5). 
During the transition period, early to mid-1990s, the ilo was central to securing 
resources and technical expertise for democratic trade unions and participants 
in tripartite forums charged with designing post-apartheid labour market pol-
icy and governance (Saul, 1993; Grawitzky, 2013). These deliberations were pri-
marily overseen by the Department of Labour (DoL). South Africa re-joined 
the ilo on 26 May 1994.
The country’s transition to democracy was in part due to powerful trade 
unions and organised business recognising their interdependence and the 
value of social dialogue (Webster and Sikwebu, 2010, 177). Major union federa-
tions, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (cosatu) and the National 
Council of Trade Unions (nactu), who were militant opponents of apartheid 
and who represented black industrial workers, had by the 1980s established 
a track record for forcing the apartheid government to consult them before 
changing labour laws (Gostner and Joffe, 1998, 131).
Contradictions in the labour law architecture under apartheid began to 
show in the late 1960s because the economic implications of shortages of 
skilled labour had not been foreseen. Out of necessity, employers started train-
ing black workers, particularly Africans, for more skilled work. In time the 
apartheid government itself became concerned about giving ‘all groups a stake 
in the system to ensure a common loyalty to the system and the country’ (Kooy 
et al., 1979, 2). It appointed the Wiehahn Commission to look into the labour 
regime and labour legislation, and its recommendations were adopted in the 
period 1979–81. Thus, the previously racialised dual system of industrial rela-
tions characterised by relatively powerless company-level liaison committees 
that cosatu and the nactu had actively opposed was abolished. Freedom of 
association was established and unions representing black workers then joined 
existing industrial councils (where the agreements struck between employers 
1 See Convention no.111 – Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occu-
pation, 1958, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@gender/documents/
genericdocument/wcms_114189.pdf (accessed on 5 June 2018).
2 Following a decision in 1963 by the ilo’s Governing Body to exclude South Africa from vari-
ous trade committees, the ilo Conference of June 1994 adopted the Declaration concerning 
the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa in 1964, http://www.ilo.org/century/
history/iloandyou/WCMS_217915/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 5 June 2018).
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and employees were legally binding). The Commission also established a dedi-
cated court to adjudicate labour matters (Kooy et al., 1979, 11, 27; Dibben et al., 
2015, 463). Interestingly, the Wiehahn Commission described South African la-
bour relations at the time as ‘tripartite’ (Kooy et al. 1979, 3). The Commission 
marked a fundamental shift in industrial relations in South Africa and resulted 
in black workers intensifying their struggles for workplace and social rights 
(Lichtenstein, 2015; Bhorat et al., 2014, 4).
With the practice of bargaining and dialogue having started well before the 
transition to democracy, by the late 1980s tripartism was accepted as a viable 
method for crafting social and labour policy. This gradual restructuring within 
the apartheid state and workplace was eventually institutionalised under the 
National Economic and Labour Council (nedlac), in 1994, both deepening 
democracy and ‘channelling discontent’ (Webster and Sikwebu, 2010, 176–177; 
Benjamin and Cooper, 2016, 3). The intention was to discuss all changes to 
labour, social and economic policy in nedlac before presentation to parlia-
ment. Labour-related matters such as basic conditions of employment, the ilo 
concept of decent work, workers’ compensation, minimum wages, employ-
ment equity and youth unemployment were addressed by nedlac.
In South Africa, the DoL is the custodian of the country’s relationship with 
the ilo. Most labour market institutions in South Africa are located in the DoL 
with the exception of those dealing with mine health and safety and with the 
education and training of mineworkers. The latter are located within the De-
partment of Mineral Resources (dmr), formerly the Department of Minerals 
and Energy. The extended mandate of the mining department is a historical 
artefact arising from mining’s central role in the industrialisation of the coun-
try and created room for differentiated approaches to tripartism. The tripartite 
Mine Health and Safety Act (mhsa) No. 29 of 1996 as amended came into ef-
fect two years after the establishment of nedlac.
As little social value was attached to black lives, mining operations were not 
designed for safety and health, from the outset and for most of the twentieth 
century. Employers in mining and elsewhere upheld apartheid in the work-
place by coercive means (Phakathi, 2012). Production was optimised in the 
support of the ‘politics of white supremacy’ (Jeeves and Crush, 1995, 6) through 
migrant labour, low wages and little regard to the health and safety of min-
ers. Work on mines was brutally policed until the mid-1960s, when production 
incentives and a rational job-grading system were introduced (Moodie, 2005, 
547, 566). From the 1980s onwards, the mining sector’s dismal health and safe-
ty record began to improve on the back of the unionisation and mobilisation 
of black mineworkers by the National Union of Mineworkers (num). In 1994, 
num succeeded in securing a ‘Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health in 
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the Mining Industry’, leading to the enactment of the mhsa in 1996 two years 
into democracy. The mhsa, which developed alongside the ilo’s Conven-
tion 176 (ilo, 1995), gave rise to the tripartite Mine Health and Safety Council 
(mhsc) and the Mining Qualification Authority (mqa). The rights, procedures 
and arrangements established by the mhsa mirror those of Convention 176. 
The practice of social dialogue and associated institutional innovations of the 
new national labour regime were thus also reflected in the mhsa, which rep-
resents the first formal application of tripartite principles in mining in dem-
ocratic South Africa. Through the mhsa, for the first time in South African 
history, mineworkers and their representatives could influence decisions af-
fecting their working conditions. By that point, a racialised and discriminatory 
system of labour-intensive mining had prevailed for almost a century.
2 The Practice of Tripartism in Democratic South Africa
2.1 Statutory Tripartism: The National Economic and Labour Council 
(nedlac)
The nedlac Act of 1994 (nedlac, 1994) adapted the concept of tripartism to 
include the voices of poor and marginalised South Africans. The Act recognised 
four stakeholder groups—government, organised business, organised labour 
and ‘community’ (representatives of civil society)—rather than three. New 
laws on labour relations, conditions of employment and skills development 
followed the establishment of nedlac (Benjamin and Cooper, 2016, 3). But 
the implementation of these new laws and policies fell short of expectations 
(Bezuidenhout et al., 2008, 64–68; von Holdt and Webster, 2005, 21). This di-
minished prospects for a broad social compact premised on agreed macroeco-
nomic policy, designed to achieve substantive economic upliftment, economic 
growth and participation in the formal economy by black South Africans.
The advent of democracy and the institutionalisation of tripartism coincid-
ed with the rise of globalisation. Alongside the structural problems in the na-
tional economy, changes in the global economy also raised formidable barriers 
to nedlac’s attempts to improve employment levels and increase partici-
pation in the formal economy. The casualisation of work, for example, com-
pounded the problem of systemic unemployment caused by apartheid policies 
(Theron, 2005, 314; von Holdt and Webster, 2005, 30). In mining, the level of 
contracting was estimated at 28 per cent by 2012 (Deloitte, 2013, 2). Contract 
workers earned less than workers in permanent jobs and their living condi-
tions were poorer and often informal. Casualisation increased job insecurity 
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and created difficulties in maintaining fair labour practices and standards. 
These were contributing factors to the explosive situation at Marikana Plati-
num Mine, culminating in 2012 in the deaths of 34 striking miners and the in-
juring of 78 others under fire from the South African Police (Farlam et al., 2015, 
514, 544–559; Deloitte, 2013, 4). Globalisation also created opportunities that 
benefitted large South African mining companies rather than the local mining 
industry, and these companies moved their head offices and stock exchange 
listings offshore as they internationalised their portfolios. Within the coun-
try, private sector investments in mining research and development dropped 
off since it appeared that expertise could be sourced from anywhere in the 
world.
nedlac’s capacity to foster deep societal change was also hampered by in-
ternal difficulties. Employer organisations and unions represented in nedlac 
were not broadly representative of society. Despite widespread unionisation, 
large numbers of South African workers were not unionised, and the interests 
of smaller and large employers diverged (Dibben et al., 2015, 465). As new op-
portunities became available to black South Africans thanks to democratisa-
tion, trade unions’ capacity to effectively represent workers diminished, with 
the loss of senior trade unionists to positions in government and business and 
promotions into supervisory and management positions at work (Buhlungu, 
2010, 157–166; Hirschsohn, 2011). Even the ‘community’ group was not fully 
representative of civil society. Many civil organisations failed to meet ned-
lac’s membership criteria, and the community group’s participation in ned-
lac was limited to discussions on development (Webster and Sikwebu, 2010, 
181–184, 214). It was apparent within a few years that dialogue in nedlac was 
more adversarial than consensus seeking. Few agreements were struck, raising 
questions about nedlac’s capacity to deliver on its mandate (ka’Nkosi, 1997). 
This led to the creation of the controversial Millennium Labour Council in 
2000 to augment nedlac, in which disagreements were to be hammered out 
before reaching nedlac (Dibben et al., 2015, 466). After the events at Mari-
kana in 2012, a review of nedlac was commissioned in the face of continued 
concerns over whether it could deliver a viable social compact (Joffe, 2013). 
The ilo provided support for this review. To date, no alternatives to nedlac 
have emerged and efforts continue to address its shortcoming and limitations. 
As reviewers Webster and Joynt pointed out, nedlac could be fixed. The fore-
most challenge was to overcome the insider–outsider problems in which in 
big business, ‘a labour aristocracy’ and a highly paid civil service seek to main-




2.2 Non-statutory Tripartism in Mining and the Role of ‘Summits’
Prior to the establishment of the mhsa in 1990, num called for social dialogue 
and tripartite discussion over the economic future of the mining industry. 
While the first of these ‘mining summits’ failed, the num put forward a de-
mand for an inquiry into mine health and safety, which eventually resulted in 
the appointment of the Commission that recommended the mhsa (Masilo 
and Rautenbach, 2008, 1–2). After the mhsa was enacted in 1996, from 1998 on-
wards several mining summits, and initiatives such as Deep Mine, PlatMine and 
FutureMine, were convened to address issues in gold- and platinum-mining 
(Durrheim, 2007). These endeavours were collaborative, multi-stakeholder 
and tripartite in form, and included scientific research. The common thread 
was to stave off mine closures and prevent job losses. In coal-mining, the 
CoalTech Research Association, established in 1999, is another example of a 
multiparty forum in which government, labour and employers are represented, 
in this case to secure the future of the coal sector by focussing on sustainability, 
competitiveness and safety (CoalTech, n.d.). Except for CoalTech, these ini-
tiatives had limited success as they failed to translate into concrete, ongoing 
programmes of work.
Cracks became evident in the ad hoc tripartite practices associated with the 
dmr when the Mining Industry Growth, Development and Employment Task 
Team (migdett), established in December 2008 by agreement between the 
tripartite stakeholders, did not conclude its work. migdett was created in re-
sponse to the global economic and financial crisis, which particularly affected 
the mining sector. It was to develop strategies for transforming the industry 
through interventions to improve competitiveness, increase the participa-
tion of black South Africans in mining, minimise job losses and position the 
mining industry for sustainable growth (pmg, 2010). The 2017 Revised Mining 
Charter (dmr, 2017), developed by the dmr, dealt with the issues assigned to 
migdett. Serious differences (le Cordeur, 2017) over the appropriateness and 
viability of the policies and mechanisms proposed in the Charter led to organ-
ised business and government turning to the courts for resolution.
The Mining Phakisa (‘phakisa’ means ‘hurry up’) is a recent and more hope-
ful expanded tripartite initiative than migdett. It got underway in 2015 with-
out significant involvement from the dmr. The Phakisa adopted a holistic 
approach to replacing outdated technologies, processes and organisational 
structures on gold and platinum mines. It recognised the interdependence of 
the futures of gold- and platinum-mining, and the many people, communi-
ties and industries dependent on these commodities. It also revisited the link-
ages between mining and industrial development. One of the workstreams of 
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the Phakisa envisaged a mechanised and ultimately automated, low-profile 
mining system which was to be designed and produced locally. This system 
would address the challenges in mining, create new employment opportuni-
ties, and meet local and international demand for such systems. A similar idea 
had been set aside in the past because of the depth of mining, the unique-
ness of the gold and platinum ore-bodies, worker resistance, and managerial 
conservatism (Paul Stewart, 2015). Following protracted discussions within 
and  between the private and public sectors, and herculean efforts to raise 
the necessary funding, the first phase of research and development work fi-
nally  started in late 2016 (csir, 2016). The background to and practice of social 
dialogue and tripartism in mining, both non-statutory and statutory, is sum-
marised in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.� Practice of social dialogue and tripartism in mining
Sources: Baartjies et al., �007; Benjamin and Cooper, �0�6; CoalTech, 
n.d.; comsa, n.d.; comsa, �0�7; comsa, �0�0–�7; comsa, �005–�7; csir, 
�0�6; Durrheim, �007; Leon et al., �994; Masilo and Rautenbach, �008, 
�–�; McCulloch, �0��, 9–�0; pmg, �0�0; Webster and Joynt, �0�4.
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2.3 Statutory Tripartite Structures of the mhsa: Achievements and 
Limitations
The provisions of the mhsa mark South Africa’s first legislated application 
of tripartite principles in mining. The mhsa sets out specific responsibilities 
for government, employers and workers’ representatives. These parties are re-
quired to work together to ensure mineworkers’ health and safety. The govern-
ment’s responsibility for mine health and safety resides with Mine Health and 
Safety Inspectorate (mhsi) in the dmr. The mhsi is responsible for health 
and safety at mines and for the effects of mining on people in surrounding 
settlements and communities. The mhsa also gave rise to the tripartite mhsc 
and the Mining Qualifications Authority (mqa). In law, the Chief Inspector of 
Mines chairs both the mhsc and the mqa.
Under the mhsa, the mhsc was designed to address the extremely high lev-
els of death and injury among mainly black mineworkers. The mhsi is the sin-
gle representative of government in the Council. Employers are primarily rep-
resented by the South African Chamber of Mines (comsa). The South African 
Mining Development Association (samda), representing mainly black-owned 
small and medium-sized mining companies, is largely inactive. The multiplic-
ity of unions representing workers is indicative of the divisions among and 
stratification of the workforce. The main fault lines are skill levels and race, 
and more recently rivalry and competition between the num and the Associa-
tion of Mine Workers and Construction Union (amcu). The num and amcu 
largely represent black mineworkers, while the other unions—Solidarity 
and the United Association South Africa (uasa)—represent artisans, techni-
cians and supervisory staff, that is to say, workers in occupations historically 
reserved for ‘whites’. amcu emerged in 2012 as a militant union in direct chal-
lenge to the num and just over a year ago agreed to formally participate in the 
mhsc. The unions representing mineworkers are increasingly more general 
than sector specific.
2.3.1 The Mine Health and Safety Council
Many achievements are associated with the mhsc and its subcommittees, in-
cluding the development of regulations and guidelines, the publication of a 
widely respected handbook on occupational health (Guild et al., 2001), several 
guidebooks and research programmes. In addition, since the inception of the 
mhsa several national tripartite initiatives have been launched (Table 4.1).
The mhsa introduced rights for workers—to representation, participa-
tion, information and training and the right to refuse dangerous work. Under 
the mhsa an extensive body of related law was developed over time, which 
included codes of practice (both mandatory and offering guidance) that invoke 
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the msha’s principal concepts–tripartism and risk management. To date, 23 
new regulations have been introduced, along with 12 guidelines for mandatory 
codes of practice and further informal guidance notes.
At mine sites, the mhsa requires engagement between inspectors from the 
mhsi, employers’ and employees’ representatives, and bipartite engagement 
between employers’ and employees’ representatives. The latter has resulted in:
– Company and mine-level agreements on arrangements for information 
sharing, joint planning and decision-making, training and auditing.
– Health and safety committees at every mine or on every shaft (the latter in 
the case of large mines).
– Mineworker health and safety representatives or stewards, who are mem-
bers of health and safety committees or subcommittees.
The committees consider issues raised by workers, managerial concerns, levels 
of compliance to rules and standards, training, health and safety interventions, 
Table 4.�  National health and safety initiatives
Tripartite initiatives Lead institution
1 2003 to 2013, Safety Milestones (Journey 
towards Zero Harm). 
Main thrusts were to reduce fatalities to 
sector-leading levels,a eliminate silicosis and 
eliminate noise-induced hearing loss.
Mine Health and Safety 
Council
2 2008, Tripartite Action Plan to achieve 2013 
milestones, and the formation of Regional 
Tripartite Health and Safety Forums.
Mine Health and Safety 
Council
3 2009, Mining Occupational Health and 
Safety (mosh) Learning Hub established.
Chamber of Mines of 
South Africa
4 2011, Culture Transformation Framework 
developed and approved.
Mine Health and Safety 
Council
5 2014, Milestones on Health and Safety. Mine Health and Safety 
Council
6 2016, Signed pledge by tripartite stakehold-
ers to ensure achievement of occupational 
health and safety milestones.
Mine Health and Safety 
Council
a South African mining fatality rates were benchmarked against the averages of the fatality 
rates of the mining sectors of Canada, the usa and Australia.
Sources: comsa, �005–�7; mhsc, �0�6; mhsc, �0�4; mosh, no date.
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and incident investigations and their results. A sector-wide audit of these re-
quirements (which included small-scale mines) conducted by the mhsi in 
2008 found that two-thirds of mines comply with these arrangements (dme, 
2008).
2.3.2 Mixed Results for Mine Safety
Mining employment peaked at over 827,000 employed in 1987, with just over 
564,000 (67 per cent) working on gold mines; but thereafter gold-mining em-
ployment declined almost steadily to 115,822 people in 2016 (Nattrass, 1995, 
862; Seekings and Nattrass, 2002, 5–6; Baartjies et al., 2007, 3–4; comsa, 
2017, 9). Higher levels of employment in platinum-, coal-, iron-, chrome- and 
manganese-mining have not offset the job losses in gold-mining, losses that 
were due to lower gold prices, the declining quality of gold reserves and increas-
ing costs and difficulties in extracting gold at deep levels using labour-intensive 
methods (Nattrass, 1995, 865). Sharp declines in employment followed. Given 
the structural linkages between the mining sector and local industry, the con-
traction of the mining sector affected employment levels across the economy 
(Fine, 2008; Fine and Rustomjee, 1996).
At face value there have been huge gains for health and safety. The Commis-
sion of Inquiry into Mine Health and Safety documented that between 1900 
and 1993 over 69,000 mineworkers lost their lives, and that over 1,000,000 were 
seriously injured (Leon et al., 1994, 15). In 1993, gold-mining fatalities account-
ed for 418 of the 578 fatalities recorded, while in coal-mining—then ranked 
the second most dangerous mining environment after gold—90 deaths were 
recorded (Leon et al., 1994, 19). By 2016 the number of deaths per annum due 
to mine accidents had fallen by 88 per cent to 73 in total, with the majority 
recorded on gold, platinum and coal mines, respectively (mhsc, 2016, 20). This 
change is significant by South African standards.
The major causes of death and injury among mineworkers involve ‘falls of 
ground’ (FoG) from the roof and sidewalls of the workplaces in underground 
mines, transport in mining, and machinery. These have been the focus of pre-
ventative interventions (mhsc, 2016, 37; comsa, 2017, 3–4) under the health 
and safety milestones agreed by the mhsc and referred to in Table 4.1. The 
mining sector has also been prone to disasters associated with rockbursts in 
deep-level mines, flammable gas explosions in coal and gassy gold mines, mine 
fires, and shaft-related accidents in deep-level gold mines. Disasters have de-
creased from a high of 82 in the 1990s to four in the period 2010–14, through 
better understanding and avoidance of the conditions and mechanisms that 
precipitate them. From 2003 onwards, the number of lives lost on gold mines 
became more comparable to those lost in platinum- and coal-mining (mhsc, 
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2014, 20), significantly reducing overall fatality frequency rates and the number 
of fatalities in mining. This is due to the falling numbers of people employed 
in gold-mining (comsa, 2017, 9), and to rising employment (albeit not match-
ing gold-mining job losses) at mines on which hazards are more amenable to 
control, such as mines at which trackless and mechanised mining methods 
are in use. The dmr currently only reports numbers of fatalities for the sector 
and each commodity, and not the associated fatality rates, which are indicative 
of the level of risk per year and are calculated as the number of fatalities per 
200,000 or 1,000,000 hours worked.
While health and safety interventions have undoubtedly brought about im-
provement on all mines, the contraction of gold-mining has had a significant 
effect on reducing mortality. Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between trends 
in fatality rates (the number of fatalities per million hours worked) on gold 
mines and the mining industry overall, as well as employment trends. While 
overall levels of employment ranged between 400,000 and 500,000 people 
employed for nearly two decades and employment in gold-mining has fallen 
dramatically, the annualised fatality rates for the sector still strongly correlate 
to that of gold-mining. The linear correlation coefficients between the gold-
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Figure 4.� Gold-mining employment and fatality rates (number of fatalities per million 
hours worked) vs. industry employment and fatality rates
Sources: Baartjies et al., �007; comsa, �0�7; comsa, �0�0–�7; comsa, 
�005–�7; mhsc, �0�6; mhsc, �0�4.
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1990–2015 and 0.92 for the period 2003–16 (when the health and safety mile-
stones applied). This is indicative of how developments in gold-mining influ-
ence the level of risk in the sector. The key factor has been the closure of older, 
difficult to operate and hazardous mines and sections of mines. Consequently, 
the level of improvement suggested by safety data cannot solely be ascribed 
to improvements in safety per se, as the effect of the shrinking gold sector has 
been significant.
Outside of the formal mining sector, the number of deaths among informal 
miners who work in ‘closed’ or officially decommissioned mines, mainly gold 
but also coal mines, has risen steeply. These deaths are not yet included in the 
official statistics. The contexts in which these deaths occur are conflicts be-
tween different groups of informal and technically illegal miners, increased en-
vironmental damage caused on land already affected by mining, health risks, 
and child labour. In South Africa, the working of decommissioned mines is il-
legal. The miners are often destitute ex-mineworkers and many appear to have 
been recruited by crime syndicates. Fires and rock falls in decommissioned 
mines are the main reported causes of death among informal miners, and their 
full extent is unknown. In March 2017, the bodies of 14 informal miners were 
found in a small town east of Johannesburg and their deaths were ascribed to 
rivalry among competing groups of miners (Pijoos, 2017). In 2009, 61 miners 
were estimated to have died in a mine fire (Mail & Guardian Online Reporter 
and sapa, 2009), and in May 2017, 40 people were reported dead following an 
‘illegal mining’ related explosion (Hosken, 2017).
2.3.3 Occupational Health: Significant Legacy Issues
Improving occupational health remains a serious challenge. The reliability of 
occupational disease data is a worldwide problem. Reasons for this include 
long periods of latency before disease becomes evident, difficulties in recog-
nising occupational disease outside of the workplace and inadequacies in the 
systems for diagnosing, documenting and recording occupational diseases 
(Burgard and Chen, 2014, 148). These factors are compounded in South Africa 
by systemic indifference to the well-being of mineworkers and by the manifes-
tation of occupational disease long after miners have returned home to far off 
rural areas. The Commission of Inquiry into Mine Health and Safety concluded 
on the basis of various studies that rates of conditions such as tuberculosis 
(TB), noise-induced hearing loss, silicosis and coal miners’ pneumoconiosis 
were very high, and possibly at epidemic levels (Leon et al., 1994, 17). Further 
evidence emerged after the Commission had completed its work, of several ep-
idemics of occupational lung diseases affecting asbestos miners and their com-
munities and gold miners exposed to silica dust (Felix et al., 1994; McCulloch, 
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2009; Murray et al., 2011). Current data gathered by the dmr suggest that ex-
posure levels to airborne dusts have been reduced, but the effects thereof on 
levels of occupational disease are not yet apparent.
Efforts to improve occupational health are, as with safety, guided by the 
milestones set at the mhsc. The priorities are to reduce noise in mines, im-
prove the effectiveness of hearing-conservation programmes, reduce exposure 
to airborne pollutants through improved ventilation systems, and introduce 
measures to prevent dust from becoming airborne (mhsc, 2016, 6, 9–10). 
Data from the dmr show that the number of cases of occupational diseases 
diagnosed declined between 2003 and 2013, the period to which the first set 
of health and safety milestones applied. This trend corresponds to declining 
numbers of cases reported at gold mines. While 7,461, 2,042 and 5,783 cases of 
pulmonary tuberculosis, silicosis, and noise-induced hearing loss, respectively, 
were diagnosed in 2003, by 2013 these numbers declined to 1,900, 1,164 and 471, 
respectively (mhsc, 2014, 20). As shown in Figure 4.3, the entire sector’s occu-
pational health data track that of gold-mining, with particularly close correla-
tions between the number of recorded cases of silicosis and TB in the whole 
sector and the number of cases recorded on gold mines.
Compensation owed to ex-mineworkers suffering from occupational dis-
















Figure 4.3 Occupational health: mining sector relative to gold-mining
Sources: Baartjies et al., �007; comsa, �0�0–�7; mhsc, �0�6; mhsc, �0�4.
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continues to weigh heavily on the sector. In 2003, litigation against Cape plc 
resulted in a settlement in favour of asbestos miners and mining communities, 
‘the award of which was managed by the Asbestos Relief and the Kgalagadi 
Relief trusts’ (Asbestos Relief Trust, 2003). In 2016, litigation to secure com-
pensation for 4,365 claimants for silicosis and silico-tuberculosis contracted 
in gold mines resulted in a settlement of usd 35 million (zar 464 million) 
with Anglo American SA and AngloGold Ashanti. This settlement followed 12 
years of litigation and may pave the way for an industry-wide compensation 
scheme for all gold miners with silicosis (Meeran and Martin, 2016). A sepa-
rate silicosis class action lawsuit, underway since 2012, aims to secure claims 
against 30 gold-mining companies (Bega, 2017). This claim could benefit over 
200,000 miners and their families through a settlement reached on 3 May 2018 
(Reuters, 2018a; Reuters, 2018b). These lawsuits point to one of the limitations 
of statutory tripartism—namely, that legacy issues have not been brought into 
statutory structures. Recent attempts to resolve compensation payment back-
logs affecting tens of thousands of migrant ex-mineworkers are being facili-
tated through a partnership between the World Bank, the International Organ-
isation for Migration and the Department of Health. While the mhsc hosted 
the 2016 Compensation Summit, it has not yet found a way to deliberate on one 
of the most poignant legacy issues in South African mining.
2.4 Mixed Experience with Workers’ Rights
The health and safety rights of mineworkers were strengthened by the intro-
duction of the mhsa. Studies show progress with respect to the practice of 
worker-elected health and safety representatives and with Section 23 of the 
mhsa, which gives workers the right to leave a dangerous workplace. In each 
case, however, workers have yet to fully realise their rights.
Case study research found that the activities of health and safety represen-
tatives included important health and safety tasks such as risk assessment, 
worker education and compliance, supervision of worker health and well-
being, and administration and reporting. However, in each area of activity, 
health and safety representatives faced significant obstacles in the execution 
of these tasks and there were more risks than benefits to being a health and 
safety representative (Coulson, 2016).
A sector-wide study commissioned by the mhsc found that the provisions 
of Section 23 had been successfully communicated to mineworkers in the large 
gold, coal and platinum commodity sectors, and virtually all were aware of 
their rights and had had some training (albeit by their employer) on how to 
exercise them. However, there were shortcomings. Workers could not state the 
procedure associated with the right, mineworkers deferred to their health and 
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safety representatives prior to taking any action, casual workers were less likely 
to exercise the right, and up to a third of workers who withdrew from their 
workplace returned there still thinking it was dangerous (Coulson et al., 2018).
The experience of worker–employer safety committees remains undocu-
mented. It is thought that the emergence of amcu in direct competition with 
the num may have reduced the effectiveness of these committees and the 
arrangements for worker representation. The underpinning collective agree-
ments between recognised trade unions and the employer are premised on the 
presence of a majority union, and relations between amcu and the num tend 
to be tense, adversarial and prone to violent confrontation (Chinguno, 2013).
2.5 Divisions between Stakeholders Persist
The sector-wide Mine Occupational Safety and Health (mosh) Leading Prac-
tice Adoption System aimed to introduce, across the South African mining sec-
tor, technologies and procedures that have a demonstrable impact on health 
and safety performance. This comsa-led programme was found—despite its 
best efforts to involve other stakeholders—to, in practice, be expert-led and 
unable to target mines with the worst health and safety performance; statu-
tory representative structures for workers were bypassed and the dmr was 
ambivalent about direct involvement (Hermanus et al., 2015). The initiative 
was conceived outside the mhsc although labour and the mhsi thought it 
ought to be brought under the Council’s umbrella. Ultimately, involvement by 
the industry in mosh was not left as voluntary and companies were required 
to report on their consideration and uptake of mosh technologies under the 
Mining Charter ii score card (a regulatory instrument that aims to ‘transform’ 
the mining sector).
In the last five years the dmr has adopted an increasingly punitive ap-
proach to enforcement in an effort to force improvement upon the industry. 
In terms of Section 54 of the mhsa, mine inspectors can stop a section of a 
mine, or an entire mine, when there is a serious and imminent threat to the 
safety of mineworkers. How the dmr and the industry differ on the interpre-
tation of this section of the Act is further straining their relationship (Ryan, 
2016). The dmr issued directives to stop mines for a wide range of infractions, 
some seemingly minor, and described these as evidence of inspectors’ stronger 
approach to enforcement (dmr, 2012). According to industry executives, stop-
pages were often justified, but not on the scale required by the dmr—closing 
an entire mine for infractions confined to a single workplace or mining section 
(Ryan, 2016). A labour decision in favour of AngloGold Ashanti gave weight to 
this argument when a judge ruled that dmr inspectors unreasonably failed 
to issue a directive proportional to the harm or potential harm they intended 
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to prevent, but instead unfairly issued a Section 54 work stoppage to a whole 
mining operation. This was described as an unreasonable act on the part of the 
dmr in a Labour Court judgement.3
3 Conclusions
Tripartism and social dialogue is well established in South Africa with a new 
labour market regime replete with institutions, new laws and entrenched pro-
cesses. In this the ilo has played a crucial role by opposing apartheid, expos-
ing the links between apartheid and forced labour, supporting liberation and 
the exiled trade union movements during apartheid, training the participants 
of tripartite forums and resourcing efforts to institutionalise social dialogue in 
the transition to democracy.
But dialogue in the premier institution, nedlac, has been too fractious 
and too narrow to bring about agreement on addressing the deeply structural 
causes of poverty, unemployment and marginalisation in South Africa. Con-
cerns over the adequacy of representation, divisions between stakeholders, 
and powerful interests in maintaining the status quo are among the issues that 
hamper nedlac. But nedlac can be fixed by acknowledging these problems 
and through a willingness to work towards substantive change (Webster and 
Joynt, 2014; Webster et al., 2008). There are also opportunities for creating a 
more comprehensive and ‘joined up’ form of tripartism by making fully vis-
ible the social project confronting South Africa and facilitating the connection 
between and the amplification of initiatives that show promise. While sectoral 
issues may require dedicated attention, nedlac could be positioned to take 
stock of, coordinate and influence dialogue across the wide spectrum of set-
tings in which social dialogue takes place. nedlac’s predicament is indicative 
of the current challenges facing the ilo in an increasingly globalised but frag-
mented world. The organisation could create and disseminate knowledge on 
how social compacts—the ideal that underpins tripartism—can be built and 
sustained. Extending its presence and bringing its expertise to bear in a wider 
range of forums could be one way of accomplishing this.
Similar issues beset mining as beset nedlac. There are divisions among the 
key stakeholder groupings, and the tripartite structures responsible for mine 
health and safety have largely avoided discussion on the inherent limitations 
3 Johannesburg Labour Court, J2459/16, AngloGold Ashanti Limited vs Mbonambi and Oth-
ers, 4 November 2016, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCJHB/2016/522.html (accessed on 
5 June 2018).
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of labour-intensive deep-level mining, the emergence of informal (illegal) 
mining, and the epidemics of occupational disease. This has led to one-sided 
or narrowly defined efforts to improve conditions in mining, unlike the efforts 
of the latest mining summit—the Mining Phakisa—which aims to transform 
gold- and platinum-mining in their totality. However, while the low-key role of 
the dmr in the Phakisa initiative and the lack of recognition of the initiative 
in nedlac might shelter the Phakisa from the turmoil present in these institu-
tions in the short term, in the long run the Phakisa is likely to falter if it cannot 
garner sufficient and wide-ranging support for its objectives.
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Chapter 5
The ilo’s Role in Global Governance: Limits  
and Potential
Velibor Jakovleski, Scott Jerbi and Thomas Biersteker
Abstract
The International Labour Organization (ilo) has demonstrated a remarkable abil-
ity to adapt to changing conditions throughout its long history. At its centenary, the 
ilo must once again respond to evolving circumstances and find new ways to engage 
state and private actors participating in an interconnected global economy where la-
bour standards continue to be violated and where work itself is undergoing significant 
transformations. This chapter explores recent efforts by the ilo’s leadership to reassert 
the organisation’s role in broader global policy contexts. Part 1 presents the concept 
of institutional layering in order to understand better the agents of change and the 
structures in which they operate. The three sections that follow demonstrate institu-
tional layering across three core dimensions of global governance—actors, rules, and 
mechanisms—in the period since 1998. The chapter concludes that the ilo’s current 
governance practices have mixed prospects for the organisation’s role in a changing 
governance landscape. New layers of soft law rules and flexible governance mecha-
nisms can potentially augment the ilo’s global standing moving forward. Its lack of 
representativeness and its continuing engagement of new actors, however, demand 
further formal changes to the ilo’s institutional apparatus.
1 Introduction
Over its long history, the International Labour Organization (ilo) has been 
at the forefront of global debates on social justice and the world of work. It 
was established in 1919 at a time when frictions between business and labour, 
the so-called labour problem, were widespread (Helfer, 2006). The ilo’s golden 
age could be said to have culminated in 1969 with the awarding of a Nobel 
Peace Prize to the Organization fifty years after its foundation.1 Thereafter, 
1 See the website https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1969/labour-facts 
.html (accessed on 12 June 2018).
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global economic and ideational changes began to challenge some of the ilo’s 
core norms. Globalisation, understood as the worldwide intensification of 
socio-economic interdependence, the deepening integration of local and na-
tional activities into the global economy, and modes of thinking shifting away 
from the national level towards regional and global levels (Biersteker, 1998), 
presented a new set of policy problems and priorities and increased pressure 
on the ilo’s foundational structure to adapt.
The extent to which the ilo has met those challenges as well as its role in 
contemporary global governance has been questioned. Some observers sug-
gest the Organization is increasingly at the margins of influence of global eco-
nomic governance (Weiss, 2011). Critiques of the ilo centre on its declining 
standard-setting role (see Figure 5.1, below), low ratification rates of its con-
ventions (Boockmann, 2001), perceived non-representativeness (Alston, 2005), 
overambitious mandate (Standing, 2008, 2010) and restrictive decision-making 
processes (Baccaro and Mele, 2012). Recent decades have also seen the emer-
gence of new and diverse governance arrangements and actors outside ilo 
structures that are also addressing, or potentially undermining, the protection 
of worker rights.
Despite these criticisms and in an effort to contribute to the debate about 
the ilo’s changing role in global governance at its centenary, this chapter as-
sesses recent efforts by the ilo’s leadership to augment the organisation’s in-
fluence in a number of critical policy domains. The analysis provides a histori-
cal institutionalist argument to explain the sources and nature of those reform 
initiatives—largely driven by different Directors General and sometimes de-
veloped outside the ilo—which at times are also supported by governments 
and employer and worker groups. Part one of the chapter introduces the con-
cept of institutional layering in order to understand why the ilo has adapted 
incrementally. The three sections that follow demonstrate layering across three 
core dimensions of global governance—actors, rules, and mechanisms— 
focusing on the period since 1998. Evidence suggests that the ilo has: (1) shift-
ed in the area of standard-setting towards soft law instruments to promote 
respect for labour rights rather than an exclusive focus on traditional interna-
tional legal instruments; (2) developed, with respect to implementation and 
capacity building, partnerships with multiple and diverse actors beyond ac-
tion undertaken exclusively within its tripartite structure; and (3) opened it-
self to the role of decentralised governance mechanisms and self-regulation in 
addition to more traditional regulation of labour through state-based steering 
mechanisms. Those changes have significant implications for the organisation’s 
global governance role. While emphasising soft and flexible instruments and 
involvement in decentralised governance can potentially augment its global 
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governance role moving forward, the ilo’s engagement of new actors will de-
mand further changes to its formal institutional apparatus to be effective.
2 Governance in Layers: The ilo’s Gradual Adaptation to a Changing 
Global Context
Global governance is defined here as ‘an inter-subjectively recognized, pur-
posive order at the global level, which defines, constrains, and shapes actor 
expectations in an issue domain’ (Biersteker, 2015, 160). It is based on systems 
of authoritative rules (both formal and informal) that apply to multiple actors 
(both public and private) whose behaviours are coordinated by governance 
mechanisms (ranging from hierarchy and steering by an agent to self-regulation 
by a market) to achieve particular objectives (Biersteker, 2015).
We argue that the ilo’s efforts over the past two decades to (re)assert its 
role in global governance entail a process of incremental change to the rules, 
actors, and mechanisms of governance. Why has change been gradual and of-
ten at the margins, despite growing concerns that the ilo’s global standing has 
itself been in decline? Even during periods of major change (e.g. wars, global 
economic crises, the changes brought on by globalisation) significant organ-
isational change does not come about easily. External factors alone are not 
sufficient to inform change because certain institutional actors must have the 
incentives and ability to do so (Andonova, 2017).
The ilo’s institutional apparatus was established in 1919 and it initially 
empowered a specific constellation of actors—governments, unions and 
 employers—within a tripartite structure that was revolutionary at the time. 
Those same actors operate essentially by the same rules today, demonstrating 
that institutions can persist long after the constellation of interests and actors 
that initially gave rise to them have changed (Pierson, 2004). The ilo’s evolu-
tion has thus been shaped by a predictable dynamic whereby the tripartite 
actors have been incentivised to perpetuate the institutional status quo and to 
consolidate further their positions, while resisting changes that challenge their 
privileged positions (Mahoney, 2000). Conversely, changes that could diverge 
notably from the status quo often originate from relatively weaker actors in-
stitutionally, such as the Director General and Secretariat, or external change 
agents such as civil society or corporations.
Under conditions where actors are either unwilling (e.g. the tripartite ac-
tors) or formally unable (e.g. the International Labour Office) to undertake 
significant change, the ilo’s recent reform efforts are examples of what his-
torical institutionalists call ‘institutional layering’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
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Layering does not alter the formal institutional framework of an organisation, 
which continues to enjoy at least a modicum of legitimacy. It is a conserva-
tive way to go about organisational change and includes new practices being 
appended to existing institutions. As a result, the institutionally privileged tri-
partite actors can tolerate deviations from the status quo and even abide by 
some new practices. If the new governance layers are perceived to threaten 
their privileged positions, however, the tripartite actors can fall back to the 
ilo’s existing institutional framework and reinforce their positions formally.
Institutional layering can take the form of new rules or policy processes, 
the addition of new actors, or the introduction of new mechanisms of gover-
nance, as the following three sections will demonstrate, respectively. Crucially, 
the institutional layers do not replicate the ilo’s existing formal structures, 
which specify a well-defined set of actors interacting largely through formal 
governance mechanisms. The new layers include ‘soft’ rules, engagements with 
a multiplicity of new actors, and more decentralised mechanisms for regulat-
ing their behaviours. Thus, layering opens the door for other actors, rules, and 
processes to contest the authority of the ilo and its social partners in the im-
plementation and development of global labour standards. How that contes-
tation is managed will have implications for the ilo’s global governance role 
moving forward.
3 The ilo’s Increasing Reliance on ‘Soft’ Governance
Historically praised for its formal standard-setting activities, the nature of the 
ilo’s outputs and the extent to which they are authoritative has evolved sig-
nificantly over recent decades. The ilo (like many other international organ-
isations) has increasingly relied on ‘soft’ governance instruments as opposed 
to legally binding standards (Vabulas and Snidal, 2013). The ilo’s Recommen-
dations, Declarations, and overarching policy frameworks are examples of 
instruments that move away from traditional forms of legal authority. They 
are characterised by relatively lower degrees of obligation, precision and del-
egation (Abbott et al., 2000) and help overcome practical problems like the 
inability to reach broad acceptance of legally binding commitments and their 
associated high political costs. For critics, however, such instruments represent 
a weakening of legally binding commitments and a dangerous turn to more 
aspirational and promotional approaches to achieving broader progress in 
labour rights protection.2
2 For a helpful summary of debates around the Declarations, see Hughes and Haworth (2011).
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3.1 Promoting Labour Standards through Recommendations
During the mid-1990s, a period during which its formal standard-setting role 
was in decline (Figure 5.1), soft law instruments were viewed as a means by 
which to breathe new life into the ilo. At that time, the tripartite constituents 
were largely content with the status quo: workers were unwavering support-
ers of the adoption of conventions as opposed to recommendations—despite 
their obviously declining ratification rates—while employers’ groups support-
ed conventions at least implicitly (ilo, 1997a).
Director General Michel Hansenne, who headed the organisation through 
the 1990s, thought other approaches could be more strategic and called for 
more frequent use of recommendations. Specifically, he advocated that rec-
ommendations serve as autonomous instruments, rather than simply as sup-
plements to elaborate conventions, as was the norm (ilo, 1997a). The idea of 
promoting recommendations separately from conventions would not chal-
lenge the institutional status quo, as Hansenne tried to assure his constituents: 





















Figure 5.� ilo standard setting over time
Source: ilo (�0�8a; �0�8b, �0�8c, �0�8d); authors’ elaboration of the 
data.
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even to change it in order to be able to take on any new standard-setting activi-
ties it might assume in this age of globalization. All it has to do is to make a 
more judicious use -- more in line with their original objectives -- of the unique 
means of action [i.e. Recommendations] placed at its disposal’ (ilo, 1997a).
Since 1998, the ilo’s formal outputs include nine conventions, two of which 
were protocols to existing conventions. The ilo’s most recent convention—the 
2011 Domestic Workers Convention3—was of a technical nature, rather than a 
priority ‘governance’ or ‘fundamental’ convention. With only 25 ratifications at 
the time of writing, this convention entered into force in 2013 and signals the 
declining relevance of ‘hard law’ instruments issued by the ilo.
During the same period, the ilo has adopted 17 additional soft instruments 
in the form of recommendations. Notably, over half of those recommenda-
tions (9 out of 17) can be classified as ‘autonomous’ instruments, meaning they 
were not adopted to simply provide precision to the terms of a corresponding 
convention. Rather they address new issues by providing guidance through 
authoritative statements on certain principles, and can shape policies and 
generate legal effects at the national level. Autonomous resolutions indicate 
a trend towards greater reliance on less formal instruments that can build on 
the formal institutional framework already in place. A recent example is the 
2015 Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation,4 
which was adopted nearly unanimously. It was anticipated that the Recom-
mendation would help address a ‘major gap in ilo standards’ and enhance 
the global standing of the ilo as a forum for the discussion of good labour 
practices (ilo, 2012,10).
3.2 Promoting Labour Standards through Broad Policy Frameworks
In a similar vein, declarations are another ‘soft’ instrument that has become 
important for the ilo in recent decades. The adoption of the 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work5 was seen by supporters both 
as addressing significant shortcomings in the implementation of existing ilo 
conventions and as solidifying global consensus in a non-legally binding text 
3 See Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), available at the website https://www.ilo 
.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189 (accessed on 
21 August 2018).
4 See Recommendation No. 204 concerning the Transition from the Informal to the Formal 
Economy, available at the website http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_377774.pdf (accessed on 21 August 2018).
5 See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, available at the website 
https://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
(accessed on 21 August 2018).
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around basic workplace rights or ‘core labour standards’ that apply in all coun-
tries. The Declaration was constituted as an expected standard of performance 
for all states and was also viewed as a framework that could assist in modernis-
ing the structure and operations of the ilo.
Like workers’ groups, some states preferred to prioritise formal instruments 
but many others preferred a non-legally binding alternative (ilo, 1997c).6  
A declaration was seen as a politically cost-effective way for Member States to 
acknowledge their commitment to core principles, even for those states not 
ready to ratify the corresponding conventions (ilo, 1997d). Supporting the 
idea of institutional layering, the Director General assured his constituents 
that ‘it is in no way a question of imposing, through such a declaration, new 
obligations on member States against their will’ (ilo, 1997d). With no new ob-
ligations, a declaration would not put into question the existing legal basis of 
the ilo system nor would it require a constitutional amendment.
In 1999, Juan Somavía began his term as the ilo’s ninth Director General 
by seeking to build on the declaration’s foundation and underlying logic as 
a governance instrument with the Decent Work Agenda (ilo, 1999). As close 
observers have noted (Rodgers et al., 2009, 223), the idea of ‘decent work’ 
reflected a desire to improve ilo coherence internally and signalled a recogni-
tion of rapid changes in the nature of work at the end of the twentieth century, 
changes to which the ilo needed to respond if it wished to maintain its rel-
evance. This was particularly important after the 2008 global financial crisis, 
which presented an opportunity for the ilo to play an important role in helping 
coordinate global action for recovery and for fair and sustainable globalisation. 
Within that context, the Director General envisioned that ‘The ilo’s Decent 
Work Agenda can be a foundation for a global new deal’ (Somavía, 2008). It was 
followed up with the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization7 
and the 2009 Global Jobs Pact,8 with the purpose of once again reaffirming ex-
isting principles and objectives of the organisation, in this case those set out in 
the Decent Work Agenda and already contained in the ilo’s Constitution.
To recap, since 1998 the ilo has moved steadily towards non-binding 
standard-setting processes. In addition to nine autonomous recommenda-
tions, it has revised a past declaration and adopted two new declarations and 
6 GB.270/3/1(Add.) 270th Session, Geneva, November 1997.
7 See ilo Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, available at the website 
http://www.ilo.org/global/meetings-and-events/campaigns/voices-on-social-justice/
WCMS_099766/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 21 August 2018).
8 See Recovering from the crisis: A Global Jobs Pact, available at the website https://www.ilo 
.org/ilc/ILCSessions/98thSession/texts/WCMS_115076/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 21 
August 2018).
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developed two broad policy frameworks (the Decent Work Agenda and Global 
Jobs Pact). These instruments have relatively lower degrees of legal obligation, 
they have broad objectives, and they rarely delegate significant formal author-
ity. As a result, recommendations, declarations and policy frameworks can in-
crease the breadth of the ilo’s regulatory reach, but not necessarily its depth. 
The incorporation of labour standards in trade agreements, as discussed in the 
next section, provides an illustration.
3.3 The Added Value of Soft Instruments? Labour Standards in Trade 
Agreements
It should be recalled that the World Trade Organization (wto) identified the 
ilo as the competent body to negotiate labour standards at its 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial Conference, with its refusal to incorporate a so-called social clause 
within the multilateral trade regime. Both employers and developing countries 
were against including a punitive social clause in the wto’s Charter because 
of concerns that it might be leveraged into a form of protectionism (Biffl and 
Isaac, 2002). There was also considerable resistance within the ilo to setting 
up what would effectively become a punitive social clause, because it would 
undermine the ilo’s traditional emphasis on technical assistance and moral 
suasion to promote labour standards (Haworth and Hughes, 1997). Soft in-
struments were a logical way of overcoming the resistance, allowing trading 
partners to incorporate some ilo labour standards, without necessarily guar-
anteeing their strict enforcement.
Between 1993 and 2017, 81 trade agreements (29 per cent overall) included 
labour provisions.9 It is noteworthy that since 2010, a greater than average pro-
portion of bilateral/regional free trade agreements have included references 
to labour standards (Figure 5.2). When trade agreements make specific refer-
ence to ilo standards, the 1998 Declaration is the most frequently referenced 
instrument, found in around 68 per cent of trade agreements (ilo, 2016b), and 
the Declaration serves as a labour standards floor in most cases (ilo, 2016a). 
Others, such as the Social Justice Declaration and the Decent Work Agenda, 
are also invoked more frequently than legally binding instruments, with the 
exception of Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.10 The ilo’s 
9 The data are based on an analysis of 279 trade agreements reported to the wto. Labour 
provisions take into account: any standards that address labour relations, any mecha-
nisms that promote compliance with the standards set, and any framework for coopera-
tive activities such as dialogue or monitoring.
10 See Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182), available at the website 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f ?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:C182 (accessed on 21 August 2018).
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so-called fundamental conventions are rarely invoked in trade agreements (9.2 
per cent) despite the fact that those eight conventions enjoy near universal 
ratification by Member States (over 91 per cent of all possible ratifications). 
The discrepancy highlights the significant difference between ratifying con-
ventions (within the ilo) and the eventuality of implementing them, espe-
cially within frameworks that can be backed up by formal dispute settlement 
and sanctions for non-compliance (such as trade agreements). The latter re-
course, however, has only rarely been used. A more promotional approach is 
often used to provide special incentives when partners subscribe to labour 
standards, rather than punishing them when they fail to do so (ilo, 2016a).
Nevertheless, the ilo’s formal processes remain in place and can be 
invoked—in tandem with the promotion of non-binding standards—when 
there is sufficient tripartite consensus and political will. A prominent recent 
example of using the ilo’s complaint procedure during the International La-
bour Conference was the complaint brought against Qatar’s violations of the 
Forced Labour11 and Labour Inspection12 Conventions. After three years the 
11 See Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), available at the website http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 (accessed on 21 August 
2018).
12 See Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), available at the website http://www.ilo 
.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C081 (accessed 
on 21 August 2018).
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Figure 5.� Proportion of trade agreements with labour provisions, 1993–2017
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complaint was withdrawn when Qatar’s government agreed to implement a 
three-year ilo technical cooperation programme. Whether such governance 
by conditionality proves to be a game changer, and the extent to which Qatar 
will revise its laws to meet international labour standards, remains to be seen. 
But it could indicate that the ilo’s comparative advantage in improving global 
labour conditions is increasingly tied to its technical cooperation expertise 
rather than its legally-binding standards setting procedures.
4 Engaging New Actors in Partnerships
Recognising that ‘new international groupings are exercising an influence of 
increasing importance in the international arena’ (ilo, 1998b, para. 52), the 
ilo has prioritised greater involvement and greater visibility both internation-
ally and at the country level in recent years in order to promote its standards 
and achieve their progressive implementation. The ilo’s approach to engag-
ing with new actors includes both partnership platforms based on strategic 
bilateral or multilateral engagement with other international organisations 
and stand-alone public–private partnerships (ppps) largely focused on imple-
mentation (Andonova, 2017).13
4.1 Partnership Platforms and Policy Influence with Other International 
Organisations
The ilo has a strong track record of partnering with other international or-
ganisations. Since 1946, the ilo has signed 86 partnerships with IOs, with a 
marked increase during the first decade of the new millennium (Figure 5.3). 
That trend is more prominent today as part of the ilo’s current reform agenda, 
which seeks to strengthen the organisation’s bilateral relationships with other 
international organisations (ilo, 2013). The partnerships demonstrate that the 
ilo continues to operate with many traditional and relatively formal arrange-
ments. They also indicate an increasing willingness and recognised need for the 
ilo to cooperate with other organisations to attain its cross-cutting mandate.
13 Partnership platforms are institutional frameworks at the global level that set out broad 
common goals. To be realised, they require a second tier of collaboration among a multi-
plicity of actors that then implement the agreements across multiple jurisdictions. ppps 
are free-standing individual agreements organised by public and private actors that pur-
sue commonly agreed objectives. Their (non-exclusive) governance functions include: (1) 
developing norms, standards, or policies, (2) implementation, and (3) information pro-
duction and dissemination. The governance functions of partnership platforms and ppps 
can overlap. See Andonova (2017, 19–20).
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Many other efforts by the ilo in the multilateral arena take the shape of multi-
stakeholder partnership platforms that vary in their degree of formality and 
institutionalisation. The following is a non-exhaustive list for illustrative pur-
poses. In each case, the ilo’s objective is not necessarily to play the main gov-
erning function but to create a ‘multiplier effect’ whereby other organisations 
take up its standards or integrate concepts such as the ‘social protection floor’ 
and ‘decent work’ into their activities (ilo, 2016c, 27).
The Better Work programme, an initiative of the ilo and the International 
Finance Corporation (ifc), is one high-profile example of a multi-stakeholder 
partnership. It began in 2001 around a joint project in Cambodia to improve 
working conditions in the country’s apparel export industry. Today, the Bet-
ter Work programme is active in eight countries with over 1,400 participating 
factories. Independent evaluations conclude that the programme has been in-
strumental in preventing abusive labour practices, limiting excessive overtime 
and closing gender pay gaps in factories involved.14
14 For more information, see Better Work, Progress and Potential: How Better Work is im-
























































Figure 5.3 Bilateral partnerships concluded between the ilo and other international organ-
isations, 1946–2015
Source: ilo (�0�8e), authors’ elaboration of data.
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The 2007 Green Jobs Initiative, described by Kees van der Ree in this volume 
(Chapter 12), provides another example. It was launched as a partnership be-
tween the United Nations Environment Programme (unep), the Internation-
al Trade Union Confederation (ituc) and the International Organisation of 
Employers (ioe). Subsequent successes for the ilo in terms of integrating its 
standards into other relevant agreements include the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change’s (unfccc) inclusion of ‘decent work’ 
in its shared vision for a future global climate change regime, and the Rio+20 
outcome document one year later recognising decent work as a key part of 
sustainable development. According to van der Ree, both internal factors (e.g. 
the role of ilo Directors General) and external factors (including growing con-
sensus on the links between climate change and labour issues) contributed to 
the establishment of the link between decent work and the environment in 
the ilo’s core work.
Another example of partnership platforms is the way the ilo seeks to influ-
ence programmes of the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the World 
Bank (WB) in low- and middle-income countries. Independent critiques of 
these programmes conclude that they have been directly at odds with core ilo 
norms, and that their flexible labour requirements are negatively correlated 
with labour rights implementation in the countries involved (Blanton et al., 
2015). In 1994, the ilo was granted observer status at annual imf/WB meet-
ings, and observer status at the imf/WB Development Committees in 1999. 
Since then, there has been a tempering of some of the World Bank’s and imf’s 
more extreme reform requirements, as well as the inclusion of labour standards 
in some development loan contracts (Onida, 2008; Anner and Caraway, 2010). 
Since 2010, the ilo and imf have also agreed to work together on policies that 
promote social dialogue, employment-creating growth and a minimum social 
protection floor for the most vulnerable (Servais and Van Goethem, 2016).
Recent ilo Directors General have also invested considerable resources 
to promote core labour standards and the Decent Work Agenda in the de-
liberations and outputs of other global governance fora, with the G20 a no-
table example. During the period 2008–15, the G20 made some 1,627 commit-
ments15 of which 92 were classified as ‘employment and labour’ commitments 
independent assessment of the Better Work programme, 2016, available at the website 
https://betterwork.org/blog/portfolio/impact-assessment/ (accessed on 17 August 2018).
15 Commitments are the specific passages in documents released publicly that carry the 
authority of the group of leaders. Commitments must be determined to have enough 
precision, obligation and future orientation so as to shape the subsequent behaviours of 
the G20 members in a measurable way.
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(G20 Research Group, 2015).16 Among all commitments by the G20 during this 
period, ilo standards were explicitly invoked on only two occasions.17 More 
often (seven times) the ilo was called on to play a supportive role, in help-
ing implementation, monitoring, and providing information or expertise.18 For 
instance, in response to the G20 calling on the ilo to play a role in examining 
how to address the social repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis, the ilo 
strengthened its capacity to monitor and assess crisis response policies (ilo, 
2009). Director General Guy Ryder even entertained a proposal to set up an 
ilo Tribunal to those ends (ilo, 2011). The latter example demonstrates that 
while the ilo is actively engaged in major processes of global governance, the 
organisation is playing a secondary, supportive role, even when the issues in 
question are part of its constitutional mandate.
4.2 Operational Public–Private Partnerships
The shift towards partnerships by the ilo is consistent with the general trend 
towards a growing number of transnational, public–private governance initia-
tives (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Andonova, 2017). The transversal nature of the 
issue of social justice has prompted the ilo to take a leadership role in many 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. One example is the ilo’s leading role in Alliance 
8.7, a new multi-actor initiative that seeks to eradicate forced labour, modern 
slavery, human trafficking and child labour in line with the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals. The ilo’s response to the 2013 Rana Plaza factory disas-
ter and its involvement in the governance of the resulting Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in Bangladesh has highlighted the organisation’s ability to work 
outside of traditional modalities and in greater direct contact with companies 
and other actors.19
16 Among the G20 Research Group’s 27 mutually exclusive coded categories, the ‘labour & 
employment’ category was the seventh most prevalent category of commitment (92), af-
ter: macroeconomic policy (375), development (179), financial regulation (154), trade (111), 
reform of international financial institutions (115), and energy (98).
17 An example of a commitment to ilo standards is: ‘To assure that global growth is broadly 
beneficial, we should implement policies consistent with ilo fundamental principles 
and rights at work’ (G20 Research Group (2015), under ‘Putting Quality Jobs at the Heart 
of the Recovery’).
18 An example of a reference to the ilo in a supporting role is: ‘We recognize successful 
employment and training programmes are often designed together with employers and 
workers, and we call on the ilo, in partnership with other organizations, to convene its 
constituents and ngos to develop a training strategy for our consideration’ (G20 Research 
Group (2015), under ‘Putting Quality Jobs at the Heart of the Recovery’).
19 An ilo representative serves as the Independent Chair of the Steering Committee for the 
Accord, an independent and legally binding agreement between leading apparel brands 
and trade unions to improve safety in Bangladesh factories; available at: http://banglade-
shaccord.org/ (accessed on 17 August 2018).
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Operationally, partnerships play an important role in the ilo’s develop-
ment activities (ilo, 2016c), as also highlighted by Alenda-Demoutiez et al. 
in this volume (Chapter 6). During the period 2008–15, the ilo entered into 
243 partnerships, involving private sector firms (56 per cent), foundations (17 
per cent), academia (13 per cent) and ngos (9.5 per cent).20 The plethora of 
partnerships varies in terms of their objectives, including: project implemen-
tation and development, funding, advocacy, knowledge exchange, or simply 
organising meetings or events. Nevertheless, all partnerships in which the ilo 
is engaged are informed by the Director General’s Announcement and Office 
Procedure of 2009, which requires that all partnerships must: (1) conform to 
ilo principles and values (as contained in the ilo’s various Declarations); (2) 
promote the Decent Work Agenda; (3) foster tripartism (harkening back to the 
institution’s core organising structure); (4) assure accountability; (5) promote 
sustainability; (6) guarantee impartiality; and (7) ensure non-preferential 
treatment.
The ilo’s engagement in global partnerships, whatever their form, con-
stitutes a form of institutional layering because partnerships introduce new 
actors into the implementation—and to a lesser extent the formulation—of 
governance objectives. Yet the ilo’s formal institutional structures—for ex-
ample, tripartism—remain firmly in place and limit to some extent the de-
gree to which the organisation can engage with external non-state actors. This 
has not been the case with the ilo’s global engagements with other interna-
tional organisations, which are explicitly mandated by its Constitution (ilo, 
2008b).
4.3 The Limits to Partnerships and Tripartism
The ilo’s recent strategy of partnering with non-state actors—beyond the 
tripartite actors—was partially influenced by former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan’s UN reform agenda, which called for greater engagement with the 
private sector and civil society and their increased involvement as ‘shapers of 
policy’ (ilo, 1998a).
The ilo has recognised on many occasions that globalisation and changing 
employment structures are altering the roles of public and private actors. But 
the tripartite actors continue to be wary of including external ‘private enti-
ties’ more substantively as shapers of policy, fearing that their own traditional 
influence could be undermined (ilo, 2008b). A strong proponent of opening 
up to civil society, former Director General Somavía was not concerned that in-
cluding other voices would ‘change the balance of the ilo’ and had to reassure 
20 For details, see the website http://www.ilo.org/pardev/public-private-partnerships/
WCMS_456482/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 15 June 2018).
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his core constituents that the ilo’s tripartite decision-making processes would 
not be diluted (ilo, 2001).
Despite extensive discussions at different points over the past two decades or 
more, the social partners (employers and unions) have ‘used their institutional 
prerogatives as voting members of the ilo’s legislative and executive organs to 
block further attempts’ (Baccaro, 2015, 284) to adapt the tripartite governance 
model to respond better to the realities of today’s world. Employers and work-
ers agreed in 2002 on the Resolution on Tripartism and Social Dialogue, which 
formally reaffirmed the traditional structure of the ilo. Moreover, the social 
partners were to be consulted every time the Secretariat planned to work with 
civil society going forward (Baccaro and Mele, 2012).
Presently critics see the composition of the ilo’s tripartite governance sys-
tem as being unrepresentative of key constituents. Growing criticisms contend 
that ilo tripartism only reflects the formal economy, thereby largely leaving 
out the voices and concerns of those in the vast and growing informal econo-
my, especially in developing nations (Standing, 2008). With trade union mem-
bership on the decline in many countries and large numbers of companies not 
affiliated with their national employer groups, the representativeness of these 
organisations is now questioned, leading to calls for wider perspectives in set-
ting ilo priorities (Rodgers et al., 2009, 17).
The ilo Secretariat has managed to circumvent the resistance to broadening 
representativeness to a certain extent through institutional layering by engaging 
non-state actors strategically and less formally where appropriate. For example, 
staff at the International Labour Office worked on issues related to the infor-
mal sector ‘if not in open defiance certainly in open non-compliance’ (Bangas-
ser, 2000, 27–28) with the preferences of the tripartite actors, who were threat-
ened by the very existence of a sizable informal sector. When the Decent Work 
Agenda broadened the regulatory scope of the ilo to include non-organised 
labour, the non-state actors that the ilo usually engages with—employers 
and unions—had no incentive to promote the interests of this constituency 
(Helfer, 2006, 718, footnote 308). As a result, the Secretariat partnered with oth-
er civil society actors to reach informal workers, actors that eventually played 
a more prominent role in shaping substantive policies related to the Decent 
Work Agenda as well as the Agenda’s implementation (Helfer, 2006, 719).
5 Decentralised Governance of Labour Standards
During the early years of the ilo, the organisation was the preeminent actor 
in the global governance of labour issues. Through the development of formal 
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and largely non-negotiable standards, the ilo attempted to harmonise global 
labour standards to the greatest extent possible. Partly in response to criti-
cisms regarding a lack of effective enforcement of labour standards globally, 
the ilo today is considerably more open to how decentralised governance 
mechanisms could help encourage greater adherence to international labour 
standards in a changing global economy.
Decentralised governance is based on actors coordinating their behaviour 
in a voluntary, ad hoc, networked and often competitive fashion, which can 
lead to approximation to certain standards (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 
2009). Such ‘private’ modes of governance can emerge spontaneously (and 
may be institutionalised thereafter) or they can be developed at the initiative 
of a ‘public’ entity (Aoki, 2001). The ilo has become more open to decentral-
ised governance mechanisms in order to promote labour standards, without 
replacing its traditional governance methods or relinquishing its standard-
setting role. The following sections provide illustrative examples of the ilo’s 
efforts in this regard.
5.1 Governance by Data
A High Level Panel appointed by the UN Secretary General to advise on the 
post-2015 global development agenda recommended that governments, in-
ternational agencies, civil society and the private sector should work together 
to harness the ‘data revolution’ to help governments track progress and make 
their decisions more accountable (UN, 2015). As part of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, the ilo is making a concerted effort to boost mea-
surement and statistics to advance its Decent Work Agenda.
It should be recalled that following the launch of the Decent Work Agenda a 
major effort was made to develop a composite index to measure labour condi-
tions comparatively across countries, inspired by the widely referenced Human 
Development Index. Despite past failures to set up a global labour standards 
index, over recent years there has been a gradual shift towards more systematic 
measurement within the ilo. The 2013 launch of ilostat,21 which provides 
key indicators on the labour market, builds on an earlier attempt at global 
governance by data. Contained within ilostat are the Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market (kilm), first published in 1999 to provide a core set of labour 
market indicators to inform the ilo’s technical assistance priorities. In its cur-
rent form, the kilm also draws on data reported by countries by incorporating 
21 ilostat is the ilo’s centralised statistics database of labour market statistics for over 200 
countries and over 100 indicators. See https://www.ilo.org/ilostat (accessed on 17 August 
2018).
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data from other organisations, such as the United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (unesco), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (oecd) and the World Bank.
In its promulgation of indicators, the ilo can be viewed as using data to 
govern indirectly, because indicators can have a regulatory effect when imple-
mented nationally (Davis et al., 2012). However, its efforts have been circum-
scribed. ilo constituents have not been able to agree on a common framework 
for measurement that would serve as a basis for comparisons globally. Estab-
lishing a social label would have been a major institutional development had 
it succeeded because it would have amounted to regulatory competition—as 
opposed to governance by steering—assuming that a global league table of 
labour standards implementation would result in social pressure and a com-
petitive race to the top.
Instead, the ilo’s efforts further indicate an incremental form of adaptation 
through the kilm, with a continuing emphasis on data and measurement. The 
fact that the ilo relies on data self-reported by governments and other IOs 
suggests that it aggregates data more than it governs by it, although the aggre-
gation itself can perform a governing function. And while subscribing to the 
motto of ‘what gets measured gets improved’ can help improve accountability 
with regard to protecting labour standards globally, over reliance on the quan-
tification of performance in general can also lead to perverse consequences 
such as distorted priorities and a focus on the quantity rather than the quality 
of standards (Biersteker, 2016).
5.2 Governance by Best Practices
During his tenure (1989–99), Director General Michel Hansenne considered 
the ilo’s governance model too ‘vertical’ and encouraged ‘horizontal’ dynam-
ics between states as a better way to promote labour standards. Hansenne 
advocated for developing a social label—effectively certifying governments 
based on their labour practices (through a Convention no less)—to give ‘an 
impulse and force to the ilo’s standard-setting action beyond its normal audi-
ence’ (ilo, 1997a). The proposal, which ultimately failed, only had one strong 
constituency within the ilo: workers’ organisations (ilo, 1997e). Several 
employers’ organisations expressed their reservations, while many countries 
were sceptical largely because they considered it to be a way of reintroducing 
the ‘social clause’ in trade and thus serving as a proxy for protectionism (ilo, 
1997b).
Hansenne’s successor, Juan Somavía, was likewise committed to ensur-
ing that the ilo, ‘project its values, concerns and objectives in a wider arena’ 
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(ilo, 1999). To accomplish this, Somavia favoured closer collaboration with ex-
isting private and voluntary governance initiatives. Part of the reason for this 
was the concern that external actors that lacked sufficient expertise would be-
gin to interpret and apply ilo standards incorrectly in their private initiatives 
(ilo, 2001). Rather than steer, there was a perceived need for the ilo to move 
those external initiatives in line with the ilo’s existing norms and standards.
Throughout the first decade of the new millennium, the ilo increased its 
involvement in corporate social responsibility (csr) related initiatives, for 
example through its role in the UN Secretary General’s Global Compact ini-
tiative. csr is driven in part by elements of regulatory competition, such as 
companies learning through the sharing of experiences to ‘build a common 
understanding of social responsibility in competitive markets’ (ilo, 2008a, 38). 
The ilo has generally promoted the principles contained in the Tripartite dec-
laration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy 
(mne Declaration22) as the basis for good csr practices. References to the 1998 
Declaration have also been incorporated into a significant number of other 
non-binding standards that apply directly to the performance of companies, 
such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the oecd 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises23 and the iso 26000 Social Responsi-
bility Standard. It is also noteworthy that international framework agreements 
between trade unions and multinational enterprises have become a common 
tool for incorporating core labour standards directly into the operations of ma-
jor corporate actors globally (ilo, 2007).
Relying on non-binding and decentralised mechanisms when engaging 
with multinational corporations might be a more effective means by which to 
improve working conditions at the national level compared to relying solely on 
traditional interstate conventions. Establishing cross-supply-chain standards 
that require suppliers to ensure minimum labour standards can potentially 
affect more workers more efficiently, circumventing the traditional channel 
whereby a government first ratifies and then implements relevant ilo con-
ventions. However, such frameworks can result in the context-dependent and 
uneven application of labour standards, which highlights the need for more 
active engagement by the ilo.
22 See mne Declaration, available at the website https://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/
WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 21 August 2018).
23 The oecd Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have been revised to better align with 
the language of the ilo Tripartite Declaration on mnes, the Decent Work Agenda and the 
1998 Declaration. See Servais and Van Goethem (2016).
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To help with global supply chain management, the ilo has already partnered 
with stakeholders in technical cooperation projects such as its Programme of 
Action for Asia and the Garment Sector in Cambodia. In 2009, the ilo estab-
lished a Helpdesk for Business on International Labour Standards to advise 
companies seeking information on how to ensure their supply chains and pro-
curement operations were consistent with such standards. More recently, the 
ilo has taken a leading role in the global discussion on how to ensure labour 
protection in increasingly complex supply chains, especially where govern-
ments have limited capacity to enforce compliance. The ilo is developing a 
programme of action to address decent work in global supply chains that com-
bines many elements of governance raised in this chapter. The programme will 
be consistent with the ilo’s existing instruments (various declarations) and 
it calls on the ilo to be ‘at the centre of the global effort’ (ilo, 2016a, 5–6), 
which will include developing partnership platforms with other international 
actors and partnerships to bolster the capacity of tripartite constituents at the 
national level.
The ilo views the increasing number of voluntary codes developing outside 
its structures—particularly those that invoke the ilo’s values and standards—
as possible stepping stones that can support further standard-setting activities 
(ilo, 1998b). In other words, these supplementary institutional layers do not 
contradict (and may augment) the ilo’s formal ways of doing business. Direc-
tors General have consistently called for greater ilo engagement with such 
initiatives over the last two decades and this engagement has taken the form of 
providing information to companies or of promoting ilo standards in external 
private initiatives. When successful, such efforts help to broaden the scope of 
the ilo’s regulatory reach while at the same time avoiding explicit challenges 
to ilo standards.
The extent to which the ilo is able to shape existing private governance 
arrangements is questionable. Even if it had the means to do so, the UN’s 
Guidelines on Cooperation with the Business Sector specify that nothing in 
such partnerships ‘shall be deemed to establish either party as the agent of 
the other party’ (UN, 2009, 2), reinforcing the decentralised nature of the 
guidelines. The ilo’s efforts have also been met with some scepticism, in part 
because csr campaigns are sometimes no more than PR activities run by 
profit-seeking corporations, and because workers are third-party beneficiaries 
of csr programmes (Lichtenstein, 2016). Where the ilo can have potentially 
more traction in decentralised governance, however, is when it takes a leader-
ship role in an emerging policy issue, like its recent efforts in regulating global 
supply chains.
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6 Conclusion
Organisations require routine maintenance to remain effective and legitimate. 
This chapter has highlighted the ilo’s recent attempts to do this across three 
dimensions of global governance. The organisation is increasingly reliant on 
non-binding standards to make labour protection more palatable, although 
legal instruments and the enforcement of states’ obligations remain central to 
its mandate. It is engaging with an ever more diverse range of actors beyond 
its tripartite structure in order to reach its objectives. And its involvement in 
decentralised mechanisms for coordinating the behaviours of its constituents 
and external actors is an attempt to increase the ilo’s regulatory reach.
Each of the ilo’s efforts is an outcome of a compromise: a changing eco-
nomic, social and political environment has incentivised some actors to push 
for change while an institutional legacy has contributed to the traditional tri-
partite actors perpetuating the institutional status quo. The resulting addition-
al institutional layers of actors, rules, and mechanisms do not replicate—nor 
do they replace—the ilo’s existing structures. Change has been incremental 
and in some instances insufficient to address broader global governance gaps 
in the areas of work and labour rights protection. As a strategy of adaptation, 
institutional layering has shown itself to be a viable short-term option. Over 
time, however, incremental adjustments can accumulate and lead to a disjunc-
ture between formal rules and actual practices, which could incentivise fur-
ther and more substantial change.
Having coexisting and potentially diverging institutional layers in place 
makes agency paramount, as actors will select the institutional forum—be it 
formal or informal—in which their interests will be best represented. The ilo’s 
current lack of representativeness in its decision-making processes is there-
fore untenable in the long run. Priority needs to be given to incorporating the 
voices of workers and employers from the informal sector. By the ilo’s own es-
timates, the informal economy comprises more than half of the global labour 
force and over 90 per cent of micro- and small enterprises worldwide.24 The 
informal sector is also associated with higher occurrences of abuse of workers’ 
rights and insufficient social protection (that is to say, the area in which the 
organisation is most needed in today’s world).
The trepidation of unions and employers’ associations about broadening 
their representativeness, combined with the diversity of the informal sector 
24 See more details at the website http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promo-
tion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 12 June 2018).
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itself, makes it difficult to institutionalise a form of collective organisation of 
informal actors that could be directly represented at the ilo (Lindel, 2011). 
However, broadening the number and type of non-governmental organisa-
tions with consultative status with the ilo that can represent the informal 
sector would be a starting point.25 It would afford more actors the ability to 
contribute to discussions of the ilo’s governance objectives. Perhaps more 
importantly, it could help promote compliance with international labour stan-
dards, because actors with consultative status can trigger the ilo’s supervisory 
apparatus for certain violations.26
Recent decades have seen more attention paid to ‘bottom-up’ and flexible 
international agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement and agree-
ments with greater scope for active engagement by outside actors including 
business and civil society. Indications are that this trend will continue. The ilo 
appears to have traded some of the depth of its regulatory reach in return for 
an expanded breadth of outreach, as can be seen in its recent activities and 
in increasing references to its standards in public, private, and hybrid global 
governance arrangements. However, instruments like declarations, and in par-
ticular autonomous recommendations, are a means by which to fill gaps in 
the ilo’s standard setting, as shown by the recent Transition from the Infor-
mal to the Formal Economy Recommendation. They can help build consensus 
gradually on contested issues (e.g. what constitutes the ‘informal econo-
my’ and how to address it) and serve as a stepping stone to formal standard 
setting.
While the instruments being promoted might be non-binding in strictly legal 
terms, they nevertheless are standards of expected performance applying to all 
actors, and the global governance structures through which they are promoted 
are not necessarily any less important or authoritative than in previous peri-
ods. The ilo is promoting newer instruments through less formal governance 
structures (e.g. the G20) and more traditional arrangements (see Figure 5.3). 
The ilo needs to build its role as an advocate for core labour standards 
25 At the time of writing, the following non-governmental regional and international organ-
isations have consultative status with the ilo: the International Co-operative Alliance, 
the International Organisation of Employers, the International Trade Union Confedera-
tion, the Organization of African Trade Union Unity, Business Africa, and the World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions.
26 For example, the Committee on Freedom of Association (cfa) reviews complaints of 
violations to collective bargaining and freedom of association raised by governments, 
employers’ and workers’ organisations and other international organisations with ilo 
consultative status.
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further, prioritising engagement with willing coalition partners. As sufficient 
trust develops among partners, their commitments can crystallise over time 
into more formalised standards, norms, and implementation systems on spe-
cific issues. History shows that many formal institutions have informal begin-
nings, suggesting a potential to augment the ilo’s future standard-setting and 
governance roles.
The ilo’s increasing engagement in ppps indicates that a significant range 
of partners are willing to play by the ilo’s rules to leverage both its legitimacy 
as a standard setter and its wealth of expertise in supporting technical assis-
tance to implement those standards on the ground. Globally, its engagement 
with the G20 and Bretton Woods Institutions shows that the ilo remains for 
many largely in a supporting role. A channel for greater influence would be 
to re-establish itself as a leading knowledge agency, using its investment in 
data collection to make inputs to inform major global policy processes. This 
might, however, require additional financial and human resources in order to 
compete in the research and knowledge space. For the time being the ilo’s 
comparative advantage may remain in targeting implementation as a predom-
inantly technical assistance agency.
Part of that role should include dedicated ilo efforts in shaping the form 
and content of private governance initiatives in the areas of decent work and 
labour rights’ protection, which are growing in importance given the limits 
of public regulation. Interested actors are already engaging in self-regulation, 
as demonstrated by proliferating csr initiatives in a wide range of industry-
specific and geographically focused areas. The ilo, on its own or in coopera-
tion with government authorities supported through technical assistance, can 
reinforce desirable private initiatives to make them more responsive to la-
bour related concerns (Locke, 2013). As the ilo’s own history suggests, getting 
in at the ground level of institutionalisation can have important and lasting 
effects.
The fact remains that major policy challenges remain largely unresolved 
and call out for effective global leadership. Guy Ryder made a bold claim for 
the ilo’s mandate and its role in such leadership on labour issues in his state-
ment as a candidate for the post of Director General: ‘The stability of our so-
cieties, the sustainability of the global system which binds them ever more 
closely, and ultimately peace itself depend on its realization’ (2012, 1).
The ilo needs to continue to evolve to fulfil that ambitious leadership role. 
This will require strong leadership within the ilo itself, and an acceptance 
that the ilo cannot lead the global policy agenda in this important issue do-
main on its own.
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Abstract
In West Africa, the right of access to universal social security is far from being respected. 
International institutions and African governments have been mobilising for several 
years to fight this phenomenon. In a role that has evolved over the years, the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ilo) provides technical and financial support to countries 
in this regard. How and why does the ilo intervene in protecting the health of popula-
tions in West Africa? For this institutional study, the methodology is based on a litera-
ture review focused on the history of the role of the ilo in the protection of healthcare 
in West Africa, specifically in Ghana and Senegal. We show the ilo’s involvement since 
the 1990s for two main reasons: firstly, the lack of access to healthcare in countries 
with a specific labour form; secondly, the rejection of the idea of social protection by 
dominant players on the international scene, leading to criticism following the struc-
tural adjustment programmes. In the contexts of Ghana and Senegal, both of which 
have experienced transitions from community-based health mechanisms to universal 
health coverage, we explain that the ilo has several ways to intervene—technically, 
institutionally, and financially. An important outcome is the revelation that the vision 
of the ilo with regard to health protection is systemic, articulating alternative ways to 
address social protection for the informal economy compared to other international 
organisations. But this approach is understated considering the dire situation in Africa 
and the need to improve access to healthcare and progress towards the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
1 Introduction
Inequalities persist among and within countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, 
41 per cent of the continent’s population lived on less than usd 1.90 per day 
(World Bank, 2016). And the right of access to universal social security is not 
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being upheld. International institutions and African governments have mo-
bilised for several years to address this. The objective of this movement has 
been to ensure substantial coverage of the poor and most vulnerable by 2030 
in these countries and to put in place sustained social protection measures.
However, sub-Saharan countries have different paths in the establishment 
of what the World Health Organization (who) calls Universal Health Cover-
age (uhc),1 due to political, economic and social reasons. The International 
Labour Organization (ilo) provides technical, financial, and institutional sup-
port to these countries in their efforts to achieve this goal. Although it is not 
the only international actor involved in protecting the health of African popu-
lations, it has interesting characteristics—its actions have been carried out for 
several years in both the formal and informal sectors, in a role that has evolved 
since its inception and that was not devolved to the organisation originally. 
Thus, how and why does the ilo intervene in protecting the health of popula-
tions in West Africa?
Firstly, through a parallel history between the ilo, its vision of social pro-
tection, and the evolution of health insurance systems in West Africa, we seek 
to understand why the ilo has played this important role of protecting the 
health of inhabitants in this region, but also the laws put in place in these 
countries since 2000. Secondly, we contextualise two West African countries, 
Ghana and Senegal, in analysing particular interventions and the place of the 
ilo in supporting community-based movements towards national health in-
surance schemes, in line with its Social Protection Floor (spf) Recommenda-
tion. Finally, we discuss two points that are important and that emerge from 
this analysis: the opportunity for the ilo in maintaining its important role in 
the development of recommendations, with a systemic framework regarding 
health and labour in developing countries; the institutional and technical ob-
stacles in a complex and saturated sector with diverse actors.
The methodology for this institutional analysis is composed of several stages. 
A first review of the literature allows us to better understand the links between 
the ilo, its evolution and the health coverage systems in West Africa. The link 
between the ilo and the countries under study, particularly through mutual 
health organisations (mhos), has already been observed by some participant 
researchers in previous works. The second step is a systematic review of the 
two countries concerned. We predetermined first a set of parameters regarding 
1 uhc in developing countries is, according to the who definition in the 2010 World Health 
Report, to ‘provide all people with access to needed health services of sufficient quality to be 
effective’, and to ‘ensure that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial 
hardship’ (who, 2010, 6).
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health, work, and the ilo. The literature mobilised comes from academic and 
institutional sources. An analysis of common and differential trends is made, 
adopting an approach that consists of comparing homogeneities and pecu-
liarities in understanding the ilo’s role in each context.
2 The ilo’s Vision, from Its Origin to Its Interventions in West Africa
2.1 Before the 1990s, a Vision Based on Wage Labour
The ilo’s vision of social protection and labour has remained but the scope of 
its missions and activities has evolved over the last hundred years. Before 1944, 
the focus was more on a technical vision of health than on socio-economic 
conditions (Weindling, 1995). In the thirties, it began to develop technical co-
operation activities, first with Latin America. These technical cooperation ac-
tivities grew with international development programmes after 1945 (Guthrie, 
2013). The aims and purposes of the ilo became larger after the International 
Labour Conference of 1944, taking in welfare, including several missions on the 
protection of health. Social security, including medical coverage and care for 
all, became one of its goals.
This vision of social protection was strongly Western-based, relying on the 
principle of wage labour; this continued until the 1990s. For the ilo, social 
protection was to be organised on a large scale by the state and/or public in-
stitutions, with the assumption that members of society have already reached 
a certain standard of living and that this should be protected (Jütting, 2002). 
With the decolonisation of African countries in the 1960s, the ilo persisted 
with this vision, with the idea that a growing part of the populations of devel-
oping countries would eventually join the formal wage sector of the economy 
and thus benefit from the social protection of health, for themselves and their 
families (ilo, 2001).
This vision has been applied in West African countries, first by their colo-
nisers, and then during independence. While Western health insurance sys-
tems have a long history, the oldest formal health coverage systems in West 
Africa are the result of the colonial era. Systems were created by the colonis-
ing countries to protect expatriates. During this time, some were extended to 
urban and industrial African workers in order to maintain their productivity. 
These systems are at the root of what exists for formal sector workers and civil 
servants in most West African countries. These are traditional, European-style 
health coverage systems, based on the Beveridge model (national coverage), 
tax-financed and state-run, or Bismarck model (social security), financed by 
contributions from workers and employers and managed by an independent 
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fund. After decolonisation, West African countries decided for the most part 
to provide free public healthcare in public institutions. The state financed and 
provided these services. At the same time, social security systems persisted, 
sometimes expanding, diffusing the legitimacy of such systems in relation to 
their effectiveness in Western countries. Countries that did not experience 
widespread coverage under colonisation nevertheless took inspiration from 
Western systems, still seeking the legitimacy of these methods (Destremeau 
and Lautier, 2006). But the focus was on occupational diseases and accidents 
at work.
The end of the 1980s marked a sudden change in the way health protection 
was managed, from free to direct payment, in a context of economic crisis. In-
debted African countries were looking for help in the form of international co-
operation. In return, states withdrew from healthcare provision and imposed 
programmes influenced by the neo-liberal doctrine (Plassart, 2011). Structural 
adjustment programmes (saps) targeted spending that was considered exces-
sive, health being part of this (Berkhout and Oostingh, 2008). By then, interna-
tional financial institutions did not have a monopoly of these initiatives. But, 
from 1980, the United Nations went through a crisis, with its role turning away 
from economic aid and towards humanitarian aid. Three institutions—the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization—
gradually became the pillars of the global economy and of development strate-
gies (Favreau, 2003). The logic changed: the goal was no longer development 
but economic growth. This era was marked by deteriorations in infrastructure, 
a shortage of medicines, deteriorations in working conditions and a flight of 
qualified personnel due to the health sector being underfunded.
2.2 A New Vision of Social Security for Development
In the 1990s, the vision of the ilo evolved in terms of the form that social secu-
rity could take in Africa and the organisation began intensive lobbying to bring 
social protection back to the forefront of development. An international con-
sensus had been formed incrementally, denouncing the injustice of the direct 
payment system and the saps. Health coverage became the new objective, the 
goal being to make it possible to extend access to healthcare through a fairer 
and more viable financing mechanism in the long term, provided that health 
care services improved (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016).
But the problem remains the same for the ilo. Promoting social protection 
cannot be done in the same way in Africa as in Western countries. This brought 
about two important changes in the ilo’s vision: the extension of social securi-
ty through decentralised, community-based mechanisms, and a better consid-
eration of the informal economy. The ilo is still promoting the ratification and 
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implementation of Convention No. 102 (1952)2 concerning social security. But 
to take account of different national contexts, flexibility clauses are included.
2.2.1 Community-based Mutual Health Organisations
Interpersonal solidarity in West Africa has been important in terms of compen-
sating for the lack of protection in terms of healthcare. Family ties, community 
support or help from the informal economy to employees all contribute to 
health. Faced with significant needs and a population unable to access care, 
mhos, and more particularly community-based mhos, emerged in the 1980s, 
impelled primarily by socio-professional, sociocultural, faith-based, and wom-
en’s groups.
An mho is ‘a voluntary, non-profit insurance scheme, formed on the basis of 
an ethic of mutual aid, solidarity and the collective pooling of health risks, in 
which the members participate effectively in its management and functioning’ 
(Atim, 1998, 2). Nowadays, many forms of mhos exist, divided into two groups: 
complementary or ‘top-up’ mhos, designed by and for formal sector workers, 
and mhos providing ‘first-dollar’ cover (i.e. 100 per cent insurance with no ex-
cess). The latter aim at households that do not have existing health cover and 
are therefore the priority target group for extension policies. These ‘first-dollar’ 
mhos consist primarily of community-based mhos based in a neighbour-
hood, village or district. Their origins are diverse: they may have been set up 
by residents of a neighbourhood, members of a community, voluntary associa-
tions, health providers, etc.
This particular mechanism gained momentum in the 1990s, with ilo sup-
port. Those excluded from social security, and its extension, were the organ-
isation’s new key focus for development, and this priority was affirmed at the 
89th session of the International Labour Conference in 2001. For the ilo, the 
development of community-based health systems is the result of a real de-
mand for socio-professional or community organisations. Hence its support 
for these organisations from that moment. While 76 mhos were registered in 
West Africa in 1997, 366 were created in 2003 and 626 in 2006, according to 
estimates (Ridde, 2012).
2 The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention is based on basic social security prin-
ciples; it establishes worldwide-agreed minimum standards for all nine branches of social 
security (medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, family, mater-
nity, invalidity, and survivors’ benefits). While Convention No. 102 covers all the branches, it 
requires that only three of these branches be ratified by Member states, which allows for the 
step-by-step extension of social security coverage by ratifying countries.
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2.2.2 The Informal Economy
The concept of the informal sector, as used for the first time by Keith Hart (1973), 
refers to the economy unknown to public policymakers. As it evolved, it be-
came characterised by pejorative elements, such as small size, a non-capitalist 
way of producing, etc. (Laville, 2010). This sector is regarded as the failure of 
development. However, the ilo shows the influence of its social-democratic 
vision in its definition of the informal sector, or the informal economy.
The ilo at first considered the informal economy as ‘units engaged in the 
production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating em-
ployment and incomes to the persons concerned’. The definition continues: 
‘These units typically operate at a low level of organization, with little or no 
division between labour and capital as factors of production and a small scale. 
Labour relations—where they exist—are based mostly on casual employ-
ment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrange-
ments with formal guarantees’ (ilo, 1993, 52). Thus, the ilo focuses on differ-
ent elements than other international organisations: the emphasis on labour 
before capital, solidarity, social responsibility. The measurement of the infor-
mal economy was a problem, forcing the ilo to restrain its definition in order 
to operationalise it—‘a group of production units which […] form part of the 
household sector as household enterprises or, equivalently, unincorporated 
enterprises owned by households’ (ilo, 1993, 53). This definition was limited 
to enterprises. In 2003, the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisti-
cians at the ilo tried a new perspective, focused directly on jobs and people, 
and not on structures: ‘The purpose of the conceptual framework developed 
for the ilo report was to relate the enterprise-based concept of employment 
in the informal sector in a consistent manner with a job-based concept of in-
formal employment, and thereby extend the former concept to a broader one’ 
(ilo, 2003, 49). From this point, informal and formal economies are viewed as 
complementary.
The ilo’s vision thus presents a systemic approach to health protection in 
Africa, prioritising the excluded: it is a question of adapting to the shape of the 
labour market, mostly informal, but also to the needs of people. Actions of the 
ilo in Africa focus on these two areas.
2.3 From Decentralised Mechanisms to Social Protection Floors
Beginning in the 1990s, the ilo focused on microenterprises, cooperatives and 
especially, in this case, on social health protection through mhos. The ilo, like 
the United States Agency for International Development (usaid), the German 
Organisation for Technical Cooperation (giz), the National Alliance of Christian 
Mutuals (anmc, Belgium), and Solidarité Mondiale (a Belgian non-governmental 
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organisation), has played a vital role in developing mhos in West Africa since 
the 1990s. The ilo was formerly involved through its acopam/ilo programme 
(Cooperative and Organisational Support to Grassroots Initiatives), as early as 
1978.3 This programme lasted until 1999. The other international stakeholders 
have been mainly involved since 1998, the date of the platform of Abidjan.4 For 
the ilo, social protection has two main objectives: to guarantee income secu-
rity (following illness, maternity, work accident, unemployment, disability, old 
age, or death of a member of the family) and to guarantee access to care of an 
acceptable quality and at a reasonable cost. The notions of democracy, empow-
erment, social cohesion and decentralisation are also important, which makes 
it easy for the ilo to accept the principle of community-based mhos.
In 2004, Clive Bailey, for the ilo’s Global Campaign on Social Security and 
Coverage for All, wrote: ‘The reality in Africa however, is that there is also a 
need for different and innovative approaches, of which micro insurance 
schemes based on solidarity and redistribution within the group is but one ex-
ample. There is often a need for a blend of activities, which strike a balance be-
tween community-based initiatives, the strengthening of public social security 
schemes, and the development of universal schemes for health care and other 
benefits’ (Bailey, 2005, 2). A new consensus on social security was adopted at 
the 2001 International Labour Convention, leading to the launch of the Global 
Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All in 2003. This was followed in 
2008 by the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, by the Global 
Jobs Pact in 2009, and by the spf Recommendation in 2012.
The spf is a flagship initiative of the ilo. It is defined as ‘an integrated set 
of social policies designed to guarantee income security and access to social 
services for all, paying particular attention to vulnerable groups, and protect-
ing and empowering people across the life cycle’ (ilo, 2011, xxii). The strategy 
comprises two dimensions. The first, expansion of social security by a basic 
set of social guarantees, is the horizontal dimension. The second dimension 
consists of implementing progressively higher standards from minimum stan-
dards, representing the vertical dimension. Also, the spf integrates healthcare 
for all, social protection for all children, support for all people of working age 
in the event of unemployment, maternity, disability or work-related accidents, 
and retirement pensions for all the elderly. Based on local needs and capabili-
ties, countries can adapt the recommendation.
3 It was a multi-bi ilo programme financed by Norway, originally to respond to the severe 
drought in the Sahel region at that time and ended in 1999.
4 The platform of Abidjan is the result of the collective reflection of the different actors in-
volved in the promotion of mhos gathered at a workshop held in Abidjan in June 1998.
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Thus, the ilo has been involved in protecting health in Africa for two main 
reasons. The first is pragmatic: in the 1990s, people in West Africa did not have 
access to care or social protection, particularly those working in the informal 
economy. The second is institutional: international recommendations with re-
gard to development have exacerbated Africa’s problems, and the dominant 
players on the international scene rejected the idea of social protection in de-
veloping countries, leaving room for criticism of the obvious failures of previ-
ous programmes in the developing world.
3 The Role of the ilo in Health Protection in Ghana and Senegal
3.1 Ghana and Senegal: Two ‘Exemplary’ Countries Regarding Health 
Protection in Africa
Ghana, Senegal and Rwanda are often presented as examples in sub-Saharan 
Africa regarding progress in health indicators and the expansion of mutu-
al health insurance. We restrict our comparison to Ghana and Senegal, two 
countries in West Africa—the focus of our study—that offer interesting com-
mon trends in their economic, social and institutional make-up (Table 6.1). 
The Republic of Ghana, in West Africa, is located on the shores of the Gulf 
of Guinea and is surrounded by Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo. It was 
one of the first countries in the continent to achieve independence, in March 
1957. The political history of the country has been turbulent, particularly in 
the 1980s, but has stabilised. The official language is English. The Republic of 
Senegal, also in West Africa, is surrounded by Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, and 
Guinea-Bissau and is open to the Atlantic Ocean. In April 1960, the country 
became independent. Senegal is also politically stable. Of all the languages 
spoken there, French remains the official language.
Regarding health, the disease burden of the continent includes hiv/aids, 
maternal and infant mortality, non-communicable diseases, and other condi-
tions. The recorded hiv/aids prevalence rate is very low in Senegal and there 
is a lower infant mortality rate than in other West African countries, but there 
are wide disparities at regional levels and within urban and rural populations. 
In Ghana, in comparison to indicators on health in the subregion, the inci-
dence of non-communicable diseases is higher (Saleh, 2012). With regards to 
health coverage, both countries have chalked up some successes, with reduc-
tions observed in under-5 child mortality and maternal mortality rates. A sig-
nificant proportion of the population works in the informal sector. In Senegal, 
agriculture and fisheries employ around 44 per cent of the population and this 
is no different from Ghana, where the population is predominantly rural. Child 
labour is an important feature of informal work in both countries.
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The governments of Ghana and Senegal have made political commitments to 
implement uhc by involving mhos. Both countries seek to apply the ilo’s dual 
strategy on which the spf programme is based: a horizontal dimension, having 
primary health protection for the whole population, and a vertical dimension, 
improving existing protection from risk. Another common point in both coun-
tries is that the first community-based mhos appeared in 1989, supported by 
a Catholic diocese: the Nkoranza Community Health Insurance Scheme at St. 
Theresa Hospital in Sunyani District for Ghana; the Fandène mho, supported 
by the Saint Jean-de-Dieu Hospital, in the Thiès region for Senegal. In the en-
suing sections of this chapter, the specific case of each country is examined 
in order to illustrate the various interventions carried out by the ilo and the 
specificities of this path to uhc.
3.2 Senegal and the ilo/step Programme
Until 2012, only around 20 per cent of the Senegalese population had (limited) 
health coverage. Among those covered were civil servants (7.35 per cent of the 
population), covered by the system inherited from the colonial era, and wage 
earners in the formal sector (3.60 per cent), protected by the Instituts de Pré-
voyance Maladie, social security funds created in 1975. The elderly—covered 
Table 6.�  General characteristics of Ghana and Senegal
Ghana Senegal
Population 28 million 15 million
Population under 15 42 per cent 42 per cent
Life expectancy 61 (women)/57 (men) 69 (women)/65 (men)
Unemployment rate 16.6 per cent (2016) 15.7 per cent (2015)
Share of population in 
informal sector
80 per cent 88 per cent
gdp (usd) 42.69 billion 14.79 billion
hdi (rank) 139th 170th
Income status Lower middle-income Lower middle-income
Child labour rates (5–17 
years)
21.8 per cent 37 per cent
source: the authors, based on world bank data and the ghana living  
standards surveys; baumann (2010); moss and majerowicz (2012); bitran (2014).
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when above 60 (4.87 per cent of the population)—and members of mhos 
(3.79 per cent) were also covered (cafsp, 2008). Since the Fandène mho in 
1989, mhos have developed rapidly, first in that same region of Thiès as well 
as in Dakar and then throughout the country. Despite the absence of complete 
censuses, from 19 functional units (units that are in activity) in 1997, they in-
creased to 129 in 2007 and to 200 in 2008 in Senegal (Villane and Faye, 2008).
The government-level transition in the health system settled in the first de-
cade of the new millennium, with the promotion of mhos. In 1996, camics 
(Cellule d’appui aux mutuelles de santé, aux ipm et comités de santé) was cre-
ated to support the creation and the evolution of mhos in the country. Attached 
to the Prevention Department, the organisation brought together several 
stakeholders with the intention of strengthening the capacities of the promot-
ers of mhos and to create links with health structures. By 2003, the country 
developed a legal framework for mhos.
The ilo’s Strategies and Tools against Social Exclusion and Poverty (step) 
programme’s role in this process was influential. The step programme (under 
the Social Security Department) was the operational instrument of the Global 
Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All. It operated on two levels: 
forming direct support to the promoters of mutuals; pursuing advocacy for the 
extension of social protection. In Senegal, and more generally in West Africa, 
the ilo, through this programme, fought to see the creation of legal frame-
works to supervise mhos. The ilo was one of the camics’ partners that sup-
ported the ‘Concertation’—an organisation bringing together several African 
countries and international structures—the objective of which was to create 
an exchange network between mhos. In 2004, in Senegal, the uhc Agency re-
lied on several promoters, particularly on the ilo, in its mission to improve 
social protection and promote mhos. From 2003 to 2006, the ilo also sup-
ported the establishment of a legal framework on mhos in the eight members 
of the Economic Community of West African States. The ilo and usaid as 
well as other donors (French, Belgian and German) have all been involved in 
Senegalese mhos (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016). The ilo/step programme has 
supported the creation and capacity-building of various community-based 
mhos, such as the Werwerlé mhos in Dakar and Thiès or the pamecas mho 
in Pikine. In the first decade of the new millennium, the ilo/step programme 
supported mhos through training and funding programmes, including the cre-
ation of the Dakar mhos Union.
In 2012, the newly elected president, Macky Sall, announced the introduc-
tion of uhc. The objectives were ambitious. The proposition was for 75 per 
cent coverage of the population by 2017. On the one hand, the compulsory 
and medical assistance schemes were strengthened for civil servants and the 
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formal sector; on the other, voluntary mhos developed in order to cover the 
rest of the population. As part of the experimentation of the National Strategy 
for the Extension of Health Risk Coverage, a decentralised scheme was devel-
oped, calling for at least one mho per local authority and setting up unions 
by department. The total coverage was 32 per cent in 2014, according to the 
uhc Agency. Since 2013, mhos have received government grants, calculated in 
relation to their membership fee. In this way, community mhos are supposed 
to take charge of primary care (through contributions), while the state takes 
responsibility for secondary care. usaid and Abt Associates5 are the govern-
ment’s main partners in its efforts to move towards uhc.
3.3 Ghana’s Path towards the National Health Insurance Scheme (nhis)
Ghana, since its independence in 1957, has experienced various evolutions in 
its health system. As in Senegal, the country chose free healthcare before im-
plementing the saps in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the ‘Cash and Carry’ system was 
established, introducing full payment for medication. Although the first mho 
was created in 1989, their development was especially important in the late 
1990s. In 2001, the country had 47 mhos, 43 of which were created in 1999 or 
2000 (Atim et al., 2001), and 168 in 2003 (Diop et al., 2006). mhos, as in Senegal, 
originated from various sources (healthcare providers, ethnic networks, so-
cial movements mainly for employees in the formal urban sector, etc.) (Atim, 
1998). But unlike in Senegal where mhos are dominant, Ghana has seen the 
evolution of both mhos and of other community-based mechanisms, experi-
menting with various types of microinsurance. In 2003, Ghana had less than 1 
per cent of its population covered by health insurance (Diop et al., 2006).
The ilo intervened institutionally from 2001 to 2003, through a global trust 
fund. This fund provided strategic guidance on the feasibility of community-
based mhos and the promulgation of the new law regarding mutual health in-
surance. But, unlike in Senegal, the step programme has not been involved in 
Ghana’s mhos. The environment with regard to international institutions was 
different, with the presence of the Danish International Development Agency 
(danida) and usaid’s Partners for Health Reformplus (phrplus) programme. 
On the domestic front, the Catholic Church played an important role in the 
development of mhos, at the regional and district health assemblies level. 
Earlier in the 1990s, who, the ilo, the European Union, the Ghana Medical 
Association and labour unions had called on the government to create health 
5 Abt Associates is a global research and programme implementation firm based in the US, 




insurance to offset the negative consequences of the ‘Cash and Carry’ system 
(Fusheini et al., 2012).
In contrast to the system existing in Senegal for civil servants and employees 
in the formal sector, Ghana decided to rely on an extension of the social secu-
rity system based on the principle of mutual health insurance for the entire 
population. Thanks to institutional arrangements between the decentralised 
administration system and national policies, the extension of coverage, from 
2003 to 2005, was trialled in all districts in the country paving the way for the 
nhis. To establish the National Health Insurance Act, a consultation process 
was initiated between the two main partners, danida and usaid, and also the 
ilo, who, the UK Department for International Development and relevant 
non-governmental organisations (Mensah et al., 2010).
The nhis and Community-Based Health Planning and Services (chps) in 
Ghana are based on the principles of equity, solidarity, the pooling of risks, 
cross-subsidisation, partnership, the democratic participation of all stake-
holders, sustainability, and geographical and financial reach for all. Act No. 650 
initially established three kinds of health insurance schemes in the country: 
District Mutual Health Insurance (dmhi) schemes, Private Mutual Health 
Insurance schemes, and Private Commercial Health Insurance. The National 
Health Insurance Council was set up, giving technical support to dmhis. These 
dmhis are allowed to operate as companies limited by guarantee and are thus 
autonomous. In 2012, the law was revised (Act 852) and brought the district 
insurance schemes into a single, pooled fund. The Ministry of Health is the 
lead ministry for the National Health Insurance Authority, which manages the 
scheme. Policy is formulated at the national level, where the accreditation of 
health services, the monitoring and evaluation of mhos, logistics and techni-
cal support also take place. Thus, the extension of health coverage has been 
achieved through the nhis (for financial access) and the chps (for geographi-
cal access), although with initial progress, the enrolment in the nhis has stag-
nated at 40 per cent of the population since the scheme’s inception and for the 
chps at 5 per cent (Atim and Amporfu, 2016). Unlike Senegal, which separates 
health protection for civil servants, the formal sector and the informal econ-
omy, the system is the same for all in Ghana. All contribute—formal sector 
employees pay a percentage of their salaries, informal economy workers pay a 
flat premium, and an important part of nhis funding comes from value added 
tax. While Senegal is seeking to combine different forms of health insurance, 
Ghana has brought everything together into a single system (government, oth-
er public initiatives, private sector insurance, community-based health mecha-
nisms) (Wietler, 2010).
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The ilo has been involved directly in health coverage in Ghana through 
capacity building, undertaking several initiatives aimed at improving the com-
petency levels of people involved in social security. The ilo provided technical 
and policy advice to the government of Ghana on the administration of the 
nhis. The Financial, Actuarial and Statistical Services Branch of the ilo in 
particular has been closely participating in a technical capacity, advising on 
national health budgets, the institutional infrastructures required, medium-
term financial planning and implementation (ilo, 2005). Further examples of 
this effort are the training and capacity building of staff of the Social Security 
and National Insurance Trust, where the administration of pensions for formal 
sector workers is domiciled (and which also forms a regular flow of revenue 
for the nhis), building capacity in actuarial science and budgeting (some of 
which has occurred through a collaborative effort between the ilo and the 
University of Maastricht), and the development of a health budget model for 
Ghana (Dovlo, 2005).
4 Discussion: A Systemic Vision
Two strong points emerge from this analysis regarding the ilo’s role in the 
health of the populations of West Africa. Both represent opportunities for the 
ilo in its efforts to maintain its important role in developing recommenda-
tions, but they are also institutional and technical obstacles. The first is the 
importance of the informal economy in West African countries and the role of 
the ilo in its protection, within a systemic framework. The second is the role 
of the ilo on the international scene regarding development, in a complex 
and saturated space with various actors.
4.1 A Systemic Vision between Health and Labour
In Africa as in the rest of the world, the organisation is, at a national and regu-
latory level, using what has been its principal tool since its inception: the rati-
fication of conventions. Ghana and Senegal have been members of the ilo 
since independence, in the process ratifying several important conventions. 
In West Africa, these conventions and recommendations can be considered 
as a complementary tool, difficult to apply but fundamental to well-being in 
the long term. Convention 102 still influences many African health protection 
systems, countries setting up pension schemes modelled on it, even if formal 
social security systems cover only a small portion of their populations. This 
Convention is still regarded as a goal for development (Servais, 2014). In this way, 
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the ilo emphasises the importance of governance conventions in improving 
the application of international labour standards. But collective agreements, 
complaints (filed by workers when employers do not respect a convention) 
and the ability to act on these rules are mainly based on the strength of trade 
unions. It is public unions that mainly take a central role with regard to labour 
demands in these two countries. The functioning and relations between the 
different unions in these countries can also be problematic. In Senegal, teach-
ers can affiliate to any of some 30 different unions. Thus, the various actions 
of the ilo depend on the strength of public institutions, on trade unions and 
on the access of information for workers about their rights, in models where 
formal wage labour is not the norm.
The magnitude of the informal sector and its diversity in Africa has, above 
all, obliged states and international organisations to make an effort to define 
interventions that take into account the need to promote the actors, and con-
tain the growth, of the informal sector. The attitude of governmental and insti-
tutional actors with regard to the informal sector has evolved. The initial desire 
to curb its expansion has given way to a certain tolerance, even a willingness 
to support it. In Senegal, the informal economy is considered an important 
cultural element that enables the majority of the population excluded from 
the formal sector to subsist and is widely accepted by all. It is not considered 
an end but a means (Fall, 2011). Thus, while employment is one of the com-
ponents of Senegalese reforms,6 there is no intention—for the moment—to 
eradicate the informal economy, the approach, rather, being to develop it in 
order to achieve ‘more decent’ work (Kanté, 2002).
Overall, there is a broad consensus on the need to improve incomes and 
productivity in the informal sector so as to reduce poverty and bring the sec-
tor’s economic and employment conditions closer to those of the formal sec-
tor. This justifies the ilo’s involvement in the health protection of workers 
in both sectors in the countries studied, and the development of mhos to 
reach the informal economy. Finding and delineating a contributory basis is 
indeed complex with a dominant informal form of labour. The concept of 
‘decent work’,7 appeared for the first time in 1999, in the report presented by 
the Director General of the ilo to the 87th Session of the International Labour 
6 Employment (especially for young people) is a strong part of the national Strategy for social 
and economic development, within two axes, growth and human capital.
7 According to the official webpage of the ilo (available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/
decent-work/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on 11 June 2018), the ‘decent work sums up the as-
pirations of people in their working lives. It involves opportunities for work that is productive 
and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better 
prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express 
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Conference. The concept is based on four pillars: employment, social protec-
tion, workers’ rights and social dialogue. The term ‘employment’ here refers 
to work in all its forms. As a result, the concept applies not only to workers in 
the formal economy, but also to informal employees, the self-employed, and 
home-based workers (Ghai, 2003). The spf programme is, essentially, part of 
the ‘decent work’ vision of the ilo, covering the health of workers and their 
families.
The ilo thus outlines a very systemic vision of the health of the populations 
of West African countries. A system, in the systemic approach, is considered 
to be the organised totality of a set of active and interdependent units that 
relate to and interact with one another through flows. There are interactions 
between system elements, both to stabilise the system and to make it evolve. 
The study of a system must be coupled with the study of its transformations, 
and the converse is true. Systems are complex and must be approached as 
a whole—since the whole is more than the sum of the parts—and not in a 
reductionist way (Donnadieu and Karsky, 2002). In practice, this involves—
when analysing the impact of a policy or actor—always thinking about its con-
sequences and its interactions with the entire system. The systemic approach 
provides another contribution to efforts to take into account the diversity of 
factors that influence health (work, environment, education, the cohesion of 
various health-financing schemes, etc.). The systemic approaches, the ‘Health 
in All Policy’ programmes,8 the analyses of social inequalities and of the social 
determinants of health are developing in the developed as in the developing 
world, but they are far from being generalised.
4.2 The ilo and the International Environment
For West African countries, the role of the ilo has been and remains im-
portant and systematic. In the 1990s it filled a vacuum, working to improve 
health protection for informal workers in African countries, in contrast to the 
position taken by international financial institutions. Thus, we have noted, the 
actions of the ilo are important for health coverage in West Africa, but also for 
the organisation itself, by adapting its vision of social protection where formal 
labour is not the norm. All in all, the ilo’s work could be seen as an applica-
tion of the ‘Health in All Policies’ approach—an approach whereby, due to the 
their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of 
opportunity and treatment for all women and men’.
8 ‘Health in All Policies is an approach to public policies across sectors that systematically 
takes into account the health implications of decisions, seeks synergies, and avoids harmful 
health impacts in order to improve population health and health equity’ (who, 2014, 2).
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ultimate goal of productivity in the workplace, the health and well-being of 
persons engaged in either the formal or the informal sector is covered. The role 
of the ilo is also due to the fact that its historical vision of social protection 
has, for a while, led to it adopting a systemic approach to the safety and health 
of workers, whereas other international institutions have taken the more re-
strictive approach of health protection (Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016). While the 
ilo’s action on ‘decent work’ and social protection in West Africa dates back 
to the 1990s, it was not until 2010 that who promoted the transition to uhc, in 
2008 highlighting the need for a systemic approach by all, as reported by the 
Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (work being, itself, a social 
determinant of health).
Such broad actions cannot be undertaken without the intervention of 
other agencies with similar and differing interests. Referring to health protec-
tion, the international consensus has turned towards a functionalist view of 
the state. The challenge is to improve the situation within the constraints of 
limited resources (Letourmy, 2003). Health insurance is definitely capable of 
providing a means to alleviate the funding challenges of institutions and to im-
prove the quality of care of populations. Within such a framework, uhc serves 
as a necessary investment with regard to economic growth and health protec-
tion for African countries. But health coverage and social protection have an 
important redistributive character, emphasising the fact that protection is a 
factor in social cohesion (Euzéby and Fargeaon, 2011). However, international 
cooperation targets poverty, not the national cohesion that is fundamental to 
achieving a sustainable and legitimate system (Stiglitz, 2002). This is one of the 
special features of the ilo that fits in the national cohesion approach, whereas 
the World Bank, for example, will focus on economic growth. Social dialogue 
is core to the ilo’s strategy, regarded as the ‘social pillar of the United Nations’, 
as opposed to the ‘economic pillars’—international financial institutions (Fa-
vreau, 2003). For the ilo, promoting social security is a political choice, re-
flecting a certain vision of society, considering social security as a fundamental 
human right (Waelkens and Criel, 2004).
Regarding health protection, the ilo and who carry out similar tasks, but 
not exactly the same vision: ‘The ilo is a global guardian of human rights and 
social rights at work; similarly, who is a global guardian for the right to both 
health in general and health at work’ (Rantanen et al., 2013, 137). Principally, 
both the ilo and who support social security schemes and uhc. They have 
jointly taken charge of the spf initiative since 2009, leading to progress—a joint 
position paper was developed and a meeting organised for the 19 participating 
UN agencies, bilateral donor agencies, and international non-governmental 
organisations. This culminated in the establishment of an ‘agreed language’ for 
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the spf initiative (Cichon, 2013). As seen from the two examples, the Ghanaian 
uhc (nhis and chps) and Senegalese uhc are sponsored mainly by usaid 
and other donors, with support from who, thus regaining its recommendatory 
role with regard to developing countries. For who, mhos are not the solution 
in themselves: mhos, and more generally microinsurance, are an interesting 
tool to develop a financial solidarity between people and become a lever for 
setting up national systems, public and/or private.
Besides, systemic approaches and solidarity mechanisms as supported by 
the ilo require a large amount of resources and time, especially considering 
the dire situation in Africa and the urgent need to improve access to healthcare 
in developing countries and to progress towards the Sustainable Development 
Goals. This ties in with the literature on ‘government silos’, which argues that 
departments may function as ‘silos’ within a vertical organisation. These divi-
sions are considered to be barriers to the implementation of effective public 
policies. According to Carey and Crammond (2015), this ‘departmentalism’, 
intended to simplify the process of governance, results in public authorities 
wanting to restrict themselves to their mandate alone. But this does not pro-
mote systemic action by all, which would include an overall evolution of the 
health system and consideration of the social determinants of health. The 
who has been committed to this vision for several years now, emphasising 
the importance of systemic and adaptive approaches to specific contexts and 
social and cultural norms (who, 2013). In 2008, the who Commission on So-
cial Determinants of Health stated that ‘given the marked failure of markets 
to supply vital goods and services equitably, [the emphasis on public finance] 
implies strong public sector leadership and adequate public expenditure’, ad-
vocating for better involvement of the state and local civil society in decisions 
(csdh, 2008, 12). But systemic approaches are still too rare, not only in the field 
of health but also in general (Kelley, 2014; Houéto and Valentini, 2014). And 
the needs and voice of the population, emphasised by the ilo, are also rarely 
considered in development programmes generally. International technical ef-
ficiency is always emphasised instead of legitimacy of actions and local actors 
(Alenda-Demoutiez, 2016).
5 Conclusion
The ilo is important for the health protection of African workers, especially 
for those in the informal economy. The action of the ilo in West Africa is very 
specific and different from its actions the world over. This capacity of adapta-
tion comes in part from the ilo’s vision regarding social protection, health, 
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and the informal economy. Now, the ilo has a leading role with who in the 
promotion of social security and the protection of the health of formal and in-
formal workers. Its work is divided into many complementary constituents for 
social protection and poverty reduction. The levels of interventions are broad, 
varied, and require the capabilities of a systemic approach, adapted to the 
specific labour and socio-economic structures of developing countries. This 
resulted in the inclusion of social protection in the Sustainable Development 
Goals, although the views of development actors are still divergent as to the 
actual meaning of social protection. The stakes in terms of health and ‘decent 
work’ are considerable and matters urgent in West Africa, and the ilo stands 
in this regard as an inescapable architect for the actualisation of this vision.
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Chapter 7
The ilo’s Shifts in Child Labour Policy: Regulation 
and Abolition
Edward van Daalen and Karl Hanson
Abstract
After wwii the International Labour Organization (ilo) slowly but surely developed 
a ‘two plank’ approach to child labour, aimed at harmonising the need to protect chil-
dren who do work, with the long-term goal of abolishing all forms of child labour. Dur-
ing the 1990s the ‘two plank’ approach, which included the regulation and humanisa-
tion of children’s work, gradually evolved into a more singular approach aimed only at 
the full eradication of all child labour, starting with the ‘worst forms’. Based on an anal-
ysis of the relevant legal and policy documents produced by the ilo and other inter-
national Organizations, completed with in-depth interviews with key informants, we 
examine the internal and external developments that made the ‘abolitionist’ approach 
now the only perspective that shapes the ilo’s child labour policies. We conclude that, 
after a century of ilo child labour policy, the intermediate objective of improving chil-
dren’s working conditions is now just as relevant as it was before the turn away from 
the ‘two plank’ approach. For the ilo to shift its position at this time, it needs to reach 
out to the research community, international development actors as well as local gov-
ernments and social movements to develop locally relevant, evidence-based policies 
for dealing with the diversity of children’s work in the world’s fast changing formal and 
informal economies.
1 Introduction
The abolition of child labour has been one of the principle objectives of the 
International Labour Organization (ilo) ever since its inception in 1919. How-
ever, when analysing legal and policy documents issued by the ilo over the 
last 100 years, a more nuanced picture emerges that shows how the ilo had 
durably adopted a dual approach to child labour. This approach included the 
abolition of child labour in the long run combined with transitional mea-
sures aimed at improving the working conditions of children. This approach 
was, for instance, made explicit in the ilo’s 1979 Resolution Concerning the 
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International Year of the Child and the Progressive Elimination of Child La-
bour and Transitional Measures, which calls upon member states to ‘take all 
necessary social and legislative action for the progressive elimination of child 
labour and, during the transitional period until the elimination of child labour, 
to regulate and humanise it’ (ilo, 1979c). This dual approach to child labour, 
which would later be coined ‘the two planks of ilo policy’, occupied a cen-
tral place on the ilo’s agenda, in particular between 1979 and 1999, before it 
gradually disappeared to make way for a more singular approach aiming at the 
eradication of all forms of child labour, starting with the worst.
On the eve of the ilo’s centenary we seek to rescue from oblivion the Or-
ganization’s commitment to combining the progressive elimination of child 
labour with its regulation and humanisation, which seems to have disappeared 
from the Organization’s own collective memory. By looking into how and why 
this two-plank policy came to be, and how and why it seems to have disap-
peared and been forgotten, we try to make sense of the ilo’s shift from the 
progressive elimination of child labour and the protection of children at work 
to its current priority of the ‘sustained eradication’ of the worst forms of child 
labour. Section 2 looks at the period between 1919 and 1946, during which the 
foundation was laid for a flexible and pragmatic approach to child labour. In 
Section 3, we then discuss the period between 1946 and 1992, during which 
the two-plank approach of ‘protecting and regulating while eliminating’ was 
developed and crystallised. How and why the discourse gradually changed to 
‘the worst forms of child labour’ is addressed in Section 4. In the last section, 
we look at some of the tensions that were revealed by the study of shifts in ilo 
child labour policies.
The data that informs this chapter was gathered through document analysis 
and multiple in-depth interviews. Over 50 ilo documents—including declara-
tions, resolutions, reports and other publications relevant to the scope of this 
chapter—were identified and studied. Guided by these findings, nine in-depth 
interviews were conducted with key informants selected on the basis of their 
position in the ilo, or in other Organizations closely involved, at crucial times 
during the process described below. The informants were promised anonymity 
and will be addressed by their professional function only.
2 The Abolition of Child Labour as a Long-Term Goal (1919–46)
2.1 The 1919 Constitution and the Abolition of Child Labour
The Constitution of the ilo was first published as Part xiii of the 1919 Ver-
sailles Peace Treaty, which made the ilo an independent organization within 
the framework of the League of Nations. Annexed to Part xiii was Article 427/
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Article 41,1 which consisted of nine ‘labour clauses’ that were those ‘methods 
and principles for regulating labour conditions’ considered to be ‘of special 
and urgent importance’ for the future of the Organization (ilo, 1919). Among 
them was ‘the abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations 
on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their educa-
tion and assure their proper physical development’ (ilo, 1919). Unfortunately, 
the legislative history of the ilo Constitution provides no information regard-
ing what exactly was meant by the abolition of child labour. All that is clear is 
that in the two earlier draft versions of the article there was no mention of a 
general ‘abolition of child labour’ clause, but instead a more specific reference 
to a minimum age for admission to work in industry and commerce, set at 14 
years. Dahlén (2007) argues that governments and the labour movement had 
pushed for the regulation of children’s and women’s work—as they were seen 
as a threat to wwi soldiers re-entering the labour market—but that a consti-
tutional commitment to a specific minimum age was thought of as too con-
troversial for non-industrialised nations. Where the text of the Constitution 
was hence limited to referring to the abolition of child labour in general terms, 
the ilo immediately, as of 1919 onwards, began to set standards on minimum 
ages by means of adopting sector-specific conventions aimed at regulating 
the ‘non-beneficial’ forms of child labour. These sector-specific conventions 
adopted a pragmatic approach to some forms of child labour that were not 
considered intrinsically problematic. In undertakings where only members of 
the same family were employed as well as when its purpose was to educate or 
train young people, child employment was even considered to be beneficial 
(Hanson and Vandaele, 2003). At the onset of wwii, only very few countries 
had ratified these sectorial minimum age conventions.
2.2 A New World Organization and a New, Flexible Approach
By adopting the Declaration of the Aims and Purposes of the International 
Labour Organization (better known as the Declaration of Philadelphia) in 
1944, the ilo started shaping its future role in the ‘new world Organization’ 
governed by the UN—of which it would become the first Specialized Agen-
cy in 1946. This meant it had to revise its ‘old world’ Constitution (ilo, 1946, 
10). Consequently, a special delegation was tasked with ‘remodelling’ and ‘re-
equipping’ the ilo and its Constitution. The most significant amendment was 
the incorporation of the Declaration of Philadelphia, which thus stated the 
new aims and purposes of the ilo. A member of the Delegation explained that 
it ‘would seem unnecessary to retain in the Constitution Article 41, which sets 
1 Article 427 became Article 41 when, in 1934, the ilo stepped out of the framework of the 
League of Nations and its constitution became independent from the Versailles Treaty.
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forth certain methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which 
were regarded in 1919 as being of special and urgent importance’ (ilo, 1946, 
20). One of the parts of Article 41 that was omitted was ‘the abolition of child 
labour’, which was thought of as having lost its ‘special and urgent importance’ 
in the new world Organization of labour. This seemingly had much to do with 
the so-called general considerations to which the Delegation attached ‘the 
highest importance’ (ilo, 1946, 15). First and foremost, the Delegation wanted 
a flexible constitution because ‘rigidity is likely to result in frustration rather 
than progress’ and ‘nothing in the existing practice and tradition of the Organi-
zation can be regarded as sacrosanct whenever new needs create new require-
ments’ (ilo, 1946, 15).
One year after the Declaration of Philadelphia but one year before the newly 
amended Constitution was adopted, the Resolution Concerning the Protection 
of Children and Young Workers was submitted to the 1945 Conference in Paris 
by the Committee on the Protection of Children and Young Workers. In a way, 
the Resolution rescued the ilo’s constitutional commitment to the abolition 
of child labour, at least on paper, by explicitly referring to Article 41 of the 1919 
Constitution just before it would be omitted. However, in its report about the 
Resolution the Committee recognises that the objective to abolish child labour 
‘may fail in its effect if at the same time no solution is found for other wider 
social problems—poverty, family disorganisation, inadequate facilities for ed-
ucation, etc.—which lead as an inevitable consequence to the employment of 
children at an early age’ (ilo, 1945a, 3). The Committee argued that in many 
countries it is inevitable for young children to work due to the specific social 
and economic circumstances, and that until those circumstances change, the 
mere ‘prohibition of employment may do more harm than good’ (ilo, 1945a, 
3). This principle is reflected in the policy set by the Resolution: ‘exemptions 
permitting the employment of children of school age outside school hours 
should be eliminated as soon as possible and pending such elimination should 
be strictly limited […]’ (ilo, 1945b). With hindsight, the 1945 ilo Resolution 
Concerning the Protection of Children and Young Workers can be seen as a 
harbinger of the ilo’s two-plank policy on child labour, the advent of which 
we will discuss in detail in the following section.
3 The Two Planks of ilo Policy (1946–92)
3.1 The Post-War Years and Convention No. 138
While the decades following wwii brought economic prosperity to most West-
ern countries, tensions between them and other ilo member states rose, espe-
cially concerning the implications of the Organization’s aim to achieve ‘social 
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justice’ (Maupain, 2013). Besides the Cold War divide, the majority of mem-
ber states were now ‘independent’ Third World countries with stagnating or 
declining economies. Although the situation in many Third World countries 
led to a new surge in child labour, the ilo kept relying on its 1945 policy of 
‘promoting’ the sector-specific minimum age conventions and urging govern-
ments to take protective measures pending abolition.2
It was only when, in the early 1970s, the beginning of the end of the ‘gold-
en age’ led to concerns about mass unemployment that discussions about a 
new and more comprehensive legal instrument on child labour were started 
(Dahlén, 2007). With the adoption of the 1973 Convention No. 138 on the mini-
mum age for admission to employment, the ilo finally gave a blanket legal 
definition of the term ‘child labour’.3 In short, for the ilo ‘child labour’ in ‘de-
veloping countries’ constitutes: all work carried out by children under 12, work 
by children between 12 and 14 that is not ‘light’ work, and ‘jeopardising’ or ‘haz-
ardous’ work carried out by children younger than 16.4 Besides Convention 138’s 
general aim of achieving the total abolition of what was now legally defined as 
‘child labour’, the supplementary Recommendation No. 146 on minimum ages 
provides further guidelines for implementation and stresses the importance of 
ensuring ‘that the conditions in which children and young persons under the 
age of 18 years are employed or work reach and are maintained at a satisfac-
tory standard’ (para. 12(1)). This recommendation addresses the importance of 
improving the working conditions not only of children and young people who 
are legally permitted to work, but also of all persons under the age of 18 years 
who are employed or work, independently of the minimum ages. These con-
ditions involve fair remuneration; the limitation of daily and weekly working 
hours so as to allow enough time for education and training, for rest and for 
leisure activities; the granting of a 12 hours’ night rest and of weekly rest days; 
annual paid holidays; social security coverage, including employment injury, 
medical care and sickness benefit schemes; and satisfactory standards of safety 
and health (para. 13(1)). Much like all the previous minimum age conventions 
that it was supposed to replace, Convention No. 138 received only very few rati-
fications in the first years after its adoption.5
2 The minimum age conventions that were adopted during that period were specifically aimed 
at night work (No. 79 and No. 90), fishermen (No. 112) and work underground (No. 123).
3 Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C138 (accessed on 1 
June 2018).
4 Different minimum ages apply for ‘developed’ countries. See Articles 2, 3 and 7 of Convention 
No. 138.
5 Up until 1979 only 22 countries had ratified the Convention.
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3.2 The International Year of the Child
In 1976 the UN’s General Assembly adopted a resolution on the International 
Year of the Child (iyc), which would be held in 1979—20 years after the adop-
tion of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child. The purpose of the iyc was 
to provide a framework for advocacy, ‘to make governments and people hold 
up a mirror to their consciences and examine their failures on behalf of their 
children’ (Black, 1986, 356). The ilo took up a mirror as well. After it was in-
volved in the preparatory work of the iyc advisory group, it made the following 
statement: ‘It is a well-known fact that, despite the efforts made by the ilo and 
member States to abolish child labour, there exists a substantial number of 
children, particularly in developing areas of the world, who are at work, often 
in exploitative conditions. No doubt, they belong to the most vulnerable cat-
egory for whom the iyc intends to offer intensive assistance. The immediate 
question would be how the ilo should confront this reality of working chil-
dren and reconcile it with the long-term objective of eliminating child labour; 
how to harmonise the need to protect these working children with the existing 
ilo activities in order to relate policy action to iyc’ (ilo, 1978a, 1).
The intention of understanding the complex situations in the developing 
world and adapting policy accordingly, instead of the other way around, was in 
line with a new way of ‘development thinking’ that had taken hold of other UN 
Organizations as well. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (unesco) especially had taken on the task of spreading informa-
tion about the process of world development, with a ‘rejection of crude and 
simplistic messages’ and ‘a desire to learn more about the complexities of try-
ing to transform underprivileged societies’ (Black, 1986, 362). The ilo’s learn-
ings resulted in combining the long-term objective of eliminating child labour 
with ‘transitional policy measures’ to promote working children’s welfare, 
particularly in developing countries (ilo, 1978b, 1). The ilo was then quick to 
point out that this ‘dual concern’ had motivated the Organization ever since 
the first minimum age convention, in 1919 (ilo, 1979a, 4). This policy was made 
public and explicit during the actual iyc in 1979, in the Director General’s Dec-
laration Concerning the International Year of the Child. It urges governments 
to strengthen their action programmes for children and stresses that one of 
the principles that should guide these attempts is that ‘pending the elimina-
tion of child labour, it must be regulated and humanised’ (ilo, 1979b). A few 
months later, the ilo adopted the Resolution Concerning the International 
Year of the Child and the Progressive Elimination of Child Labour and Tran-
sitional Measures, which reaffirmed the Organization’s commitment to, as 
the title suggests, progressively eliminating child labour and regulating and 
humanising it by means of transitional measures (ilo, 1979c). After the 1945 
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Resolution, this was only the second general resolution on child labour that 
the ilo had adopted.
3.3 A Successful Policy Framework
In the years following the iyc, the thus formulated ilo child labour policy 
framework was reaffirmed, most importantly in the 1983 Report of the Director- 
General. This report states that ‘the elimination of child labour as an objec-
tive coupled with a commitment to action, pending its attainment, to improve 
the conditions of working children are the two planks of ilo policy’ (ilo, 1983, 
5; emphasis added). It also made it clear that although the goal of improving 
the conditions of children that do work was listed as a ‘short-term goal’, it was 
thought of as a long-lasting one: ‘pending the improvement of economic con-
ditions to the point where it will no longer be necessary or profitable for chil-
dren to work, efforts must be made to complement long-term employment 
and development policies with progressive measures aimed at regulating and 
humanising child work’ (ilo, 1983, 19). The report also provides clarity regard-
ing what was to be the most important goal of these progressive measures—
namely, ‘to deal with the worst forms of child labour wherever they exist, and 
to provide minimum levels of protection where such labour is unavoidable’ 
(ilo, 1983, 19). It furthermore stresses that child labour legislation, even if in 
line with the ilo Conventions, should ‘never be implemented in isolation 
from the socioeconomic setting’ as it may lead to ‘greater clandestine work 
and more exploitative work situations’ (ilo, 1983, 19).
Two years later, in a report entitled Towards a Global Programme of Action 
on Child Labour, the ilo went one step further in the promotion of its progres-
sive and pragmatic approach. According to the Organization, ‘a reduction in 
the incidence of child labour can provide for improved terms of employment 
for children’ and countries should thus ‘set realistic quantitative and quali-
tative targets such that there will be a gradual reduction in the incidence of 
child labour while they provide for the protection of those who are and will 
continue to be at work until such time that the abolition objective is attained’ 
(ilo, 1985, 5). The 1985 report also re-prioritises the two planks of ilo policy: 
countries must aim to first improve the conditions of working children, and 
secondly gradually abolish child labour (ilo, 1985).
It is important to note that at the same time the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions (icftu)—the most influential Organization on the 
workers’ side of the ilo’s tripartite system—was fully supporting the two-
plank policy. In 1979 the icftu itself adopted two resolutions concerning 
the iyc and in its 1986 report on ‘how to combat child labour’ it urges trade 
unions ‘to complement long-term employment and development policies with 
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progressive measures aimed at regulating and humanising child work’ (icftu, 
1986, 26). According to the icftu, it was ‘the only realistic approach’ and ‘long-
term measures ought not to rule out short-term action’ (ilo, 1989, 53).
What the two-plank policy had accomplished in practice, during the first 
ten years since the iyc, was laid out in a 1989 special report of the Director 
General. The ilo had witnessed a ‘growing reorientation of public policy and 
programmes as policy-makers and practitioners search for pragmatic and ef-
fective new approaches to the concentration of child labour’ (ilo, 1989, 25). 
This had led to a ‘remarkable surge’ in creative projects, conducted by govern-
ments and ngos alike, to ‘prevent the abuse of child labour and to protect and 
assist those children who do work’ (ilo, 1989, 30). For the ilo, these creative 
projects represented ‘a reason for optimism in the long-term struggle against 
child labour’ (ilo, 1989, 25).
4 Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour (1992–present)
4.1 The ipec in Practice
In 1992 the ilo launched the International Programme on the Elimination 
of Child Labour (ipec), which, at first, was intended as the technical co- 
operation arm of the ilo’s Interdepartmental Project concerning child labour. 
It is important to note that the ipec was not born out of an internal drive to 
provide technical co-operation to members regarding child labour. Soon af-
ter the Director General had announced the launch of the Interdepartmental 
Project, the government of Germany announced that it would make a five-
year-long annual donation of around usd 7 million for an ilo programme 
on child labour. With and especially for this donation, the ipec was created. 
The founding document of the ipec states that the long-term objective of the 
programme is the effective abolition of child labour. For the two immediate 
objectives the document refers to the 1979 Resolution concerning the iyc. The 
first is to help countries design and implement policies, programmes and proj-
ects for the elimination of child labour and the protection of working children. 
The second is to raise global awareness concerning child labour and the con-
sequences thereof.
Before the ipec started, the ilo had already facilitated a project aimed at 
improving the conditions of children working at a garbage dump in Manila, 
Philippines, the so-called Smoky Mountain. It started in 1987 and it was the 
ilo’s first ever technical cooperation project on child labour. Yet, to one 
of the ilo experts who was involved in the project, it was more a tool of 
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advocacy. The media coverage of young children working on a smoking moun-
tain of garbage combined with previously released global statistics on child 
labour helped the ilo to draw attention to the issue (interview with a former 
ilo staff member). With the ipec in place the ilo was now ready to provide 
more structural technical assistance inside member states. The ipec’s first Im-
plementation Report showed that the implementation of the programme was 
in line with the two-plank policy. Projects in India and Thailand were mainly 
focused on improving the conditions of working children (ilo, 1993a). In Bra-
zil, working children were trained in order to defend their rights as workers 
and to guide them to ‘get organized and encourage their involvement in trade 
unions’ (ilo, 1993a, 11).
In a 1993 report on the implications of the ilo’s child labour policy for the 
cooperation activities in the field, the ilo states that while the primary aim 
of the ipec is to ‘promote and support action in ilo member States which 
contributes to the effective abolition of child labour’, as a transitional mea-
sure, the ‘protection of working children, especially in terms of improving their 
conditions of work, can constitute another objective of technical cooperation’ 
(ilo, 1993b, 2). However, now that the ilo itself would be responsible, to some 
extent, for the implementation of the two planks, the Organization became 
more conscious of its wording, and pointed at a potential conflict between the 
objectives to abolish and to regulate child labour by stating that ‘it is of the 
greatest importance, in technical cooperation activities with a secondary aim 
of protecting or improving the lot of working children, not to legitimize what 
is prohibited by ilo standards’ (ilo, 1993b, 3).
4.2 Child Labour in the Globalised Economy
While previously the icftu had supported and implemented the ilo’s two-
plank policy, as was noted above, from 1994 onwards it took a different direc-
tion. This had much to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The absence 
of the necessity to discuss the Cold War opened up the agenda for ‘a real de-
bate about improving the labour conditions for people around the world’ (in-
terview with a former icftu Staff member). In the new, globalised economy, 
child labour had become ‘global child labour’ (Nieuwenhuys, 2007) and the 
labour economists of the Western trade unions feared for their competitive 
position vis-à-vis cheap and child labour in other parts of the world. For them 
it was time to go back to the agenda of trade liberalisation from before wwi.
At this time, due to only few ratifications of Convention No. 138 and critical 
country reports, discussions were ongoing in the Office of the ilo about gradu-
ally replacing the objective of abolishing all child labour with the abolition 
of harmful work and thereby ‘operationally re-defining child labour as work 
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harmful to children’ (interview with a former ilo Staff member). There was 
furthermore an informal consensus about leaving ‘child labour’ out of what 
became the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. When 
the icftu was confronted with these developments, it fiercely objected and 
launched its own anti-child labour campaign pushing for more ratifications of 
Convention No. 138. According to one of the people behind the campaign, it 
was impossible to regulate and humanise child labour because the very nature 
of child labour is an exploitative relation in the marginal areas of the labour 
market, and thus a strategy of improving that relation will never work (inter-
view with a former icftu Staff member). The icftu thus kept pushing the 
first plank, that is to say, the long-term objective of abolishing child labour, 
but replaced the second plank, that is to say, the short-term objective of im-
proving the conditions of working children, with the promotion of Convention 
No. 138 and international instruments against the trade in goods produced by 
children (icftu, 1994). The icftu campaign played an important role in the 
development of the ilo’s new convention on child labour and in its shifting 
policy.
4.3 A New Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
The hard work undertaken by the ilo to put the spotlight on the problem of 
child labour, combined with advocacy efforts concerning the ratification and 
implementation of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc)6 
and the remarkable rise of international advocacy campaigns on violence 
against children (Poretti et al., 2014), pushed the issue of child labour higher 
up the international development agenda during the 1990s. There was a surge 
in coverage in both the academic literature and the mainstream media, and 
many other international Organizations started working on the topic as well. 
This also meant that more and more attention was drawn to the tension be-
tween the two planks of ilo policy and to the progressive and pragmatic ap-
proach adopted by the ipec.
Now that the eyes of the world were on the programme, from within the 
ipec office demands arose for a new or revised instrument that would be more 
in tune with reality (ilo, 2000). An unpublished internal review of the ipec 
stressed the importance of a two-way translation of international child labour 
norms, in the sense that not only should it be the case that ‘technical coop-
eration promotes the ratification and implementation of standards’, but also 
that the ilo’s practical activities should ‘inspire our standard setting work and 
6 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Profession-
alInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx (accessed on 1 June 2018).
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policy development’ (ilo, 2000, 13). The ipec’s action programmes thus far 
had been aimed mainly at helping children who worked in the ‘most intol-
erable’, ‘most hazardous’ or ‘worst’ forms of child labour. For example, many 
of the ipec programmes were dealing with child prostitution, something that 
Convention No. 138 had not foreseen. For the proponents of a new or revised 
Convention it was thus evident that it would be focused on these forms of 
child labour.
Besides the experiences gained from the ipec projects in third world coun-
tries, a 1994 report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations provided important input on what was under-
stood by the ‘most intolerable’ or ‘worst’ forms. Commenting on the application 
of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention (No. 29),7 the Committee raised concern 
about ‘forced child labour, and particularly the exploitation of children for 
prostitution and pornography. […] No longer is such exploitation of children 
a responsibility only of the country in which it occurs, it is an international 
responsibility’ (ilo, 1994, 28). The idea that the ilo would take up this interna-
tional responsibility by means of a new convention provoked strong resistance 
from the technical and standards departments of the ilo’s Office (ilo, 2000). 
Yet, all three constituencies of the ilo’s tripartite system were in favour and in 
March 1996 the Governing Body accepted a proposal to place the adoption of 
a new convention on the agenda of the 1998 International Labour Conference. 
The cause was further strengthened with the adoption of a new resolution 
on child labour in 1996. The Resolution recalls the 1979 Resolution concern-
ing the iyc and stresses that in the context of the progressive elimination of 
child labour there is the need to ‘immediately proceed with the abolition of its 
most intolerable aspects’ (ilo, 1996b). A few months later the ilo prepared a 
special report for the World Congress on Commercial Sexual Exploitation of 
Children, in Stockholm, in which it identifies prostitution and other forms of 
commercial sexual exploitation of children as a form of forced child labour. 
In a more elaborate publication on the reasons for a new convention, entitled 
‘Targeting the Intolerable’, the ilo made clear its intentions for its new child 
labour policy. Instead of taking immediate action to improve the conditions of 
working children by regulating and humanising child labour, member states 
were now urged to give ‘priority in the first instance to abolishing the worst 
and intolerable forms of child labour such as slavery and slave-like practices, 
7 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 (accessed on 1 June 2018). In 2014 a protocol to 
the Convention was adopted, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100 
:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:P029 https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12 
100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:P029 (accessed on 1 June 2018).
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all forms of forced labour including debt bondage and child prostitution, and 
child work in hazardous occupations and industries’ (ilo, 1996a, 115). This 
more narrow focus on the worst forms of child labour in the developing world 
quickly gained support from some of the larger industrialised countries, such 
as the US, Canada and Australia, who at that point in time were not willing to 
ratify Convention No. 138, which was considered difficult to ratify for federal 
states (interview with a former icftu Staff member).
During the negotiations over the content of the new convention the icftu 
drove a hard bargain on behalf of the trade unions. They had learned that there 
would be no ‘social clause’ in the new World Trade Organization (wto) to en-
force ilo labour standards and were adamant about reinforcing the ilo’s orig-
inal commitment to the abolition of all child labour, afraid of a so-called race 
to the bottom (Nieuwenhuys, 2007). The proposed formulation—‘most intol-
erable forms of child labour’—was the subject of objections from the unions 
because this implied there were tolerable forms of child labour. They also de-
manded that despite the focus on the worst forms, the new Convention would 
explicitly refer to Convention No. 138 as the fundamental instrument and to 
the objective of the effective elimination of all forms of child labour. It was fur-
thermore decided that both Convention No. 138 and the new Convention No. 
182 would be amongst the so-called ‘ilo fundamental Conventions’ reflected 
in the Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which 
would mean that each individual member state would have to abide by them 
even if it had not specifically ratified them. The final version of the 1999 Con-
vention No. 182 indeed refers to Convention No. 138 and to the 1996 Resolution, 
but no longer to the 1979 Resolution concerning the iyc.8 It was the writing on 
the wall for the ‘old’ two planks of ilo child labour policy.
After the adoption of Convention No. 182, which quickly became one of the 
most ratified of ilo conventions, the short-term objective of humanising child 
labour by regulating and improving working conditions gradually disappeared 
from the ilo’s discourse. In practice, the two-plank policy seemed to remain 
an important part of the ipec action programmes for at least a few more years. 
The ipec Implementations Reports until 2001 provide statistics on the number 
of children impacted by programmes aimed at improving working conditions. 
In 2002 the ilo participated in the UN Special Session on Children. With re-
gard to its role in drafting the outcome document of the Special Session, the 
ilo stated that ‘discussions on how to incorporate the elimination of child 
8 Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100
:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C182 (accessed on 1 June 2018).
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labour were continually side-tracked by proposals appealing for improvement 
of children’s working conditions’ (ilo, 2003, 16). Instead of referring to its long-
standing two-plank policy, the ilo pointed out that Conventions No. 138 and 
No. 182 allow ‘governments a certain degree of discretion and flexibility in set-
ting the minimum age for admission to work’ (ilo, 2003, 17). This proved to be 
an important turning point in the ilo’s approach to child labour. From 2003 
on, the ipec Implementation Reports and other global policy publications on 
child labour (ilo, 2010, 2013, 2015; 2017) no longer mention the humanisation, 
regulation or improvement of the working conditions of children under the 
minimum age as a transitional policy measure. Instead the focus now lies on 
the ‘sustained’ eradication of all forms of child labour by 2025, as stipulated 
in Target 8.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals. The decade following the 
official introduction of the two-plank approach in 1979, which was previously 
described as a period that saw a surge in creative, pragmatic and progressive 
projects around the world (ilo, 1989), is now considered by the ilo as a pe-
riod that ‘represented a lost opportunity to launch a sustained worldwide cam-
paign against child labour’ (ilo, 2007, 10).
5 Tense Translations of International Child Labour Norms
The study of the shifts over a period of almost 100 years in ilo child labour 
policies shows that the international standards and norms on child labour—
which have both provided a basis for these policies, which in turn have in-
fluenced the development of the said standards and norms—are open to 
different interpretations. What is at work here are ‘translations’ of children’s 
rights (Hanson and Nieuwenhuys, 2013), a concept that suggests that interna-
tional discourse and policy making are not merely about transferring one idea 
or standpoint into another context but imply an active stance of reproducing 
and change (Freeman, 2009). As a theoretical construct, the concept of transla-
tion is a prompt to reflexivity and can make the active reproduction of mean-
ing more explicit and open to debate. Considering the changes in the way that 
the ilo has addressed child labour over time, the translation concept reveals a 
series of tensions that deal with the regulation paradox, principled approach-
es versus pragmatism, and the place of the ilo within wider transnational 
developments.
A first tension that underlies many of the policy debates on children’s work 
is about trying to advance apparently conflicting objectives. Can an activity 
that ultimately needs to be abolished at the same time be regulated? The ilo 
itself (1993b, see above) pointed at the risk that by regulating child labour, the 
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target of eliminating child labour would by the same token be further removed 
instead of brought closer. Reversely, as was noted in a 1983 report by the ilo’s 
Director General, there is a risk that legislation aiming at merely abolishing 
child labour, if it is not accompanied by socio-economic changes, ‘may lead to 
greater clandestine work and more exploitative work situations’ (ilo, 1983, 19). 
The ilo’s long-held but now disappeared two-plank policy to regulate/human-
ise child labour in the short term while aiming at its abolition in the long term 
indeed reveals a ‘regulation paradox’, with which many other significant social 
debates also have to deal. Think, for instance, of the criminalisation versus reg-
ulation positions in debates about drug policy (Pardo, 2014) or the, in feminist 
circles, heated debate as to whether sex work should be regulated (granting 
specific rights to sex workers) or once and for all be outlawed by criminalis-
ing the customers (Munro and Della Giusta, 2016). Situations such as these, 
which express contradictory policy objectives, do not necessarily preclude the 
establishment of specific programmes that go in varied and even opposite di-
rections. In the case of child labour policy, there seems to be no readily avail-
able way out of the regulation paradox, especially given the strong, principled 
positions that cut across the debates.
This leads to our second point, which deals with principled versus prag-
matic approaches. Child labour policy is intimately connected to labour rights, 
human rights and children’s rights, all fields that are traversed by firm prin-
ciples, leading to deep-seated ideological positions. However, when making 
policy even in a field where strong moral convictions abound, at least some 
portions of pragmatism tend to crop up. When in 1919 the drafters of the ilo 
Constitution, at the last minute, decided to simply refer to ‘the abolition of 
child labour’ instead of a fixed minimum age, they did so for pragmatic rea-
sons. It would be up to the constituents to decide on the exact standards in 
conventions, and up to member states to ratify them or not. When in 1946 
the ilo decided to scrap from the Constitution the commitment to the abo-
lition of child labour, it did so because of a lesson it had learned from the 
first 25 years—namely, that ‘rigidity is likely to result in frustration rather 
than progress’ (ilo, 1946, 15). When the ilo introduced in 1979 its two-plank 
policy, it did so because it faced the fact that for millions of children work-
ing in third world countries their work was inevitable. The standard-setting 
practice of the ilo was failing them, and member states were encouraged to 
progressively restrict, regulate and humanise child labour while striving for 
a socio-economic climate in which the abolition of child labour would be a 
realistic goal. Subsequently, when the ipec was established in 1992, the ilo ini-
tially pursued its two-plank policy through technical assistance programmes 
on the ground. The success of the programme within as well as outside the 
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ilo, and the concomitant rise of a worldwide campaign against child labour, 
provoked a shift of the ilo’s child labour policy in a new direction. Ironically, 
the attempts to translate the ilo’s progressive and practical activities from the 
field up into new standards rehabilitated a principled approach to the aboli-
tion of child labour. The extant pragmatic approach came to be replaced by a 
new form of pragmatism contained in the rigid 1999 Convention—pending 
the abolition of all forms of child labour, eliminating the worst forms first—
leaving little room for flexible measures like the regulation and humanisation 
of child labour. One of our respondents, a former ipec Staff member, provides 
a compelling explanation for the reappearance of entrenched ideologies in 
child labour policy, which he links with the return of trade unions to the now 
much more publicly exposed discussions. According to our respondent, trade 
unions are ‘culturised in abolishing child labour’, and so the question was not 
so much about data and the demonstrable realities of children in work, but 
rather ‘about organised labour’s sense of identity. They felt the integrity of the 
labour movement was at stake’.
Even if the institutionalised labour movement, employers’ Organizations 
and governments, who make up the tripartite ilo constituency, are significant 
actors in the pursuit of social justice, decent work for all and the advance-
ment of human and labour rights, they are not the only transnational actors in 
these fields. When developing policies and programmes related to child labour 
and children’s work, the ilo must find its place amongst a myriad of other 
stakeholders including entities engaged with economic development such 
as the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme (undp), 
children’s rights agencies and bodies such as the United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund (unicef) or the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, as well as civil society Organizations such as Save the Children or Hu-
man Rights Watch. Hence, the ilo as a transnational actor also needs to deal 
with the tension between its position as leader with regard to legal and techni-
cal questions in the field of child labour and the intimate connection of this 
field with larger developments related to human rights and global economic 
developments that lie beyond the control of any single actor. The ilo has, for 
instance, played a leading role in the drafting process of Article 32 of the crc, 
which deals with children’s economic exploitation; it has also largely influ-
enced the positions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and other 
children’s rights entities including unicef and children’s rights ngos on how 
to interpret children’s rights in relation to child labour (Hanson et al., 2015). 
More recently, through providing seed funding to facilitate its inception and 
serving as its secretariat during the initial stage, the ilo has played a central 
role in Alliance 8.7, a global partnership established within the framework of 
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the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that is committed to securing 
the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour and ending 
child labour in all its forms by 2025.
The shift of the ilo’s child labour policy from a position that included rea-
sonable regulation to an almost exclusive abolitionist one was accompanied 
by an increase of referencing the most egregious forms of child exploitation 
such as child trafficking, the recruitment of child soldiers and slave-like prac-
tices. This is in line with a broader trend towards a moralisation of interna-
tional human rights and children’s rights discourses and policy (Poretti et al., 
2014; see also Mouffe, 2005). The ilo has been only one of many transnational 
actors that emphasise dramatic stories, children’s victimhood and vulnerabil-
ity, leaving less space for addressing the political responsibility for dealing with 
economic and structural inequalities.
6 Conclusion
In our analysis of the history of the ilo’s child labour policies, we have seen 
that, over the years, important changes have taken place in the way in which 
ideas and practices concerning child labour have been translated into inter-
national standards, discourses and policies. Working children’s opinions and 
representations have played an indirect role, in particular during the period 
when the ilo designed and implemented its two-plank policy combining the 
long-term abolition with the short-term regulation of child labour. During its 
early years, the ipec did foresee space, both in its discourse and in its pro-
grammes, for including working children’s representations by explicitly in-
cluding the regulation of children’s work as part of its child labour policy and 
by giving financial support to working children’s organisations. The remark-
able policy shift operated at the end of the twentieth century has, however, se-
riously diminished these influences. Today, the abolitionist perspective upheld 
by trade unions, which are firmly established as one of the Organization’s three 
constituencies, are at the core of the ilo’s child labour discourse and policy. 
It is this particular language that is now dominating not only actual transla-
tion processes but also particular interpretations of the history of the ilo’s 
child labour policy itself. Other particular languages that deal with regulat-
ing and humanising children’s work, as a matter of principle or while awaiting 
total abolition, and that have been present for a long time in the ilo’s history 
of child labour policy have slowly but surely disappeared from its discourse 
and practice. However, after 100 years of ilo child labour policies the Organ-
ization’s own global estimates (ilo, 2017) show us that more than 150 million 
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children are still working under the minimum age or in hazardous conditions. 
Just like in 1979 the ilo must face the fact that in many countries the social 
and economic conditions make the work of these children inevitable and that 
the short-term goal of improving their working conditions is just as relevant 
as it was back then. To shift its position at this time, the ilo would need to 
engage with the ever-growing body of literature providing evidence about the 
detrimental and beneficial consequences of work for children’s well-being as 
well as about the impact of its own policy on children’s lives (e.g. Morrow and 
Boyden, 2018; Bourdillon et al., 2010). In doing so, the ilo should actively col-
laborate with the research community, international development actors as 
well as local governments and social movements to develop locally relevant 
evidence-based policies for dealing with the diversity of children’s work in the 
world’s fast changing formal and informal economies.
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From the Centre to the Margins and Back Again: 
Women in Agriculture at the ilo
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Abstract
Women in agriculture play a particularly important role in the economy. But their 
work—as peasants and as agricultural wage earners—their knowledge, their place in 
agricultural systems of production and their contribution to global prosperity have 
only been recognised in recent years, or still lack significant recognition. With changes 
in systems of production that are related to globalisation, the marginalisation and 
the workload of women in agriculture has often increased due to the perpetuation 
of an unequal sexual division of work in agriculture, and due to unequal access to the 
workforce and to agricultural inputs, technologies, credit schemes and land. One of 
the main constraints faced by female peasants and agricultural wage earners is the 
continuous and increasing reproductive work, which rests disproportionately on the 
most excluded women.
Feminist studies have theorised and underlined the centrality of social repro-
duction, deconstructing what women’s work is and contesting the binary dis-
tinction between ‘production’ and ‘reproduction’. They have, further, shown 
how the prosperity of the global economy benefits from women’s work, includ-
ing subsistence production where women play a major role.
The focus on women in agriculture has been a starting point for gender 
and development studies. The International Labour Organization’s (ilo) pro-
grammes on women in rural areas have included groundbreaking research, 
the recognition of women’s unpaid and paid work, and support for women’s 
 empowerment in grass-roots organisations. After having disappeared to the 
margins, rural women are back at the centre of the ilo’s discussion on rural 
economies in recent years. The approach is now guided by the Decent Work 
agenda, which prevails globally in the ilo. We will explore how the ilo’s pro-
grammes on rural economies and gender have evolved since the Organiza-
tion’s inception. We will also consider how the ilo’s analysis and programmes 
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directed at the work of the most excluded women in agriculture could contrib-
ute to informing the Decent Work Agenda and changing the organisation of 
social reproduction and livelihoods.
1 Introduction
Rural issues have occupied a central place in the history of Development Stud-
ies, and issues regarding women in agriculture have been the starting point 
in Women/Gender and Development Studies. While the International La-
bour Organization (ilo) is not the specialised United Nations (UN) agency 
on rural issues, it has nevertheless also started its pioneering work on gender 
issues in the UN system by focusing on women’s work in agriculture. In this 
chapter, we will concentrate on one component of rural women’s economic 
 participation—their work in subsistence agriculture and as agricultural wage 
earners—and particularly on marginalised women in rural areas.
In order to situate women in agriculture in the gender and development 
debate, the chapter starts with a brief history of the understanding of ‘develop-
ment’ and the place of rural economies in this discourse and an overview of 
how the women/gender and development debate has evolved. This requires an 
intersectional approach to include women who are at the margins—for rea-
sons of class, race, ethnicity, caste or other mutually reinforcing categories of 
exclusion.
We will then present how, since the ilo’s inception, rural issues and an in-
terrogation of women’s work in agriculture have gone through ebbs and flows, 
moving from the centre to the margins and back again in the Organization’s 
work on gender issues.
The field of knowledge on gender and development, which has been con-
structed with close interaction between scholars, feminist movements and 
international organisations, has been fuelled by some of the contributions of 
the ilo. Selected groundbreaking central feminist concepts elaborated on this 
path will be discussed, in particular women’s work and social reproduction. 
Analysis of women’s work in agriculture has been pivotal to the discussion of 
these concepts, and to understanding the articulation between subsistence pro-
duction and the global economy and capitalist prosperity (Meillassoux, 1975).
We will conclude with a discussion on how, and if, the ilo’s Decent Work 
Agenda in rural economies takes into account marginalised women in agricul-
ture and how it can contribute to the discussion on the future of work, and to 
changes in the organisation of social reproduction and livelihoods.
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2 Workers and Women’s Work: Debates and Challenges
The protection of wage earners was the target of the ilo at its inception—
those who operate in the labour market as formal, paid workers. Women’s or-
ganisations and feminist movements managed to introduce women’s issues 
into the early ilo debates, with contrasting positions on protectionist laws 
and laws promoting the principle of equality—positions that have continued 
to influence policy deliberations throughout the history of the ilo (ilo, 2009). 
At the first International Labour Conference (ilc) in 1919, two of the six con-
ventions adopted concerned women—prohibiting night work for women and 
ensuring maternity protection for working women.
However, the way in which the ilo’s target had been defined meant that the 
majority of women were not included, since most were not formal, paid work-
ers but rather peasants, informal, home-working, or domestic workers (see, for 
instance, for France, Maruani and Meron, 2013). With the ilo Declaration of 
Philadelphia in 1944, independent workers were included as targets, but not 
informal workers. But even today informal workers constitute the majority of 
the workers in the world.1
In the 1970s, the ilo’s definition of informal workers referred to the ‘work-
ing poor’ in urban areas of developing countries, working in very small-scale 
units, mostly self-employed or with some assistance from family members or 
hired workers, whose income-generating activities are not registered, recog-
nised or regulated by the government (ilo, 1991a). Rural employment statistics 
(see Table 8.1) show a large number of ‘self-employed’ people in agriculture, 
a small number working in non-agricultural employment, and a significant 
number of ‘non-active’ or ‘not reported’. The number of wage earners is mar-
ginal, particularly in agriculture and specifically among women. The 2002 ilo 
Resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy included both 
wage earners and ‘own-account workers’—people engaged exclusively in non-
market production are not taken into account. There is no universally accurate 
or accepted description or definition of the informal economy, except that in 
it activities are insufficiently covered by formal arrangements, leading to work-
ers lacking protection, rights and representation.
1 For instance, in India in 2002, 93 per cent of workers were informal workers. On average, 
for the year 2000, the levels of informality were 78 per cent in Asia and 52 per cent in Latin 
America. In Africa, where statistics are less reliable and comparable, figures by country indi-
cate high levels of informality too (for example, 80 per cent for Zambia in 1998) (Bacchetta et 
al., 2009, 30).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Women are disproportionately affected by informality (ilo, 2016, 11) and 
are thus considerably disadvantaged. In addition, across the world, unpaid re-
productive work—goods, services or care for the household—is mostly per-
formed by women.2 This unequal sexual division of work has been recognised 
as being a persistent source of inequalities, particularly regarding access to the 
formal labour market. Generally, women are more likely to work shorter hours 
for pay or profit. Globally, in 2016, women represented less than 40 per cent of 
total employment and made up 57 per cent of those working on a part-time ba-
sis (ilo, 2016, 17). Women’s contributions to the global economy thus include 
a huge amount of work that is either not valued as work and thus not included 
in Gross National Product (gnp) calculations (undp, 1995) or that does not 
lead to equal benefits, rights, protection and space for political participation.
The ilo’s contributions on Third World peasant women’s work contributed 
to the broad recognition of women’s work and fuelled the gender and develop-
ment debate. To better understand these debates and contributions, it is nec-
essary to include a brief discussion on the notion of ‘development’, and on the 
construction of the field of knowledge ‘gender and development’.
3 Discussing Development as a Specific Reading of the Trajectories  
of Societies
The term ‘development’ was coined in 1949 in an address by the then newly 
elected President of the US, Harry Truman, and was linked to a call to fight 
poverty and hunger:
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approach-
ing misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their 
economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and 
a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas […]. What we envis-
age is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic 
fair-dealing […]. Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace.
h. truman, 1949, author’s emphasis
Today, 70 years later, half the global population is rural, poverty is persistent 
and hunger has not been eradicated. Famines repeatedly occur, including in 
2 Women spend an average of 4 hours and 30 minutes per day on unpaid reproductive work 
(ilo, 2016, 20), with important variations due to social belongings (class, race, caste, gender) 
and across countries.
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1970 in the Sahel region, in 2008 with world food prices at their highest levels, 
or at the time of writing in Yemen and Sudan. According to its Charter, the UN 
(1945) has, amongst other aims, the goal to ‘promote social progress and bet-
ter standards of life in larger freedom’. However, ‘development’ did not eradi-
cate hunger, and famine and food riots are recurrent. Unequal power relations 
along gender, race and class lines are persistent and inequalities are growing.
Diverse schools of thought have addressed development processes, from 
‘developmentalists’ (Rostow, 1963) and dependence theorists (Frank, 1969; 
Amin, 1973; Furtado, 1976; Wallerstein, 2006) to ‘decolonial’ theorists (Quijano, 
1992; Escobar, 1988 and 2004). Adherents of the developmentalist current ar-
gued that modernisation theories would pave the way for ‘underdeveloped’ 
countries to take off in order to catch up with ‘developed’ countries and that, 
overall, wealth would trickle down from the rich to the poor. For theorists of 
dependency the ‘periphery’ was hampered by unequal trade relationships and 
needed to sever its dependency ties to the ‘centre’ in order to industrialise in 
similar ways. The association of ‘development’ with a process moving from ‘un-
derdeveloped’ (and primarily rural) to ‘developed’ (and industrial) states has 
reinforced the image of agriculture as a sector of activity that had to be trans-
formed in depth. The contemporary agricultural revolution (Mazoyer, 2002) in-
troduced rapid changes, in the form of large-scale, mechanised, chemicalised, 
intensified systems of production. Small farming systems were generally con-
sidered as ‘primitive’, poorly ‘developed’, and ‘backward’, with low productivity 
and irrational ways of producing, not related to the global economy. Agricul-
tural industrialisation, meanwhile, was considered a necessary step towards 
modernity and ‘development’. Peasants were seen as a group that would pro-
gressively disappear.
A critical analysis of the ‘development’ discourse suggests that it constitutes 
a system of beliefs that imposes its specific reading on the trajectory of societ-
ies (Quijano, 1992; Rist, 1996). The concept of ‘coloniality of power’ has interro-
gated this Euro–American modernist and ‘civilising mission’ that is considered 
as a form of intellectual colonialism. Decolonial feminist scholars have signifi-
cantly contributed to critically revisiting development theories, incorporating 
gender, class and race exclusions, including marginalised female peasants, and 
revealing the production–reproduction nexus (Benería, 1979; León, 1982 and 
1985; Elson, 1991; Agarwal, 1992 and 1994). Today, the dominant industrialised 
agricultural system of production is under scrutiny and movements working 
towards sustainable, healthy and more equitable food-production systems 
are gaining momentum, including agro-ecological movements, where female 
farmers and feminist claims are very present. These critical views have contrib-
uted to re-conceptualising women’s work and suggest that we reflect on how 
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this specific reading of the trajectory of societies influences the discussion on 
formalisation—namely, of women’s work—and the debate on unpaid repro-
ductive work, including peasant women’s work.
4 Rural Women and the Construction of the Gender and 
Development Field of Knowledge
The drive to include women in development has existed ever since the discus-
sion on development began (Verschuur, 2009; Verschuur et al., 2014). As a result 
of pressures exerted by feminist movements, the UN included consideration 
of the advancement of women’s rights, since its very inception, both in its dis-
course and in the practices of its institutions. Already in 1946, a Commission 
on the Status of Women (csw) was formed within the UN Commission for 
Human Rights in order to address problems faced specifically by women and 
to introduce equality between women and men.
Academics too exerted, through their writings, an influence to include 
women’s issues, writings that informed the policies of international institu-
tions and fostered change in conceptual and analytical frameworks. The semi-
nal work, Woman’s Role in Economic Development (1970), by Ester Boserup, a 
Danish economist, provided an analysis of the labour of peasant women in Af-
rica, Asia and Latin America, arguing that both colonialism and modernisation 
policies had had negative effects on women’s status. This analysis, while having 
several insufficiencies, opened the way to recognition of female farmers and 
their work. At the time, the term ‘gender’ had not been coined and power rela-
tions, in particular in the family, were not taken into consideration. Inspired by 
feminist practices, the works of feminist scholars fuelled women’s liberation 
movements, which, in turn, exerted added pressure on the UN and interna-
tional cooperation organisations. These various pressures led the UN csw to 
launch International Women’s Year, in Mexico City in 1975. Subsequently, the 
Commission held the responsibility for the organisation of women’s confer-
ences, including in Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995. 
The ilo contributed importantly to the huge body of research and publica-
tions that was produced during this period, as we will see. These moments 
were particularly important to the creation of a field of knowledge on women/
gender and development and to the push for resolutions, recommendations 
and plans of action to introduce gender into development institutions, pro-
grammes and policies.
In a first moment, the previously unacknowledged work of women, in partic-
ular that of Third World peasant women, was recognised as such (Benería and 
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Sen, 1981; Boserup, 1970). The next period was marked by analyses of the social 
relations of sex, race and class within the new international division of labour 
in the context of globalised neo-liberal capitalism. Many studies focused on 
issues such as the integration of women into the delocalised manufacturing in-
dustry, the feminisation of the proletariat, women’s increasing importance in 
informal urban economies and the feminisation of migration (Verschuur and 
Catarino, 2013). The ilo was the driver, with domestic workers associations, 
of the promotion of a groundbreaking resolution on domestic workers (No. 
189, in 20113), and carried out extensive work on migrant women workers and 
indigenous women. However, female small farmers and rural workers were not 
part of the main research or policy agendas of the ilo during this period. In 
the following period, researchers and feminist movements deconstructed the 
colonial image of the supposedly homogeneous ‘Southern woman’ and provid-
ed an impulse for the re-examination of the interlocking nature of race, caste, 
class and gender categories, as well as for critiques of the hegemony of Western 
feminisms (Mohanty, 1988), which had also contributed to the marginalisation 
of rural women’s issues, opening the way for analyses and practices that con-
sider individuals as subjects of their own history (Rauber, 2003). Women’s and 
feminist movements in the global South contributed to the emergence of con-
cepts such as the solidarity economy or the right to food, and of environmental 
concerns and the defence of alternative systems of production, as networks 
like Via Campesina4 do, taking into account intersectionality.
Critical theories on ‘development’, the inclusion of an intersectional and 
decolonial approach in the women/gender and development field and social, 
economic, financial and environmental crises have led to a rethinking of the 
agrarian question and the place and work of marginalised women—whose 
livelihoods are related to rural areas. These issues have been brought back to 
the agenda in the ilo.
5 Ebbs and Flows in the ilo on Rural Development—Women and 
Work in Agriculture
Rural development has been on the ilo’s agenda since the Organization’s es-
tablishment in 1919. The 1921 ilc is sometimes referred to as the ‘Agricultural 
3 See the website https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:
:P12100_ILO_CODE:C189 (accessed on 13 August 2018).
4 International peasant’s movement. For more information, see https://viacampesina.org/en/ 
(accessed on 8 August 2018).
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Session’, since many agriculture-centred conventions and recommendations 
were adopted (on unemployment, living conditions, night work for women 
and youths, the right to association). In 1922, it was decided5 that the ilo 
should concern itself with workers in agriculture as well as those in industry, 
and shortly afterwards the first Director General, Albert Thomas, established 
an Agricultural Division (de Luca et al., 2011, 13). Since then, the ilo has ad-
opted over 30 international labour standards that are of direct relevance to 
agriculture and rural development. In the beginning, the main concerns of the 
ilo in rural areas were labour standards, working conditions, social dialogue 
and employment issues.
Expert committees were set up on indigenous labour and work on planta-
tions, and rural employment conditions were a priority in the ilo’s work. In 
1951, stronger relations were established with the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (fao), confirming the ilo’s mandate to work in rural areas, more 
specifically on training, cooperative development, rural industries and migra-
tion (de Luca et al., 2011, 19). With the decolonisation process starting from the 
1950s, priorities changed from an emphasis on modern industry to rural issues. 
With the arrival of new member states from ‘developing economies’, agricul-
tural and rural issues became dominant. Rural issues became central to the 
ilo’s work from the 1950s onward, peaking in the 1970s and 1980s.
The ilo’s Resolution 19606 highlighted the challenge of rural develop-
ment and set up an Office-wide, rural-oriented strategy. In 1969, the ilo had 
launched the World Employment Programme (wep), and the Director Gener-
al’s report introducing the wep stressed (among other points) the need to shift 
investment from capital-intensive to labour-intensive activities, from physical 
(i.e. machinery) to human capital, and from urban to rural development (ilo, 
1969, 68 and 81).
The Rural Employment Policies Research Branch (emp/RU), set up in 1973, 
constituted the lead unit and was designated as the ‘in-house hub’ for rural 
matters, promoting research on these issues and designing the ilo’s rural de-
velopment strategy. The emergence of rural issues as a priority was further evi-
denced at the UN World Food Conference in 1974, which called on the UN to 
place more emphasis on rural development (de Luca et al., 2011, 21).
5 Between 1922 and 1932, the Permanent Court of International Justice, since 1946 the Inter-
national Court of Justice, issued four advisory opinions related to the International Labour 
Organization, two on agriculture, one on women’s work at night.
6 See the website https://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/resolucao_
ilo_1975.pdf (accessed on 13 August 2018).
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The World Employment Conference (wec) in 1976 called for ‘according 
high priority to the development of rural areas in all its dimensions, from ag-
riculture modernization to development of agro-based industries, including 
rural crafts, to the provision of physical and social infrastructure, appropriate 
technology, vocational training, credit facilities and cooperatives […], special 
efforts to ensure effective workers’ participation, and agrarian reform includ-
ing land distribution, to achieve effective national development strategies’ (de 
Luca et al., 2011, 22). However, women in rural areas appeared only sporadical-
ly, in chapters referring to disadvantaged groups such as indigenous and tribal 
people, youth and disabled persons.
5.1 Innovative Approaches and Debates
Considerable and high-quality research and analysis was produced during 
those years by world-renowned scholars (Jolly, 1976; Sen, 1981; Benería, 1982) 
and on issues of land reform, rural technology and female rural workers, con-
tributing to important innovative concepts. Among these was the ‘basic needs’ 
approach (Jolly, 1976; Ghai et al., 1980), the debates on informality, the ques-
tioning of growth in itself as a way of ensuring employment creation and pov-
erty reduction or, concerning gender issues, the deconstruction of the concept 
of women’s work and the sexual division of labour (de Luca et al., 2011, 31). A 
lot of research was also produced on rural cooperatives. This progressive and 
groundbreaking research provoked resistance, from the constituent parts of 
and internally within the ilo. Interestingly, the huge volume of research docu-
ments and training material produced on cooperatives by acopam (Appui 
Coopératif au Programme Alimentaire Mondial—Cooperative and Organiza-
tional Support to Grassroots Initiatives) was not supported by the ilo—de-
spite growing prestige within the ilo, important contributions to poverty al-
leviation by increasing rural employment and securing social rights, and being 
considered as ‘exemplary in gradually strengthening a project’s gender sensi-
tivity and in screening projects for gender sensitization’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 
66). In part, this reluctance is attributed to the fact that ‘all documents and 
training materials were in French’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 66), which also tells us 
a lot about the ‘unequal traveling and translation of feminist practices, theo-
ries and texts, and their reception’ (de Lima Costa and Alvarez, 2014, 558). The 
rich body of feminist literature produced by non-Anglo-Saxon feminist schol-
ars since the seventies (Delphy, 1970; León, 1982; Bisilliat, 1985; Lagarde, 1994; 
Devreux, 1995) has been poorly incorporated into the UN apparatus and only 
weakly influenced debates, programmes or research. Transnational encoun-
ters have, however, opened spaces of circulation of ideas.
Verschuur162
<UN>
In preparation of the first UN conference on women, in Mexico in 1975, a 
Women’s Programme had been opened around the wep in 1974, with studies 
on the sexual division of labour and on the contribution of women to develop-
ment and the gender biases. The 1976 wec had pointed to the fact that women 
faced the most disadvantages and had called for action to relieve ‘the work 
burden and drudgery of rural women by improving their living and working 
conditions and providing more resources for investment in favour of women 
in rural areas’ (Ghai, 1982, vi). The Programme attempted to implement the 
relevant recommendations of the wec as well as those adopted by the World 
Conferences on Women held in Mexico City and Copenhagen in 1975 and 
1980, respectively. The introduction of a seminal book produced by the ilo on 
women and development recognised that the studies published in the book 
contributed to understanding ‘the forces that perpetuate [women’s] subordi-
nation’ (Ghai, 1982, vi).
5.2 The Programme on Rural Women
The Programme on Rural Women established in these years was an icebreaker 
in the UN system. ‘I remember how the first reaction of my colleagues [of wep, 
where we were initially only two women] to my proposal to calculate women’s 
unpaid work was initially quite negative and received with smiles’ (interview 
with Lourdes Benería, August 2017). The Programme undertook groundbreak-
ing research (Benería, 1982; ilo, 1991b), produced innovative concepts and 
approaches, ‘from women awareness raising, social mobilisation and working 
collectively to solve problems, generate income, and give women a voice; to in-
creasing women’s access to government officials, and awareness-raising among 
employers to women’s needs (in terms of health, education, shelter, water and 
sanitation); to women capacity building; to micro-finance for income-poor 
women’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 40). ‘By 1990, the ilo’s analytical work and practi-
cal experience had been synthesized in over 150 working papers, books and 
conference papers covering a wide range of topics’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 43).
Research produced by the Programme on Rural Women contributed to dis-
cussions not only of what women’s work—including domestic work—is, but 
also of what is considered to be women’s work in terms of non-domestic pro-
duction (Benería, 1982, xiv). It documented how some rural women perform 
the same agricultural tasks as men, and others perform sex-typed activities like 
processing food for sale (the Hausa region in Nigeria) or making laces (India). 
It showed that the sexual division of work in agriculture is not universal— 
coffee production may be carried out by women or by men according to  country, 
ethnicity, etc.—and is subject to change according to global economic changes 
and the process of accumulation. It illustrated the differences between women 
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and men in the proletarianisation of the labour force with the transformation 
of agrarian structures and in the processes of land commercialisation and con-
centration that occurred in these years. It also illustrated how global econom-
ic changes intensified reproduction activities, and how the household also is 
subject to changes. The Programme on Rural Women not only paid attention 
to women, it also defended the idea that ‘one of the dimensions of women’s op-
pression is the existence of mechanisms of exploitation that feed on and accen-
tuate inequalities related to class and gender’ (Benería, 1982, xvi). This accent on 
the need to link gender and class differences leads us to ‘ask questions about the 
reasons for their existence and about the possibility of doing away with them’ 
(Benería, 1982, xvii). Institutional questions derived from these statements. ‘If 
private ownership, unequal distribution of resources, and a capitalist organiza-
tion of production result in fundamental class differences—affecting women 
in a variety of ways—we need to ask whether any institutional change ad-
dressed to altering these factors will do away with gender-related mechanisms 
of subordination affecting women’ (Benería, 1982, xvii). Studies showed that a 
more egalitarian distribution of economic resources was not sufficient and that 
patriarchal systems need to be challenged in order to achieve real changes with 
regard to gender equality. Finally, the Programme’s remarkable contribution 
was to document the ‘extent to which women’s economic activities are under-
estimated in labour force and national income statistics and are undervalued 
in general’ (Benería, 1982, xvii), including in economic activities other than do-
mestic work. This led to major theoretical contributions to feminist studies, to 
‘redefine the concept of economic activity, so that it includes not only tasks re-
lated to commodity production but also tasks that contribute to human welfare’ 
(Benería, 1982, xvii). The focus on commodity production—in other words, the 
production of exchange values rather than use values—has distorted the way 
participation in the labour force is defined. Feminist scholars in the ilo’s Pro-
gramme on Rural Women argued that participation in the labour force should 
also include use value production (Benería, 1982, xvii). While some efforts had 
been made to estimate this participation in subsistence  agriculture—this was 
not done in domestic activities, viewed at that time as outside the economic 
realm—they remained seriously insufficient and often failed to relate it to hu-
man welfare rather than to a process of growth and accumulation.
The Programme on Rural Women also supported income-generating proj-
ects and grass-roots level organisations and cooperatives among poor rural 
women. It helped organise women into rural worker’s organisations, for in-
stance with the Self-Employed Women’s Association (sewa) in India,7 and in 
7 For more information, see the website http://www.sewa.org (accessed on 8 August 2018).
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some countries worked with women plantation workers (including in Ban-
gladesh). But although it had contributed to a huge body of knowledge, the 
Programme had not managed to change the approaches and projects. Projects 
targeted women, but due to the fact that they did not sufficiently recognise 
women’s already huge burden of work in domestic activities and in subsis-
tence production ended up overburdening the most disadvantaged women. 
The Programme could not structurally change the mechanisms that reproduce 
unequal power relations and sexual division of labour; nor could it change the 
global economic system. It did not get the necessary high-level support to in-
tegrate its findings into all the departments of the ilo and remained isolated 
and poorly funded. For instance, one of the major components of the ilo’s ru-
ral work in the 1970s and 1980s, the Special Public Works Programme, had abso-
lutely no mention or inclusion of women or gender issues. The same happened 
with the ilo Unit Management Development Programme, which focused on 
small-scale enterprises considered as having an important capacity to ‘create 
jobs, multiply, and satisfy the basic needs of local population’ (de Luca et al., 
2011, 68). In the ilo programmes also reaching rural areas like Skills, or Oc-
cupational Safety and Health and Working Conditions, the absence of gender 
was also striking.
Tensions also came to surface between concepts and approaches such as 
‘landlessness, poverty, work at village level, and “traditional” ilo work’ (de 
Luca et al., 2011, 29), or between ‘constituents and traditional ilo officials’ on 
the one hand, and the ‘donor-funded rural research programme that focused 
on land reform, organizing the poor and women on the other’ (de Luca et al., 
2011, 29). In 1987, the emp/RU, the ‘in-house hub’ for rural matters, was disman-
tled. Many innovative approaches and programmes had not been integrated 
into the ilo, in particular those regarding rural women.
After a marked decline within the ilo for around twenty years, rural issues 
regained attention from the year 2008 onwards, when hunger riots exploded, 
illustrating the limits of the agricultural and food production and exchange 
system, the social, economic, financial and environmental crises and more 
generally the crisis of social reproduction and the widespread and persistent 
poverty in rural areas.
The accent on reducing poverty expressed in the international agenda urged 
the ilo to redirect policies towards rural areas that had been present at the 
beginning of the ilo’s mandate and work. Following its discussion of the ilo 
(2008) ilo report Rural Employment for Poverty Reduction, the ilc confirmed 
the need to engage more decisively and urgently in rural areas, mobilising the 
Decent Work Agenda. The ilc adopted, in 2009, a Resolution and Conclusions 
to promote rural employment, and a Resolution to put gender equality at the 
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heart of decent work. ‘In March 2011, the Governing Body adopted a strategy 
on promoting decent work for rural development, identified as one of the ar-
eas for priority action in 2014–15 and one of ten Policy Outcomes in 2016–17 
to continue providing high-value services to the ilo’s tripartite constituents’ 
(ilo, 2017). In 2011, fao published its annual report on women in agriculture, 
recognising their central role as food producers in farming systems; and 2014 
was decreed as the year of ‘family farming’, and joint programmes between 
the ilo, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (ifad) and fao 
have been established. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also in-
cluded priorities on rural development and agriculture and food security.
6 The ilo, the Decent Work Agenda in Rural Economies, and Gender
The concerns of the ilo in rural areas are nowadays related to the Organi-
zation’s agenda on decent work. As a study on the ilo’s rural work legacy 
observed: ‘decent work deficits are numerous and include higher rates of 
un- and under-employment (especially among youth and women); an alarm-
ing prevalence of child labour (agriculture alone represents 60 per cent of all 
child labour); a high frequency of precarious work as wage workers are mostly 
temporary or casual; widespread informal activities; limited social protection; 
exposure to adverse working conditions due to poor labour standards cover-
age and monitoring; and little or no unionization’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 13). The 
Decent Work Agenda in rural areas includes, according to ilo statements, pay-
ing ‘special attention to women, youth, and other disadvantaged groups with 
untapped potential’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 16). It addresses ‘issues such as access 
to skills and employment services, sustainable entrepreneurship, extension of 
social protection and improved occupational safety and health and working 
conditions, International Labour Standards, and the need for strengthened ru-
ral organization’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 16).
Agriculture is acknowledged as being the main source of rural employment 
for both women and men in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South-East 
Asia. In Latin America, female rural work is equally distributed between agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors. In the Middle East and North Africa, ru-
ral women work mostly in agriculture and rural men as non-agricultural wage 
earners. In Central Asia and Europe, the majority of the rural population works 
as waged employees in non-agricultural activities (fao, ifad and ilo, 2010, 
4). In all cases, a significant proportion of women are either ‘self-employed’, as 
referred to by the fao, ifad and ilo report, or non-active or ‘not-reported’. De-
cent rural work programmes by the ilo concentrate however on ‘remunerative 
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employment’ (fao, ifad and ilo, 2010, 20), where women are only marginally 
represented. Unpaid work and informal work are not part of the Decent Work 
Agenda. As underlined by a high-level officer: ‘[The] ilo’s specific area of work 
is wage-workers’ (personal interview with van Leur, Director of the Sectoral 
Policies Department, July 2017).
While the Decent Work Agenda does mention the necessity to ‘[take] wom-
en’s role in the care economy adequately into account, for instance through 
work–family balance measures and providing workplace-level incentives for 
the provision of childcare and parental leave’ (ilo, 2018), this concerns only 
formal workers. Unpaid and reproductive work—including food production, 
goods, services and care— carried out by women in rural economies, in par-
ticular in agriculture, is thus still not taken into account in the Decent Work 
Agenda and does not give access to women, as workers, to rights, social protec-
tion and representation.
The ilo’s tripartite structure enables employers’ organisations and trade 
unions to be officially represented in its governing bodies. However, feminist 
scholars and movements question to what extent mainstream trade unions—
generally male dominated—represent the specific interests of women work-
ers. More importantly, and specifically in rural areas since women constitute 
a major proportion of unorganised workers and unpaid agricultural workers 
(see Table 8.1), there is a serious shortcoming with regard to voicing rural, less 
advantaged women’s interests. At the level of governments, while a small num-
ber of them are strong promoters of gender equality (for instance the Nordic 
countries, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands), many others do not include 
gender equality as a real priority, even if gender mainstreaming is present in 
the discourses. Rural agro-industrial lobbies may also have decisive power to 
influence their governments and the employers’ parties so that support to-
wards small peasants is reduced. All of this reinforces the marginalisation of a 
major proportion of women in agriculture.
Working on rural economies implies coordination and collaboration but 
also some tensions and competition with other specialised agencies of the UN 
that have a specific mandate to deal with agriculture and food issues (in partic-
ular fao and ifad). The ilo explained its focus on decent work for wage-earn-
ers in rural economies in order to define its specificity. In 2010, fao, ifad and 
the ilo prepared a joint report on gender and rural employment, based on an 
impressive number of studies and research from different agencies and schol-
ars. It extends the notion of women’s participation in rural employment to 
‘farming, self-employment working in trade, small enterprises providing goods 
and services, wage labour in these and wage labour in agriculture’ (fao, ifad 
and ilo, 2010, 3). The report describes the gendered constraints that women 
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in rural economies face and how to reduce them. In 2012, the ilo, fao and 
ifad jointly organised a panel discussion, during the 56th Session of the csw, 
on Rural Employment and Agriculture. Amongst other issues, ‘examples and 
success stories of cooperatives unleashing rural women’s potential and giving 
them a stronger voice’ were presented (ilo, 2012, 2). Recognition of women as 
farmers with associated rights was included in the issues discussed, as was ‘de-
cent work for indigenous women in rural areas’ (ilo, 2012, 2). ilo Convention 
No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples8 was highlighted as a framework for 
indigenous women’s rights.
The ilo’s Sectoral Unit on the Rural Economy9 has prepared, since its es-
tablishment in 2013, a series of policy guidelines on gender and rural issues, 
one of which focuses on women’s empowerment. On International Women’s 
Day 2012, the chosen focus was to ‘empower rural women—end hunger and 
poverty’, and a call was made to increase employment, education and organ-
isation as key tools in the empowerment of rural women. There seems to be a 
shift from the category gender—sometimes understood as a politically correct 
concept that displaces attention to men—to women’s empowerment and con-
tinuous attention to women’s grass-root level initiatives and ‘small projects’ 
(personal interview with van Leur, Director of the Sectoral Policies Depart-
ment, July 2017).
The ilo considers that ‘the rural economy holds significant potential for 
creating decent and productive jobs and contributing to sustainable develop-
ment and economic growth’ (ilo, 2017). The lack of support given to rural areas 
is considered by an ilo report as ‘missed opportunities’, ‘such as the waste of 
agricultural produce […]; an under-utilization of the rural workforce […]. Well-
developed rural areas hold considerable potential for economic growth with 
high returns and good, productive jobs and livelihoods’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 
13). Rural areas are seen as having a potential that needs to be unlocked, and 
investing in them is seen as ‘good business’ (de Luca et al., 2011, 14). Supporting 
rural areas is understood as being ‘smart economics’, following the World Bank 
in its proposal to invest in women and girls and in women’s empowerment 
as individual persons, to reinforce the efficiency of the neo-liberal economic 
model of development. However this ‘smart economics’ approach has been 
widely criticised by feminist scholars as one that is embedded in the neo-lib-
eral gender agenda, aiming at investing in women and girls for more efficient 
8 See the website https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/fr/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRU-
MENT_ID,P12100_LANG_CODE:312314,en:NO (accessed on 13 August 2018).




development outcomes (Chant, 2012). This instrumental approach considers 
women as an underutilised resource, it does not understand the concept of 
gender as an expression of power (Scott, 1986), it does not take into account 
the critical approaches to empowerment, the analysis of women’s subordina-
tion and of the mechanisms that reproduce gender and social inequalities. Nu-
merous studies have demonstrated that the neo-liberal model of development 
cannot contribute to increase social and gender justice and to reduce inequali-
ties, poverty and hunger without structural changes (Razavi, 2002 and 2009; 
unrisd, 2005). The way the Decent Work Agenda is conceptualised could 
benefit from critical feminist analysis on ‘smart economics’, from the seminal 
contributions the ilo’s Programme on Rural Women has made on social repro-
duction, and from the critical analysis of the specific reading of the trajectories 
of societies offered by ‘development’ and feminist studies. Some of this has 
indeed been included in the programme of the ilo’s Bureau for Gender Equal-
ity. Besides many resolutions10 that respond to long lasting feminist struggles, 
important efforts have been made to encourage the recognition, redistribution 
and reduction of care work, considered as the cause of the reproduction of 
gender inequalities, in particular in relation to access to employment.
7 Women’s Work in Agriculture, Social Reproduction, and Family 
Agriculture
Research on agricultural activities has for a long time neglected small-scale 
family farming, associated with backwardness and unproductivity, and 
 irrationality—a system of production that was considered unable to feed the 
world. Women in agriculture have often only been represented as spouses or 
daughters, not as workers. The female small peasant’s work has long been con-
sidered as ‘help’ and not as work. Failure to acknowledge the power relations 
and the division of work in the household and the farm has tended to reinforce 
inequalities and devaluate the specific knowledge, practices, and crops culti-
vated by women peasants. It has also meant ignoring issues of unequal rights 
to land, to means of production, to the market, and of unequal participation 
10 The Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100); the Discrimination in Employment and 
Occupation Convention (No. 111); the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention 
(No. 156); the Maternity Protection Convention (No. 183); the Resolution concerning Gen-
der Equality at the Heart of Decent Work; the Resolution concerning the Promotion of 
Gender Equality, Pay Equity and Maternity Protection; and the Convention for Domestic 
Workers (No. 189). See the website https://www.ilo.org/gender/Aboutus/ILOandGende-
rEquality/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 13 August 2018).
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in decisions regarding the process of production and distribution. The under-
representation of women in rural unions and farmers’ unions contributes to 
their invisibility, notably that of their agency, and disregards their political 
subjectivity.
Feminist and critical rural social scientists have highlighted instead the 
centrality of the small peasantry in food production and the importance of 
women’s work, as peasants as well as wage earners. They have shown how the 
sexual division of work, with marginalised peasant women working on sub-
sistence production and men as wage earners, sustains the prosperity of the 
global economy. As an ilo publication of 1993 noted, ‘[agricultural] workers 
are not fully salaried and depend for a part of their income on the produce of 
their small farms, most often in the hands of women. This subordination of 
small peasant production to the labor market allows employers to pay a very 
low daily wage to agricultural workers’ (Egger, 1993, 58, author’s translation). 
These words from an ilo official illustrate well the articulation between differ-
ent systems and relations of production, which is pivotal for the working of the 
global economy (Meillassoux and Verschuur, 1985).
Social reproduction includes all activities, relations and institutions that are 
necessary for the reproduction of life. It comprises biological reproduction, 
the reproduction of the labour force, and all activities that are necessary for 
daily life and future generations. This includes, for instance, food production, 
preparation and transformation, petty commodity production and commer-
cialisation, caring for the others (dependents and non-dependents) and caring 
for nature. Unpaid labour in the production of goods and services and in care 
is considered a fundamental economic activity in feminist economics.
With changes in systems of production, changes related to globalisation 
and male migration, the marginalisation and workloads of rural women often 
increased, due to the persistent unequal sexual division of labour in agricul-
ture and to unequal access to the workforce, agricultural inputs, technologies, 
credit and land. One of the major constraints faced by women peasants and 
agricultural wage earners is the continuous and increasing nature of repro-
ductive work, which relies disproportionately on the most excluded women 
because of unequal power relations, sexual division of labour in the family 
and the coloniality of power. With neo-liberal globalisation, a crisis of social 
reproduction can be observed (Federici, 1999) and includes disappearing pub-
lic services, unemployment and falling wages. In rural areas, the reproduc-
tive activities of disadvantaged women peasants are particularly burdensome 
due to poor infrastructure (electricity, water, roads…) and a lack of facilities 




The food crisis and the crisis of social reproduction have generated doubts 
about the sustainability of the agribusiness model, for social, economic and 
environmental reasons. This has led to the rehabilitation of and support for 
other systems of production that value food production, agro-ecological prac-
tices and support for family agriculture. This change of perspective is not only 
due to the food crisis, it is also a consequence of the mobilisation of rural so-
cial movements claiming the right to land and to decent work and livelihoods, 
and of ecological movements. Family agriculture has featured in development 
agencies (fao decreed 2014 to be the year of family agriculture) and public pol-
icies as a strategic proposal to fight poverty and improve food security through 
the modernisation of agriculture.
Public policies with regard to family agriculture are promoting enhanced 
productivity and farmers’ participation in the market, mainly through access 
to credit provided to the most integrated ‘productive farmers’. These policies 
mainly aim at an increased integration of the farmer into the capitalist system 
and not at the construction of alternative models of production and alterna-
tive markets, nor at pushing forward agrarian reform agendas or including 
feminist issues. While such moves seem to be an attempt to create a new social 
identity to replace the traditional opposition between large- and small-scale 
agriculture, they still lack a clear definition and do not provide an analysis of 
the system of production, on the scale of the land, on the sexual division of 
work, on the gender inequalities in the family, or on the nature of work, and of 
marginalised women’s work in particular.
Some social movements, including Via Campesina mentioned above, con-
test the very category of family agriculture as not being representative of the 
peasants and their values and not in line with their struggles for change. Other 
rural social movements have envisaged family agriculture as the construc-
tion of alternative modes of agricultural development, to defend small-scale 
peasants and peasants without land (much like in Brazil, with the Movimento 
Sem Terra [mst]11), decent work and livelihoods and sound environmental 
practices. Women’s movements, including the Marcha das Margaridas12 in 
Brazil, included feminist issues in their claims, including women’s equal ac-
cess to land titles and to social rights as workers, extension services directed 
at female farmers, the struggle against gender violence, and women’s political 
representation.
11 For more information, see the website http://www.mstbrazil.org/content/what-mst (ac-
cessed on 8 August 2018).
12 For more information, see the website http://transformatoriomargaridas.org.br/?page_
id=139 (accessed on 13 August 2018).
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Data are difficult to obtain on female agricultural-waged workers since it is 
a complex category, including irregular, part-time, seasonal, unregistered and 
non-formal work and data collection is scarce. Women are generally far less 
often employed as rural wage earners than are men (see Table 8.1 above). fao’s 
report on the State of Food and Agriculture 2010–11, which focused for the first 
time on women and agriculture, provides some scattered information on the 
employment gap between men and women (fao, 2011). For instance, ‘almost 
15 per cent of men but fewer than 4 per cent of women are employed for wages 
in Ghana. The gap is even wider in some other countries, such as Bangladesh, 
where 24 per cent of rural men and only 3 per cent of rural women work in 
wage employment. […] In Ecuador almost 30 per cent of rural men and only 
9 per cent of rural women receive a wage’ (fao, 2011, 18–19). However, women 
constitute the majority in several export-oriented agro-industries, including 
for instance in Colombia’s flower industries. In all cases, women ‘are more like-
ly to be in part-time, seasonal and/or low-paying jobs. Similarly, rural wage-
earning women are more likely than men to hold low-wage jobs’ (fao, 2011, 19). 
More data and analysis with regard to female agricultural workers is needed.
8 Conclusion
The ilo’s Decent Work Agenda in rural areas concentrates on rural wage earn-
ers. However, this means neglecting the majority of women in rural areas, who 
do not work mainly for wages or profit. If the Decent Work Agenda is about 
promoting social and gender justice, it needs to be extended to all women, 
including both small peasants who are working to provide a livelihood for 
their families, rural waged workers and the urban poor. It needs to be better 
informed by previous debates in the ilo, which contributed to the recognition 
of the place of women in social reproduction in a broad sense, including care 
and also producing food, goods and services and livelihood provision for all. 
This work is mostly performed by marginalised women in the form of unpaid, 
non-registered or informal work.
Women have long been associated either with the domestic sphere or with 
subsistence farming, which has contributed to them being ignored and deval-
ued as workers and their central contribution to food security and social repro-
duction has been disregarded (Boserup, 1970; Benería, 1982; fao, 2011). Until 
today, peasant women still lack equal access to recognised status as farmers, 
to policies and resources that support agricultural production and to social 




The attention given to women and development issues was born from re-
search on rural women carried out in the 1970s. Their work, their knowledge, 
their place in agricultural systems of production and their central role in liveli-
hoods and social reproduction was late to be recognised and this led to changes 
in women’s influence in development policies, programmes and research pro-
grammes. With the organisation of the United Nations World Conferences on 
Women, which connected feminist movements and scholars and stimulated re-
search and evaluation programmes, a large field of study on women/gender and 
development has been constituted. Feminist studies and women’s movements 
discussed and challenged the sexual division of labour and asked ‘difficult ques-
tions about how societies are organized to satisfy basic human needs’ (Benería, 
1982, xi), and women’s struggles for equality posed ‘fundamental questions 
about the nature of inequality, of exploitation and subordination, and about 
the type of social change necessary to eliminate them’ (Benería, 1982, xi).
Feminist studies introduced the concept of gender as an expression of pow-
er (Scott, 1986). Women’s oppression is not only located in the labour market 
and in the sphere of paid production, seen as essentially outside the domestic 
sphere. It is also located in the family—the home of unpaid domestic work 
and food production. Thus attention needs to be paid also to unequal power 
relations in the household, to the patriarchal system that influences all social-
ising institutions—that lead to women’s subordinate position in the paid la-
bour market— to the sphere of reproduction and to the articulation between 
production and reproduction. The struggle against women’s oppression thus 
needs not only equality of access to the sphere of non-domestic production 
(paid and unpaid) but also transformations of unequal power relations and of 
the unequal division of reproductive activities in the household.
Groundbreaking research on gender equality issues took place at the ilo in 
the 1980s and brought with it solid, innovative feminist labour economics con-
tributions. The ilo established a Gender Equality Policy in 1999. Following the 
1995 Beijing Plan of Action and the dissemination of gender mainstreaming 
policies, the number of staff working on gender issues significantly increased, 
gender was integrated into the ilo’s technical co-operation programmes, gen-
der guidelines were elaborated and gender training was given—much targeted 
specifically at women—and the systematic inclusion of women in all projects 
was encouraged. In that respect, the ilo is one of the UN organisations that 
has integrated gender equality issues most significantly.
As in most international agencies, gender has become a priority but is of-
ten still not adequately budgeted for. Gender experts lack power and legiti-
macy and strategies to deploy gender in the institution are subject to political 
changes. The ilo Bureau for Gender Equality (now called the Gender, Equality 
and Diversity Branch) has not always benefitted from the same well-placed 
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institutional position and resources with which to influence policy. It lacks the 
power to influence some departments and sectorial approaches. Through its 
Gender Network, the Gender, Equality and Diversity Branch at the ilo recent-
ly highlighted a number of areas in which stronger efforts need to be made to 
support constituents. These include recognising domestic work as work, vio-
lence and sexual harassment in the workplace, improving equal pay for work 
of equal value, and ensuring that the Decent Work Agenda and gender equality 
maintain their relevance on international and national agendas during times 
of crisis, and continue to influence the high-level policy forums of intergovern-
mental organisations and the UN (ilo, 2012, 3).
While gender mainstreaming has grown appreciably at the ilo and gender 
is supposedly at the top of the Organization’s list of priorities, the theoreti-
cal feminist contributions made by the ilo in the 1980s, which deconstructed 
what work is and in particular what female peasants’ work is, have remained 
difficult to introduce into programmes and policies. Whereas rural employ-
ment and the rural economy have once again returned as one of the priorities 
of the ilo, after a marked decline, gender, rural issues and the Decent Work 
Agenda combined could benefit more from the previous research and theoret-
ical contributions of the ilo, and from the burgeoning, organised social move-
ments of peasant women, who contest the dominant agricultural model, trade 
unions and lobbies. Recognising, reducing and redistributing care (Fraser, 
2004) as one of the levers with which to reduce gender inequalities is now part 
of the ilo’s and the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) agenda. While this 
is a big achievement, there is a need for a broader vision on rural women and 
social reproduction in the Decent Work Agenda.
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Some 400,000 unskilled and prevalently male Nepali labourers work in Qatar as per an 
agreement between the governments of the two countries. They are the lowest level of 
the genetically engineered pyramid of some two million migrant workers that repre-
sent some 90 per cent of the resident population in Qatar. The pyramid and the myriad 
forms of exploitation and discrimination that go with it are functional to Qatar’s devel-
opment agenda and in particular preparations for the 2022 football World Cup. Based 
on ethnographic fieldwork in Nepal and Qatar, this chapter analyses social transforma-
tions in rural Nepal, the exploitative regulation of migration and the human condition 
of Nepali migrants in Qatar as well as the meanings ascribed to it. We look at the pres-
sure exerted by international organisations, namely the International Labour Organi-
zation (ilo) and international trade unions, that led to reforms recently introduced by 
Qatar and reflect on the longer-term implications, if and when the ‘brave new world’ 
of Qatar no longer requires an extensive migrant presence.
In a run-down area of downtown Doha—a neighbourhood that will be 
demolished to make place for the gleaming new city that will host the 
fifa World Cup in 2022—we visited three young boys from the Langtang 
area who were camping on the roof of a derelict hostel for migrant work-
ers. They had arrived in Qatar two months earlier and found that their 
working conditions, salary, and accommodation were not what they had 
been promised. They had protested, and their sponsor had thrown them 
out on the street with no salary, no exit permit and no passport. They 
were surviving thanks to canned food and other items provided by an un-
official Nepali self-help group and some foreign benefactors. They had no 
money (and had taken out large loans from moneylenders in their village) 
and no way of leaving Qatar. The Nepali embassy had been approached 
but seemed ineffective in addressing the case. They were stuck. Getting 
exit papers was going to take time. They were dirty, tired, depressed and 
hopeless. When asked what would happen when, eventually, they would 
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make their way back to Nepal, they said that in addition to the loss of 
face of having been unsuccessful in their migration attempt, they would 
somehow have to pay back npr 120,000 to npr 160,000 (usd 1,070 to usd 
1,425) each. The only solution would be for their family to sell whatever 
land they still had.
Fieldnotes, donini, Doha, December 2012; see Figure 9.1
1 Introduction
Over the past 20 years Nepal has undergone many transformations: from war 
to relative peace, from monarchy to a putative democratic system, from the 
rigidities of a mainly rural, caste-based social structure to more rural-urban or 
‘rurban’ world views based on social and geographical mobility, from marginal-
isation to gradual integration into the regional processes of globalisation. This 
process of change has been particularly significant in rural Nepal. The politi-
cal economy, especially in the Middle Hills, has undergone a significant trans-
formation that has resulted in the gradual weakening of traditional forms of 




bonded and caste-based division of labour. The vectors of change that Polanyi 
applied to his analysis of the ‘Great Transformation’ that accompanied the in-
dustrial revolution in Europe provide a useful lens with which to understand 
social change in Nepal (Donini et al., 2013; Polanyi, 2001). These vectors involve 
the commodification of land, labour and money, which previously were em-
bedded in social relationships rather than functions of the market. In rural 
Nepal, land used to be where people worked, and labour was what they did. 
Bonded or exchange-based forms of labour rather than cash transactions were 
how one eked out a livelihood. Now, even remote areas of rural Nepal have wit-
nessed a change from a relatively static situation of social reproduction to one 
where land and labour are increasingly bought and sold and where the market 
economy and globalised economic and social processes (communications, mi-
gration, remittances) have rapidly taken hold.
A consequence of this transformation is the transition of rural livelihoods 
from exclusively agricultural and land-based to more fluid systems that in-
volve mobility and cash. These systems include, for example, day-labour on 
someone else’s farm, building or road construction work in the same val-
ley, internal migration to work in brick kilns in the Kathmandu valley or as 
domestic workers, seasonal migration to India, sponsored and somewhat 
regulated migration to the Gulf countries, Malaysia, South Korea and some-
times beyond. The common characteristic of these forms of livelihoods is that 
they are ‘modern’ in the sense that they are cash-based and often exploitative 
but also because of the aspiration of young people, who no longer feel straight-
jacketed in the caste system, to escape the village in order to lead a more ‘mod-
ern life’. For many young people, both men and women, staying in the village is 
tantamount to being labelled as faltu (useless) and leaving is a kind of rite of pas-
sage (Donini et al., 2013, 41; Sharma, 2013; Monsutti, 2007). These aspirations are 
often sorely dashed, as we shall see in the case of Nepali migrants in Qatar.
Although the shift from fields to cities constitutes a shift from subjects to 
citizens, the movement away from the rural and agrarian sectors has not been 
free of structural violence and social suffering. This movement has not been 
one of unfreedom to freedom (Sharma & Donini, 2012). Poorer migrants have 
very little social or legal protection, and are often the victims of various forms 
of exploitation. Although experiences and working conditions vary, most work 
in the domestic informal sector remains under-monitored, under-regulated, 
casualised and without access to any official social protection whatsoever. Offi-
cially sanctioned migration to Qatar or other Gulf countries is highly organised 
but equally exploitative. Both types of migration rely initially on informal net-
works of agents and brokers at the village level that are often based on family 
or kinship relationships. ‘Regulated’ external migration relies on sophisticated 
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and highly exploitative chains of intermediaries that link the village to the 
destination.
One of the paradoxes of migration, whether internal or international, is that 
it offers both freedom and unfreedom. Embarking on a journey to paid em-
ployment has certainly offered income opportunities to Nepali women who 
otherwise would be largely excluded from the labour market. This has chal-
lenged the stereotypical representation of women as unproductive and con-
tributed to financial gains and some empowerment. However, the nature of 
domestic work as maids or carers reinforces gendered ideas of work. The status 
of domestic workers moving to Kathmandu or other cities, and even more so 
in the Gulf, makes women vulnerable to downward social mobility, discrimina-
tion, and abuse including sexual exploitation. For men, in destinations such 
as Qatar, while there are opportunities for increased income, these are erratic 
and do not necessarily lead to upward mobility. Debt entrapment looms large 
as does loss of face vis-à-vis family and community if the migration is not, or 
is not perceived as, successful. In addition, masculinity issues arise in the all-
male environment of the labour camp where sexuality is highly constrained 
and there are little or no opportunities to meet young Nepali women (migra-
tion of Nepalis to Qatar is over 90 per cent male). As in other migration situ-
ations the lure of a better life is high and while the risks are well known, they 
are played down or ignored.
Moreover, migrant labourers are subjected to both visible and invisible 
forms of violence, punishment, whimsical treatment, including discrimina-
tion and humiliation and, of course, exploitative contractual arrangements. 
These are often accompanied by forced compliance with arbitrary norms if 
not stripping the migrant of his or her identity (the confiscation of the mi-
grant worker’s passport on arrival in the Gulf is highly symbolic of the status of 
unfreedom). What we have here is another paradox: the persistence of a kind 
of postmodern feudalism, in a highly globalised context among populations 
that—wittingly or not—are aspiring to escape the rigours of the caste system. 
Bonded labour is alive and well in Qatar, the country with the world’s highest 
gross domestic product (gdp) per capita… but only for Qataris. Behind Qatar’s 
glistening facade, modernity, segregation and forced labour coexist and sup-
port each other (Qatar ranks fifth on the world slavery index1). As we shall 
1 According to the 2016 World Slavery Index: ‘Forced labour in the construction sector is one 
of the dominant forms of modern slavery in Qatar, reflecting the demand for cheap labour to 
build extensive infrastructure for the 2022 fifa World Cup. The ongoing construction of foot-
ball stadiums, and the huge infrastructure projects required to access and service these loca-
tions, continues to see massive influxes of migrant labourers who are vulnerable to abuse. 
The vast majority of construction workers are low, semi and unskilled. Almost exclusively 
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see below, in the hyper-globalised, genetically re-engineered society of Qatar, 
these unfreedoms are functional to the economic strategies of the state.
A third paradox is that migration, in addition to being gendered is also classed. 
Migration and wage labour have led to contradictory class mobility—that is to 
say, while migration has certainly opened up opportunities for cash income, 
the nature of work and working conditions have often resulted in dislocation, 
humiliation, debt entrapment, social suffering and structural violence. While 
increasing numbers of men seek to assert their masculinity through labour 
mobility, both in the form of earnings and wider experience beyond village 
life, this does not automatically translate into an affirmation of identity. Many 
migrants struggle to save money to reimburse their debt and, especially when 
the migration experience fails because the conditions in Qatar or in other des-
tination countries turn out to be more exploitative than expected, psychologi-
cal trauma compounds the economic trauma. As mentioned above, migration 
is consubstantial with the weakening of the caste system and the penetration, 
into the remotest areas, of ‘modernity’ in the form of the capitalist system and 
its corollary wage-based labour relations, which are ‘dis-attached’ from the old 
production, property and social relations regime (Mishra, 2007, 23). Some have 
argued that a class lens would be more adequate to capture the situation of 
marginal migrants than the caste-ethnicity-rural-urban lens that is more fre-
quently applied (Bruslé, 2010; Mishra, 2007; Sharma, 2016).
Caste is hardly a factor in migration. Trans-caste or class factors such as 
youth and the ability to raise the necessary resources are better predictors of 
migration. At the point of destination, caste is further diluted; Nepalis tend to 
self-identify as a group rather than by caste or ethnicity. Bruslé (2010) makes a 
convincing case that the spatial segregation found in places like Qatar—‘a land 
of control and separation’—where migrants’ lives are strongly conditioned by 
the multiple hierarchies and divisions they encounter, is more about class than 
nationality or occupation. In fact, it could be said that the waves of young Ne-
palis who accept the risks inherent in recurrent labour migration constitute an 
emerging class, albeit one without class-consciousness.
Our ethnographic work (and that of others, including Bruslé (2010 and 2012)) 
confirms that this class is caught in a kind of vice: it is still mentally attached 
to the village, and most migrants identify as rural from a particular area when 
asked. But at the same time it is part of a global exploitative system that rarely 
male (99.4 percent in 2012), they are predominately from South and South East Asian na-
tions—India, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.’ See: https://cdn.globalslav-
eryindex.org/2018-content/uploads/2018/07/19123316/GSI-2016-Full-Report.pdf (accessed on 
1 September 2018).
183Nepali Workers in Qatar
<UN>
allows individual migrants to ‘break into’ modernity. The absence of the state 
compounds the exploitation. The Nepali state simultaneously benefits from 
migration—remittances represent 20 to 25 per cent of gdp (Mishra, 2007)—
and migration also functions as a safety valve that reduces social tension. But 
at the same time, the state takes little responsibility for the well-being of its mi-
grants. While the Nepal–Qatar migration corridor is formally regulated by an 
interstate agreement that defines the numbers and duration of migration, the 
Nepali government is unable or unwilling to intervene other than in the most 
extreme cases of exploitation. The web of manpower agencies that are the 
obligatory entry point for aspiring migrants are essentially exploitation-pro-
moting, money-making business that easily evade control and accountability. 
Family, kinship and the presence of small Nepali migrant non-governmental 
organisations (ngos) operating more or less under the radar in Qatar provide 
limited protection and some sense of belonging. Until recently, pressure by 
the International Labour Organization (ilo), the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ituc) and ngos has been equally ineffective in ensuring com-
pliance with international regulatory mechanisms although this seems to be 
changing at the time of writing (see end of this chapter). Thus, the gap be-
tween the aspiration towards personal freedom and bikas (development) and 
the reality of the structural violence that accompanies the migrant at all steps 
along the journey from the village to the unfreedoms of Qatar is at the heart of 
the human condition of 400,000 or so Nepalis, to which we now turn.
2 Nepalis in the ‘Brave New World’ of Qatar2
After traveling thousands of miles, [migrants] said they had little choice 
but to accept work they had not agreed to perform, and unsatisfactory 
conditions and practices that included employers withholding wages 
(typically as security to prevent them from quitting), illegal wage deduc tions, 
2 This section is based on ethnographic work conducted in Nepal (Middle Hills, Terai and 
Kathmandu Valley), Northern India and Qatar in 2010–12 as part of a research project on 
perceptions of social transformation and migration. The findings are summarised in Donini 
et al. (2013). For this chapter, additional materials collected at the time and some updates 
have been incorporated. The research was conducted at the Feinstein International Center, 
Tufts University, under a grant from the Humanity United Foundation, by a team comprising 
Jeevan Raj Sharma, Sanjay Aryal and the author. The fieldwork in Qatar was conducted by 
Sanjay Aryal and the author. All studies are available at fic.tufts.edu. The author expresses 
his gratitude to the Feinstein Center and to his co-researchers for allowing him to reproduce 
some of the material here.
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or salaries far below those promised. Some said they signed contracts 
under coercive circumstances, while others never saw an employment 
contract at all.
hrw, 2012
The exploitative conditions under which approximately two million migrant 
workers live and work in Qatar have been well described both in the academic 
literature and in the work of human rights organisations, the international 
trade union movement and the ilo (see for example hrw, 2012; Amnesty In-
ternational, 2016a and b; Harroff-Tavel and Nasri, 2013; ituc, 2015). While some 
Gulf States—Kuwait for example—have abolished the kafala (sponsorship) 
system, Qatar has only recently responded to international pressure. Legal and 
other measures were announced at the end of 2017 by the Qatar authorities to 
address the most glaring issues of exploitation but falling short of the abolition 
of the kafala system (hrw, 2017). Pressure from international human rights 
groups, the international trade union movement and the ilo has been some-
what successful in bringing about these changes. The potential reputational 
damage resulting from exposure in the context of the preparations for the 2022 
World Cup has probably had a more important role in these changes. Whether 
and how the fundamentals of an organised forced labour system will change 
is too early to tell. The following paragraphs provide a snapshot of the human 
condition of Nepali migrants in Qatar in late 2012. Our findings resonate with 
those of similar studies, whether ethnographic (Bruslé, 2010 and 2012) or ad-
vocacy related such as reports by Human Rights Watch (2012 and 2017) and 
Amnesty International (2016a and 2016b).
Qatar has a population of close to 2.6 million of which some 90 per cent 
are migrants.3 Nepali migrants total about 400,000 and constitute the largest 
single contingent of foreign workers.4 The majority of migrants work in con-
struction: hundreds of thousands of workers are needed to fulfil Qatar’s ambi-
tious objectives, both economic and linked to the projection of its visibility 
and power. These two objectives come together in the enormous construction 
projects that are remodelling the city of Doha in view of the 2022 World Cup.
By negotiating state-to-state agreements with Nepal, Bangladesh, India and 
other South Asian countries, as well as the Philippines, for the provision of 
3 2018 estimate. UN population data: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ (accessed on 
22 August 2018).
4 There are actually some 650,000 Indian nationals living in Qatar but these include families 
and not just workers.
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large contingents of unskilled or semi-skilled labour, Qatar has created a kind 
of genetically engineered society in which migrants constitute the expend-
able labour force that is functional to the production of the wealth and power 
of those—the small minority of Qatari families and the small elite of foreign 
managers—who rule from the top of the pyramid. As in Huxley’s dystopia, the 
pyramid is stratified, and because the various layers have different interests, 
there is little opportunity for solidarity or the expression of grievances across 
layers. Moreover, because all migration is temporary—a maximum of 2–3 
years for Nepalis, after which a 2-year break is mandatory, except for a small 
layer of managers (south Indians, Palestinians, nationals of other Gulf coun-
tries) who are allowed to stay longer—the Qatari state has little concern for the 
long-term stability of the pyramid. The migration tap can be turned on or off at 
will and layers or groups that are no longer required can be easily phased out 
with minimal risk to stability. The Nepali contingent, mostly young, unskilled 
and over 90 per cent male is at the bottom of the pyramid and is the most dis-
advantaged, exploited, and discriminated against.
2.1 Complexity of Labour Arrangements
Migration to Qatar is based on the kafala system, which reflects the practices 
of control and exclusion of migrants. There are two main types of sponsorship 
arrangements:
(a) The regulated system based on an agreement between the governments 
of Qatar and Nepal allows for a certain quota of Nepalis to migrate to Qatar 
each year. This involves a multilayered set of intermediaries that start with 
family or kinship at the village level. Agents, who are sometimes family mem-
bers, identify potential migrants. These agents work for manpower agencies 
in Kathmandu, which provide a number of services: basic induction, health 
check, required paperwork, and the identification of a kapil (sponsor, a Qatari 
national) and a mudir (manager, usually a migrant from one of the higher lay-
ers of the pyramid) in Qatar. A contract is drawn up specifying work conditions 
and salary; a passport and ticket as well as an exit permit from Nepal and a visa 
for Qatar are also provided by the agency. Contracts are normally in English 
and are only handed over to the migrant at the last moment, for example at 
Kathmandu international airport on the day of departure. All this comes at a 
cost for the migrant and his family. Typically, aspiring migrants are required to 
pay approximately npr 150,000 (or approx. usd 1,400) for these services and 
spend a variable amount of time—from a few days to several weeks—in guest-
houses or small hotels in Kathmandu before receiving their marching orders. 
Repeated visits to Kathmandu may be required before the documents are 
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finalised. In some cases the process is aborted by the manpower agency or the 
sponsor. In theory, manpower agencies are obliged to protect the migrant from 
excessive costs and if contractual arrangements are not respected or are overly 
exploitative, to arrange for the return of the migrant, at their cost, to his or her 
village. In practice, the manpower agency is reluctant to do so or does so only 
as a last resort. Most migrants need to take out loans to cover the agency fees 
and other expenses. Loan rates are extortionate and seem to be usually around 
36 per cent/year, sometimes up to 50 per cent/year. Debt can quickly become 
an unsustainable burden, especially if things do not go as planned. Migrants 
suffer from extreme pressure to succeed so that the debts to family or money-
lenders can be repaid.5
(b) The so-called ‘free visa’ system whereby a migrant already working in 
Qatar identifies a potential mudir and a work opportunity and contacts an 
interested potential migrant—usually a family member or someone from 
the same village. This bypasses the manpower agency and is therefore much 
cheaper for the sponsor. However, the aspiring migrants often have to pay 
for their own ticket. If the migrant leaves via India, the process also bypasses 
the quota system and can be faster. The risks for the migrant are greater, as 
the agreement is not recorded, and even the minimal protection afforded by 
the manpower agency is absent. There are many instances of migrants who are 
‘invited’ by a family member or friend, only to find that they have been tricked 
into a predicament that bears no relation to the conditions that were prom-
ised. Because the mudir typically pays a fee to the migrant who ‘invites’ a family 
member, there is an in-built incentive to trick a newcomer into coming.
There is also a third way: (c) Illegal entry into Qatar with a tourist visa. This 
is sometimes the route chosen by female migrants who go there to work as 
maids or carers (Nepal no longer allows female migrants under 30 years of age 
to go to Qatar legally) and by young men who go on the off chance that they 
will be allowed entry. The risks are high because entering on a tourist visa re-
quires evidence of a return ticket, sufficient cash, as well as a contact address 
in Qatar. Those who enter illegally tend to lead a precarious existence, may be 
subjected to physical violence by their employers and face immediate deporta-
tion if caught by the police.
Few skilled Nepali labourers make it to Qatar; the vast majority of Nepalis 
who work there are unskilled and work in construction or, to a lesser extent, 
in agriculture. The few semi-skilled labourers work as taxi drivers or hotel 
workers.
5 For a detailed analysis of the functions performed by brokers and agencies, see Kern and 
Müller-Böcker (2015).
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2.2 Exploitation
Push and pull factors combine in the decision to migrate: poverty, the semi-
feudal labour arrangements in the agricultural sector, the fact that the caste 
system has weakened and that feudal arrangements have collapsed because 
landowners have brought farm machinery and require less manual labour. 
Family pressure (real or presumed) and the aspiration for change and a better 
life, on one side, and the role of agents who scour the countryside looking for 
potential migrants, on the other, also play an important role. Many aspiring 
migrants have heard both positive and negative stories of ‘what happens’. They 
have seen migrants return and build a pakka (brick and concrete) house; but 
they have also heard of bad experiences where families have been unable to 
repay their debts and have been forced to sell their land. Some claim that they 
were genuinely ignorant of the exploitative conditions they would find. Over-
all, the lure is strong, and aspiring migrants tend to brush aside the risks or 
block them from their minds and hope for the best.
Whether the overall experience is a positive one or not, there is a wide-
spread sense among migrants of ‘being owned’. Once they step out of Doha 
International Airport, migrants become totally dependent on their employer 
for their survival and well-being. Their interface is the mudir, usually a migrant 
himself, who manages labourers on behalf of the employer (usually a Qatari 
national). Migrants are dependent on their mudir for everything: working 
and living conditions, payment of salary, ensuring their legal status (proper 
ID and visa), access to healthcare, as well as permission to change jobs and 
the financing of their return ticket home. This set-up creates the basis for ex-
ploitation, which starts with the confiscation of the migrant’s passport upon 
arrival. Though illegal as per Qatari law, this is the norm for unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers. As one migrant put it, ‘The first thing that happens is 
that your identity is taken away from you’. The sense of bondage becomes ap-
parent when, in many cases, migrants realise that their working conditions 
and salary are much inferior to what was promised (and their contract states), 
that they cannot change employer or job unless the employer agrees to sign 
a release waiver, and that they cannot leave the country without an exit per-
mit, the withholding of which is used to pressure migrants to accept under-par 
conditions.
Effectively, many migrants become caught in a vice: they are forced to ac-
cept these living conditions (see Figure 9.2) because challenging the system is 
difficult, costly, time-consuming, and of uncertain outcome. Debt entrapment, 
family pressure, and the potential loss of face of being considered ‘faltu’ (use-
less) upon return to the village conspire to force migrants to comply. When 
conditions become abusive or unbearable, the only available option is to run 
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away (which is illegal) and seek employment directly with another mudir 
(which is doubly illegal). The boundaries between illegal and licit fluctuate: for 
the mudir the advantage of recruiting a runaway migrant is that he does not 
need to pay for healthcare, the renewal of the visa, and the cost of the return 
ticket if the migrant is caught by the police. Moreover, the risks incurred by the 
mudir are minimal, as labour laws protect employers and are seldom enforced 
in favour of migrants. Such illegal arrangements are sought after by employers 
Figure 9.2 Migrant living conditions at labour camp, outskirts of Doha
Credits: antonio donini
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in need of greater numbers of workers than the ‘official’ system can provide. 
Sometimes, despite the obvious risks of deportation and lack of access to ser-
vices, such arrangements can work to the advantage of the migrant, as the re-
lationship is more freely entered into than the sponsorship system and pay can 
be moderately higher. Less bondage, but more insecurity.
Generally speaking, larger employers—and especially the huge construc-
tion companies that are part-owned by reputable international companies—
provide more predictable and decent working and living conditions than small 
employers. Some of the worst forms of exploitation occur for migrants who are 
recruited by service companies (i.e. companies that provide unskilled labour 
to larger companies), as the demand for workers fluctuates and the service 
company is often unwilling or unable to pay salaries on time or invest in proper 
living quarters for its workers.
A visit to a farm in the desert some 50 km NW of Doha provides a more 
nuanced picture than the urban big company and big camp situation. 




The farm produces vegetables for 7–8 months per year when the weather 
is reasonably cool. In the hottest months agriculture is impossible but 
there are chickens and cows to tend. The owner of the farm is Qatari. 
He has invested in huge water pumps that drain the aquifer. The farm is 
modern. The living quarters are adequate (with 5–6 migrants per room). 
There are many shaded areas for outdoor activities. The owner is seldom 
seen but there is a Palestinian manager who lives on the farm with his 
family. It is a Friday, there is less work to do and the atmosphere is re-
laxed. The manager is chatty and offers us fresh slices of melon. Some of 
the migrants are playing cards, others are repainting their living quarters. 
Some are chatting via Skype, presumably to their families. After a visit 
to fields and animal pens, we speak to a couple of Nepali migrants. A 
34-year-old man says: ‘I have been working here for nine years. My initial 
salary was qar 400/month (usd 110). Now I earn qar 1,050 (usd 290) 
plus some overtime. We get free accommodation and food. We work eight 
hours per day and usually 1.5 h overtime. Less so in the extremely hot 
summer months. When there is more work to be done, the manager hires 
some ‘illegals’ who have usually run away from construction jobs. They 
come because conditions are better here. There is not much risk of being 
caught and the manager ensures they get healthcare. There are 21 Nepalis 
working on the farm, 3 Bangladeshis and 3 Indians. All have more or less 
the same pay. The Indians get a bit more (because of a better agreement 
negotiated between India and Qatar). I send all my salary back home—
except for my mobile phone costs. I go home every 17 months. The man-
ager pays for the trip but I get no salary when I am away. My family wants 
me to return home but I prefer it here’. A young man disagrees: ‘I have 
been here six months. I am not too happy. I was expecting better. I had 
to take out an npr 80,000 loan from the village money lender at a 50 per 
cent per annum rate. I am never going to be able to pay this back. My 
wife has just had a baby. I will have to surrender my land to the money 
lender.’
donini, fieldnotes, desert farm north of Doha, December 2012; see Figure 9.3
2.3 Grievances
Because of the weakness of the Nepali state’s negotiating position compared 
to other more ‘organised’ states such as India or the Philippines, the 2005 
Nepal–Qatar migration framework agreement results in low protection and 
significant exploitation of Nepali migrants.6 The resolution of disputes is 
6 The text of the agreement can be found at https://www.ceslam.org/index.php?pageName= 
content&contentId=148 (accessed on 18 March 2019).
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 particularly difficult because all claims need to be submitted to the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs while the Nepali embassy in Doha can only commu-
nicate via Note Verbale to the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned, 
sponsorship agreements are often arbitrary and constitute a modern version 
of bonded labour, if not slavery. In our interviews we were confronted with a 
catalogue of grievances and only very few instances of relatively acceptable 
conditions. The most common issues were:
– Working conditions and salary do not correspond to the written contract 
and late payment of salary (sometimes months in arrears). Just one exam-
ple: a security guard was promised usd 330/month (qar 1,200 /month) and 
a food allowance for eight hours work/day but received only usd 275 (qar 
1,000), no food, and was forced to work 12 hours/day.
– The withholding of the exit permit by the mudir as a way of putting pressure 
on the migrant to stay. Or the refusal of the mudir to process the annual visa 
extension that is essential in order to get an ID card, access to healthcare 
and the exit permit.
Other issues noted were a lack of dignity in the workplace, abusive treatment 
by the Qatari authorities and the state of the accommodation provided, which 
is often cramped with sometimes a dozen of migrants to a room.
The expression of grievances is met with threats to withdraw ID cards or 
even sponsorship itself (without the agreement of the sponsor, and the identi-
fication of a new one, it is not possible to change jobs). In theory, workers who 
are dissatisfied with their jobs have the option of asking the Nepali manpower 
agency to repatriate them within three months of their arrival but this is dif-
ficult for a number of reasons: the reluctance of the manpower agency to cover 
the costs, the withholding by the sponsor of those papers necessary for obtain-
ing an exit permit, and the reluctance of individual migrants to return home 
and confront loss of face and onerous debt repayment. As a result, many mi-
grants run away. According to one source, there may be up to 20,000 to 30,000 
Nepali ‘escapees’ who lack legal documents and have either found alternative 
employment illegally or are living under the radar with meagre support from 
former co-workers or small Nepali charity associations.
One young man was particularly vocal in his animosity towards the man-
power agency in Kathmandu that had recruited him: ‘I am a former sol-
dier. I have fought the insurgency and killed people. When I go back I will 
kill three more: the lady at the manpower agency and her two bosses’. He 
had taken out an npr 60,000 (usd 535) loan that he was unable to pay 
back in full. The interest was 36 per cent per year. ‘It would have been bet-
ter for me to stay home and raise buffaloes.’




When migrants seek redress for exploitative conditions, the odds are stacked 
against them. The expression of grievances or complaints is ignored or met 
with hostility. Instances of workers simply being kicked out by their employer 
for protesting against working or living conditions abound. They find them-
selves in limbo—no job, no money, no exit permit. The vignette at the begin-
ning of this chapter illustrates a typical case.
In theory, complaints can be addressed by migrants to the Qatar Labour De-
partment, but the decisions of the department are often ignored by mudirs. 
Many do not bother to show up when summoned. Complainants can also go to 
the courts, but this is expensive, can take months, and is of uncertain outcome. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that the mudir will comply with the decisions 
of the court.
The only other avenue of redress is via the Nepali embassy (see Figure 9.4), 
but it is understaffed if not under-committed, and its leverage with the author-
ities is minimal. Practically, the labour attaché can call the mudir informally 
and advocate on the migrant’s behalf or invite the mudir to come to the embas-
sy for a meeting. As the latter is under no obligation to comply, this often fails. 
In more serious cases, the embassy writes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as 
by law it cannot contact the Labour Department directly, to request an inter-
view with the department. This can take months to arrange, and the outcome 
is by no means certain. Eventually, problems get solved when the department 
releases an exit permit—or when a migrant without proper papers is caught 
by the police and deported. The embassy also deals with the repatriation of the 
remains of workers who die in industrial accidents or from heat exhaustion or 
unexplained ‘heart failure’, which can be a euphemism for stress, psychological 
exhaustion or suicide.7
A visit to the Nepali Embassy is instructive. It is in a hot and dusty suburb 
far from the centre of town. To get there takes a long walk and there is no 
public transport. Migrants in small groups are hanging around outside 
and in the courtyard. Shade is at a premium. They have come to bring 
their complaints to the overworked staff. The ambassador is busy but we 
speak to the number two. He explains that the role of the embassy is ‘very 
limited’. Individual cases are sometimes easy to solve by speaking to the 
7 Spot checks and interviews by Sanjay Aryal at Kathmandu airport indicate that 1–2 bodies 
are repatriated every day.
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Figure 9.4 Nepali migrants filling out complaint forms, Nepali Embassy, Doha, December 
2012
Credits: sanjay aryal
mudir, but when groups of workers are involved, it is more difficult, espe-
cially if there has been ‘agitation’. ‘We tell the boys that they must respect 
the rules of the country. Sometimes they do things that are not allowed’. 
One major company went bankrupt and some 80 Nepalis lost their jobs. 
Salaries were not paid for 4–5 months. The workers were kicked out of 
the camp with no cash. The embassy tried to collect food and donations 
from Nepalis. The embassy took the case to the Labour Department but 
the mudir did not show up. They had to pay qar 500 (usd 137) per per-
son to file the case. It has been dragging on for months. Now, the agreed 
‘solution’ is that the company will repatriate 70 workers but will not pay 
the salaries they are owed. For the migrants that have nowhere to go, the 
embassy has a small dormitory—although this is illegal—but it is not big 
enough. ‘In the evening, when the staff leave, we move the furniture and 
roll out some bedding. Yesterday we had 21 people sleeping here.’




In our findings, Nepali migrants in Qatar are neither passive victims facing 
abuse and exploitation nor successful migrants who have been able to take 
control of their lives. Experiences run the range from the relatively successful 
to the abominable. Not all mudirs are abusive or insensitive to the human con-
dition of migrants. However, the collective identity of Nepalis in Qatar is one 
of exploitation, discrimination, and loss of dignity.
How do migrants cope with this situation? Membership of trade unions is 
not possible for migrants (though Qatari trade unions exist and participate in 
the ilo tripartite structures), but a variety of small self-help groups set up by 
migrants themselves or by the Non-resident Nepali Association (nrna) pro-
vide some services, including cash subsidies in extreme cases and assistance 
regarding repatriation. Nevertheless, there are some everyday forms of resis-
tance. Just as the forms of structural violence these migrants face are subtle 
although powerful, resistance occurs in the same discreet pattern on an ev-
eryday basis (for example, ‘work to rule’ or deliberate slowdown, absenteeism, 
unofficial work stoppages, etc.).
Strikes are illegal in Qatar, but this does not mean that they do not happen. 
A major multinational construction company was obliged to address workers’ 
grievances after a series of unofficial strikes in 2006. Similarly, the main taxi 
company in Qatar, at which many Nepalis work, had to substantially improve 
salary and working conditions after a strike in 2011. Qatar needs foreign labour 
and is mindful of its image: strikes and the visible expulsion of workers do not 
play well. The fact remains, however, that the protection afforded by worker or-
ganisations is minimal. Actions to confront the system are risky, and, because 
of the layered structure of the migrants’ pyramid, the disparate concerns and 
grievances of the various layers often do not add up. It is easy for employers 
to ‘play’ one group or nationality against another, and Nepalis are considered 
by employers, and by their co-workers of a different nationality, as the bottom 
level of the pyramid. This also explains why Nepalis are sought-after: they are 
paid less, complain less, and are seen as hard-working and compliant.
2.6 Masculinity
Ninety per cent of Nepali migrants in Qatar are male. They are also relatively 
young, in their twenties, especially the new arrivals who are more subject to 
exploitation. Older migrants are usually returnee migrants who have achieved 
improved conditions and some respectability. Some successful migrants, who 
earn good money, have become mudirs and have been allowed to bring their 
families and have long-term visas. But by and large, migration to Qatar for 
Nepalis is a young and male affair. This entails considerable emotional suffer-
ing (and, presumably, repressed sexuality). Many have left young wives and 
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children back in their villages; others are facing debt entrapment, which pre-
cludes them from getting married.
Avenues for socialising between the sexes are extraordinarily limited. Fe-
male Nepali migrants work either as maids or as carers; some others are sales-
people. Usually their mobility is constrained by tight controls from employ-
ers. Male migrants are freer to move around town and tend to congregate 
on Fridays in a couple of squares, under an underpass to stay away from the 
scorching heat, or in Nepali restaurants. Moreover, on Fridays access to parks 
and beaches is reserved for families and women. Men without an accompa-
nying spouse or children/family members are chased away (as the author of 
this article can attest). This further limits potential interactions between the 
sexes.
Language and perceived discrimination preclude contact with female mi-
grants of other nationalities (the female Filipino contingent is of quite consid-
erable size) and of course with Qatari women. We did not look into how these 
frustrations are managed, but we did hear several references to substance 
abuse: as liquor is not available publicly, some migrants consume pesticides or 
low-quality black market liquor, and many do so regularly.
3 Will the Human Condition Improve?
A casual visitor travelling by taxi from the airport to the gleaming new skyscrap-
ers of downtown Doha, rushing by the fake ‘Souk’ and the brand-new Museum 
of Islamic Art designed by I.M. Pei, would certainly notice the massive con-
struction projects—stadiums, conference centres, 5-star hotels—dotting the 
skyline. But he or she would have no clue as to the social engineering behind 
the glitzy facade. The ‘camps’ where migrant workers live are conveniently out 
of sight. Workers are transported by bus to the spatially segregated areas where 
they live and where they become invisible. As mentioned above, even on their 
days off they are not allowed to mingle in the parks with the Qatari locals. They 
meet to chat, smoke, drink and exchange stories of aspiration and exploita-
tion under dusty underpasses, in run-down squares where the sheer number 
of migrants forces their toleration by the authorities or in small restaurants 
that cook the food from back home. But in this land of control and separation, 
segregation is segmented and runs deeper: in addition to being geographical, it 
is social, cultural and language- and class-based. All aspects of migrants’ daily 
lives are determined by the multiple divisions they encounter.
Many studies by the international trade union federations, human rights 
organisations and academics (for example Bruslé, 2010 and 2012; Harroff-Tavel 
and Nasri, 2013; and ituc, 2015) have concluded that what Nepali migrants 
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experience in Qatar is forced labour, if not a modern form of slavery.8 This has 
prompted a number of complaints including at the ilo.9 But it is worse than 
that. In one sense, this condition of unfreedom is, at least formally, freely ac-
cepted and constitutes a form of self-exploitation. In another sense, structure 
and agency combine to trap the migrant in a situation from which it is practi-
cally impossible to escape. Debt, family pressure to succeed, fear of the shame 
of failure, exploitation, discrimination and humiliation, make for a descending 
spiral. The twin metaphors of the ‘camp’ as a site of what Agamben calls the 
‘state of exception’ and the ‘bare life’—the biopolitical condition of those who 
can be ‘expended’—seem apt reminders of what it means to be a migrant today 
(Agamben, 1998; Bruslé, 2012). The camp has no fence and migrants are ‘free’ 
to leave their place of work, but in practice the structures of domination make 
such choices very difficult if not impossible. The spaces where migrants live 
and work are simultaneously sites of inclusion and exclusion. Nepali migrants 
are included in, and functional to, the global capitalist system and to Qatar’s 
role in it. At the same time they are physically excluded from mainstream so-
ciety and segregated in ‘spaces of exception’ where their lives are considered 
worthless or expendable.
On paper, the labour reforms announced in late 2017 are significant. The 
Secretary General of the ituc calls them ‘pathbreaking’: ‘I am confident the 
kafala system is on its way out in Qatar and that will free two million migrant 
workers. By the end of March we will have seen the worst of kafala off the agen-
da and the beginnings of a mature industrial relations structure’ (Harwood, 
2018). Besides abolishing the kafala system, Qatar also announced other major 
reforms, including:
– The opening of an ilo office (which had long been refused) to oversee re-
form implementation.
– A labour tribunal to resolve disputes within three weeks.
– Contracts to be lodged with the government to prevent substitution.
8 At the 2012 ilo Labour Conference, the Secretary General of the ituc noted that: ‘Working 
and living conditions for migrant workers in Qatar are modern-day slavery. As it undertakes 
a massive construction job for the 2022 World Cup, Qatar is putting at risk the lives of thou-
sands of workers. Without genuine legal protection and union rights, more workers will die 
building the World Cup stadiums than players will play in the World Cup itself.’(Harroff-Tavel 
and Nasri, 2013, p. 116).
9 See the 2014 ilo complaint concerning non-observance by Qatar of the Forced Labour Con-
vention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) at https://www 
.ilo.org/gb/GBSessions/GB329/ins/WCMS_546605/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 30 Au-
gust 2018).
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– A minimum wage covering all workers, ending the nationality-based system 
of wages.
– Residency permits and the elimination of exit visas.
– Workers free to leave the country, either for home leave or at the end of their 
contract.
– A support fund from the government to pay for employees’ journey home, 
after which the authorities would sue employers to get money back.
– Domestic workers’ hours regulated and these workers given a day off each 
week.
Whether these commitments made by Qatar to the ilo and ituc will be 
implemented, and if so at what speed, remains to be seen. Some details are 
still sketchy. For example, a minimum wage is ‘prescribed’ without stipulating 
when, at what levels and by whom it will be enforced. A labour inspection 
policy relying on independent experts is foreseen but no details are provided. 
As a result of the Qatar announcements, the ilo has withdrawn its complaint 
against Qatar for non-observance of the Forced Labour Convention. Human 
Rights organisations have also been generally supportive of the measures an-
nounced. Implementation remains key. It is as yet unclear if the reforms are 
purely cosmetic and aimed at assuaging public opinion in the run-up to the 
2022 World Cup or if they will cut deep into the systemic discrimination and 
structural violence under which migrants in Qatar still labour today. Moreover, 
it may be that after 2022, the need for migrant labour will peak or even de-
crease. Dismantling a system predicated on a layered pyramid of workers with 
different origins and interests will, at best, be a long-haul project.
A larger issue should perhaps be flagged. What does the Nepali experience 
in Qatar tell us about the future of work and the future of migration? Very 
unequal power dynamics are at play here. For individual Nepali migrants, the 
unfreedoms embedded in the current arrangements are both a form of self- 
exploitation and an aspiration to a better life. For the government of Nepal, 
there are two obvious benefits: substantial remittances and providing some 
form of occupation to a possibly restless class of unemployed youth that 
are still semi-rural but with a rapidly globalising view of the world. Qatar, of 
course, calls the shots and benefits the most economically, if not in terms of 
its reputation. But in the longer term? Qatar and the other Gulf States may no 
longer need large amounts of unskilled labour and might turn the tap off. The 
problems described in this article may thus wither away as Qatar’s globalised 
economy evolves rather than because of any international pressure or domes-
tic desire to reduce levels of class exploitation in Qatar. This, coupled with pro-
cesses of tertiarisation, robotisation and uberisation, on the one hand, and de-
mographic pressure in Nepal and elsewhere in South Asia, on the other, could 
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provide a toxic and explosive mix for which migration producing countries in 
the region are unprepared. The urgent development of a research and policy 
agenda on how best to accompany and reduce the harmful consequences—
for migrants and aspiring migrants—of this transition would seem to be a top 
priority for Nepal and other South Asian countries. It remains to be seen if the 
ilo, the ituc and other international organisations are fit and equipped to 
provide the necessary gale warnings and advice to navigators on the choppy 
seas ahead.
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Digitisation and the Disappearing Job Theory:  
A Role for the ilo in Africa?
Stefano Bellucci  and Eric E. Otenyo
Abstract
For a coherent framework for understanding the future of work, there is a need to unify 
theories on the role of digitisation in any potential job losses. Is it possible that digitisa-
tion not only achieves efficiencies but also retains or creates jobs in selected sectors of 
African economies? With Africa’s population expected to reach 2 billion by 2050, can 
we be content with the fact that the impact of digitisation has been mostly discussed 
in the context of advanced economies? This chapter explores possible effects of digi-
tisation in three economic sectors of African economies. Based on reviews of library, 
security, and entertainment sectors in selected countries, we interrogate the validity 
of the disappearing job theory, which is reinforced by the global digital revolution. 
This chapter is intended to fuel the ongoing discussions about the future of jobs in 
Africa and the role the International Labour Organization (ilo) might play in sustain-
ing African jobs. Since digitisation in Africa has not yet reached the same level as the 
developed world, its impact is mostly positive in the selected sectors. However, there is 
a need to manage any unintended consequences of the emerging digitised workplace. 
Possible interventions by the ilo and support for Africa’s ability to cope with emerging 
changes are recommended.
1 Introduction: Digitisation and the Changing Workplace
Digitisation is continuing to change the workplace in major ways. In Africa, 
the accelerating pace of digitisation has been boosted by the increased afford-
ability of computers and mobile telephones, and by improved skills capacities, 
especially among youths. Although much progress has been made in various 
sectors—including vehicle maintenance, aircraft and flight operations, human 
resource management, supplies management and procurement, education 
(online learning, e.g. through e-readers, online libraries, etc.), media services 
and finance (e.g. M-Pesa, a mobile finance app popular in Kenya and atms)—
the applicability level, in Africa, is relatively low.
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To further explore the concept of digitisation, let us first operationalise our 
key concept. According to Gartner, Inc. (2017), digitisation is the ‘use of digital 
technologies to change a business model and provide new revenue and value-
producing opportunities; it is the process of moving to a digital business’. This 
perspective suggests African nations will benefit from the process. Yet, as we 
know, African countries are far from being fully digitised. Dutta and Bilbao-
Osorio (2012) describe the continent as consisting of ‘constrained economies’, 
which means digitisation has yet to mature and is applicable in only limited 
services and industries.
Although scholars use the terms ‘digitisation’ and ‘digitalisation’ inter-
changeably, J. Scott Brennen and Daniel Kreiss (2016) and Beatrice Fabunmi 
et al. (2009, 28) offer conceptual clarity to emphasise that digitisation is a 
 technical process of data conversion from analogue to digital bits. The subse-
quent introduction of digital technologies also leads to socio-economic chang-
es (Hess, 2016).  Digitalisation, on the other hand, refers to increased use of 
digital and computer  technologies in organisations, countries, and workplaces 
in general. Casual observations would suggest that the impact of digitisation 
would be disruptive and lead to job losses in some sectors, and worsen unem-
ployment in some economies.
1.1 Youth Unemployment and Population Outlook
The accelerated pace of digitisation in the workplace produces an increase 
in the productivity of labour, which results in the reduction of labour de-
mand in a situation of weak capital investment. This conjuncture fuels the 
growing concerns over Africa’s rising population. The African Economic Out-
look reports that ‘Africa’s population will rise to almost 1.7 billion in 2030 
and almost 2.5 billion in 2050’ (AfDB et al., 2016, 41). Africa has the world’s 
fastest growing labour force and among the highest rates of youth unem-
ployment. For instance, in 2015 the North Africa region had the highest 
youth unemployment rate in the world at about 30 per cent (ilo, 2016). Africa 
is the most youthful continent. In all, 20 per cent of the continent’s total popu-
lation is comprised of people aged 15–24 and those under 30 make up around 
65 per cent of the continent’s over 1 billion people (AfDB, 2012, 98; ilo, 2015; 
UN, 2013 and 2017). Sub-Saharan Africa does not fare any better and the situa-
tion there is objectively worse when it comes to job quality. The vast majority 
of jobs are informal and of poor quality, with few benefits for employees (ilo, 
2016; Page and Shimeles, 2014). The ilo reports that ‘over 70 per cent of work-
ers are in vulnerable employment against the global average of 46.3 per cent’ 
(ilo, 2016). The ilo adds that employment prospects in sub-Saharan African 
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countries are stagnating due to low productivity attributed to a lack of diversi-
fication in the economies (Sow, 2017).
1.2 Job Displacement and Its Theoretical Assumptions
The literature on the digitisation of economies is broad and expansive. An ear-
ly version of the job displacement theory was found in Jeremy Rifkin’s (1996) 
work. Rifkin argued that unemployment would increase in most parts of the 
world as a result of the proliferation of information and communication tech-
nologies (icts) in work environments. For him, the digital revolution would 
adversely affect jobs in sectors such as manufacturing, retail, marketing and 
many service areas. According to Rifkin, by 2010 12 per cent of the global popu-
lation would work in manufacturing and that figure would decrease to 2 per 
cent by 2020. Most recently, Carl Frey and Michael Osborne (2013) triggered 
much interest in the notion that automation and digitisation would lead to fu-
ture job losses in advanced economies. They looked at jobs that were at risk as 
a consequence of automated technologies and estimated that over 47 per cent 
of jobs across all sectors were at risk of being displaced by computers. Melanie 
Arntz, Terry Gregory and Ulrich Zierahn (2016), Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew 
McAfee (2011), and Steve Denning (2015) have discussed concerns that digi-
talisation might result in displacements, disruptions and jobless futures in sev-
eral economies. Derek Thompson (2015) adds that job losses in certain sectors 
will continue to be witnessed as a result of digitisation, leading to the reduc-
tion of human labour demands with associated wage stagnation. By focusing 
on tasks that are easily automated and digitalised, scholars estimate that on 
average 9 per cent of jobs are automatable in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (oecd) countries, but they also recognise suf-
ficient heterogeneities based on workplace organisation. However, these esti-
mates are frequently disputed or challenged by new research insights. And in 
many instances there are contradictory conclusions concerning job displace-
ment, especially because digitisation has known benefits. The opposite view is 
that digitisation adds jobs and value, but that the future of work will change 
through innovation (Eichhorst, 2014).
Building on work carried out in conjunction with Booz & Company, Karim 
Sabbagh et al. (2012) consider digitisation to be icts’ next evolution and less 
harmful than generally believed to many economies in the developing world. 
They enhance our understanding of digitisation by classifying its stages. In 
their formulation, most of Africa falls within the constrained economies cat-
egory, which means that realisation of the full benefits of digitisation is ham-
pered and constrained. On their scale of digitisation, African countries score 
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below 25, while the best performers—the advanced countries of Europe, Aus-
tralia and North America—score greater than 40 and are considered as mature 
in digitisation terms.
Although the studies mentioned above are generalisable, there is insuffi-
cient discussion to clarify the impacts of digitisation in labour-rich systems. 
For the most part, the seminal studies lack diversity in scope and range. Afri-
can economies also have large informal sectors. This analysis recognises the 
need to develop a nuanced understanding of different sectors of the African 
economy in which the youth are impacted. In addition, these countries offer 
evidence of Tiziana Terranova’s (2013, 39) thesis of the misappropriation of 
the ‘fruits of cultural labor’ by those who produce. We suggest theories on job 
displacement will be refined if data on especially informal sectors of African 
economies are included in the analysis. With a few exceptions, previous re-
search has not seriously taken into consideration the impact of digitisation in 
African settings. For example, Bahjat El-Darwiche et al. (2013, 7) reported in 
2011 that 600,000 jobs had been created as a result of digitisation.
Our work focuses on sectors that are sufficiently diverse to test existing the-
ories of displacement emanating from digitisation, which are widely noted in, 
for instance, multinational corporation-operated banking and insurance sec-
tors. Furthermore, David Autor (2010) has observed that displacements have 
occurred mainly in lower-middle-class jobs that are repetitive in nature. Ac-
cording to the World Bank, in African countries examples of these jobs include 
clerical work, the preparation of registries, bookkeeping, banking and jobs in 
manufacturing (The Nation, 2016; Ngunjiri, 2017; Nwachukwu, 2017; Omulo, 
2017; Reuters, 2017). The sector-level approach seems to be a reasonable way 
by which to test the applicability of the job disappearance theory. Economists 
Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo (2016), among others, identify sectors, 
such as manufacturing, where automation eliminates job tasks more heavily 
than in most other job sectors. Where reductions in manufacturing have oc-
curred, digitisation is associated with a growth in call centres, as witnessed in 
South Africa (Webster, 2006, 21–22).
Hopefully, the cases below provide perspectives on the cultural dynamics of 
digitisation, which may aid the process of finding solutions for massive unem-
ployment on the African continent. Using documentary and other qualitative 
methods, we interrogate the ambiguity in claims of job displacement, focusing 
mainly on three instrumental sectors—libraries, security, and entertainment. 
Bruce Berg (1998, 216) observes that instrumental cases may not be viewed 
as typical but are helpful for refining a theoretical explanation. These cases 
are essential for description, which helps strengthen our explanatory abilities 
and implications of theoretical positions (King et al., 1994, 44). The sectors are 
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examined because they offer a breeding ground for new insights, where digi-
tisation plays a large part in tasks and jobs. In addition, the consumption of 
entertainment artefacts cuts across all nations and is a useful starting point 
from which to refine the assumptions in the disappearing job narrative.
In the remainder of this chapter we explain how digitisation has been mani-
fest in the three sectors. We then discuss the qualitative limitations of the dis-
appearing job theory and develop an alternative perspective on the unfold-
ing changes in African work arenas. Finally, we discuss the implications of our 
perspectives for strategies by the International Labour Organization (ilo) and 
future outcomes.
2 Digitisation in Information Libraries: Cases in Kenya
Since 2000, libraries in universities have experienced greater digitisation than 
the underfunded public libraries in several African cities, where these exist. 
The driving force for digitisation is the expected return on investment (roi), 
especially tangible benefits such as lower staff time, higher productivity, faster 
time to delivery, reduced paper costs, reduced manually-handled information 
queries, increased volume or traffic, faster and more reliable inventory, reduced 
travel costs and a reduction in redundant records (Garson, 2006, 334–335, 419). 
Digital libraries and archives reduce the costs associated with the maintenance 
of physical spaces for storing books. At Kenyatta University, for example, the 
implementation of ‘Digital Library Technologies’ came in response to the need 
to provide patrons ‘instant access to information sources, from any location, at 
any time and from any device’ (Fabunmi et al., 2009; Wangila, 2014, 533–534).
In most cases, university libraries have the largest collections and most digi-
tisation efforts have received external funding (Amollo, 2011). However, due to 
a weaker resource base, libraries in Kenya are at an early stage of digitisation 
and full assessment of the effect of digitisation on labour would be premature 
(Mutula, 2012, 295). Additionally, scholar Beatrice Amollo’s initial assessment 
concluded that Kenya’s digitisation process was patchy and its pace not im-
pressive by global standards (Amollo, 2011). In Kenya, the University of Iowa’s 
eGranary Digital Library was among the first to open its doors to African schol-
ars, giving them access to its vast online resources.1 Further support to uni-
versities in Africa was received from partners such as Michigan State Univer-
sity. Because of limited government support, the digital libraries established 
1 For further information, see the website https://now.uiowa.edu/2012/09/widernet-projects-
500th-library-goes-historic-kenyan-town (accessed on 6 August 2018).
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by African institutions remain relatively disorganised. Stephen Mutula (2012, 
291) notes that although there had been ‘staff anxiety about losing jobs, learn-
ing new skills and added responsibilities’ due to the digitisation of library ser-
vices in Botswana University library, transformations were successful because 
of policy support. In the case of the University of Nairobi, Kenya, new jobs 
were created in units such as ict infrastructure management, e-Resources, the 
newly constituted Digital Content Unit and Multimedia Resource Centers in 
other universities. In addition, digital libraries expanded jobs in e-learning en-
terprises. As Fernando Wangila explains, digitisation at Kenyatta University ‘fa-
cilitates the development and use of virtual learning environments’ (Wangila, 
2014, 534).
Qualitative assessment establishes that at the University of Nairobi and Ke-
nyatta University, digitisation resulted in the retraining of employees and also 
created opportunities rather than displacing workers. A noted consequence of 
digitisation is the reskilling of library employees to facilitate navigation in the 
new media. No observed job displacements reported for clerical staff manually 
handling card catalogues were wholly attributed to digitisation.
However, should such concerns regarding potential job losses due to digi-
tisation prove founded, then the legal framework for collective bargaining 
would require some rethinking. One reason for this is that matters of digitisa-
tion were not included in collective bargaining agreements (cbas) between 
the fragmented unions and the government, or employer. For instance, at 
the University of Nairobi, the Universities Academic Staff Union (uasu) rep-
resents the academic staff and senior librarians while mid-level library staff, 
catering and administrative staff are represented by the Kenya Universities 
Staff Union (kusu). A separate union, the Kenya Union of Domestic Hotels 
and Educational Institutions, Hospitals, and Allied Union (kudheiha) is con-
cerned with terms and conditions of service for members of staff grades 1–5. 
These unions are also ill-equipped to navigate the changing nature of work in 
the digital age and require collaboration to advance common interests (Ote-
nyo, 2017, 207). And these unions have to move away from silo mentalities and 
unions have to encourage training in the icts skills necessary in the knowl-
edge economy (Otenyo, 2017, 154).
3 Security and Public Safety Sector in Selected East African Cities
Modernisation of the security sector has much to do with the increased digi-
tisation associated with the proliferation of closed-circuit television (cctv) 
in Africa. Due to a generalised perception of deteriorating public safety and 
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 insecurity, cctv has become a common feature of cities on the continent. 
Older analogue systems are being replaced with digital and hybrid systems. 
Although South Africa remains the largest market for cctv in Africa, usage is 
on the rise on the continent as a whole. Most large African cities have installed 
IP-based cctv in various locations. For South Africa, a combination of post-
apartheid insecurity and its hosting of the fifa soccer World Cup during the 
summer of 2010 provided an additional motivation for heavy investments in 
cctv (Minaar, 2012). What is notable is the reskilling of existing public safety 
employees, especially those working in Africa’s large urban centres and busi-
ness districts.
And there have been opportunities to create new units to oversee the cctv 
management portfolio. In Kenya, for example, recruitment into the police 
force has increased (National Police Service Commission, 2017). Additional re-
tailing vendor jobs have been created in the private sector as well. In Nairobi, 
for instance, the National Surveillance, Communication and Control System 
was presented as a collaboration between central government, police, and pri-
vate sector vendors including Internet provider Safaricom and Huawei. Similar 
private–public managerial partnerships exist elsewhere such as for example in 
Kampala’s cctvs where Sekanyolya Systems Ltd. was the contracted private 
partner. It is noteworthy that the cities of Kampala and Entebbe installed cctv 
to improve policing during the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (chogm) but retained the equipment afterwards.
Similarly, the business district in Dar es Salaam had cctv installed through 
contracts with the private sector. By 2014, the national parliament had urged 
the government to expedite the process to install cctv in major cities (Muga-
rula, 2014).
Evidently, cctv generates data and requires extremely extensive hours of 
viewing when crimes are being investigated. As more data is generated, new 
tasks are created, especially in analytics. Also, the digitalised components of 
the data require stable power and connectivity, which also translates into tech-
nician positions. This means more training and job creation in areas such as 
Big Data analytics and skills for facial recognition, among others. In addition, 
manpower training in analysis presents opportunities for manpower develop-
ment. Because of growing needs for public safety, digitisation in the security 
sector does not fit into the pattern of technologies that lead to job losses or 
displacements. However, the evidence suggests increases in the numbers of 
jobs in sales and in security consultants, cctv technicians, operators, and con-
trollers across the continent.
Therefore, our general initial appraisal of the digitisation of cctv is that, on 
balance, it has helped modernise the public safety sector and, as of now, has 
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generated new types of tasks. This finding is consistent with Professor Richard 
Baldwin’s expert observation of the security sector in advanced economies. 
Here, Robot Security cops, which report data in digitised forms, are an excel-
lent example of how blending Artificial Intelligence (AI), robots and automa-
tion defines the modern workplace (Baldwin, 2017). The main challenge for 
African governments is to establish legal frameworks for managing the digi-
tised security sector, such as data storage, safety, and reliability (Otenyo, 2015).
4 Digitisation in the Entertainment Sector
The economic significance of the entertainment industry cannot be mini-
mised in the discourse on income generation and job displacement. Accord-
ing to The Economist (2017), music is ‘Congo’s [drc] most influential export’ 
after lucrative minerals like copper and gold. However, job displacements and 
disruptions have been extensively documented in the entertainment sector. 
Data from PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2016) research reveals the impressive job 
creation potential of Africa’s entertainment sector. For example, Nigeria has 
one of the world’s fastest growing entertainment sectors and its music industry 
will almost double in value from usd 47 million in 2015 to usd 86 million in 
2020. Revenues from streaming music in Kenya are projected to rise from usd 
19 million in 2016 to usd 29 million in 2020 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016).
For comparative purposes, although the exact impact remains inconclu-
sive and ambiguous, for European artists digitisation cannot be ignored in the 
discourses on job displacements and profitability (Bourreau et al., 2013). As 
Robert Klotz (2004, 171–172) explains, works in digital forms are easily copied 
and distributed on the Internet, which is the world’s largest ‘copy machine’. 
With the advent of ‘remix culture’, new forms of copyrighted works are being 
formed. There is also outright copycat infringement in which music and film is 
dubbed and shared illegally on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, Soundcloud and YouTube. Two opposing views emerge: on the one hand, 
the emerging free culture and digitisation have, to some extent, affected the 
ability of creative artists to reap the full benefits of their trades and changed 
the game for communications businesses (Felten, 2004; Lessig, 2005; Jenkins, 
2006). At the opposite end of this scale is the claim that the benefits of digitisa-
tion are recognisable and include sustainable livelihoods for artists.
In A&M Records vs. Napster (United States Court of Appeals, 2001), evidence 
was provided to show that the illegal downloading of music and film is disrup-
tive and prohibited. In addition, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (dmca) 
of 1998 tasked Internet service providers (isps) with reporting those infringing 
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on copyrights. In Africa, attempts at formulating relevant legislation have been 
made. For example, the Copyright Amendment Bill (2017),2 formulated in line 
with the dmca principles, is designed to punish Internet service providers for 
failure to expunge copyrighted content from their networks. Bloggers and web-
sites that publish copyrighted literary content have also been sanctioned. With 
regard to music, in Congo musicians no longer rely on record sales but resort 
to other means of livelihood because of digitally enabled piracy and copyright 
infringements (Congo Vibes, 2014, 85; Trapido, 2016, 95; White 2008, 170–173). In 
Congo, piracy-related losses were exacerbated due to the government’s own in-
ability to regulate the industry. The société nationale des éditeurs, compositeurs, 
et auteurs (soneca), a government entity responsible for protecting cultural 
products, is notoriously incompetent (White, 2008, 85). Also, for Congo, laws 
that prohibit copyright infringement have existed since 1982 (Ngombe, 2016). 
However, these laws are weak and not strictly enforced due to bureaucratic 
incompetence (Ngombe, 2016; wipo, 2010).
Before the emergence of the MP3 format, in the 1970s the unauthorised re-
cording of music on cassette tapes had negatively impacted record sales. Brian 
Shimkovitz (2012) of wire magazine observed that the ‘tape culture’ was wide-
spread in other parts of Africa. According to Shimkovitz, cassette technology 
became a huge movement within the music distribution industry. The popu-
larity of tapes coincided with the explosion of piracy on the continent. Tapes 
also contributed to a decline in the manufacture of vinyl LPs, thereby reducing 
jobs at recording labels such as Decca and Philips.
Similar accounts can be offered for Tanzania, which ironically boasts of 
one of the oldest union bands—nuta Jazz (the National Union of Tanzanian 
Trade Union Workers) (Finke, 2003, 754). Formed in 1964, nuta, now ottu 
Jazz Band (Organization of Tanzanian Trade Unions), had vested interests in 
the welfare of musicians but lacked the capacity to protect musicians from pi-
racy. A successor oversight body, the Tanzania Musicians Network (tmn), did 
not fare any better. This pattern of weak legal and bureaucratic institutions is 
rampant in most African countries and has attracted attention from the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (unesco).
unesco, which wants artists to be meaningfully employed, plays a huge 
part in efforts to improve the organisational capacities of musicians. And in 
furtherance of its broad objectives, unesco developed a series of policies to 
2 For further information see the Republic of South Africa (2017) Copyright Amendment Bill, 
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/South-Africa-Copyright-Amendment-
Bill-2017.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2018).
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combat piracy in the wake of the increased use of digital technologies.3 unes-
co, through training, especially the Anti-Piracy Training for Trainers (aptt) 
project and piracy awareness initiatives, has been able to make a contribu-
tion toward reducing rates of piracy. In the East Africa region, unesco has 
cooperated with law enforcement agencies and lawmakers to provide policy 
implementation support.
4.1 An Alternative Perspective on the Impact of Digitisation on 
Entertainment Companies
Although digitisation has been abused by unscrupulous traders, there is also 
an opposite view that digitisation offered benefits for entertainers and produc-
ers. The central thesis of this perspective is that ‘information and communica-
tion technologies (icts) facilitated contacts for artists and music producers’ 
(Brandellero and Kloosterman, 2016, 182). This perception is a dominant ar-
gument among many of the emerging musicians and artists who had been 
left behind in the ict-driven era of globalisation. Through exposure on social 
media, especially YouTube and Facebook, digitisation is said to have liberated 
literally millions of African artists from the narrow confines of the village and 
pushed them to the global stage (Shimkovitz, 2012).
The positive perspective on the role of digitisation suggests economic gains, 
and similar arguments can be extended to the film industry. To some degree, 
Nigeria’s film industry is the most consequential expression of being a modern 
African (Bright, 2015; Haynes, 2016; Hugo, 2009). Nollywood’s (Nigeria’s equiva-
lent of Hollywood in the US or Bollywood in India) rapid rise to become one 
of the three largest film industries in the world is evidence that the electronic 
age and globalisation have made an impact on Africa’s entertainment sector. 
The industry produced at least 1,844 movies in 2015 alone (Bright, 2015). About 
7,000 new titles were produced between 1992 and 2005 (Barrot, 2009). Nolly-
wood is now a usd 3.3 billion industry making it the most lucrative of its kind 
in Africa (Bright, 2015).
Observers agree that Nollywood generates much revenue but that it is scat-
tered. A great number of videos and dvds are sold in Africa’s informal streets 
markets. More significant is that Nigerian movies are reproduced and resold 
by unauthorised vendors through various digital media. This complicates the 
proper management of the industry. Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics 
3 Of particular importance is the establishment of the World Anti-Piracy Observatory. The 
various policies adopted by unesco in this domain can be found on the website http://
www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/creativity/creative-industries/world-anti-piracy-
observatory/ (accessed on 14 August 2018).
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data can only be an estimate of the industry’s actual share of gross domestic 
product (gdp).
Many industry specialists now believe that current efforts to work with vid-
eo streaming companies—such as US-based Netflix (which is seeking to enter 
international markets), Africa Magic (a Naspers-owned South African Satellite 
TV affiliate) and Kenya’s Buni.tv—to offer movie streaming services at a fee, 
will expand the industry. In 2012, Nigeria’s iROKOtv, the country’s first major 
online movie streaming platform, acquired exclusive rights to distribute Nol-
lywood films. At the time of its launch, iROKOtv was referred to as the ‘Netflix 
of Africa’. In its first year, it reported over 152 million viewers and now has a 
library of over 4,800 movies, accessible from anywhere on the planet (Mulupi, 
2012). A United Nation’s (UN) study has declared digitisation a blessing to Ke-
nyan movie audiences, who now pay lower rates to watch films on digital TV 
platforms, including Zuku and Digital Satellite Television (DStv) (UN, 2016, 
27).
Thus, it is plausible that emerging digital video-on-demand (vod) plat-
forms are creating new job opportunities in Africa. As Kevin Zhu (2001, 273) 
writes, the motion picture was not previously in tune with high-tech business 
practices. It is only recently that advances in digital technologies changed the 
way we view movies. The Internet, especially broadband connection, has pro-
foundly changed the movie distribution industry, so much so that producers 
and studios deliver movies directly to consumers, bypassing distribution com-
panies. The streaming business is a fairly recent phenomenon and is poised 
to expand. As Dinfin Mulupi (2012) observes: ‘The whole African tech scene is 
very exciting, dynamic, bold and ready to burst onto the global scene. Africa is 
just starting to come online and there is so much potential in this market, not 
just in Nigeria’.
Although concrete data is not available, our qualitative indicators suggest 
digitisation is adding jobs to the music and film industries. Consistent with Zhu 
(2001, 276), the impact of the digitisation of the film industry in the short-term 
reduces costs in the various production and distribution sectors. However, the 
long-term prognosis may change depending on individual sectors. Therefore, 
as the ‘internet becomes a viable distribution channel, several types of busi-
nesses along the traditional value chain may be seriously impacted or even 
eliminated’ (Zhu, 2001, 276). Depending on the intensity of digitisation, among 
the types of jobs to face reduction or elimination (or more technically, disin-
termediation) will be those at the previously popular video kiosks and those 
of hawkers common on streets of Africa’s largest cities. In addition, film manu-
facturers, processors, and duplicators, distributors and video rental stores will 
be negatively affected, whether in Africa or in developed economies. The ilo 
Bellucci and Otenyo214
<UN>
can and should indeed play a role when it comes to supporting labour policies 
in this regard.
5 A Way Forward for the ilo
As Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (2011) posit, producing labour skills 
that cope with the fast pace of advances in technology is necessary in all econ-
omies. Perhaps the starting point is to call for additional support for Africa’s 
weak labour governance systems and institutions and their efforts to educate 
workers on the global future of work concepts, especially those associated 
with digitisation in the workplace. Existing training institutions seem to be 
ill-equipped to provide the skills required for navigating through the changes 
brought about through digitisation as broadly defined. For example, the Afri-
can Advanced Level Telecommunications Institute (afralti) has an outdated 
curriculum (Kariuki, 2016). And even though private–public sector partner-
ships with corporations such as Oracle, Huawei, Microsoft and ibm exist, skills 
development is far behind compared to all other continents. Going forward, 
African countries will need more support from organisations such as the ilo. 
Otenyo (2017, 206) asserts that since unions in Africa are affiliated with the 
ilo, it will continue to offer development programmes for union leaders, espe-
cially with regard to navigating the interconnected world of icts.
Already the ilo and other units of the UN have made great efforts to support 
Africa’s capacity to streamline its labour policies and improve the technical 
capacity of its workers. Additional policy changes are necessary to strengthen 
employment creation capacities in the near future, especially in sectors that 
do not receive much government support. Notwithstanding digitisation’s po-
tential to change the nature of work in the formal sector, there is room for 
reorganisation of informal sectors, which had previously not been able to ex-
ploit global market opportunities.
Since the 1990s, in recognition of the need for modernisation, unesco has 
supported the digitisation of library services in Kenya by offering forums and 
training events (Amollo, 2011). The ilo can join unesco and other organisa-
tions to frame jobs in the informal entertainment sector as being ‘quality’ or 
‘decent’ jobs. Perhaps providing information on technological changes should 
be an aspect of the ilo’s next agenda in the coming years. Since the two organ-
isations have extensive collaborative experience, templates for Memorandums 
of Understandings (MoUs) between the ilo and unesco already exist and 
can be updated, especially in the area of addressing job security in emerging 
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sectors. Areas such as film production and studio management, among others, 
could be provided with platforms to energise existing efforts.
Over the years, the ilo has put great efforts into the provision of decent work 
and social protection for vulnerable groups in Africa, which include millions in 
informal job sectors. For example, the ilo announced in 2012 that more than 
70 per cent of workers worldwide had no statutory access to unemployment 
insurance, which is typical of those working in the music industry. During its 
100th Session, the International Labour Conference adopted Recommenda-
tion 22, establishing the Social Protection Floors. These are not widely debated 
in African parliaments but ought to be. The absence of unemployment assis-
tance is a huge problem for African artists and many also lack business skills.
Perhaps the weak capacity within the labour movement has contributed to 
the failure of African governments to establish meaningful, corruption-free 
social protection systems. The ilo’s periodic advisory warning to countries 
without labour rights is an important step towards building accountability 
structures within the African, and perhaps even global, context. The ilo con-
tinues to single out certain African countries that create conditions under 
which it is difficult for unions to flourish. This pressure from the ilo helps the 
capacity building of the key stakeholders required to put together a sustain-
able plan to address any future externalities arising from the digitisation of 
jobs, as Africa’s digitisation index moves closer to the ‘emerging’ and ‘transi-
tional’ stages of digitisation.
In Africa, the ilo could play a major role in supporting research and publi-
cations to enhance legally based policymaking processes. It can do this for the 
benefit of workers, especially in order to address work-related uncertainties 
provoked by aspects of digitisation. Although proposals to encourage work-
ers to buy shares in companies that manufacture and develop digital products 
have been made in advanced countries, the landscape in Africa is different. 
The critical mass of workers necessary to start conversations around earning 
‘robot dividends’ remains a mirage. The vast majority of African union lead-
ers and policy makers will, however, need to understand the implications of 
digitisation and automation. Karim Sabbagh et al. (2012) emphasise that policy 
makers need knowledge of the benefits of digitisation. The case for this is, in 
fact, stronger because Africans are already major consumers of ict products, 
including mobile money and social media.
Because the pace of change and level of labour displacements vary by coun-
try and industry, solutions have to be designed according to specific situations. 
Cooperation in areas such as ict training can be addressed through coopera-
tive ventures to enhance ‘brain-gain’ strategies. Different organisations have to 
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cooperate rather than compete for human capital, especially in science, tech-
nology, engineering and math (stem) areas, where talent is very scarce (Cann, 
2016; wef, 2017, iii). The ilo has already made policy responses to the ‘brain 
drain’ one of its action areas (ilo, 2003, 50). It may be necessary to periodically 
review this issue.
Various ilo reports on priorities for Africa include the creation of greater 
employment and income opportunities, social protection, rights at work and 
social dialogue. The ilo’s ability to offer forums for dialogue, especially its 
 collaboration over policies associated with the African Union and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (nepad), are much welcome. These 
initiatives recognise that any programmes for development must be Africa-
led. We believe these objectives have to be maintained and must especially 
include the restoration and maintenance of viable governance structures that 
will provide structures for building the capacity of states to leverage icts for 
 sustainable job creation (ilo, 2003, 5). This support for governance structures 
should include assistance in the shape of country-level initiatives to guide 
union participation in protecting workers’ rights to decent work and incomes.
6 Final Remarks
The pace of digitisation in African economies is accelerating in sectors such 
as security, library services and entertainment. The entertainment sector 
may have been a major beneficiary of the changing nature of work and lei-
sure, thanks to digitisation. Our conclusion is that the process of embracing 
digitisation entails careful planning and policy management. Digital trans-
formation is more than promoting efficiencies and upgrading software and it 
works best when planned and carefully executed (Andriole, 2017). This means 
governments should fully understand the consequences of digital transforma-
tions and be able to manage any disruptions that might occur. In the case of 
libraries, for example, the transformations in question need greater resource 
support, particularly because the economic and cultural benefits for society 
are enormous.
Current evidence suggests that the maturation of a digitised economy 
remains a work in progress. Technically, the data does not support the job 
displacement or disappearing theory in Africa. This is true at least for some 
sectors, including libraries, security and entertainment. But considering that 
these sectors are among the most affected by digitisation, it seems that our 
hypothesis is validated. The argument we are making here is that digitisation 
does not lead to massive job losses and could be a springboard for the creation 
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of new jobs. We are aware that this chapter is a first step in understanding the 
effects of digitisation on job security in selected African sectors. While we have 
not been able to ascertain in quantitative terms the number of jobs created 
through digitisation efforts, the descriptive findings are generalisable in the 
context of the sectors selected. Still, further work is welcome.
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Working Futures: The ilo, Automation and Digital 
Work in India
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Abstract
With access to data communication networks and the prevalence of informal work, 
workers in the global South are rapidly inching closer to confronting the impact of 
automated or digitally enabled non-standard employment. What are the social and 
political responses required to face this shifting engagement with the means of au-
tomated production and the experience of digital work mediated through privately 
owned global technology  platforms? By examining India’s job market, with a focus on 
the country’s information technology (IT) industry, this chapter assesses whether the 
International Labour Organization’s (ilo) focus on labour rights and social protec-
tion is suited to addressing the potential for capital–labour substitution and the new 
ecosystem of software-mediated work. The chapter suggests a new engagement with 
digital labour, closer scrutiny of unregulated working conditions, and democratic con-
trol over tech-enabled digital platforms.
1 What Working Future?
The world faces today a new challenge posed by the combination of jobless 
economic growth, rising human productivity, and an increase of the available 
labour pool. In developing economies in particular, the future may not even 
hold enough jobs for everyone.1 It is estimated that by 2030, the global labour 
1 This much was intimated by the World Bank’s president in a 2016 speech: ‘The traditional 
economic path from productive agriculture to light manufacturing and then to large scale 
industrialisation may not be possible for all developing countries. In large parts of Africa 
it is likely that technology could fundamentally disrupt this pattern.’ Research based on 
World Bank data has predicted that the proportion of jobs threatened by automation in In-
dia is 69 per cent, 77 per cent in China and as high as 85 per cent in Ethiopia.’ ‘If this is true,’ 
Jim Yong Kim continued, ‘we need to understand the paths to economic growth that will 
be available for these countries and then adapt our approach to infrastructure accordingly.’ 
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force will increase by 428 million workers, the majority of whom will be in 
low- and middle-income countries (lmcs) in Africa and South-East Asia (ilo, 
2017). India’s population, for example, is expected to surpass China’s within a 
decade, reaching 1.66 billion by 2050, and ten countries alone are expected to 
contribute collectively to more than half of the world’s expected population 
increase from 2017 to 2050.2 The demographic pressure of a growing labour 
force, particularly for youth in vulnerable employment in low-income coun-
tries, may exacerbate the mismatch between workers’ skills and those sought 
by employers (ilo, 2017, 34), and encourage the competition for the least valu-
able skills, i.e. skill sets available will become less valuable. If the benefits of 
this demographic transition depend largely on the ability to employ produc-
tively its working-age population, the prospect of a growing labour force out-
pacing job creation and productivity gains foreshadows a future of widespread 
joblessness. This challenge is further exacerbated by the job replacement po-
tential of recent developments in artificial intelligence (AI).
Previous waves of mechanisation and automation have led to the creation 
of redundant or surplus human labour in agricultural and manufacturing jobs. 
Despite a recent decline in global unemployment rates, often attributed to 
shrinking labour force participation, few jobs are now immune to computeri-
sation or automation. With AI, in fact, bots, drones, and other intelligent ma-
chines are learning to perform autonomous work, identify patterns and predict 
behaviour, and solve non-routine and cognitive tasks, rendering most human 
labour potentially automatable at the point when humans are more produc-
tive than ever. If developments in robotisation have been mostly confined to 
developed economies, falling technology costs and the sweeping effects of 
intelligent software development for non-routine tasks are already impacting 
low-skilled and low-waged labour as well as high-skilled workers across lmcs.3 
Speech by World Bank President Jim Yong Kim—The World Bank Group’s Mission: To End 
Extreme Poverty, 3 October, 2016, available online at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
speech/2016/10/03/speech-by-world-bank-president-jim-yong-kim-the-world-bank-groups 
-mission-to-end-extreme-poverty (accessed on 22 June 2018).
2 Aside from India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the US, the remaining six countries are located in 
Africa: Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Egypt. 
As of 2017, 60 per cent of the African population was under 24 years of age, and about four 
out of ten Africans was under 14 years of age. While population growth rates are expected 
to slow down by mid-century, Africa’s population will continue to rise, from a forecast 1.7 
billion in 2030 to an estimated 4.4 billion people by 2100 (UN 2017, 23). If the main challenge 
faced today in sub-Saharan Africa is the poor quality of employment, the prospect of mas-
sive unemployment looms on the horizon with an additional 12 million youths joining the 
workforce by 2020.
3 As will become apparent in the case of India’s IT industry, the skill-biased technological 
change (sbtc) hypothesis suggesting a shift towards educated workers as a response to 
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In India, for example, a survey of young people aged 16 to 25 found that 52 
per cent of those polled believed that AI machines or computer programmes 
would replace human jobs within a decade.4
Academic studies concerned with this shift to automated labour and im-
pending robotised or computerised work, commonly glossed as the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, tend to vary between the alarming prospect of a jobless 
future and the optimistic vision of a society free from taxing work. For some, 
the declining costs of automation and a move to capital-intensive technology 
will exacerbate the scope and impact of this transformation, with estimates 
ranging from 9 per cent of job ‘automatibility’ across oecd countries (Arntz 
et al., 2016) to 40 to 60 per cent of US jobs potentially lost within the next 
twenty years (Frey and Osborne, 2017; Hicks and Devaraj, 2015).5 For others, 
humans should embrace the freedom of a fully automated economy (Srnicek 
and  Williams, 2015; Livingston, 2016) or devise new mechanisms to either slow 
down the effects of automation or compensate for lost income in the form 
of robot taxes (Guerreiro et al., 2017) or Basic Income programmes (Barchiesi, 
2007; Davala et al., 2015; Standing, 2017; Seekings and Matisonn, 2010). Aside 
from an emergent critique in the digital studies literature concerned with rela-
tions of exploitation and marginalisation in the digital economy (Casilli, 2017; 
Fuchs, 2016; Graham et al., 2014), the exposure of the global South’s workers 
to automation has been largely overlooked, as have the lessons it may offer 
with regard to addressing changing conceptions of production in an internet- 
enabled and increasingly interconnected economy. Rather than reducing tech-
nological unemployment to the Schumpeterian ‘gale of creative destruction’ 
and the gloomy prospect of a Luddite fallacy, or embracing futuristic visions 
of an automated post-work scenario and the ‘post-wage’ realities of an on-
demand ‘gig economy’, the fundamental question we seek to address hinges 
on the institutional division of labour and the social and political conditions 
enabling the adoption of technology: what working future awaits the next gen-
eration of workers? And if robots are replacing human labour, is a new social 
 technological change may no longer hold sway with the advent of increasingly autonomous 
machines capable of non-routine and cognitive tasks. See Goos et al. (2014) for a review of 
sbtc.
4 See the research presented on the website Infosys, Amplifying Human Potential: Educa-
tion and Skills for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, http://www.experienceinfosys.com/ 
humanpotential (accessed on 21 June 2018).
5 Aside from the creation of new jobs fostered by technological change, this occupation-based 
approach to the potential for automation and computerisation may underestimate the need 
for tasks performed by humans. For an alternative tasks-based approach to computerisation, 
see Arntz et al. (2016).
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contract needed to compensate for the loss of taxable (human) income, ris-
ing income inequality, and the unprecedented power of large multinational 
corporations?
According to estimates of the International Labour Organization (ilo), ir-
regular or underemployment—informal, casual, or temporary work—affects 
up to 75 per cent of the workforce, particularly in lmcs. By sheer demographic 
pressure and the prevalence of informal work, shored up by cheap access to 
robust data communication networks, workers in these countries are rapidly 
inching closer to experiencing the impact of automated or digitally enabled 
non-standard employment.6 Important as it may be to estimate what jobs 
will be available and to prepare workers accordingly, it may not be enough to 
tackle inadequate training in ‘marketable’ skills or create new entrepreneur-
ship opportunities for those dispossessed of work. There are also considerable 
political consequences induced by the unfettered adoption of technological 
innovations in the world of labour. These would include added surveillance 
of and scrutiny over personal and working lives, from cashless transactions 
to remote desktop and keystroke monitoring, as well as the unregulated, cor-
porate-owned troves of information amassed by data mining and predictive 
algorithms. While these are important issues, our main goal in this chapter is 
to examine the actual and potential exposure of temporary, contracted, and 
freelance work to computerisation and automation, on the one hand, and the 
opportunities and limitations afforded by access to digital labour platforms to 
mitigate, rather than exacerbate, the precarity prevalent in lmcs, on the other.
The remainder of this chapter assesses sector-specific trends and ongoing 
transformations in India’s job market with a specific focus on the information 
technology (IT) industry. The IT industry and IT-enabled services in India face 
high labour costs, global competition, and the rapid adoption of technological 
advancements, making them particularly vulnerable to job loss and replace-
ment. Moreover, most studies of automation have been largely confined to 
low-wage, low-skilled jobs, and the three decades of IT transformations in In-
dia offer an important case study through which to assess the adoption of tech-
nology in high-skilled industries. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a 
new international convention on digital labour is necessary to face the chal-
lenges of work and social protection in the twenty-first century. We now turn 
to an overview of India’s job market.
6 The ilo (2016) defines non-standard employment (nse) as work that falls outside the 
realm of standard employment, understood as a full-time, indefinite bilateral employment 
relationship.
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2 India’s Job Market
This section examines the challenge posed by a burgeoning working-age popu-
lation with a decrease in agriculture and public sector jobs. India’s modest job 
growth is exacerbated by technological advances and automation, and with 
a shift of stable employment away from manufacturing and construction to 
services, present and future generations are already experiencing the risks of 
heightened working precarity in the country.
2.1 Jobless Growth in Manufacturing
In the few decades since India’s economic liberalisation and despite changes 
in the overall make-up of public and private sector employment, the funda-
mental structure of employment and self-employment in India has not been 
altered significantly (see Figure 11.1).7
7 Public sector employment decreased from 19.466 million jobs in 1995 to 17.548 million in 2011, 
with corresponding gains in private sector employment. Data from the Open Government 
Data Platform, India, https://data.gov.in/catalog/employment-public-sector-and-private-
sector (accessed on 10 September 2018) and the Quarterly Reports on Employment Surveys, 
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Figure 11.1 Self-employed workers and salaried workers in India




However, labour-shedding transformations and a move towards capital-
intensive industries have largely offset post-1990s employment gains.8 While 
the loss of public sector jobs represents a steady march towards less secure or 
stable jobs, only 17 per cent of the workforce earns a regular wage or salary, and 
almost half of the working population is either self-employed or casually em-
ployed. Between 2000 and 2017, rural worker numbers declined from 59.9 per 
cent to 44.2 per cent of the total workforce, with manufacturing, construction 
and service jobs compensating for losses in rural jobs (See Figure 11.2).9
Yet, India’s economic growth has spurred only modest or ‘sluggish’ job cre-
ation—if any at all (Tejani, 2016).10 While the employment-to-population ratio 
for the population above 15 years of age has been steadily declining in India, 
the working-age population in the age group 15–64 years has risen (see Figure 
11.3).11 Considering the expected increase in the working-age population over 
the next decade, this jobless growth may spell trouble for the future.
8 See Kannan and Raveendran (2009) for the manufacturing sector and Tejani (2016) for a 
broader account of increased productivity without labour-intensive production.
9 Service jobs increased (from 23.7 per cent in 1999–2000 to 26.9 per cent in 2011–12) as 
did construction jobs (from 4.5 per cent to 10.6 per cent in 2011–12). Figures are from the 
National Sample Survey Office data, in Misra and Suresh (2014).
10 The Economic Survey published by India’s Ministry of Finance acknowledges that ‘em-
ployment growth has been sluggish’ for the years preceding 2016–17 (Government of In-
dia, 2017, 61).
11 We use the employment-to-population ratio as a more accurate indicator of employment 
generated. Employment is defined as persons of working age who, during a reference pe-
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Figure 11.2 Indian population employed in agricultural and services sectors
Source: World Bank (no date), World Development Indicators: 
India.
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In this context of jobless growth, the ilo observes that India’s strong econom-
ic growth of 7.6 per cent (2015–16) has not translated into improved employ-
ment, but is rather accompanied by fewer jobs and rising inequalities.12 With 
the informalisation of the organised sector, a significant number of workers 
are without access to employment benefits and social security.13 Along with 
decreases in the overall employment rate, labour force participation in India’s 
job market has declined steadily since the 1990s. In official statistics, unem-
ployment has remained at low levels of 4 to 5 per cent for 2017, which can be 
attributed to the sharp decline in labour force participation amongst women 
and to sampling bias.14 Finally, the distinction between temporary and perma-
nent employees is increasingly blurred and is often identified as the primary 
cause of labour  unrest in many industries, leading the government of India 
12 India’s gdp growth was 5.6 per cent for 2012–13, 6.6 per cent for 2013–14 and 7.6 per cent 
for 2015–16. Per capita income also increased, from 5.8 per cent for 2014–15 to 6.2 per cent 
for 2015–16. Despite a declining poverty rate (from 37.2 per cent for 2004–05 to 21.9 per 
cent for 2011–12), inequality has risen particularly in urban India, where the Gini index—
used as a measure of inequality—has increased from 34.3 for 1993–94 to 39.3 for 2009–10 
(see ilo, 2018 and World Bank, 2018).
13 The organised sector consists of ‘incorporated’ or legally registered and regulated estab-
lishments consisting of ten or more workers. The ilo notes that the share of workers in 
the unorganised sector fell only marginally, from 86.3 per cent for 2004–05 to 84.3 per cent 
for 2009–10 and to 82.2 per cent for 2011–12 (ilo, 2018).
14 For example, female labour force participation in rural areas dropped from 52.5 per cent 
for 2004–05 to 39.9 per cent for 2009–10, and in urban areas from 26 per cent to 21 per cent 
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to consider enforcing salary parity to mitigate differences between stable and 
short-term contracts.15
Manufacturing jobs are the most significant source of regular employment 
and until recent years contributed the lion’s share of new jobs created in the 
private sector.16 Out of the 10 million new manufacturing jobs, the automo-
bile industry accounted for the largest number (7.6 million), mostly in auto 
component manufacturing but also in auto sales, services, transportation and 
logistics, for a total of 25 million jobs in the automobile industry in 2016.17 
This figure is poised to increase over the next few years, with an ambitious 
governmental Automotive Mission Plan (2016–26) estimating 65 million new 
direct and indirect jobs in the automobile industry (siam, no date). There is 
no detailed survey information on the impact of automation on jobs in the 
manufacturing sector, but frequent newspaper reports stress the snowballing 
adoption of robotic devices in manufacturing processes.18 More broadly, these 
estimates minimise the number of jobs needed to match the increase in the 
working-age population or the skills necessary to tackle technological unem-
ployment. A careful assessment of sector-specific susceptibility to automation 
and trends in employment would seem to recommend a shift away from man-
ufacturing-intensive sectors, to sectors less susceptible to automation, such as 
the education sector, which already accounts for 24.35 per cent of all service 
jobs.
15 The government of India has initiated changes in the Contract Labour (Regulation & 
Abolition) Act of 1970. At the time of writing, the draft bill was announced and pending 
the consultative process. See the Ministry of Labour and Employment, ‘Amendment in 
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970’, available at https://labour.gov 
.in/sites/default/files/Amendment_Contract_Labour.pdf (accessed on 7 September 2018).
16 Notwithstanding the consistent growth in community, social and personal services (16.03 
million in 1995 to 23.50 million in 2011) along with finance, real estate and insurance jobs 
(2.93 million in 1995 to 17.18 million in 2011). Open Government Data Platform, India, 
https://data.gov.in/catalog/employment-public-sector-and-private-sector (accessed on 
10 September 2018).
17 Government of India (2011), ‘Human resource and skill requirements in the auto and auto 
components sector’, the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship and Na-
tional Skill Development Corporation. According to this report, an additional 2.7 million 
jobs are to be added to the existing 12.81 million jobs generated in the sector by 2022, 
largely in auto component manufacturing.
18 Automation is increasingly used by automobile companies such as Maruti Suzuki, with 
5,000 robots in its plants in India. Ford’s latest plant in Gujarat has more than 500 robots, 
most of which operate in the body shop area, whereas its older plant in Chennai has only 
100 robots.
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2.2 Retail Jobs and the Risk of Automation
The retail sector in India, at first glance, offers a hopeful avenue for the major-
ity of Indians having completed either primary or secondary school.19 With a 
large Internet user base, cash on delivery and electronic payment systems have 
become increasingly commonplace in India. However, the service sector has 
not generated as many jobs as expected due to high productivity and minimal 
labour input (Gordon and Gupta, 2004). In fact, despite a strong growth of on-
line retailers and Internet penetration, in 2016 e-commerce and related servic-
es accounted for only about one million jobs in India.20 The biggest  employers 
in the e-commerce business in India are Amazon and Flipkart, which have 
pushed to expand automated warehouses and fulfilment centres.21 Following 
a global trend, large online retailers such as Amazon have begun moving from 
e-commerce operations to online marketplaces for work in India.22
The bulk of employment opportunities in the sector are presently generated 
in automation-prone jobs in logistics, warehousing and delivery services. Con-
veying, organising and loading tasks are now increasingly performed by robots 
and though automation is presently limited, it is set to increase in warehousing 
and storage operations in the near future. For example, e-commerce market 
leaders (including Flipkart, Jabong, Myntra, and PepperFry) and logistics com-
panies (Aramex, dtdc, Delhivery, and Gojavas) are serviced by Grey Orange, a 
multinational firm that designs, manufactures and deploys advanced robotics 
systems for automation at warehouses and distribution and fulfilment cen-
tres. GreyOrange has entered into an exclusive partnership with the Indian 
19 Some estimates suggest that 12 million jobs will be created in e-commerce and related 
services by 2025 (Bhandari and Srinivas, 2016).
20 A 2016 joint kpmg and Snapdeal report suggested that e-commerce can create 1.45 mil-
lion direct jobs by 2021, with one million of these jobs in logistics and warehousing. The 
online seller base is projected to grow to 1.3 million by 2020 with the creation of an ad-
ditional 10 million new jobs. These expectations are based on estimates of market growth 
and of an increase in the numbers of online shoppers (kpmg and Snapdeal, 2016).
21 In 2017, Amazon reported a total of 50,000 people on its payrolls in India, making it the 
company’s second largest workforce centre after the US. In 2016, Flipkart had a total of 
30,000 employees, despite plans to lay off between 700 and 1,000.
22 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a marketplace for the ‘on-demand’ workforce, is perhaps the 
most popular of these labour or ‘crowd-work’ platforms, despite recent restrictions with 
regard to international workers (De Stefano, 2016; Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft, 2014; 
Irani, 2015). Although most of the direct jobs created by Amazon will be in fulfilment cen-
tres or in customer service, Amazon announced in early 2017 plans to create 5,000 remote 
customer service jobs. Increasingly, these positions are being framed as ‘employee friend-
ly’ as they enable flexible work. One example of the latter strategy emerged in  August 
2017, when Amazon India launched a cost-efficient virtual customer service platform for 
skilled workers seeking to work from home.
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 company Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. to market and distribute in India its propri-
etary warehouse automation solutions, the Pick-Put-To-Light (pptl) system, 
responding to the growing demand for entry-level warehouse automation so-
lutions. The remaining one-third of jobs created by online retailers and service 
providers are in customer care, IT and top management, which require higher 
education, and less significantly in research and development, data analytics, 
AI and machine learning.23
Overall, the liberalisation years of the 1980s and 1990s in India were met 
with contradictory calls for more stringent laws or further deregulation. En-
terprises adopted a strategy of capital deepening—modernising, automating 
and substituting labour with capital (Ghose, 1994) —and resorted to contract 
labour, which increased from 12 per cent of total manufacturing work in 1990 
to 23 per cent in 2002. This has been possible in part because of a state that 
appears to favour an agenda of decent and secure work, while enabling an en-
vironment that normalises contraventions. New strategies with regard to out-
sourcing have also negatively affected trade unions, with a concomitant loss of 
bargaining power with which to negotiate wages, allowances, benefits or social 
protection (Sharma, 2006). More broadly, the future of work critically hovers 
over the move towards e-commerce, online labour and service platforms in 
India, specifically in transportation, hospitality, and food services.
We now turn to a discussion of the specific challenges and opportunities 
posed by the emerging digital economy in India, from tech-work platforms to 
the IT sector.
3 India’s Digital Labour Economy
Work today relies on an interconnected division of computerised and human 
labour, with on-demand workers for hire in platform services, outsourced 
customer support or human resources, and automated processes to facilitate 
payroll and accountancy. With increased and increasingly inexpensive mobile 
internet access, app-based service platforms ensure easy coordination and a 
seamless customer experience, inasmuch as they allow workers to overcome 
the geographic constraints of local labour markets. This section examines digi-
tally mediated work in India to understand the challenges of a digital labour 
23 In August 2017, as widely reported in the media, Amazon announced plans to hire 1,000 
workers in India, including research scientists and data analysts as well as natural lan-
guage processing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and Android developers. See, 
for example, Anand, J. and Shilpa Phadnis (2017).
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marketplace. Despite the possibilities for labour arbitrage in global platforms, 
studies have shown that there is an imbalance in data and value transfer, 
skewed towards the global North (Casilli, 2017) in relations of digital produc-
tion that rest upon a ‘vast and complex network of interconnected, global pro-
cesses of exploitation’ (Fuchs, 2016, 21). Workers in the global South are more 
prone to economic exclusion, sub-contracting, and loss of bargaining power, 
and contrary to the idea that a worker’s location is rendered irrelevant, it is the 
imbalanced nature of relations between places that foster the development of 
these digital work networks (Graham et al., 2017, 142).
3.1 Freedom and Flexibility, On-demand
For the first generation of software developers and digital workers, coding and 
software programming rested upon free use, at once open source and shared 
with no restrictions (Coleman, 2013). The crowd-sourced nature of the ‘shar-
ing economy’ (Sundararajan, 2016) is frequently portrayed as a community-
based, liberating experience unbound by the shackles of formal employment. 
For work platforms specifically, a vision of freedom is espoused in the figure 
of the freelancer: the worker is free to work without constraints, though also 
free from regulation and protection. For a growing number of critics, sharing 
labour platforms (on-demand and micro-work platforms) are unregulated, 
 profit-seeking, data-generating infrastructures that rest upon opaque la-
bour supply chains and asymmetrical algorithmic operations (Shapiro, 2017; 
 Graham et al., 2017; Rosenblat and Stark, 2016). Be it under the guise of com-
putation services  (Irani, 2015) or short-term, task-oriented work, on-demand 
work is ‘labour without overhead’ (Shapiro, 2017, 14).
With dwindling employment opportunities, a large number of Indians are 
turning to temporary employment or tech-enabled freelance work. India has 
an estimated 2.1 million temporary workers in the organised sector and hosts 
the third largest flexible staffing workforce in the world after China and the 
United States. India has also become the largest supplier of digital labour, 
providing data-processing work, software and technology services (Kässi, O., 
M. Hadley, and V. Lehdonvirta, 2018).24 In the absence of stable work, online 
piecework has become a prominent means of securing a livelihood. Corpora-
tions also increasingly favour and enable unprotected, freelance work, moving 
24 In the online labour platform Truelancer, which offers freelancers for hire, India has the 
largest workforce contingent after the US, with about 15 million users (Jesee, 2015). A 
survey by Payoneer, a payment platform for freelancing, reveals that 78 per cent of these 




towards project-based work and short- or medium-term employment.25 With-
out enough jobs to go around and leaner technology firms, this ‘gig economy’ 
is expected to become more widespread in the future in what we could call 
a ‘global digital factory’. Unlike the ‘global factory’ of the 1990s and dawn of 
the new millennium’s sweatshops and maquiladoras (Fuentes and Ehrenreich, 
1983; Louie, 2001), these online marketplaces and the new kind of labour there-
in performed are not spatially bound but represent instead an infrastructure 
of digital labour (Scholz, 2013). A common example would be Amazon’s Me-
chanical Turk, which allows recruiters to ‘tinker’ with human workers by allow-
ing ‘employers to experiment with the uses of human labour, exploring new 
business areas with little accountability or obligation to those employed in the 
experiments’ (Irani, 2015, 230).
The emergence of this disposable and flexible workforce is not a new phe-
nomenon in India. At least since the 1990s, Indian-run recruitment agencies 
(‘body shops’) have supplied skilled Indian IT professionals for foreign compa-
nies and institutions’ temporary, on-site projects, without incurring the finan-
cial burden of layoffs for the destination country. These body shop operators 
and agencies would recruit and make available a highly mobile and flexible la-
bour pool, effectively selling workers abroad while selling jobs to Indian work-
ers (Xiang, 2007). With growing visa restrictions and the possibility of  delivering 
IT services off-site, the need for international body shopping slowed down in 
the mid-2000s. Hyderabad, the capital of the State of Telangana in Southern 
India, was formerly a ‘capital node in global body-shopping networks’ (Xiang, 
2007, 48). Today, it rivals Bengaluru for the title of IT hub of India. During visits 
to these technological hubs, news that jobs were to be outsourced or rendered 
redundant was received with uneasy silence by IT workers who were reluctant 
to discuss this newfound predicament on the record. The reported rise in tech 
workers’ suicides, however, was a sombre reminder of the current job crisis.26 
In informal conversations held with IT and software developers employed by 
US multinational corporations in both Hyderabad and Bengaluru, there was 
noticeable apprehension regarding the prospect of redundancy. As described 
to the authors by an Amazon employee in Hyderabad, there is a sense that the 
25 For example, PwC and Ernst and Young organise online marketplaces and labour pools 
from which to tap freelancers for internal projects and occasional hires. For smaller com-
panies, core work is increasingly allocated to freelancers online.
26 As massive layoffs were taking place in technology companies in India, in July 2017, the 
suicides of two technology workers were reported in newspapers in Bengaluru and Pune. 
Based on notes left by these workers, their deaths were attributed to the lack of job secu-
rity in the tech industry (See Shinde, 2017).
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current workforce is paving the way for a future of automated processes and 
diminished employment.
3.2 Autonomy and Control
Given the prevalence of on-demand transportation services, research on Uber 
and other ride-sharing tech platforms has demonstrated information asymme-
tries generated by algorithmic operations (Rosenblat and Stark, 2016) and the 
importance of reputational capital among workers largely devoid of any other 
form of protection. Though responsible for their own equipment, workers de-
pend on the technological brokerage of these platforms to access the labour 
market (Surie and Koduganti, 2016; Shapiro, 2017). These companies’ push for 
disintermediation carries two important consequences for the current analy-
sis: first, employment is defined as an autonomous monetisation of the self, 
contingent upon a certain threshold of acceptance or reputation; second, the 
worker’s apparent freedom is undermined by the control and surveillance ex-
erted by these companies.
Ethnographic studies of Uber and Ola27 drivers in India have shown how 
workers value the freedom from the obligations inherent in conventional em-
ployment and the flexibility that comes from deciding for how long, when, 
and where to work (Surie, 2017). Working for Uber or Ola can be equally lib-
erating for the worker in terms of caste and communal identities, and a sense 
of autonomy is reinforced by the perception of rising incomes and the social 
mobility that comes from an entrepreneurial profession. Yet this rhetoric of 
autonomy plays into the hands of the technology companies operating sharing 
platforms. In early 2017, Uber and Ola drivers noticed a dip in their earnings. 
After amassing a large number of drivers, most of whom accessed bank credit 
to pay off their car loans, the companies brought down their fares and incen-
tives resulting in a 60 per cent drop in incomes and in 24 per cent of the driv-
ers renouncing these platforms a month after the changes (Business Standard, 
2017). Initially lured by the promise of autonomy and higher incomes, the re-
ported 250,000 Uber drivers and 350,000 Ola drivers are not legally considered 
employees of these technology companies, and the drivers’ grievances are not 
dealt with by the state labour department. Notwithstanding this predicament 
of autonomy, Uber conducts interviews and recruits drivers, and exerts mecha-
nisms of control through complaint mechanisms and rating systems with im-
pacts on remuneration, giving credence to an actual employment relationship.
27 Ola is an Indian online transportation network company. See Ola’s website https://www 
.olacabs.com (accessed on 18 August 2018).
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The inability to decide fares or incentives or the broader terms of the work-
ing relationship between worker and employer raises significant questions 
about the nature of such employment and its future. This condition of work is 
not just a fragile and insecure experience; it is one that is wrapped in invasive 
control mechanisms.28 Drivers earning less than the minimum wage have their 
every move subjected to technologically enabled forms of surveillance as they 
grant an inordinate level of access to personal information (location, driving 
routes, and acceptance rate) in order to power the algorithmic operations of 
the platform. They are not unlike factory workers under constant surveillance 
and supervision, albeit without regular wages and health or social security 
benefits.
3.3 India’s IT Industry
India’s IT and software industry accounts for an estimated 3 million jobs 
(Upadhya, 2016, 2). Along with business process outsourcing (bpo) jobs for 
third-party providers, a growing share of new jobs created each year in India 
are generated by the IT sector (see Figure 11.4). In 2017, however, the sector 
underwent its first jobs crisis since 2008. If the sector is often hailed as repre-
senting the future of work in India, the number of jobs for IT workers and pro-
grammers in Bengaluru and Hyderabad is diminishing, with 56,000 employees 
slated to be laid off in 2017 according to widespread media reports (see for 
example Siddiqui and Sharma, 2017). This doubles the number laid off in 2016 
and represents the largest retrenchment in the technology sector thus far.
If the IT work of the late 1990s and the start of the new millennium entailed 
labour-intensive and fragmented tasks that resulted in the deskilling of its 
workers (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2008), the tech world now embraces a trimmed 
down, highly skilled workforce that can creatively develop whole products. 
Foreign companies that relied on body shops have reduced their workforces 
in India and look towards future technology developments in cloud comput-
ing, AI and machine learning technologies, with Google and other tech giants 
buying up small Indian start-ups working with AI and deep learning systems. 
For the first time in India, companies are returning to the United States for 
political, economic and technological reasons. Infosys, one of the earliest and 
largest technology companies in the country, has announced its plans to hire 
28 First denounced by The New York Times (see Isaac, 2017). Uber’s use of the ‘greyball’ tool 
to gather detailed personal and work-related information on its drivers and evade the 
control of authorities is one example of deploying surveillance technologies through soft-
ware applications.
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more American workers at an estimated loss of four trained Indian positions 
for each new US-based job, with other companies following suit. Whether 
this move should be attributed to the improving skills of American graduates, 
the rising wages of Indian programmers, a corporate realignment towards the 
US-based customer base for political expediency, or a combination of these 
factors, such analyses disregard the fact that automation already accounts for 
much of the routine coding, testing jobs, and mining of call centre data (Pal-
lotta and Delmonte, 2013).
The realities of IT-enabled industries or the global outsourcing of flexible 
workers have been documented ethnographically (Amrute, 2016; Ho, 2009; 
Lane, 2011; Patel, 2010; Upadhya, 2016) but the recent talk of outsourcing and 
dismissals stunned our interlocutors in the IT industry and threw into question 
the promises of social mobility personified by its nouveau riche middle class 
of IT professionals (Fuller and Narasimhan, 2007). In fact, many routine pro-
gramming jobs are becoming defunct as automation increases efficiency and 
enhances productivity, scrapping a few additional workers from the payrolls. 
More broadly, these developments bespeak the first effects of AI-led software 
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Figure 11.4 New Employment and Employment in IT and bpo in India
Source: Government of India (2017b), Quarterly Reports on  
Employment Surveys, 2012–2017.
Note: Between 2009 and 2015, the Quarterly Employment Survey data was 
sourced from 2,000–3,000 establishments. In 2016, the survey was revamped to 
include more than 10,000 establishments, which accounts for the significant 
correction in employment numbers for that year and the year that follows.
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process of the future through autonomous decision-making, algorithm learn-
ing, and software coding, humans are seemingly left with being the creative 
complement to AI or responsible for carving out exceptions in automated pro-
cesses. Second, as this surplus of high-skilled labour in the Indian IT sector en-
ters global labour markets, the responsibility of ensuring the necessary means 
of production shifts onto the workers themselves.
4 The ilo and Social Protection in a Digital Economy
In the experiences of flexibility and autonomy examined here and with the 
distinction between formal and informal, standard and non-standard becom-
ing increasingly thin, it is not surprising that demands for job security have 
been replaced by demands for income security (Sharma, 2006). Presented as 
the magic bullet that will remedy the lack of jobs, Basic Income initiatives and 
new redistributive policies should be part of the ilo’s agenda to reinforce ini-
tiatives geared towards decent work and social protection, much like the call 
for ‘serious consideration’ to be given to Universal Basic Income programmes 
in India’s Economic Survey of 2017.29 Beyond redistributive policies, however, 
the ilo should be able to respond to the challenges of automation and the 
effects of a growing workforce of digital workers accessing the labour market 
through global platforms.
The ilo has sparked a discussion about the impact of automation on the 
global division of labour by binding its centennial initiative to the future 
of work. The ilo is not a stranger to the pitfalls and analytic limitations of 
thinking about the future of work through the prism of decent or standard 
employment, and has made important strides in assessing work in gig econo-
mies (De Stefano, 2016) and non-standard contract work in India (Srivastava, 
2015). However, in these and other fora, work is often reduced to an antithetical 
condition of freedom and dependence, joblessness or actively choosing not to 
work (Denning, 2010; Calvão, 2016). In every other respect, the ilo has been 
reluctant to address the paradigm of post-wage or post-human labour. This is 
not to say that humans will ultimately be deemed redundant, or that all jobs 
will vanish. Rather, we propose that the shared global yearning for autonomy 
29 Universal Basic Income is being considered as a policy to address issues of weakly im-
plemented welfare schemes with misallocation, leakages and exclusion of the poor. The 
objective is not to substitute for state capacity or replace existing welfare provisions and 
access to public goods but to ensure that welfare transfers are more efficient and to sup-
plement work income (Government of India, 2017a).
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and flexibility signals an aspiration for meaningful dependency as a mode of 
productive action, which is to say the capacity to create and maintain relations 
of interdependence (Ferguson, 2015; Graeber, 2001). Seen as labouring activity, 
the digital work of the future will necessarily entail meaningful human action. 
But if a measure of success for technology companies entails the concealment 
of the human element behind automated data-processing and digitally en-
abled work (Irani, 2015), how can the ilo valorise digital work in-between de-
humanising experiences and the desire for human autonomy and flexibility?
First, the ilo holds a particular responsibility in addressing the need to 
valorise workers across labour platforms, including the added burden that ac-
crues from owning the resources needed for production. Internationally, com-
panies such as Airbnb and Uber have come under increasing legal scrutiny for 
corporate practices that drive down wages, shift risk to their workers, or evade 
social and fiscal responsibilities. In the United States, Uber was forced to settle 
two separate class action suits, but has retained the ability to run an operation 
of ‘independent contractors’.30 A London court, on the other hand, recently 
rejected Uber’s argument of providing a common ‘platform’ of partners, in a 
decision with far-reaching implications.31 This move towards virtual human 
clouds, digital products and flexible contractors should be recognised by a 
convention on digital work that addresses the social value of work and the 
diminished role of human labour in economic productivity, and how to best 
ensure ilo standards and protections for those embracing piecemeal work in 
this new, global digital factory. As proposed here, this means taking seriously 
the freedom ascribed to these jobs by many workers while scrutinising the un-
regulated data-gathering power and control exerted by large corporations.
Second, we suggest, the ilo should further engage with forms of digitally 
mediated work and network governance, and develop a new understanding 
30 The California Labor Commission ruled in favour of considering Uber drivers as company 
employees in 2015, but only in regard to one individual worker. Similar legal and politi-
cal challenges to Uber and other corporations that emerged on the heels of the sharing 
economy have cropped up. Uber’s driverless pilot project in Pittsburgh was shut down 
in 2017 by city orders. In addition, Airbnb’s operations have been restricted in different 
countries due to the impact of its commercial operations on local residents.
31 The London tribunal held that drivers were in fact company employees, and thus were 
entitled to a living wage and holiday pay as per the country’s labour laws. However, the 
ruling remarked that the only route for promotion meant spending more hours at the 
wheel, and that drivers were unable to determine business terms including the right to 
negotiate, except to agree to a lower fare than that set by Uber. It further observed that 
Uber amends contracts unilaterally. As of September 2017, Uber has been stripped of its 
commercial licence in London while the decision is under appeal. See Mr. Y. Aslan & 
 Others vs. Uber B.V. and Others, case no: 2202550/2015.
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of digitised labour relations no longer tied to conventional working arrange-
ments but to ways of monetising the self in a digital ecosystem. Beyond the 
terms of employment or independent contract work, a modicum of workers’ 
control and autonomy over digital labour platforms should further include 
ownership or transferability of ratings and reputational capital (De Stefano, 
2016, 22). This brave new world of the sharing economy, specifically that me-
diated by autonomous work facilitated by technology platforms, signals the 
need for policy and legislation to regulate such working environments and the 
forms of digital surveillance and control exerted by private companies. In re-
imagining work, however, it is important not to rush any policy decisions in 
that the flexible workforce characteristic of digital economies shares a num-
ber of features with standard employment and assumes an integral role in the 
functioning of global supply chains (Tsing, 2009; De Stefano, 2016). Given the 
lack of social protection in these sectors, more rigorous tax mechanisms and 
social protection benefits should be devised for contract, self-employed and 
temporary workers.
Third, attention to the new ecosystem of digital work opens up an impor-
tant reflection on the digital commons and platform ‘cooperativism’ (Scholz 
and Schneider, 2016). If efforts to promote fair cooperatives and collective bar-
gaining have been far more successful and widespread in countries such as 
India, this experience could conceivably be replicated across the automated 
and on-demand economy.32 As more and more seek the autonomy of working 
in these platforms, this effort should not be aimed at facilitating or curtailing 
the adoption of automated labour; rather, it should consider what it means to 
rely on privately owned technology platforms to access the labour market, the 
nature of providing services to multiple employers under the guise of recruit-
ers and commissioners, and what constitutes the work product of digitally me-
diated, semi-automated labour. A push towards the collective co-ownership of 
digital platforms would be an important step in that direction.
Finally, by the same token, the ilo should consider in concert with national 
governments the effect of technological transfers to developing economies as 
well as the exposure of developed economies to a competitive and abundant 
global workforce in a new international division of labour. Concretely, this 
means devising national strategies to compensate for the unequal economic 
geographies of global digital work networks (Graham et al., 2014). In India, 
studies that highlight the risk of a jobless future have largely fallen on deaf 
32 The Self Employed Women’s Association is a noteworthy example of strengthened bar-
gaining power through associative action in India (Rose, 1992; Agarwal, 1997).
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ears. Instead of adequately preparing for a loss of jobs to automation in India, 
technological advances and rising productivity have not been factored in when 
designing recent policy. Despite signs of expanding automation and  growing 
job losses, India is intent on generating low-skilled contract work in the 
 manufacturing sector (Srivastava, 2015). The recently adopted ‘Make in India’ 
policy, which focuses primarily on industrial production, is proof of this con-
tinued commitment to manufacturing, ignoring the new technologies that are 
replacing human labour. In this regard, future strategies by the ilo should be 
attentive to the dynamics of ‘cunning states’ that selectively implement certain 
neo-liberal policies and that ‘capitalize on their perceived weakness in order 
to render themselves unaccountable both to their citizens and to international 
institutions’ (Randeria, 2003, 1). This holds true of India’s alignment of its latest 
five-year plan for job creation with the ilo’s decent work programme. More-
over, the purview of laws ensuring basic working conditions or the safety and 
health of workers concerns the formal sector alone and should be expanded to 
include work falling outside the realm of ‘standard employment’ as a bilateral 
employment relationship.33
5 Conclusion
Historically, the ilo has been instrumental in enforcing international stan-
dards for the protection of labour rights. Despite the challenges of organising 
labour in the digital economy, this long-standing mission should ensure that 
future work will be realised as a social, meaningful activity and to its full po-
tential with regard to equality and justice. Workers and small employers play 
a pivotal role in moderating corporate-fostered competition for lower pay and 
in fostering more transparent and ethical working arrangements. However, the 
new global technological brokers of piecemeal digital work should not be able 
to unilaterally set the rules of engagement between worker and customer, or 
single-handedly determine the relationship between employer and employee. 
In the absence of conventional jobs or standard employment, the terms of 
33 See Lerche (2012). In a survey of factories employing more than one thousand workers, 
only 20 per cent were shown to pay minimum wage (Sharma, 2006), and adherence to a 
minimum wage is rarely followed in government-sponsored programmes. The national 
rural employment scheme launched to tackle unemployment in rural areas, for example, 
provides a minimum wage of inr 100 per day, or a fraction of the pay for comparable work 
determined by each state in India (Sankaran, 2011).
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access, use, and transaction in tech-enabled digital and virtual work should be 
placed squarely under democratic control.
This is not to suggest a return to the shared authority and autonomy of collec-
tive guilds, although there are lessons to retain from practices of shared control 
over production and equality among members as those emanating from the 
Social and Solidarity Economy (sse). The United Nations Inter- Agency Task 
Force on Social and Solidarity Economy (tfsse, 2014) defines these  practices 
as pursuing some combination of economic, social, environmental and eman-
cipatory objectives that include job creation, access to markets, provision 
of financial intermediation, and economies of scale. Based on principles of 
mutuality, solidarity and reciprocity, sse practices would enable better social 
protection and hold the potential to tackle vulnerable employment by bridg-
ing the transition from the informal to the formal economy. In a context of 
expanding digital precariousness, the ilo should openly advocate for the col-
lective organisation of freelance platform work and the use of publicly owned, 
open software to mediate transactions between clients and service providers. 
This would encourage, in turn, an investment in human capital in a new com-
mons of the digital economy.
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Promoting Green Jobs: Decent Work in the 
Transition to Low-carbon, Green Economies
Kees van der Ree 
Abstract
This chapter explores the nexus between climate change and jobs. For the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ilo), the relevance of climate change and low carbon de-
velopment has not always been evident. Member states and social partners have long 
been reluctant to include the transition to low carbon economies in the programme 
of work and commit resources to it. But in recent years, environmental issues have 
become a policy priority among ilo member states and social partners. Why, then, 
is climate change now more relevant than ever for the world of work? What are the 
current and forecasted employment and social implications of climate change and 
the policies for adaptation and mitigation? How can the distributional impact of the 
move to a low-carbon society be better understood and managed? In this respect, how 
relevant is the concept of ‘green jobs’? What policy approach has emerged within the 
ilo despite initial resistance and disagreement among constituents? Finally, what role 
could the ilo play in the future to promote social justice in the transition?
1 Introduction
The International Labour Organization (ilo) has addressed the relationship be-
tween the environment and employment on several occasions in its past, with 
peaks of attention occurring at the rhythm of subsequent international environ-
mental conferences (1992, 2002 and 2012). Its contributions argued for a better 
reflection of the social dimension in the agenda for sustainable development. 
Still, for many years these efforts remained peripheral relative to the attention on 
standard setting and social dialogue—the core functions of the Organization.
Over the last decade, in parallel to the growing international concern over 
climate change and resource scarcity, the issue has gained importance with-
in the Organization—albeit not without initial resistance. This chapter first 
explores the relevance of the employment and social dimension of climate 
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change. It introduces the concept of ‘green jobs’ and argues how it can be used 
to improve the understanding of the potential losses and gains resulting from 
dedicated policies to address the effects of climate change. It then discusses 
the need for and features of policies to ensure a just transition and examines 
how the ilo has recently shaped its support to the design and implementation 
of such policies.
The chapter then offers a more introspective view on how the ilo as a tri-
partite institution has incorporated environmental sustainability as a policy 
priority in all its areas of work. It argues that the initial resistance among some 
member states and the benign ignorance among others have been overcome 
thanks to the growing international concern about climate change and the 
persistent advocacy of one of the social partners. Finally, it concludes that the 
Organization’s mandate to promote social justice compels it to provide global 
leadership for a just transition towards environmental sustainability as an in-
dispensable element in its future policy agenda.
2 The Relationship between Climate Change and Employment
Rising temperatures and erratic weather patterns are directly affecting the 
lives and income sources of many people. The number of people displaced by 
floods and environmental degradation is rising year after year. It is generally 
believed that as many as 200 million people could be compelled to migrate 
permanently by 2050 due to the physical effects of climate change (Brown, 
2007). Higher seasonal temperatures are posing a health risk to more and more 
workers in outdoor occupations, such as in agriculture, construction, infra-
structure development and those engaged in informal street trading and food 
vending. According to the issue paper ‘Climate Change and Labour: Impacts 
of heat in the workplace’ (undp, 2016), peak temperatures could reduce work-
ing hours during the day by up to 5 per cent in countries such as Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan, even if the global temperature rise can be limited to 1.5°C. 
This, added to rising air pollution in densely populated cities, has far-reaching 
implications for job quality and productivity.
Clearly, climate change and environmental degradation have repercus-
sions on employment. If, on the one hand, there are negative effects on work-
ing conditions and job security in exposed areas, adaptation measures, on 
the other hand, can in themselves be a source of job creation, notably in 
building sustainable infrastructure, or through adding planting and harvest-
ing cycles.
van der Ree 250
<UN>
Mitigation policies also have significant effects on jobs, both in negative and 
positive ways. Energy policies that aim to reduce dependence on coal and the 
current wave of disinvestment in coal mining by large financial institutions, 
for example, have led to job losses in particular geographical areas and among 
specific parts of the work force. But mitigation can also drive job creation, for 
example through investment in renewable energy, eco- and energy-efficient 
(‘green’) construction, or improved waste management.
Realising the economic and social linkages between climate change and 
employment, national policymakers and international organisations have be-
gun to recognise this nexus and have adopted policies to address it. As the 
ilo Director General wrote in his report to the 106th International Labour 
Conference, there is ample ‘evidence that the transition to an inclusive green 
economy can indeed act as a new engine for growth and a strong driver of 
decent work creation in developing, emerging and advanced economies’ (ilo, 
2017a, 8). However, he also acknowledged that this outcome is not guaranteed. 
Indeed, the jobs in a greener future will not be decent by default, but by design 
(ilo, 2017a). Such an outcome requires economic and social policies that help 
workers to adjust, including large-scale investment in education and training 
systems at the secondary and tertiary levels.
This reflection of the importance of climate change for the ilo’s future 
agenda is fundamentally different from the place environmental sustainabil-
ity had in the Organization in the past. The Brundtland Report in 1987 and 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (unced), 
or Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 triggered more interest among the 
ilo’s constituents and within the Secretariat for addressing the implications 
of environmental challenges for the world of work (ilo, 2017a). As a result, the 
ilo began contributing to the adoption of global conventions on occupational 
safety and health issues directly related to environmental hazards and risks.1
However, it took a good 20 more years before the ilo embraced the need to 
address climate change as relevant for its own work. After the adoption of full 
employment and decent work as a global goal by the World Summit on Social 
Development in 2005, a set of indicators on employment were brought into 
the Millennium Development Goals (mdgs) framework. The Director General 
proposed, in his report to the 2007 International Labour Conference, ‘Decent 
Work for Sustainable Development’, to set up a programme of work for ‘promot-
ing a socially just transition to green jobs’ (ilo, 2007, 2). In subsequent years 
the climate change agenda began to gain ground across constituents and ilo 
programmes, albeit with initial reservations from a number of constituents.
1 See, for a summary, http://www.ilo.org/safework/areasofwork/chemical-safety-and-the 
-environment/WCMS_118357/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 11 June 2018).
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2.1 Defining and Contextualising ‘Green Jobs’ 2
Over the past decade there has been a continuous flow of studies, reports and 
articles about the nature, quantity and quality of green jobs; a useful overview 
is provided by Bowen and Kuralbayeva (2015), concluding that despite a myri-
ad of empirical reviews there remain considerable methodological flaws.
Green jobs can be viewed from two perspectives: through the lens of final 
output or through production processes. From an output perspective green 
jobs generate goods or provide services that benefit the environment.  Examples 
include green buildings, clean transportation or solar-powered water-heating 
systems. The jobs involved are viewed as green even though the outputs may 
not be based on 100 per cent environmentally friendly production processes 
and technologies.
On the other hand, jobs can be green when they contribute to more envi-
ronmentally friendly processes—for example by reducing water consumption, 
controlling air pollution or improving recycling services. Again, green jobs de-
fined in terms of production processes do not necessarily produce 100 per cent 
environmentally friendly final goods or services.
As shown in Figure 12.1, green jobs do not automatically constitute de-
cent work. Many current recycling jobs, for instance, recover raw materials 
and thus help to alleviate pressure on natural resources. These jobs would be 
in Circle A. However, the jobs involve a working practice that is often dirty 
and dangerous, causing significant damage to human health. Employment in 
this industry tends to be precarious and unprotected and workers’ earnings 
are low. To be truly classified as green jobs, labour conditions need to meet 
decent work criteria3 (i.e. overlapping with Circle C in Figure 12.1). Thus, in the 
case of waste management, jobs would be ‘green’ if social protection measures 
were accessible and safety and health at work were ensured, whilst some kind 
of labour agreement lent employment security to workers engaged by 
collection companies. In the same vein, jobs involved in ensuring resource 
efficiency in bottling companies, for example, or applying clean production 
methods (Circle B), should meet decent work criteria if they are to qualify as 
‘green jobs’.
2 This section largely builds on van der Ree (2017).
3 The ilo’s definition of decent work includes (i) opportunities for work that is productive 
and delivers a fair income, (ii) security in the workplace and social protection for families, 
(iii) prospects for personal development and social integration, (iv) freedom for people to 
express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that affect their lives, and 
(v) equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men (see the website https://
www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm (accessed on 16 August 2018)).
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The inclusion of the decent work dimension in the concept of jobs linked to 
environmental sustainability is the defining element of the ilo interpretation 
of green jobs (Box 12.1).
The concept of green jobs relates to employment in economic activities in 











Figure 12.1 The Relationship between the environment and employment
Source: ilo (2013a).
Source: ilo (2016).
Box 12.1 ilo definition of green jobs
Green jobs are decent jobs that contribute to preserve or restore the 
environment, be they in traditional sectors such as manufacturing and 
construction, or in new, emerging green sectors such as renewable energy 
and energy efficiency.
Green jobs contribute to:
– Improving energy and raw materials efficiency
– Limiting greenhouse gas emissions
– Minimizing waste and pollution
– Protecting and restoring ecosystems
– Adapting to the effects of climate change
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gases, (ii) are efficient in resource use, (iii) maintain biodiversity and ecosys-
tems and (iv) enhance social inclusion. Ultimately such activities should result 
in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities.
In the context of the Agenda for Sustainable Development and the outcome 
of the Rio+20 Summit, the green economy is positioned as ‘one of the impor-
tant tools available for achieving sustainable development […] that should 
contribute to eradicating poverty as well as to sustained economic growth, 
enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare and creating opportuni-
ties for employment and decent work for all, while maintaining the healthy 
functioning of the Earth’s ecosystems’ (UN, 2012, para. 56). This signals that the 
green economy and green jobs are means of achieving the goal of sustainable 
development, rather than being ends in themselves.
In a similar fashion green jobs can be viewed as instrumental to achieving 
the targets of several of the Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs). Although 
sgd 8 is the most explicit about employment (‘to promote sustained, inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and de-
cent work for all’), jobs and improved working practices are key to achieving 
several other goals, notably sdg 12 on sustainable consumption and produc-
tion, or sdg 7 on ensuring energy access for all.
The significance of social and employment factors that determine the suc-
cessful achievement of sustainable development has been highlighted by a 
range of international agencies, notably the United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development (unrisd). In its contribution to the Rio+20 Confer-
ence (unrisd, 2012), it argued for shifting the policy focus towards a ‘social 
green economy’. This would require a more balanced policy approach between 
(i) providing compensatory measures for those negatively affected, (ii) maxi-
mising co-benefits in terms of green jobs, and (iii) fostering participation and 
ensuring rights. unrisd also called for social policies that underpin environ-
mental investments such as those in public transport systems or in retrofitting 
housing for energy efficiency, as well as for capacity building to access and use 
green economy technologies.
A more conscious effort to assess and correct the negative social impact 
of the green transition could also enable greater gender equality (ilo, 2017c). 
Green jobs are not by definition more or less accessible to women. However, 
environmental policies can have gender-balance repercussions due to the dif-
ferent sectoral impacts of low-emissions strategies. Men are more affected in 
shrinking extractive industries with predominantly male workers, and men 
are more likely too to become engaged in green construction. Women may 
benefit more from the growth of organic horticulture or waste  management 
van der Ree 254
<UN>
in  countries where the related workforce is female-biased. Investment in re-
newable energy in rural areas may ease the task for women to provide energy 
for the household. Dedicated, gender-sensitive labour market policies can 
play an important role in facilitating the adjustments and ensuring that en-
vironmentally sustainable jobs are decent and provide real opportunities for 
women.
The report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (oecd) ‘Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth’ (oecd, 2017) acknowl-
edges that the goal of reducing emissions can only be reached if  governments 
take fully into account the social and economic factors that determine the 
success of ambitious climate policies. It argues for ensuring an ‘inclusive tran-
sition’ based on dialogue and consensus building among stakeholders, and 
stresses the importance of adopting active labour market policies to guide 
and facilitate the change. Similarly, the Global Green Growth Institute (gggi) 
has included job creation as one of the six strategic outcomes of its refreshed 
mid-term strategy (gggi, 2017). These are illustrations of the broad consen-
sus that has emerged over the last six years or so from earlier negligence—at 
best—among international organisations regarding the key importance of the 
employment dimension of climate change action.
2.2 The Employment Effects of Environmental Policies
The visualisation of green jobs in Figure 12.1 also helps us understand the 
dynamic relationship between economic development and environmental 
sustainability. Recent sector studies using modelling techniques based on 
 available statistics show how expanding sectors such as renewable energy 
provide for new job opportunities. In addition to the jobs directly created, 
employment will expand along supply chains and in service sectors. The in-
comes earned and consequently expanded consumer demand will induce yet 
more jobs. Together, the modelling suggests that this would add up to the ag-
gregate job gain stemming from an investment in renewable energy (Montt et 
al., 2018). Long-term effects on employment can be even more positive if the 
productivity and growth of certain categories of enterprises increase, such as 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in rural areas, which would 
become connected to national electricity networks, or farmers adopting re-
source-saving technologies using local renewable energy sources.
Environmental regulation and new technologies regarding cleaner produc-
tion, emissions reduction or nature conservation can in principle contribute 
to the creation of green jobs. However, they may also risk stifling economic 
activity or lead to the relocation of enterprises. In the latter case, the impli-
cations for workers and their families need to be anticipated and managed 
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through supportive labour market measures and social protection. This is par-
ticularly relevant in the energy and transport sectors.
Taken together, employment experiences multiple effects of climate change 
and the policies designed in response to it. Four types of changes in the labour 
market can be identified in Table 12.1 below.
Source: Elaborated from ilo (2011).





1 New jobs will  
be created (in  
existing and  
new  
occupations)
Solar panel technicians, organic farmers, recy-
cling managers, staff in eco- 
tourism resorts, workers in natural resource 
conservation and restoration, environmental 
advisers, workers in bicycle shops.
Modest
2 Certain jobs  
may be eliminated
Coal miners, worker in bottling  
industry adopting water and  
material-saving technology, staff of obsolete 
or prohibited packaging materials industry.
Small
3 Jobs will be  
substituted (occu-
pations change)
Jobs in transport systems moving to rail, elec-
tric cars and shared vehicles, waste manage-
ment jobs in landfilling/dumpsite moving to 
incineration  
and recycling, jobs in quarries for  
construction using new building  
materials and re-use of left-overs  
and waste.
Modest




Workers, operators and managers in green-
ing sectors notable buildings, agriculture or 
transport: all learning  
to manage new technology and  
operating practices; workers in all sectors 
where energy and resource efficiency is in-
troduced (cleaner production in manufactur-
ing, retail services without packaging, bottle 
companies changing to new materials and 
products), staff in financial  
institutions adopting sustainable investment 
strategies.
Large
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To guide policymakers and programme implementation, the ilo has un-
dertaken a series of mapping studies to better understand and measure the 
impact on employment of climate change and policies for environmental sus-
tainability.4 The ilo has published a Policy Brief (ilo, 2013b) and a Practitio-
ners’ Manual (ilo, 2017d) laying out the specifics and methodological steps 
involved.
The assessments—though similar in their objective—are unique, as they 
each follow a consultative approach with stakeholders to distinguish ‘green’ 
jobs from others in each key sector (see Box 12.2).
4 These include studies of China, Bangladesh, Mauritius, South Africa, Kenya, Senegal, Zam-
bia, Tunisia, Namibia, India (State of Gujarat), Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia (forest-
ry), Mexico, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina.
Box 12.2 Green jobs assessment, Mauritius
In support of Mauritius’s ‘Ile Durable’ initiative, the ilo supported an assess-
ment of the prevalence and potential of green jobs in the country. It used 
the input–output table 2009 from the Statistics Office, disaggregated into 
sub-sectors defined as ‘green’, such as green agriculture, sustainable fishing, 
green textiles, recycling, green hotels, sustainable transport, or renewable 
energy. The analysis considered green jobs from three perspectives: (i) jobs 
that add value to green products and services, (ii) jobs in greening process-
es, and (iii) jobs contributing to natural resource conservation.
The study revealed that there are 35,000 green jobs in Mauritius, or 6.3 
per cent of total employment. Most green jobs were found in electricity 
generation, with 23 per cent of jobs involving supplying bagasse from sugar 
cane production to electricity plants. In agriculture, 12 per cent of employ-
ment was considered green as well as decent. In textiles only around 5 per 
cent of employment was found to be green.
The potential for green jobs was modelled using output and employment 
multipliers for green sub-sectors in agriculture (sugar), manufacturing (tex-
tiles), tourism (hotels) and energy (renewable versus fossil fuel), thus evalu-
ating the direct and indirect effect throughout the economy. Projecting an 
annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent of total output, 21,600 new green jobs 
would be created. This compares favourably to 15,250 jobs when assuming 
business-as-usual growth without increased green products and processes. 
In particular, the increase in employment in the renewable energy scenario 




The number of and trends regarding jobs related to environmental goods and 
services have been documented for a growing number of countries. For the US, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics has concluded that, in 2010, the United States 
had 3.1 million green goods and services (ggs) jobs. ggs jobs accounted for 2.4 
per cent of total US wage and salary employment (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2010).
For the EU, a recent review asserts that the share of green jobs (defined as 
employment in the environmental goods and services sector) in total employ-
ment increased by around 37 per cent from 2002 to 2011 (Pociovălișteanu et 
al., 2015). In 2012, around 4.2 million people across the European Union (EU) 
were employed full-time in the environmental goods and services sector, with 
a large share of these jobs found in natural resource management. A panel 
review with data for EU countries from 2005 to 2013 shows that the growth rate 
has been positive in almost all countries, with the share in overall employment 
reaching 2 per cent. A particularly rapidly growing sector is waste recycling, 
with an increase of 45 per cent in 2000–07 (Altenburg and Assmann, 2017).
Other international organisations have become more active in monitoring 
trends and providing forecasts regarding employment in the green economy. 
One such example is the renewable energy sector, which is rapidly growing 
worldwide in terms of output. The International Renewable Energy Agency 
(irena, 2018) reports annually on global employment trends in renewable 
energy and asserts that global employment has grown substantially in recent 
years reaching an estimated 10.3 million jobs5 in 2017 (see Figure 12.2).
5 The estimates reflect annual data collection efforts based on a wide range of sources, includ-
ing government agencies, industry and ngo studies, academic reports, and interviews with 
experts. Inevitably however, the underlying methodologies vary and data gaps remain.
The differences between the green and the conventional growth 
scenario—as illustrated in the renewable energy sector—are due to the 
higher integration of green industries, and notably renewable energy-based 
activities, through linkages into the value chains of the Mauritian economy. 
Conversely, fossil fuels are imported and have much weaker linkages into 
the domestic economy, therefore generating less additional employment 
and value added in the country.
source: ilo (2015a).
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2.3 The Skills Needed for Green Jobs
The anticipated shifts in the labour markets of economies with carbon-inten-
sive or high-emitting sectors will have a significant impact on skills needs. A 
global review of 21 countries, published by the ilo and the European Centre for 
the Development of Vocational Training (cedefop) in 2011, found a frequent 
and significant gap between the skills levels required for jobs in green sectors—
in particular renewable energy, green buildings, and  manufacturing—and the 
training and competency standards provided by national vocational and ter-
tiary institutions (ilo, 2011). This mismatch has effectively slowed down the 
advancement of green investment and enterprise development, as illustrated 
in countries such as Kenya, where 80 per cent of the technicians needed to 
build and operate a new wind farm—the largest in Africa—were  recruited 
on the international market (paghc, 2017). Skills shortages, including those 
necessary for the creation and management of small enterprises, hinder the 
proliferation of investment in renewable energy in Africa in general, with 
only 30 per cent of the population having access to conventionally-generated 
electricity. In addition, skills training significantly enhances the employability 
and productivity of workers engaged in large-scale public employment pro-
grammes for environmental protection, such as evidenced by South Africa’s 
Million jobs
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Figure 12.2 Global renewable energy employment by technology, 2012–17
Source: irena (2018).
* includes liquid biofuels, solid biomass and biogas
** other technologies include geothermal energy, hydropower  
(small), concentrated solar power (csp), heat pumps (ground-based),  
municipal and industrial waste, and ocean energy.
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Expanded Public Works programme (‘Working For’) and Brazil’s Bolsa Verde 
initiative (unfcc, 2016).
An increasing number of countries are adopting environmental legislation 
that makes reference to skills development. Recent national employment poli-
cies too include provisions for adapting skills systems, with more technical and 
vocational training for green jobs (van der Ree, 2017). An ilo survey of 2016 
among 27 countries worldwide found that 19 had set up stakeholder platforms 
to anticipate skills needs and the provision of adequate training. But these ef-
forts are hampered by a lack of consensus regarding the definition of skills for 
green jobs and by limited capacities for assessing the changing need for skills 
(ilo, 2018). Consequently, skills development policies in support of transition 
still have a short-term horizon and are implemented on a limited scale.
Countries with well-established labour market policies and effective Tech-
nical and Vocational Education and Training (tvet) institutions that are en-
gaged with the private sector have adapted much quicker to the changing need 
for skills. In Germany and France, for example, the greening of the building 
sector has been much facilitated by a responsive training system adjusting cur-
ricula and introducing new green certification courses at an early stage.
3 Managing the Transition for Enterprises, Workers and 
Communities
The analysis of employment trends over the last decade undertaken by the ilo, 
the EU, the International Renewable Energy Agency (irena), the oecd and 
others consistently shows that employment in environmentally related sectors 
and industries is significant and, in many countries, growing. It also suggests 
that commitments to targets for emissions reductions consistent with the 2015 
Paris Agreement and related policies and investments for green growth do not 
necessarily hurt jobs at the aggregate level. But the effects on labour markets 
will often be sector-specific and spatially concentrated in areas with resource-
intensive industries. Many of these effects can be anticipated, but others may 
come as a relative shock when environmental policies change due to abrupt 
political changes.
Some policies will lead to the reduction of economic activity and value 
added in high-emitting sectors, hence leading to a loss of jobs. Whether the 
reallocation of workers towards alternative jobs in expanding industries, for 
example renewable energy, will offset this loss is dependent on factors such 
as the flexibility of labour markets, the alignment of incentives for investing 
and engaging workers in low-carbon sectors, and supportive measures by 
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 governments that seek to ease the transition. These challenges may be more 
important in emerging economies with a greater share of carbon-intensive in-
dustry, which also employ mostly low-skilled workers (oecd, 2017).
The ilo and oecd reviewed 24 available studies and the employment effect 
of environmental policies. They found that, in general, the net employment 
 effects were positive, albeit modest. In countries where environmental policies 
were combined with well-designed supportive measures such as subsidies, fis-
cal incentives and sector promotion, as well as with active labour market mea-
sures, job outcomes were better (ilo and oecd, 2012).
The review also found that potential losses of employment were largely con-
fined to high-emission, polluting industries, which often employ only a small 
portion of the total workforce. The top ten polluting industries, which are also 
responsible for the lion’s share of emissions in the EU-25 countries, were only 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































Cumulative share of Co2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion
Cumulative share of official employment
Figure 12.3 CO2 emissions and employment, EU-25, 2005
Source: ilo and oecd (2012).
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Further analysis of the educational profile and professional experience of 
workers in high-emitting industries shows that their skills level is generally 
lower. This implies that, for those workers, the transition to other jobs may be 
more difficult and possibly more costly in terms of unemployment payments, 
relocation and retraining (see Box 12.3).
Box 12.3 China’s employment transition
To address industrial overcapacity and achieve CO2 emission targets, the 
Chinese government ordered the closure of a series of coalmines, metallur-
gic industries and electricity companies in 2016 and 2017. As a result, at least 
1.8 million workers employed in those industries would lose their jobs, with 
further negative effects on surrounding local economies due to the reduc-
tion in consumer demand.
At the national level, the government designed a package of measures. 
These included:
– A re-employment training subsidy, a start-your-business subsidy, en-
hanced public employment services, including job fairs.
– Early ‘internal’ retirement for workers less than five years away from re-
tirement age, with enterprises remaining responsible for workers’ ‘subsis-
tence’ during these bridging years.
– Social protection and medical and pension benefits for employees of 
closing enterprises.
– Public Employment Projects to help individuals find re-employment, in 
which the government provides a subsidy for salaries and subsidies for 
social services.
In addition, the government induced enterprises to take on their own re-
sponsibilities by obliging them to absorb laid off workers, using new tech-
nologies and focusing on the enterprise-internal service sector. In return for 
these efforts, enterprises received preferential treatment and tax incentives. 
Enterprise-based hrd departments should undertake active labour mar-
ket mediation, including helping individuals to start their own enterprises 
whilst keeping their formal labour relationship with the firm. These firms 
received subsidies for these start-ups.
The national government budget for these efforts stood at Yuan 10 billion 
(or US$ 1.5 billion) in June 2017, to which funding from provincial govern-
ments was added. A total of 726,000 workers in 28 provinces and 2,000 enter-
prises have been re-employed or assisted in other ways since the measures 
came into force in 2016. Good examples, where a re-employment plan had 
been discussed and agreed before employees’ contracts were terminated, 
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For the US, the Political Economy Research Institute (Pollin and Callaci, 2016) 
has estimated the scope and costs of supporting the transition of workers and 
communities that are currently dependent on domestic fossil fuel production. 
Essentially, it calculated the budget required for (i) income, retraining and re-
location support for workers facing retrenchments from fossil fuel based in-
dustries, (ii) guaranteeing the pensions of workers in the affected industries, 
and (iii) setting up effective transition programmes in affected communities.
Forecasting a downsizing of the US fossil fuel industry coherent with the 
CO2 emissions reduction targets set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (ipcc), the impact on the supply chain and downstream energy 
production was calculated. Coal, gas and ancillary industries are, together, es-
timated to employ around 750,000 people. In the adopted emissions reduction 
scenarios around 450,000 jobs would be at stake. Of these, by far the great-
est part—83 per cent of jobs—are held by workers who could retire in the 
 projected period. The remaining 17 per cent would have to be redeployed in 
renewable energies or other sectors. Together with funding for the pension 
provisions of retired workers over the long term and transitional support for 
affected local economies and communities, the total cost would be usd 600 
million per year.
The International Trade Union Congress (ituc) has long advocated for 
a just transition. In 2016, it established the Just Transition Centre with the 
 intention of being a clearing house and proponent of strategies and tools for 
national governments and local actors, with a focus on workers’ organisations 
(ituc, 2016). It intends to bring together workers, employers, communities 
and governments to undertake social dialogue in order to shape the pathway 
to a just transition, understood as ‘an economy-wide process that produces the 
plans, policies and investments that lead to a future where all jobs are green 
and decent, emissions are at net zero, poverty is eradicated, and communities 
are thriving and resilient’ (ituc, 2017, 6).
include the iron and steel industries in the city of Wuhan, Hebei province, 
and the steel industry the city of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province.
China, having adopted green, clean development as one of the key priori-
ties of its 2017–22 Development Plan, has begun addressing the particular 
challenge of the green transition.
Source: van der Ree (2017).
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Indeed, there is a strong case for learning from earlier transitions, such as 
those related to coal mining. The Institute for Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (iddri) and Climate Strategies are leading a research 
and dialogue project on the future of coal. Their review includes cases from 
Spain, the UK, the Netherlands, the US, and the Czech Republic and Poland, 
and has included the drawing up of detailed policy recommendations to plan 
and manage the closure of mines (Caldecott et al., 2017). The ilo’s Green Jobs 
programme is actively supporting the piloting of just transition approaches in 
a learning-by-doing approach in the Philippines, Ghana and Uruguay.
3.1 ilo Support for a Just Transition
Throughout its history, the ilo has promoted social justice in all major eco-
nomic transitions. This mandate has shaped the role of the Organization in 
helping to ensure that economic growth policies generate opportunities for 
decent work and social protection for all—in other words are just and inclu-
sive. In the current context of climate change, social justice underpins the im-
perative of a ‘just transition’ of the workforce and the creation of decent work 
and quality jobs, which are also reflected in the 2015 Paris Agreement.
The Green Jobs Initiative6 was launched in 2007 to promote opportunity, 
equity and a just transition to sustainable economies, using social dialogue to 
shape coherent policies for a green economy with green jobs and decent work 
for all. It led to the creation of a dedicated, resourced programme of work on 
Green Jobs in 2008, with a mandate to work across the ilo to raise awareness 
and rally support for the promotion of green jobs.
3.2 Diverging Political Positions
Even though the Green Jobs Initiative was conceived and driven by a tripartite 
ilo partnership together with the United Nations Environment Programme, 
the policy consensus with regard to the full integration of climate change in the 
work of the Organization still had to be forged. The differences among certain 
member states and the diverging positions of employers’ and workers’ organ-
isations became visible in the debates at the Governing Body leading up to the 
Rio+20 Conference. A number of representatives of the G77 group, opposed 
to the terms ‘green economy’ and green jobs, suggested adopting the concept 
6 A partnership between the International Trade Union Confederation (ituc), the Interna-
tional Organisation of Employers (ioe), the ilo and the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (unep).
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of sustainable development instead.7 The Employers’ representatives also ex-
pressed a fear that separating ‘green’ from other forms of enterprises would 
lead to the stigmatisation of the latter as undesirable firms in terms of their 
environmental impact. They argued that the aim should not be to promote 
green enterprises and green jobs per se, but to work with the entire private 
sector towards more resilience and higher resource efficiency. This position 
reflected the concern in the private sector regarding strong environmental reg-
ulation from governments, particular in industrialised countries. In parallel, 
member states with emerging economies called for an enabling global policy 
environment (for trade openness and transfer of and access to technology and 
finance) without making the degree of ‘greening’ a condition of or obstacle to 
trade and their own economic growth.
Meanwhile, the workers’ representatives argued consistently for a proactive 
role from the ilo, following the trade unions’ own resolution on ‘Combating 
Climate Change through Sustainable Development and Just Transition’, at 
their second Congress, in Vancouver, 2010 (Rosemberg, 2013).
Despite these differences, the policy discussions on the ilo’s Governing 
Board did not, in essence, reveal a fundamental disagreement at the level of 
the Organization with regard to the rationale for addressing the impact of cli-
mate change on the world of work. Rather, the debate was focused on how 
links to the decent work agenda could be made, what the unique value added 
by the ilo would be, and whether this would eventually lead to a new interna-
tional labour standard regarding social justice in the context of the transition. 
A compromise was found, with the agreement to hold a General Discussion 
at the International Labour Conference in 2013, which would shape the policy 
agenda and review the available ilo instruments that might support a just 
transition.
At the same time, the parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (unfccc) included a specific reference to decent 
work in the ‘shared vision’ for a future global climate agreement, in Cancun, 
2011. The year after, the Rio+20 outcome document—‘The Future We Want’— 
established the key role of decent work for sustainable development in a dedi-
cated chapter and through numerous cross references (UN, 2012). It identi-
fies the concept of a green economy as one of the pathways to sustainable 
 development and stresses that such an approach must lead to social inclusion 
and the creation of employment and decent work for all. It also acknowledges 
7 This is consistent with the deliberations that led to the final Rio+20 outcome document—
‘The Future We Want’ (UN, 2012).
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‘the importance of efforts to promote the exchange of information and knowl-
edge on decent work for all and job creation, including green jobs initiatives 
and related skills, and to facilitate the integration of relevant data into national 
economic and employment policies’ (UN, 2012, 29).
3.3 ilo Follow-up to Rio+20 and Anticipation of the Paris Climate 
Agreement
In the wake of Rio+20, the International Labour Conference of June 2013 ad-
opted a landmark resolution with a set of conclusions on the relationship be-
tween sustainable development, decent work and green jobs (ilo, 2013a). The 
conclusions set out a common vision for achieving decent work, green jobs 
and sustainable development and provide guiding principles for the greening 
of economies, enterprises and jobs. Although not an international labour stan-
dard or convention that requires ratification by member states, the outcome 
signified the agreed normative guidance to constituents on how to effectively 
deal with the implications of climate change and environmental degradation 
for the labour market and for social protection.
The adoption and follow up to the 2013 conclusions also accelerated the 
mainstreaming of environmental concerns across all policy outcomes and 
country programmes within the ilo, leading to the inclusion of environmental 
sustainability as one of the four cross-cutting policy drivers in the Organiza-
tion’s Programme and Budget 2018–19 (ilo, 2017b).
The 2013 conclusions also define a basic policy framework to ensure a just 
transition for all. As a follow up, the ilo issued guidelines for a just transi-
tion towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies for all, for-
mulated by a tripartite meeting of 24 experts, held in October 2015 in Geneva 
(ilo, 2015b). The Guidelines provide detailed suggestions in eight distinct 
policy areas to support national capacities for the design and implementation 
of transition measures, with the creation of decent work, poverty eradication 
and social inclusion.
The notion of just transition for the workforce was included in the pream-
ble of the 2015 Paris Agreement. In turn, this led to the creation of an ad hoc 
unfccc Technical Expert Group on the impact of the implementation of re-
sponse measures (unfccc, 2016).
In preparation for the ilo’s centenary celebrations in 2019, seven Centenary 
Initiatives were launched, including the Green Initiative. The Director General 
devoted his personal report to the International Labour Conference of 2017 to 
‘Work in a Changing Climate’ (ilo, 2017a). As part of the Green Initiative, the 
2018 edition of the annual ilo World Employment and Social Outlook report 
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(ilo, 2018), ‘Greening with Jobs’, was entirely devoted to the employment di-
mensions of the evolving green transformation, in both quantitative and quali-
tative terms. The report brought together fresh analysis at global, national and 
sectoral levels with regard to job gains, losses and transformations—where 
possible, disaggregated by gender. It was a timely contribution, in particular for 
countries turning their nationally determined commitments (ndcs)—made 
under the 2015 Paris Agreement to reduce emissions—into feasible national 
strategies and sectoral action plans.
3.4 Drivers of the Green Policy Agenda
There have been few comparable issues that have risen so rapidly on the ilo’s 
policy agenda. In a span of ten years environmental sustainability has become 
a central policy concern, among others, and a structuring element for a grow-
ing number of operational programmes with dedicated staff.
The changing international context around climate change and the adop-
tion of the sdgs has certainly helped catalyse this process. ilo constituents 
too are more conscious of the increasing threats of climate change, pollution 
and natural resource depletion. The proactive role of the International Trade 
Unions Congress has had a particularly dynamic effect in promoting climate 
change to its place high on the ilo’s policy agenda. Despite different interests 
and sometimes opposing views, workers’ and employers’ delegates have been 
able, with the support of member states, to find a political compromise in the 
form of a Resolution with Conclusions and non-binding guidelines on a just 
transition, rather than developing a new international labour standard.
The changing landscape of international development assistance towards 
climate-related finance, especially the creation of the Green Climate Fund, has 
catalysed efforts to make the ilo eligible and ‘fit for purpose’ for obtaining 
climate finance.
Other, more internal factors have also contributed to the matter’s rise in or-
ganisational priority—and popularity. Two successive ilo Directors General 
over 15 years with a deep concern for environmental sustainability showed 
strong political commitment to articulate the link with decent work at the 
highest organisational level. The Secretariat pursued a pragmatic approach 
combining high external visibility through flagship reports with strong inter-
nal advocacy and expanded staff capacity building. A strong emphasis on team 
work for knowledge sharing and the creation of synergies for the promotion 
of green jobs—as opposed to building up a stand-alone programme—has 
enabled a rapid proliferation across key departments and Field Offices. 
Finally, a consistent capacity building programme for increasing relevant 
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competencies among staff has facilitated the intended mainstreaming of the 
green jobs agenda.
4 Conclusion
The success of achieving the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement is predicated 
on the societal agreement to adopt deep changes in patterns of consumption 
and production. The required structural changes in economies will entail sec-
toral shifts and new business models. The effects on the volume and struc-
ture of employment will be unequally distributed across segments of labour 
markets. Supportive policies can cushion and facilitate the adjustment. At the 
same time, policies that stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship whilst 
generating well-educated workers can in themselves help trigger a faster 
transformation.
But the question of whether the loss of jobs will be offset by gains in emerg-
ing sectors and through improved business practices is not simply a mathe-
matical equation. Those who stand to lose their jobs do not necessarily have 
the necessary access and capabilities to seize new employment opportunities. 
From a social equity perspective, the real issue to address is the distributional 
implications, across and within countries, of the transition to a low-carbon, cli-
mate resilient society. The factors that set this transition apart from other struc-
tural changes in society are its global scale and its urgency. The achievement of 
the emissions reduction target for a climate change scenario not  exceeding 2 
degrees Celsius will depend on the speed of a successful transition. As Schmitz 
puts it: ‘this is the first transition in history that has to be achieved purposely 
and with a deadline’ (Schmitz, 2015, 170).
From an initial ad hoc engagement on environmental sustainability at 
the time of major global conferences and events, the ilo has shown a more 
consistent and increasingly strategic focus over the last decade. Its work has 
helped improve global recognition of the significance of employment and 
the critical role of the actors of the world of work. This is perhaps most con-
vincingly reflected in the adoption of the ‘imperative of a just transition of 
the workforce’ in the 2015 Paris Agreement and the incorporation of environ-
mental sustainability as a cross-cutting policy driver in the entire spectrum 
of the Organization’s work. As national governments become more engaged 
in setting the policy framework and designing sector reform in order to at-
tain the emissions reductions each of them has signed up to in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, they come to realise the intricacies of labour markets and the 
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need to buffer shocks and facilitate the adjustment of enterprises, workers and 
communities.
Internally, the ilo has been successful in creating consensus, building op-
erational capacity and rallying policy support for considering climate change 
and the greening of the economy throughout its departments and Field Of-
fices. Progressively, the concept of ‘green jobs’ has been adapted and integrated 
into work programmes, in particular those related to employment promotion, 
skills upgrading and enterprise development. Most importantly, the concept 
has helped overcome the false dilemma of promoting jobs versus saving the 
planet.
The task ahead, however, goes far beyond assessing the number and quality 
of jobs affected or created by climate change and the related policies. Given 
the expected sectoral shifts in the economy there is a growing demand for an-
ticipating and managing the distributional implications for employment and 
the equity of environmental policies. Incidentally, these changes will also re-
inforce domestic and international migration trends, bringing with them yet 
other policy challenges in terms of national security, resettlement and social 
inclusion.
A more systemic approach must embed environmental aspects in all areas 
of work in order to further enhance the ilo’s relevance to the future world 
of work and its appeal to constituents and funding partners. This would cer-
tainly apply to employment promotion, sustainable enterprise development, 
entrepreneurship promotion and skills upgrading, etc. But new boundaries 
will need to be crossed to shape social protection policies and mechanisms 
in the context of vulnerabilities to climate change, for example, and enlarge 
the scope and outreach of safety and health in existing hazardous work—such 
as waste management—and new green economy occupations. The renewed 
attention to improving the productivity of firms and workers should incor-
porate a drive to enhance resource productivity, seeking to maximise syner-
gies through employer–worker cooperation, among other approaches. In a 
broader context, work on promoting and enforcing labour standards through 
factory-level compliance along global supply chains could be reinforced 
by joining similar initiatives on environmental standards—such as Better 
Cotton.8
Averting the worst impacts of climate change and keeping the use of re-
sources within planetary boundaries compels all international organisa-
tions to undertake a fundamental reflection regarding their role. For the ilo, 
this  challenge is essentially a call for ensuring social justice in the evolving 
8 See the website http://bettercotton.org/ (accessed on 11 June 2018).
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 transition and chartering the course towards a sustainable future that is decent 
and green for all.
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Redefining Working Conditions in Europe
Patricia Vendramin and Agnès Parent-Thirion
Abstract
By the standards of the International Labour Organization (ilo), working conditions 
in Europe are relatively enviable. This chapter, however, highlights a number of trends 
that are both counterproductive for companies and harmful for employees and the 
community. Over the past twenty years, the conditions and forms of work organisation 
have been changing in ways that no longer meet the evolution of the working popu-
lation. In particular, they no longer match the high and ‘expressive’ expectations of 
ever more qualified employees, the increasing number of women in the labour market, 
changing lifestyles and an ageing workforce. During this time, the notion of ‘quality 
of work’ has sometimes been high on the political agenda. It is now being taken into 
consideration at the European level thanks to the new European Pillar of Social Rights 
and the concept of sustainable work. This chapter explores academic and political dis-
courses on the quality of work and provides a review of working conditions in Europe 
and current challenges in this area. It is based on successive waves of the European 
Working Conditions Survey (ewcs) conducted by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound). In conclusion, we ask 
whether the notion of sustainable work can be incorporated into the ilo’s forward-
looking approach and become a decisive factor in the future of the world of work.
1 Introduction
By the standards of the International Labour Organization (ilo), working 
conditions in Europe are far from problematic. Admittedly, seen from a long 
historical perspective, they have steadily improved and are even extremely en-
viable in comparison with those prevailing in other regions of the world. Nev-
ertheless, the record of the world of work in Europe is far from unblemished 
and active players in that world, whether associated with the state or not, need 
to be attentive to the trends of the past twenty years. Working conditions seem 
to be evolving in a way that seems to fly in the face of workers’ expectations: 
job insecurity has increased, loss of meaning and lack of recognition prevail 
in many professional environments, and psychosocial and musculoskeletal 
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problems have become alarmingly widespread. These developments are not 
favourable to workers or to companies, which are now obliged to struggle with 
absenteeism, the lack of commitment of their employees, and difficulties in re-
taining staff. Virtuous practices cannot be prescribed by law. They are driven by 
environments conducive to their development. At the societal level, working 
conditions must also remain compatible with the ageing of the working popu-
lation and the lengthening of careers. In addition, the transformation of life-
styles and the full participation of women in the labour market require a new 
balance. To reflect current working conditions in Europe, this chapter traces 
the fluctuations of the political commitment to the quality of work, analyses 
a series of indicators representative of the state and evolution of these condi-
tions and, by way of conclusion, raises a number of contemporary issues in this 
area at the level of Europe and the ilo.
2 From the Quality of Work to Sustainable Work
For twenty years, questions and debates about working conditions in Europe 
have successively focused on three concepts: quality of work, flexicurity and 
sustainable work. As a major focus of the European Union’s (EU’s) economic 
and development policy between 2000 and 2010, the Lisbon Strategy set itself 
the goal of creating ‘more and better jobs’. But following the failure of its imple-
mentation, and the global financial crisis of 2008, another approach to work 
emerged: flexicurity. Recently, the notion of sustainable work seems to have 
prevailed. It offers a more convincing response to an ageing population, to the 
desire to increase the proportion of older workers in the labour force, and also 
to the marked increase in musculoskeletal and psychosocial problems among 
workers of all ages.
2.1 Interest in the Quality of Work is Gradually Overshadowed  
by Flexicurity
Since the 1980s, the world of work has undergone profound changes. New 
forms of work organisation (nfwo) have gradually been put in place and have 
considerably modified both the way of working and the criteria for defining 
the quality of work. The industrial model, the Fordist company, and bureau-
cratic red tape have given way to new modes of organisation seen as better 
adapted to the challenges of an ever evolving globalised economy. These nfwo 
are based on flexibility, networks, technologies, just-in-time flows, customer 
strategy, quality, diversification and customisation.
In tandem with this, the profile of the workforce has changed: women are 
increasingly present in the labour market and the average level of workers’ 
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qualifications has increased. Workers are now seeking to make sense of their 
professional activity; they need recognition and they aspire to personal growth 
and development. So-called ‘expressive’ expectations of work have gradually 
assumed considerable importance (Méda and Vendramin, 2016). But nfwo 
have provided only very partial answers and, as a result, generated new frac-
tures in the world of work, most often related to job status and opportunities 
for self-fulfilment.
These changes have occurred in a context in which the economic position 
of certain social groups—including the young and the least qualified—has 
become chronically insecure. Their increasingly evident malaise is indicative 
both of their dissatisfaction and of some of the dysfunctions that prevail in 
organisations. When work no longer guarantees long-term economic security 
and leads to dissatisfaction, thus undermining the physical and mental health 
of workers—musculoskeletal and psychosocial disorders have become more 
widespread over this period—its ‘quality’ inevitably becomes a political is-
sue. But this concept of quality of work is complex and reflects a specific way 
of considering reality and the compromise that binds all those involved 
together.
Since the beginning of the new millennium, many researchers have tried to 
define and measure the quality of work. They have proposed many indices and 
definitions that inevitably highlight the multidimensional nature of the notion 
of quality of work and employment. Eurofound (2002 and 2012), for example, 
suggested a model with four dimensions: wages, the quality of the working 
contract, working time, and the intrinsic quality of the work (skills develop-
ment, physical environment, social environment, work intensity). For their 
part, Francis Green (2006), Andrew Brown et al. (2007) and Francis Green and 
Tarek Mostafa (2012) have highlighted the content of work, working conditions 
and conditions of employment (including wages). The Laeken indicators, in-
troduced by the European Union in 2001, are based on a set of ten dimensions 
that cover the labour market, working conditions and social policies (Davoine 
et al., 2008). The concept of ‘decent work’—developed by the ilo—focuses 
more on labour law, social protection and social justice, all themes consistent 
with the global reach of the ilo’s work (Ghai, 2003). Many other studies have 
proposed definitions and indices relating to the quality of work, including 
 Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo et al. (2009), Holman and  McClelland (2011), and the 
 European Trade Union Institute (Leschke and Watt, 2008) and its Job Qual-
ity Index (jqi). This academic effervescence has highlighted the multidimen-
sional nature of the concept, but also the fact that it lies at the crossroads of 
research, public policies and ethics. Quality of work remains difficult to define 
because the different social players do not agree on any of its many compo-
nents, and this definition involves a certain conception of work.
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Thus, the fact that European politicians have chosen to favour the concept 
of job quality rather than that of decent work is not just a question of seman-
tics. Prieto and Serrano Pascual (2014) saw this decision as a way of depoliti-
cising the social question. Naming a social fact contributes to producing it as 
a political phenomenon. Therefore, treating work from the point of view of 
dignity or decency rather than of quality reflects, in the view of these authors, 
a shift from the notion of justice to that of efficiency. The political issues as-
sociated with this shift in perspective are important. The concept of decent 
work is based on a vision of social justice and involves a certain moral judge-
ment. Born of the desire for social reformism that prevailed at the end of the 
nineteenth century—at the time of the invention of the welfare state and in 
the wake of the workers’ movements—the idea of decent work comes with 
a normative ambition: to develop the social rights of work and workers. In 
contrast, the fuzzy, relative, and multidimensional concept of job quality is 
closely related to its economic effects on productivity and profitability. In the 
European strategy, improving the quantity and quality of jobs is the element 
needed to connect a competitive economy with greater social cohesion. The 
‘quality’ promoted and recommended refers, in essence, to the application 
of good practices. For Prieto and Serrano Pascual, the notion of job quality— 
unlike that of decent work—tends to dissociate the issue of ‘good work’ from 
the social question and to favour a ‘logic of recommendations of good practice’ 
rather than the demanding of certain rights. The European Commission, in the 
authors’ view, has tried to replace ‘decent work’ with job quality; ‘decent work’ 
is more expensive to set up and much less compatible with its economic policy 
and its ideological frame of reference.
In the first decade of the new millennium, the theme of job quality spread 
beyond academia to become a matter of international economic policy, nota-
bly through the ilo’s ‘decent work’ agenda and the Lisbon Strategy of the EU. 
Between the end of the 1990s and 2003, the EU implemented a seemingly am-
bitious employment policy and social agenda through various directives and 
the European Employment Strategy (ees). In 2001, job quality became a goal of 
the ees in its own right. But the political initiatives for the quality of work and 
employment came up against the principles laid down by the Organisation for 
Economic and Co-operation and Development (oecd) and subsequently by 
the European Commission, with the aim of placing competition at the heart of 
the European project. After the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy carried 
out in 2004 by Wim Kok, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, the notion 
of flexicurity finally overshadowed the notion of quality of work.
In 2007, the European Commission published a communication entitled 
‘Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through 
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 flexibility and security’ (European Commission, 2007). It defined flexicurity 
as ‘an integrated strategy to enhance, at the same time, flexibility and secu-
rity in the labour market’ (European Commission, 2007, 10). The concept was 
appealing (Barbier, 2007; Serrano Pascual, 2008) because it allowed for the 
 reconciliation of opposites and could become an objective for all member 
states, regardless of the specificities and traditions of each one (the idea was 
that each country could follow its own ‘flexicurity course’ adapted to the par-
ticularities of its labour market). However, flexicurity has essentially remained 
a political slogan that has resulted in more flexibility but little security (Bevort 
et al., 2006; Serrano Pascual, 2012). After 2008, the EU, faced with economic 
recession, abandoned its social objectives, including the quality of work.
With its ‘Europe 2020’ strategy (a growth strategy for Europe in the 2010s), 
the Commission focused on poverty at the expense of job quality, at the risk 
of allowing the latter to be drowned out by the issue of impoverished workers 
(Bothfeld and Leschke, 2012) and thus reducing employment to its instrumen-
tal dimension of ensuring livelihood and security of existence. The growing 
inequalities in Europe relegated the concern for job quality to the background. 
In a Europe deprived of a social project, the Commission has recently decided 
to implement an ambitious project for a European Pillar of Social Rights aimed 
at ensuring the proper functioning of labour markets and social protection sys-
tems. The future will tell whether putting working conditions back at the top of 
European priorities will actually improve the lot of workers.
2.2 A New Perspective: So-called Sustainable Work
In a context of demographic ageing, longer working lives, and the development 
of contemporary work-related ills, including musculoskeletal and psychosocial 
disorders, a new approach to working conditions has gradually moved out of 
the scientific field and into the the political realm: long-term or sustainable 
work. This concept, which seemingly replaces that of quality of work, origi-
nated in the notion of sustainable development, defined in the Brundtland 
Report as follows: it is development that ‘meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(S, 1987, 39, para. 49). This approach has been applied to the way companies 
operate, and in particular to the nature of work.
The concept of sustainable work was born within the Swedish research pro-
gramme saltsa,1 more specifically in the framework of the international re-
search project ‘From intensive to sustainable work systems’ coordinated, from 
1 The saltsa programme is a joint undertaking by the Swedish confederation of employ-
ees (LO, saco and tco) and Sweden’s National Institute for Working Life (now closed), 
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1996 to 2007, by the National Institute for Working Life (niwl) in collabora-
tion with labour organisations. The first studies produced by the researchers 
involved—who came from thirteen countries and eight scientific disciplines 
(including management sciences, ergonomics, sociology, software design, 
psychology and educational sciences)—were synthesised in a reference work 
entitled ‘Creating Sustainable Work Systems’ (Docherty et al., 2002). In this 
document, the notion of a sustainable work system refers to a system that can 
‘maintain and reproduce the given human and social resources or even extend 
them’ (Docherty et al., 2002, 101), a definition consistent with a logic similar to 
that of the Brundtland Report.
Thus, unlike the so-called intensive work system, the sustainable work sys-
tem must be able to regenerate and develop the human and social resources 
that it mobilises. When that reference work was being written, the intensive 
system seemed inadequate, since the organisation of work and the way in 
which the companies associated with it operated were putting increasing pres-
sure on an ageing workforce. The field of reflection and action on sustainable 
work arose from these contradictory pressures.
The concept of a sustainable work system was originally sociotechnical in 
nature (Barisi, 2011). It was part of a vision that from the outset posited hu-
man activities as a place where human, social and environmental factors could 
overlap and the technical and ecological resources of the system be integrated 
into questions of well-being at work and of human resources (physical, cog-
nitive, emotional and social). Subsequently, ergonomists and sociologists—
among others—took it up and reformulated it from the problem of ageing at 
work (Gollac et al., 2008), a process in the course of which it lost its socio-
technical component. Moving into the scientific field, the concept of a sustain-
able work system gave birth to a reflection on the notion of sustainable work, 
which resulted in a refocusing on the quality of work, in all its dimensions, 
and a strengthening of the notion of individuals’ trajectories. The approach to 
sustainable work therefore involves taking into account the effects of working 
conditions—cumulative over time—and their relationship with private life in 
the long term. It combines the analysis of work and the focus on individuals 
as a whole, with all their characteristics, their trajectories and the constraints 
that weigh on them. In particular, this approach guided the creation of the 
Eurofound Work Programme 2013–16 as well as the 2016–17 campaign of the 
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) entitled ‘Healthy 
Workplaces for All Ages’.
a  government agency for the conduct of research, development and educational work on 
work-life issues.
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The proponents of this new perspective still faced two conceptual chal-
lenges: agreeing on a definition of the quality of work and integrating the dy-
namic dimension of individuals’ trajectories. These issues are both conceptual 
and strategic. The definition of the quality of work is being discussed in dif-
ferent scientific disciplines and in debates between public decision makers. 
And while the need to take into account the dynamic dimension of individual 
trajectories seems to be unanimously recognised, the operationalisation of 
this perspective is a complex scientific challenge and its implementation will 
require new approaches. The fraught national debates on arduous work ac-
counts2 reflect the difficulties in realising this perspective.
The authors of a report entitled ‘Sustainable work and the ageing workforce’ 
(Vendramin et al., 2012) include in their analysis framework a set of variables 
aimed at a better understanding of the sustainability of work. To the tradi-
tional parameters defining the quality of work (Eurofound, 2002), they add 
health variables and more subjective components connected with the relation 
to work. Their analytical framework, shown in Figure 13.1 in the form of a daisy-
shaped graph, includes five axes:
2 For further information on arduous work accounts see the website https://www.eurofound 
.europa.eu/publications/article/2017/france-occupational-personal-accounts-take-effect 


























Figure 13.1 Work Sustainability from the Perspective of Ageing
Source: vendramin et al. (2012).
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– socio-economic security: job status and job security;
– working conditions: changes in work, exposure to risks, non-standard work-
ing time, flexibility, work pace and emotional pressure;
– health: physical health, psychological health and indicators of perceived 
health;
– the expressive dimension of work: autonomy, work content, job satisfaction, 
recognition, skills development and the social environment;
– the balance between working/non-working time: the balance between work 
and non-work commitments and arrangements relating to working time 
arrangements.
The following section provides an analysis of working conditions in Europe 
and their evolution along these five axes.
3 The Evolution of Working Conditions: A Halftone Portrait
The five-year Eurofound survey on working conditions is a valuable source 
of information on the evolution of working conditions in Europe, thanks to 
the richness of its questionnaire, the extent of its geographical coverage and 
the longevity of the arrangements that have underpinned it (since 1991). This 
section, structured along the five axes of sustainable work, includes some of 
its key indicators relating to the state of working conditions in Europe and 
their evolution over 25 years. It reports the data for the 28 EU countries (out 
of the 35 countries analysed in the survey)—that is to say, the result of 29,719 
face-to-face interviews with employees and 5,491 with the self-employed (out 
of the 43,850 conducted for the entire survey). Unless otherwise indicated, all 
the data mentioned below relate exclusively to employees and come from the 
 European Working Conditions Survey (ewcs) (Eurofound, 2016).
To account for the significant trends in Europe, we have deliberately favoured 
European averages, even though these may conceal significant  disparities be-
tween countries, regions or groups of workers. This chapter is not intended to 
report systematically on these intra-European disparities.
3.1 Diffuse Growth of Socio-Economic Insecurity
Various indicators can testify to the socio-economic insecurity affecting the 
working population, including the four mentioned below.
The first is the form of the employment contract that binds employees to 
their employers. The fixed-term contract, the temping agency contract and 
those contracts that embody all the other statuses involve a finite period of 
work and, often, less access to the protection and social benefits to which the 
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standard full-time contract of indefinite length gives entitlement (coverage in 
case of sickness or invalidity, unemployment benefit, maternity leave, etc.).
According to the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (eurostat 2016), tempo-
rary contracts accounted for 14 per cent of total employment in the EU-28 in 
2016, but 32 per cent for the under-30s. A total of 62 per cent of the people 
concerned accepted these contracts because they could not find a permanent 
job. Part-time employment, which grew steadily, affected one in five European 
employees in the same year, but this figure concealed large disparities between 
countries and by sex. In addition, a large majority of young people entered 
the labour market through atypical employment. According to the 2015 ewcs 
survey, only 60 per cent of employees under 30 years of age were in permanent 
employment.
In 2015, 16 per cent of European employees lived in fear of losing their job 
during the next six months (11 per cent of employees on permanent contracts, 
but this figure was 43 per cent for employees on fixed-term contracts and 32 
per cent for employees with other contractual arrangements). This indicator of 
socio-economic insecurity increased by three percentage points between 2005 
and 2015. A number of prospective studies (Dickerson and Green, 2009; Green, 
2015) have shown that, in most cases, it heralded significant job losses.
The second indicator is the number of employees who feel it would be dif-
ficult for them to find a job as well-paid as their current job, should they lose it. 
In 2015, almost half of employees expressed this feeling.
The third determinant of socio-economic insecurity, and arguably the most 
telling one, is the level of remuneration. The proportion of employees classi-
fied as in the lowest income quintile3 in 2015 was 13 per cent for permanent 
employees, but 31 per cent for fixed-term employees and 57 per cent for em-
ployees holding other types of contracts.
Finally, the fourth indicator is the proportion of workers’ households that 
report having difficulties in ‘making ends meet’—more than a third of the 
people at work in 20154 (35 per cent, as against 38 per cent in 2010). These per-
ceived economic difficulties were more common among employees with fixed-
term contracts (48 per cent) or other contractual arrangements (52 per cent) 
than among permanent contract holders (31 per cent). According to the latest 
Benchmarking Europe report (etui, 2017), the number of poor workers5 in 
3 In all, 20 per cent of those surveyed refused to answer this question: if we are to believe some 
of the multifarious analyses of these non-respondents, the incomes noted by the ewcs are 
too low.
4 The expression ‘people at work’ designates employees and the self-employed.
5 ‘Poor workers’ are persons who have worked throughout most of the reference year but who 
live in a household whose income per unit of consumption falls under the threshold of the 
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Europe is growing (nearly one in ten workers in 2017), particularly among the 
self-employed, those with low qualifications (International Standard Classifi-
cation of Education [isced] 0–2) and employees on temporary or part-time 
contracts. In addition, new forms of insecure employment will arise from the 
advent of the digital economy and the rapid proliferation of ‘small jobs’ avail-
able online (Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016), a phenomenon that Ursula Huws 
(2003) has described as the ‘cybertariat’.
Flexicurity thus seems not to have kept all its promises in the European 
Union. The employees most exposed to socio-economic insecurity are the 
holders of fixed-term contracts and, even more, the holders of so-called ‘atypi-
cal’ contracts, employees with low seniority, agricultural workers and those 
in ‘basic’ occupations, part-time employees, women—more than men—and 
older workers.
3.2 Working Conditions
The notion of working conditions has widened as certain aspects of working 
life have become more visible, were removed from the ‘naturalness of work’ 
and taken into consideration. Exposure to risk, non-standard working hours 
and work intensity will be covered here.
The health and safety policies of the member states of the European Union 
have long sought to eliminate—either totally or by substitution—the risks, in 
particular the physical risks, likely to harm workers’ health. But, as can be seen 
in Figure 13.2, technical progress and the spread of new technologies have not 
removed these physical risks from various work environments.
In 10 years, only exposure to tobacco smoke has changed significantly (11 per 
cent lower). Musculoskeletal disorders have spread. They now affect millions 
of workers and cost employers billions of euros (Eurofound, 2016). These disor-
ders result from physical factors—such as repetitive movements, heavy loads, 
frequent bending and twisting, exposure to cold, and insufficient time for re-
covery—but also from certain psychosocial factors (da Costa and Viera, 2010).
The occupational groups most exposed to physical hazards are machine op-
erators, manual workers and those in basic occupations. All other occupations 
are exposed to some of the most common physical hazards that, along with 
stress, can cause musculoskeletal disorders. For example, about half of man-
agers, professionals and technicians (International Standard Classification of 
Occupations [isco] 1) say that they perform repetitive movements with their 
risk of poverty, fixed at 60 per cent of the median income. See the website http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_statistics_on_income_and_living_conditions 
_(EU-SILC)_methodology_-_in-work_poverty (accessed on 31 July 2018).
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hands or arms for at least a quarter of their working time. In addition, more 
than 25 per cent of them say they have to adopt painful or tiring positions 
for more than a quarter of their working time. Workers in the services sector, 
meanwhile, have an exposure equal to or above the European average.
The fact that service and office activities also involve exposure to physical 
risks shows the need to continue to develop physical facilities in all work envi-
ronments and to implement preventive programmes based on the actual activ-
ity of workers as a whole. In some work settings where activity is particularly 
intense, workers are not always able to adopt the safest behaviours. They may 
choose the quickest option, even if it is more ‘dangerous’.
In addition, some practices related to working time—long and irregular 
schedules and overtime, and schedules that are difficult to control or are un-
predictable—may pose a health risk while others, such as flexibility when tai-
lored to staff needs, provide real room for manoeuvre. These time factors can 
predict a poor balance between private and professional life. Atypical sched-
ules may, however, be suitable for some people for personal reasons, and to 
others at certain stages of their lives.
Due to the increase in part-time work and the decrease in long hours, the av-
erage number of working hours has decreased. The number of people working 
long hours (more than 48 hours per week) decreased between 2005 and 2015, 
from 19 per cent to 16 per cent. Likewise, only 32 per cent of people at work said 
they had working days of at least 10 hours in 2015, compared to 36 per cent in 
2005. But 23 per cent said they had, at least once during the previous month, 
worked two days in succession separated by a break of less than 11 hours.
Shift work is on the rise (four percentage points more in 10 years), as are 
working Sundays (two percentage points more, notably due to legislative 
Figure 13.2 Exposure to Physical Risks
Source: eurofound (2016).
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changes related to stores’ opening hours). In addition, employees are working 
frequently on Saturdays—52 per cent had worked on a Saturday at least once 
in the month prior to the survey. Night work is practised at least once a month 
by 19 per cent of people at work.
In the majority of cases (56 per cent of people at work and 64 per cent of 
employees), the hours worked are determined by the employers—a figure un-
changed for ten years. In all, 9 per cent of people at work (10 per cent of em-
ployees) can choose from several schedules and nearly 20 per cent of them can 
adapt their schedules. Only 7 per cent of employees (and 16 per cent of people 
at work) can choose their working hours freely. In seven out of ten cases, work-
ing hours do not change; 13 per cent of people at work have work schedules 
that change the same day or the day before; and 12 per cent of them can be 
called to work with very little prior notice.
Very regular schedules (i.e. working the same number of hours per day, the 
same number of hours per week and the same number of days per week with 
fixed times for the beginning and end of the day) involve just under half of em-
ployees (a little over a third of employees with atypical contracts). Work dur-
ing one’s free time is frequent: 19 per cent of European employees now work 
in their free time several times a month (and several times a week in 8 per 
cent of cases) to meet the requirements of their jobs. This figure conceals large 
disparities according to professional profiles: more than a third of the most 
highly-qualified white-collar workers see their free time encroached upon.
Finally, there is an increase in workload, and especially in the intensity of 
work. Employees have to work faster, carry out more demanding tasks, and 
have jobs that are richer in emotions: so they must reconcile a diverse set of 
factors regulating the pace of work, thus adding operational constraints and 
complicating their task. Especially over long periods, these new constraints 
have adverse consequences for the health and well-being of workers. Accord-
ing to the ewcs survey, 37 per cent of employees work ‘to tight deadlines’ and 
34 per cent ‘at high speed’ for more than three quarters of their working time 
(figures that have not decreased since 2005). In addition, numerous epidemi-
ological studies have shown that workers subjected to very intense activities 
have an increased risk of health problems (cardiovascular diseases, musculo-
skeletal disorders, depression, etc.), especially when they have to meet multi-
ple demands while having limited autonomy and little support (Karasek, 1979; 
Karasek and Theorell, 1992; Siegriest, 1996).
3.3 More Expressive Expectations, Not Necessarily Satisfied
The instrumental component of work—security and income—remains essen-
tial, but professional activity has become a vector of social connection and the 
site of strong expressive expectations: to blossom in one’s work, to develop 
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one’s skills, to be recognised, to find meaning in one’s work, to do useful work, 
etc. (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Mercure and Vultur, 2010; Bigi et al., 2015; Méda 
and Vendramin, 2016). These expectations of development and personal fulfil-
ment in work have become increasingly important since the 1950s. This rela-
tive effacement of the instrumental and painful dimension of work in favour 
of another dimension, more related to the activity itself and its consequences 
for the individual, took place in two stages. It was theorised in the nineteenth 
century (notably by Hegel and Marx) and came to fruition in the second half 
of the twentieth century, when the conditions for its implementation were 
met (Lalive d’Epinay, 1994). According to Christian Lalive d’Epinay, two essen-
tial events marked the history of the disappearance of the ethos of duty: on 
the one hand, the development of the welfare state and the idea that it is in-
cumbent upon it to guarantee the well-being of its citizens, and, on the other 
hand—and above all—the explosion of economic growth that suddenly made 
accessible the utopia of work–pleasure; that is to say, the transformation of tri-
palium or work–duty into an instrument of self-realisation and self-expression. 
In this shift from an ethic of duty to an ethic of fulfilment, Lalive d’Epinay 
sees a fundamental reversal: society is now at the service of the fulfilment of 
individuals who, before, found self-realisation in carrying out the mission with 
which society had entrusted them.
Some of the indicators in the ewcs survey relate to this expressive compo-
nent of work: the use and development of employees’ skills, autonomy and the 
social environment. The majority of European employees report that their job 
gives them job satisfaction (80 per cent) and have the feeling of doing useful 
work (84 per cent). But 16 per cent of them do not feel that they receive the 
recognition they deserve for their work and only 38 per cent think they have 
career prospects.
In these times of flexicurity and uncertainty, employees doubt their profes-
sional future and attach great importance to being able to use and develop 
their skills. Thus, 71 per cent of them say that their job involves learning new 
things, but this is not the case for the remaining 29 per cent. Nearly half of 
employees (46 per cent) say they perform monotonous tasks, but just as many 
feel they can apply their own ideas into their work (27 per cent sometimes and 
25 per cent never).
Life-long training is a European issue in the ‘Education and Training 2020’ 
strategic framework. The survey shows that 41 per cent of employees received 
training paid for by their employers during the previous 12 months. The most 
qualified of them have access to more and longer-term training.
In terms of autonomy, the situations are contrasted. About 65 per cent of 
employees can choose or change the order of the tasks they have to perform, 
their working speed and the methods applied. Only a quarter of them have a 
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say in choosing their colleagues. The participation of employees in decisions 
concerning the organisational aspects that concern them remains limited: 44 
per cent of them are consulted prior to their objectives being set; 44 per cent 
are involved in improving the organisation and work processes of their depart-
ment; and 41 per cent have an influence on the important decisions that con-
cern them.
Only a third of employees are autonomous in the performance of their tasks 
and also have the opportunity to be heard and to contribute to the develop-
ment of the organisation. Conversely, 34 per cent have no opportunity to ex-
ercise their autonomy and contribute to the development of the organisation. 
The situation in this area is therefore still far from optimal.
Work can also be an opportunity to meet new people and belong to a pro-
fessional community. In most cases, this experience is positive. But sometimes 
it is less so, especially when people at work are victims of certain forms of 
violence, when they are not supported by their colleagues or their superiors, or 
when they are placed under the authority of a manager unable or unwilling to 
help and encourage them.
For more than two-thirds of employees, the social climate in which they 
operate is positive: 69 per cent say that employees generally trust their man-
agement, 71 per cent say that conflicts are resolved in a fair way, 73 per cent feel 
that the work is distributed equitably and 82 per cent feel that management 
trusts the employees to do their job well. Finally, 89 per cent of employees say 
they work well with their colleagues.
Many employees benefit from social support within the company if a prob-
lem arises: 72 per cent of them say they have—always or nearly always—the 
support of their colleagues, while 58 per cent say they are supported by their 
superior in the hierarchy. They feel respected by the latter in nine out of ten 
cases; but 5 per cent of employees say they are never or almost never respected 
by this same superior. About seven out of ten employees appreciate the tech-
nical skills of their manager: 66 per cent feel that their superior is helpful in 
getting the job done better; 70 per cent say that their supervisor provides use-
ful feedback on their work; 71 per cent say they are congratulated and recog-
nised by their supervisor when they do a good job; and 73 per cent report that 
their superior is successful in getting people to work together. Just under seven 
in ten (68 per cent) feel encouraged and supported by their manager in their 
professional development. But this figure should not overshadow the fact that 
more than three in ten employees say they are poorly managed.
3.4 Health Indicators Revealing the Ageing Labour Force
The sixth ewcs survey provides a number of indicators on the perceived 
health and subjective well-being of workers based on the who-5 World Health 
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Organization index.6 This index assesses different aspects (positive mood, vi-
tality and general interest) to calculate a score between 0 and 100. On average, 
the subjective well-being of workers is quite high in Europe (68 points out of 
100). But a quarter of European employees (25 per cent) say that their health 
is threatened by their work; 41 per cent suffer from muscle pain in the shoul-
ders, neck and/or upper limbs and 29 per cent from muscle pain in their lower 
limbs. The impact of working conditions on the health of workers is a signifi-
cant cost to the company and the community.
Numerous other indicators measure the prevalence of certain symptoms 
(including sleep disorders, general fatigue, anxiety and stress) and provide a 
better understanding of how these disorders relate to certain organisational 
or occupational characteristics. Thus, 35 per cent of European employees suf-
fered from general fatigue during the twelve months preceding the survey, 18 
per cent from insomnia or sleep disorders (several times a week) and 15 per 
cent from anxiety. More women than men suffer from general fatigue, insom-
nia and sleep disorders. A significant proportion of European employees also 
report having been confronted with stress in the course of their work: almost 
10 per cent ‘always’, 17 per cent ‘most of the time’, 40 per cent ‘sometimes’, 20 
per cent ‘rarely’ and 13 per cent ‘never’. More than one in four employees state 
that they are regularly exposed to stress in the course of their work. Exposure 
to stress differs with occupation. It is frequent in management functions (34 
per cent) as well as in the category of professionals7 (29 per cent), among plant 
and machine operators (29 per cent) and among service workers and techni-
cians, as well as clerks8 (26 per cent). Disparities between countries are also 
significant.
This survey highlights the fact that lack of time to do one’s job is one of 
the main factors of stress. European employees who say they ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ 
have the time necessary to perform their work (55 per cent) also report being 
regularly confronted with stress in their jobs. Only 27 per cent of European em-
ployees say they have always enough time to do their jobs. It should be noted 
6 For more information on the index, see the website https://www.psykiatri-regionh.dk/who-5/ 
who-5-questionnaires/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 31 July 2018).
7 This category includes the professions of engineering, architecture, research, management, 
marketing, IT, law, social sciences, culture, media; artists, doctors, nursing managers, chem-
ists, dentists, paramedics, and those involved in any of the levels of education including 
training outside of the school environment.
8 This category includes those working in accounting, finance, property, commercial services, 
specialised secretaries, social workers, customs inspectors, those working in tax, the police, 
sports, arts and leisure activities; technicians in industry, in laboratory work, in transport, 
supervisors, inspectors, ict and media technicians; technicians and assistants in medicine 
and the paramedical domain, nurses and midwives, and health officials.
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that employees in structures that experienced significant restructuring or re-
organisation during the three years preceding the survey were more likely to 
report being exposed to stress on a regular basis. The same phenomenon is 
observed in those who have recently experienced the implementation of new 
processes or new technologies or who report a feeling of insecurity in their 
jobs. Employees who fear losing their jobs in the next six months are thus more 
likely to declare themselves exposed to stress in their work.
Finally, the retention of older workers—which is essential for European 
economies—is highly dependent on working conditions. Based on 2010 data 
from the ewcs survey, the Eurofound report shows that the retention of the 
oldest employees in working life is strongly correlated with working conditions 
(Vendramin et al., 2012). The most unfavourable factors for such retention are a 
rapid pace of work, exposure to physical risks, painful postures, night work or 
shift work, a lack of balance between work and personal life, and, finally, being 
confronted with aggressive behaviour or harassment.
3.5 The Return of a Balance between Work and Private Life
For several decades, the work–life balance, formerly known as the work–fam-
ily balance, has been a recurring theme on the job scene. This new term has 
not been chosen at random: the notion of balance questions work itself. The 
idea of work–family balance was essentially aimed at adapting private life to 
work—that is to say, supporting workers in their private lives so as to enable 
them to carry out their professional activities. This issue is again on the agenda 
in a context in which workers—especially the youngest of them—have a new 
relationship with their work.
Dominique Méda and Patricia Vendramin (2016) conducted a large-scale 
research project in six European countries,9 in which they highlighted conver-
gences in the development of the work relationship. Two of these convergen-
ces relate directly to this quest for balance between work and private life. First, 
there is a rejection of the hegemonic place given to work and a desire to tackle 
projects in various fields. If work remains an important value for  Europeans, 
9 SPReW (Social patterns of relationship to work/Intergenerational dimensions in changing 
relations to work). European research carried out under the 6th Framework Programme for 
Research of the European Union. The research brought together eight partners and six coun-
tries (Germany, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy and Portugal) from June 2006 to  September 
2008. It drew inter alia on a qualitative approach (150 narrative interviews and 18 group in-
terviews in total) conducted in the six countries as well as on quantitative data from inter-
national (European Value Survey [evs], European Social Survey [ess], International Social 
 Survey Programme [issp]) and national surveys. For more information, see the website 
http://www.ftu-namur.org/sprew (accessed on 19 June 2018).
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they also express the wish to be able to flourish in other spheres of life that 
all contribute to the building of their identity—family in particular, but also 
friends, hobbies, social life and civic life. For both women and men, the he-
gemony of labour–value has given way to a multi-centred conception of life: 
this development makes it all the more necessary to redefine the modalities of 
the balance between professional life and private life—especially for expens-
es relating to care. Méda and Vendramin highlighted an increasing closeness 
between male and female models of commitment to work, particularly obvi-
ous in the case of younger generations of workers. This phenomenon could 
be defined as a feminisation of the masculine model coupled with a mascu-
linisation of the feminine model. In their relation to work, young men seem 
more guided by expressive aims and by changes in the perception of their role 
as fathers. Despite a still very unequal division of roles, this new engagement 
of men in the family increases with the level of education of the male part-
ner as well as in families where both partners are active. In addition, young 
women—who, on average, have a higher level of education than their male 
counterparts—are seeking to become fully engaged in working life and no lon-
ger perceive themselves as providing supplementary wages. Young women are 
increasingly building their social identity from their work. This convergence of 
gender models in the work relationship—especially for young graduates—is 
an incentive for human resources managers to question the retention of young 
graduates and to take into account the new types of compromises that young 
male executives are willing to make in order to balance working and family life.
According to the ewcs survey, 82 per cent of employees feel their work 
hours fit in with family or social commitments outside of work. This propor-
tion has changed little since 2005. The remaining 18 per cent believe, on the 
contrary, that their working hours do not suit their private lives, but this fig-
ure conceals large disparities between countries. A total of 63 per cent of em-
ployees can easily come to an arrangement with their employer involving an 
hour or two’s work when family reasons are concerned. In the remaining 37 per 
cent, we more commonly find employees with long working days (48 hours a 
week or more), those who take work home and those working nights, shifts or 
weekends.
Conflicts between private and professional life have negative consequences 
for both workers and companies: the employees concerned can suffer a de-
terioration in their psychological balance and health, and they may also be 
less involved in their work. According to the survey, around 20 per cent of em-
ployees say they are too tired to carry out the necessary household chores. In 
addition, 12 per cent of them think about their work during their free time and 
11 per cent say they cannot spend as much time as they would like with their 
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families because of their work. Importantly, family problems seem to weigh 
less heavily on work than work-related problems do on the family. Only 3 per 
cent of employees say they have difficulty concentrating on their work because 
of family responsibilities or have not spent as much time as they wanted to 
at work because of family responsibilities. Finally, a good balance between 
work and private life is also a factor in keeping older workers in employment 
 (Vendramin et al., 2012).
4 Sustainable Work: A Desirable Horizon?
These data on current working conditions in Europe need to be put into per-
spective, especially by taking into account the significance of work in our West-
ern societies. Dominique Méda and Patricia Vendramin (2016) have attempted 
to interpret, in a historical and comparative perspective, the contemporary 
meaning of work. They have identified three types of worker-specific expecta-
tions, which are the result of historical developments that cannot be discussed 
here,10 but which shape the current relationship to work. First, work must en-
sure the security of existence. These so-called instrumental expectations make 
it a means to an end—to provide income and security. Second, work is a pro-
vider of social links. It is important to develop quality social relationships with 
colleagues, the hierarchy and other partners in the activity—subcontractors, 
customers or users. Finally, work must satisfy the expressive expectations of 
workers, their need to develop and flourish in their professional activity. Rec-
ognition, meaningful work, learning and sense of purpose: the labour force 
aspires to all these factors of well-being, now that it is overall better trained 
and partly relieved of the weight of the instrumental component of labour 
thanks to the development of the welfare state since the post-war years. These 
expressive expectations come up against often unsuitable modes of organisa-
tion. Therefore, the process of redefining working conditions must impera-
tively take into account this dissatisfaction and reconnect the world of work 
and its changing nature to the expectations of Europeans. Indeed, the desire 
to create jobs without regard to their quality and to promote all-round flexibil-
ity is currently threatening social cohesion in Europe, increasing inequalities 
and undermining the well-being of the population in most European states. 
Therefore, social justice and inclusive development must follow other routes. 
10 For the historical developments, see Méda and Vendramin, 2016, pp. 7–47.
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Thanks to the twenty key principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights,11 
job quality has returned to the public arena. The European Commission en-
courages permanent employment, social dialogue and worker participation, 
healthy and adapted workplaces, secure employment for a fair wage, and fi-
nally a balance between professional life and private life.
Sustainable work is a desirable horizon for Europe, insofar as it is likely to 
underlie a multidimensional approach to quality of work that will take into 
account working individuals as a whole, with their characteristics, their con-
straints and their trajectories. The ilo could also choose this direction, which 
is already reflected in the many points raised during the national dialogues on 
the future of work (ilo, 2017). Moreover, since the concept of sustainable work 
initially brought together two issues—that is to say, sustainable development 
and working systems—it could probably be used to combine the priorities of 
sustainable development and decent work. It could also contribute to a reaffir-
mation of the humanistic and social principles of the Declaration of Philadel-
phia (ilo, 1944) and lead us to a society in which ‘labour is not a commodity’ 
and in which ‘all human beings […] have the right to pursue both their mate-
rial well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and 
dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity’ (ilo, 1944, Article ii(a)).
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